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ABSTRACT!
My!dissertation!explores!the!Platonic!and!medieval!roots!of!a!philosophical!

conception!of!negation!that!finds!its!full!expression!in!Hegel’s!dialectic.!I!set!out!the!
basic!features!of!this!conception!and!defend!it!against!the!prevailing!Fregean!treatment!
of!negation!as,!in!effect,!a!semantic!switch,!i.e.,!one!that!converts!true!to!false,!and!false!
to!true.!According!to!the!Hegelian!conception,!negation!is!both!what!opens!up!the!
predicative*interval,!the!logical!space!between!subject!and!predicate,!and!what!guides!
the!determination!of!concepts!through!the!judgments!in!which!they!are!employed.!As!
such,!negation!is!the!fundamental!engine!of!discursive!thought!and!expression.!
I!argue!that!this!conception!originates!with!Plato,!who!rescues!negation!from!the!
extensional!semantics!of!names!and!the!corresponding!bivalent!metaphysics!of!being!
and!nonGbeing.!With!Boethius!the!vital!role!of!negation!is!denied,!and!indeed!forgotten,!
although!he!retains!a!formal!sense!of!its!original,!propositional!setting.!It!is!Hegel,!
however,!who!recognizes!in!negation!the!ground!of!concepts,!inference!and!truth.!
Plato’s!recasting!of!negation!as!difference!also!underpins!the!traditional!Aristotelian!and!
scholastic!treatment!of!differentiae!and!is!tied!to!a!view!of!concepts!(and!kinds)!as!
hierarchically!determined,!and!to!a!method!for!mapping!out!this!hierarchy,!i.e.,!the!
method*or!science*of*division.!This!method!is!introduced!by!Plato,!developed!by!Aristotle,!
institutionalized!by!Boethius,!and!reconceived!in!Hegel’s!Logic.!
vi!
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INTRODUCTION!
THE!DISCOURSE!OF!NEGATION!
Section(One.(Philosophy(and(Negation(
!

Negation,!like!being,!is!said!in!many!ways.!Indeed,!properly!understood,!it!is!

never!not!said.!This!remains!true!despite!the!fact!that,!unlike!being,!it!is!rarely!spoken!of!
at!all,!and!what!little!philosophical!attention!is!historically!granted!it!is!largely!devoted!
to!marginalizing!its!use!or!registering!its!logical,!metaphysical!or!ethical!shortcomings.!
Aristotle!associates!it!with!indeterminacy,!Augustine,!in!a!crucial!setting,!with!privation,!
and!in!particular!the!privation!of!good!(privatio*boni),!and!so!evil,!and!Duns!Scotus!
observes!that!it!is!derivative!(and!so!in!principle!dispensable),!insisting!that!it!is!"clear!
that!we!can!know!negations…only!through!affirmations,!since!negation!is!not!intelligible!
except!through!affirmation,”!and!indeed!that!negative!predicates!are!always!reducible!
to!positive!ones.1!He!elsewhere!adds!to!his!list!of!reasons!against!the!possibility!of!
knowing!God,!or!anything!else,!through!negation,!the!observation!that!"we!do!not!love!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

!Duns!Scotus,!Philosophical*Writings,!trans.!Allan!Wolter!(Indianapolis:!Hackett!Publishing!Company,!
1987),!15.!
!

1!

!

2!

negations!to!the!highest!degree,"2!a!consideration!that!presumably!holds!sway!because!
God!is!the!most!proper!object!of!our!love.!
This!same!disregard!for!negation!is!expressed!by,!amongst!others,!Schelling,!
Henri!Bergson3!and,!under!the!acknowledged!influence!of!Scotus!and!Bergson,!Gilles!
Deleuze.!Whilst!for!the!former!it!is!associated!with!the!inaccessibility!of!a!transcendent!
metaphysics,!for!Deleuze!and!Deleuzians!the!issue!is!pointedly!socio[political!as!well![!
not!is!the!ensign!of!despotic!prohibition!and!territorialization.!Negation!is!also,!of!
course,!associated!with!denial,!rejection!and!prohibition,!and!has!the!broader!cultural!
significance!of!moralism,!alienation,!nihilism,!non[being!and!death.!Nowhere!is!its!
philosophical!marginality!more!emphatically!declared!than!in!contemporary!analytic!
philosophy!where!it!is!left!to!the!perfunctory!catalogues!of!logical!expressions!with!
which!logic!textbooks!typically!begin![!following!Frege,!its!proper!use!is!defined!by!the!
prescriptions!of!formal!logic,!which!treats!negation!as!a!truth!function,!i.e.,!a!semantic!
switch,!so!to!speak,!that!converts!truth!values,!mapping!true!to!false*and!false*to!true.!
This!then!is!the!consensus!view!of!the!role!and!function!of!negation.!
Yet!even!if!marginalized,!negation!appears!to!be!an!ineliminable!component!of!
thinking!and!what!we!think!about,!and!although!this!on!its!own!need!not!confer!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

!Negationes*etiam*non*summe*amamus,!in!John!Duns!Scotus,!Ordinatio!1,!d.!3,!pars!1,!ed.!Vatican,!vol.!3,!
5,!n.10.!Aristotle!makes!a!related!claim!at!Metaphysics,!4.2.1003b!9[11.!!All!citations!of!the!Metaphysics!
are!from!Metaphysica,!ed.!W.!Jaeger!(Oxford:!Clarendon!Press,!1957),!and,!unless!otherwise!indicated,!all!
translations!of!this!text!are!my!own.!
!
3
!Bergson!defends!a!position!exactly!contrary!to!Frege’s,!arguing!that!negation!is!always!applied!to!rather!
than!being!a!part!of!the!content!of!a!proposition.!See!Henri!Bergson,!Creative*Evolution,!trans.!Arthur!
Mitchell!(Westport,!Conn.:!Greenwood!Press,!1975),!288.!

!

!

3!

philosophical!significance,!the!case!for!the!general!philosophical!interest!of!negation!is!
quite!compelling.!Without!some!notion!of!negation!it!would!seem!difficult,!for!example,!
to!understand!the!basic!logical!connectives!of!disjunction!and!implication!(e.g.,!to!
understand!their!connection!to!one!another),!or!the!fundamental!laws!of!non[
contradiction,!~(P&~P),!and!excluded!middle,!(Pv~P),!whether!these!are!construed!in!
logical!or!metaphysical!terms.!And,!on!the!other!hand,!the!non[being,!absence!or!
emptiness!associated!with!negation,!rather!than!depriving!negation!of!philosophical!
interest,!might!be!thought!of!as!recommending!its!study,!since!it!might!turn!out!that!it!is!
necessary!to!contend!with!such!deficits!as!irreducible!elements!of!the!world!we!
experience!or!because!they!ground!the!linguistic,!cognitive!or!evaluative!systems!we!use!
to!describe,!comprehend!or!assess!it.!More!specifically,!systematic!interruption,!
punctuation,!or!difference!might!turn!out!to!be!a!fundamental!condition!of!all!systems,!
be!they!grammatical,!conceptual,!logical,!psychological,!moral,!political!or!metaphysical,!
inasmuch!as!an!uninterrupted!expanse!of!grammatical,!conceptual!elements,!etc.,!is!
likely!inapprehensible,4!just!as!unbounded!enjoyment,!freedom,!affirmation,!or!
perception!is!likely!impracticable.!
!

Beyond!merely!conceding!a!place!for!it,!however,!there!is!also!a!philosophical!

tradition!that!accords!negation!a!fundamental!role!in!the!differentiation!and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

!It!should!be!noted!in!this!context!that!even!an,!in!principle,!uninterrupted!series!such!as!that!of!the!
irrational!numbers!is!only!made!intelligible!on!the!basis!of!an!interpolation!(a!Dedekind*cut)!into!the!
segmented!series!of!rationals.!Similarly,!a!string!of!morphemes!is!just!that,!an!already!segmented!series,!
not!a!continuous!stretch!of!undifferentiated!sound.!This!last!point!is!the!basis!of!Plato’s!presentation!of!
the!myth!of!the!Egyptian!God!Theuth’s!determination!of!the!elements!of!language!in!Plato’s!Philebus,!
18b6[d2.!See!Plato’s!Philebus,!trans.!J.!C.!B.!Gosling!(Oxford:!Clarendon!Press,!1975).!

!

!

4!

deployment!of!concepts,!and!in!accessing!the!kinds,!universals!and!particulars!to!which!
concepts!apply,!a!tradition!associated!with!Hegel,!in!whom!it!finds!its!most!complete!
development.!This!tradition!provides!the!logico[metaphysical!basis!for!the!more!limited,!
but!still!substantive,!application!of!negation!one!finds!in!a!number!of!other!vital!
philosophical!lines.!For!example,!in!the!main!lines!of!Neoplatonism!negation!takes!on!a!
more!strictly!metaphysical!character,!serving!primarily!as!a!causal!principle!governing!
the!grades!of!an!ontological!hierarchy.!A!similarly!circumscribed!view!of!negation!shows!
up!in!the!negative!theologies!of!Nicholas!of!Cusa,!Maimonides,!etc.,!which!likely!
descend!from!that!of!Pseudo[Dionysius.!The!via*negativa*that!frames!such!theologies,!
though!it!specifies!a!path!of!epistemic!ascent!rather!than!descent,!considers!negation!
with!regard!to!its!use!in!negative!predication,!and!this!exclusively!in!relation!to!the!
knowledge!and!description!of!God.!Because!such!knowledge!and!the!negative!form!it!
assumes!are!associated!with!God’s!attributes,!not!his!nature!or!essence,!here!negation!
is!not!thought!to!play!any!general!role!in!facilitating!conceptual!determination!or!
constraining!ontology.!
According!to!the!tradition!with!which!I!shall!be!concerned,!however,!such!
determination!is!precisely!the!role!played!by!negation,!and!in!the!domains!of!concept!
and!object!alike.5!The!aim!of!this!dissertation!is!to!shed!light!on!the!conception!of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

!The!claim!that!negation!plays!a!role!in!determining!not!just!concepts!themselves!but!their!extensions!is!
no!doubt!controversial,!and!will!have!to!be!left!to!emerge!in!the!course!of!the!dissertation,!as!the!crucial!
theme!of!the!metaphysical!basis!of!logic!is!developed.!Two!general!considerations!might!mitigate!the!
perhaps!counterintuitive!character!of!this!claim:!one,!that!the!extensions!of!our!concepts!can!only!be!
made!out!as!parcels!of!the!experienced!world!that!are!parceled!out,!so!to!speak,!by!these!very!concepts,!

!

!

5!

negation!underlying!this!tradition!and!thereby!to!defend!the!philosophical!significance!
of!negation!as!such.!The!route!I!take!is!that!of!philosophical!genealogy,6!which!though!it!
proceeds!chronologically,!aims!primarily!at!conceptual!rather!than!historical!
clarification.!That!is,!attention!to!the!historical!lineage!of!this!tradition!is!intended!to!
clarify!the!conception!of!negation!itself!and!to!establish!its!presuppositions,!cognates!
and!broader!philosophical!setting,!rather!than!to!trace!the!historical!lines!of!succession!
and!influence.!Furthermore,!a!complete!genealogy,!even!granted!these!constraints,!is!
impossible!within!the!limits!of!a!single!volume.!Thus!although!I!touch!on!other!figures!
within!this!lineage,!and!give!some!indication!of!how!it!continues!beyond!Hegel!in!20th!
century!and!contemporary!philosophy!on!both!sides!of!the!continental/analytic!divide,!
what!I!present!here!constitutes!the!mere!beginning!of!a!philosophical!study!of!negation.!
I!focus!on!the!three!signal!moments!of!this!lineage,!each!the!subject!of!a!
separate!chapter,!and!discussed!in!the!following!order:!i)!its!starting!point!in!Plato’s!
Sophist,!where!Plato!develops!a!method!of*logical!analysis!he!calls!division*(diairesis)!7!
and!connects!it!with!what!I!will!call!determinate*negation,8!that!is,!negation!as!a!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and!two,!that!the!more!abstract!objects!that!philosophers!typically!privilege!tend!to!cleave!rather!closely!
to!the!abstract!concepts!we!have!of!them,!inasmuch!as!they!are!defined!primarily!by!their!essential!
properties,!which!have!nothing!to!do!with!such!concrete!properties!as!place,!time,!position,!etc.,!through!
which!we!regularly!identify!mind[independent!particulars.!
!
6
!Philosophical!genealogy,!as!I!intend!it,!has!little!to!do!with!the!broader!ambitions!of!its!Nietzschean!or!
Foucauldian!models.!In!particular,!it!does!not!aspire!to!socio[political!critique!or!intervention.!
!
7
!Plato!regularly!mentions!Prodicus!as!his!predecessor!on!the!topic!of!division,!but!no!other!discussion!of!
the!method!exists!anywhere!before!Plato!and!it!is!clearly!Plato’s!model!that!Aristotle!and!the!succeeding!
traditions!follow.!
!

!

!

6!

differentiating!principle,!recast!as,!and!so!identified!with,!formal!difference!(to*heteron),!
and,!extensionally,!with!the!metaphysical!bounds!(perata)!of!being(s)!(Chapter!1);!ii)!its!
institutionalization!by!Boethius,!who!in!his!De*Divisione9!establishes!the!science*of!
division!(scientia*divisionis)!as!the!primary!instrument!of!conceptual!analysis!,!but!
paradoxically!disavows!the!philosophical!relevance!of!negation!even!as!he!concedes!its!
necessity!for!this!very!method!(Chapter!2),!and!iii)!its!full!realization!in!Hegel’s!dialectic,!
where!negation!is!revealed!as!the!very!engine!of!judgment,!conceiving!and!metaphysical!
differentiation,!as!that!which!“propels!the!concept!onward,“10!under!the!guiding!
principle,!omnis*determinatio*est*negatio!(literally:!every*determination*is*negation)!
(Chapter!3).!Hegel!famously!attributes!this!principle!to!Spinoza,!but!criticizes!him!for!
having!failed!to!grasp!its!real!significance.11!Yet!given!the!relative!weight!each!assigns!it,!
it!is!properly!speaking!Hegel’s,!not!Spinoza’s!principle,!and!I!will!treat!it!as!such.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8

!The!expression!is!Hegel’s,!but!I!hope!to!show!that!conceiving!of!negation!as!an!instrument!of!
determination!originates!with!Plato.!
!
9
!Boethius’!De*Divisione*was!a!key!text!of!the!old!logical!and!metaphysical!canon,!the!Logica*Vetus,!and!
the!only!such!text!to!remain!influential!until!well!beyond!the!thirteenth!century,!when,!with!the!
rediscovery!of!the!rest!of!Aristotle's!Organon,!the!remaining!texts!of!this!canon!recede!in!importance.!The!
other!works!comprising!the!Logica*Vetus*were!Boethius'!Latin!translations!of!Aristotle's!Categories!and!De*
Interpretatione,!and!of!Porphyry's!!Isagoge,!Boethius'!commentaries!on!these!same!works!and!on!Cicero's!
Topics,!plus!his!own!Topics*!and!De*Syllogismo*Hypothetico.!
!
10
!Hegel,!G.!W.!F.,!The*Science*of*Logic,!trans.!George!di!Giovanni!(Cambridge,!Cambridge!University!Press,!
2010),!§21.39.!All!citations!of!the!text!are!taken!from!this!edition!unless!otherwise!indicated.!
!
11
!Hegel!cites!the!principle!in!his!Encyclopedia*Logic,!§91!Addition,!though!it!is!also!to!be!found!in!his!1817!
review!of!Jacobi's!Werke!in!Heidelbergischer*Jahrbücher*der*Literatur.!See!G.!W.!F.!Hegel,!Encyclopedia*of*
the*Philosophical*Sciences*in*Basic*Outline,!Part*1:*Logic,!trans.!and!ed.!by!Klaus!Brinkman!and!Daniel!O.!
Dahlstrom!(Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press,!2010),!147!(henceforth!Encyclopedia*Logic).!G.!W.!F.!
Hegel,!review!of!Jacobi’s!Werke!(1816),!in!Heidelberg*Writings,!trans.!B.!Bowman!and!A.!Speight!
(Cambridge!University!Press,!2009),!p.!8.!

!

!

7!
I!refer!to!the!conception!of!negation!at!work!here!as!Hegelian!because!it!is!in!

Hegel’s!Logic!and!the!Phenomenology!of*Spirit*that!it!is!most!fully!expressed,!and!
because!I!proceed!from!the!standpoint!of!the!broader!Hegelian!semantics!and!
metaphysics!to!which!this!conception!of!negation!belongs.!However,!although!Plato!and!
Boethius!are!read!in!light!of,!and!with!the!promise!of!illuminating,!Hegel’s!views,!it!is!
also!hoped!that!light!is!cast!in!the!other!direction!as!well,!that!an!understanding!of!
Plato’s!and!Boethius’!views!is!advanced!by!approaching!them!through!Hegel.!To!the!
extent!possible,!the!readings!I!offer!of!each!figure!are!also!intended!to!be!
philosophically!autonomous.!Plato’s!discovery!of!the!place!of!negation!in!conceiving!and!
cognition,!for!instance,!as!well!as!the!method*of!division!used!to!tabulate!these,!are!
significant!philosophical!achievements!in!their!own!right.!However,!I!believe!we!can!only!
appreciate!the!importance!of!Plato’s!discoveries!with!a!view!to!their!(largely!
unremarked)!development!in!Hegel’s!logic.12!Finally,!it!is!the!philosophical!significance!
of!negation!as!such!that!I!hope!to!demonstrate,!despite!the!largely!historical!framing!of!
much!of!the!discussion!that!follows.!
Perhaps!the!most!difficult!figure!to!place!within!this!framework!is!Boethius,!who,!
in!his!De*Divisione,!denies!negation!the!very!role!it!seems!so!obviously!to!serve.!I!argue!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12

!While!there!are!occasional!references!to!Plato!in!the!literature!on!Hegel,!and!in!particular!to!his!Sophist,!
these!amount!to!little!more!than!vague!indications!of!philosophical!indebtedness.!Dieter!Henrich’s!
remarks!in!his!Between*Kant*and*Hegel!is!perhaps!the!most!suggestive,!though!nothing!further!is!made!of!
the!observation,!for!example,!that!“Hegel’s!Logic!of!Being!(i.e.,!the!logic!of!determinateness)!is!a!refined!
exposition!of!what!Plato!called!heterotēs!(otherness.!It!is!actually!an!attempt!to!resume!the!dialectics!of!
Plato’s!Sophist!within!the!context!of!modern!philosophy.”!See!Dieter!Henrich,!Between*Kant*and*Hegel,*
ed.!David!S.!Pacini!(Cambridge:!Harvard!University!Press,!2008),!320.!!
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that!despite!this!concentrated!spectacle!of!denial,!Boethius!nonetheless!approaches!
negation!as!a!fundamental!operation!of!discursive!cognition!and,!through!the!enduring!
influence!of!this!text,!along!with!his!commentaries!on!Aristotle,!establishes!this!view!of!
negation!within!the!logical!canon!of!scholastic!philosophy.!Boethius’!reasons!for!
proscribing!negation!are!simultaneously!logical!and!metaphysical,!though!they!express!a!
revealing!and!important!inconsistency!in!his!views.!He!embraces!a!Platonic!semantics!of!
names,!even!as!he!obscures!it!in!viewing!this!semantics!through!the!prism!of!an!
Aristotelian!model!of!categorical!predication,!and!in!a!language,!i.e.,!Latin,!that!is!at!
once!near!and!foreign!to!the!Greek!in!which!that!semantics!is!natively!formulated.!More!
importantly,!although!he!accepts!the!isomorphism!of!logic!and!ontology,!he!is!more!
attuned!to!the!logical!import!of!ontological!assumptions!than!to!the!ontological!import!
of!logical!assumptions.!For!Boethius,!in!naming,!ontology!is!paramount,!whereas!in!
predication!it!is!logical!syntax!that!takes!precedence.!It!is!both!his!failure!to!connect!the!
Platonic!semantics!of!names!to!that!of!predication,!together!with,!and!more!specifically!
and!paradoxically,!his!avowed!metaphysical!Platonism,!that!lead!Boethius!to!his!
proscription!of!negation.!
The!difficulty!of!seeing!a!unified!approach!to!the!semantics!of!names!and!
propositions!derives,!in!large!part,!from!the!separation!of!the!logics!of!division!and!
syllogistic!Aristotle!is!seen!to!have!established!as!a!matter!of!philosophical!orthodoxy,!
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although!for!his!part!Aristotle!also!insists!on!linking!the!two!as!deductive!systems.13!
Hegel,!as!we!shall!see,!argues!for!a!more!profound!link!between!the!two,!showing,!by!
way!of!the!development!of!his!logic,!that!the!logic!of!division!is!already!the!logic!of!
syllogistic,!although!a!formal!expression,!if!not!a!formal!apparatus,!of!the!syllogism!is!
required!to!show!how!and!that!this!is!the!case.!
Section(Two.(The(Philosophical(Discourse(of(Negation14(
So!what!does!the!Hegelian!conception!of!negation!look!like?!Since!this!is!a!
question!to!which!the!dissertation!as!a!whole!is!addressed,!what!I!can!usefully!provide!
here,!removed!from!the!philosophical!settings!in!which!its!features!are!arrived!at,!is!a!
brief,!general!overview.!To!put!things!simply!to!begin!with,!negation!is!part!of!a!more!
general!semantics!that!treats!concepts!as!interconnected!and!hierarchically!
differentiated.!As!it!turns!out,!this!semantics!is!also!aligned!with!the!very!specific!
metaphysics!of!Platonism.!This!is!hardly!surprising,!given!the!ontological!opulence!of!
realist!semantics!and!metaphysics!more!generally!and!Platonism!in!particular:!if!
universals!are!to!be!countenanced!as!the!abstract!extensions!of!general!terms,!then!the!
something!similar!readily!goes!for!other!linguistic!expressions!such!as!negation.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

!This!is!taken!up!in!Chapter!2,!while!the!resumption!of!a!connection!between!division!and!syllogistic!is!
discussed!at!length!in!Chapter!3.!!
!
14
!By!“discourse”!I!mean!to!indicate!a!set!of!theoretical!commitments!or!theses,!rather!than!any!specific!
treatise!or!doctrine,!roughly!what!Foucault!describes!as!a!“discursive!formation,”!though!without!the!
suggestion!of!historical!discontinuity!or!of!ideological!latency.!Thus!what!I!present!here!is!an!account!not!
of!influence,!but!of!philosophical!lineage,!plotted!in!terms!of!the!three!critical!moments!of!its!expression.!
For!his!introduction!of!the!notion!of!discursive*formation!see!Michel!Foucault,!The*Archaeology*of*
Knowledge,!trans.!A.!M.!Sheridan!Smith!(New!York:!Harper!and!Row,!1972).!
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Within!this!semantics,!negation!is!what!makes!conceptual!interconnection!

possible,!since!it!divides!concepts!and!thereby!reveals!their!lines!of!contiguity.!As!such,!
negation!is!not!itself!a!concept!but!an!instrument,!indeed!the!basic!instrument,!of!
conceptual!differentiation,!and!this!is!Plato’s!initial!insight,!although!he!lacks!the!logical!
tools!to!work!out!its!ramifications.!So!understood,!it!is!in!the!first!place!an!operation!of!
conceiving,!of!demarcating!concepts.!To!this!extent!it!would!seem!that!its!explicit,!
linguistic!expression!in!negative!predication!and!judgment!is!derivative,!and!that!all!
other!lexically!overt!uses!of!negation!depend!upon!this!primary!use.!Yet,!as!Hegel!will!
finally!demonstrate,!concepts!themselves!are!demarcated!in!the!divided!terrain!of!the!
propositions!they!comprise.!The!more!fundamental!use!of!negation!thus!lies!in!its!
establishment!of!discursive!expression,!and!to!this!extent!it!is!therefore!logically!prior!to!
assertion,!the!exclusive!mode!of!logical!engagement!accepted!since!Frege.15!However,!
to!say!this!is!also!to!place!negation!and!assertion!on!an!equal!footing:!just!as!assertion,!
traditionally!understood!as!affirmation!(kataphasis/affirmatio)!and!expressed!by!the!
copula,!is!an!operation!of!composition!or!conjunction!that!brings!an!affirmative!
proposition!into!logical!or!linguistic!play,!negation!is!an!operation!of!separation!or!
division*that!thereby!brings!a!given!proposition!into!play.!However,!Hegel,!like!his!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15

!While!this!claim!directly!contradicts!Frege’s!privileging!of!assertion!as!the!only!true!form!of!semantic!
engagement,!it!also!runs!counter!to!the!priority!accorded!affirmation!in!Aquinas,!Duns!Scotus!and!most!
scholastic!philosophers.!Frege!also!thought!assertion!to!be!an!extra[propositional!feature!of!judgment,!
denying,!in!essence,!not!only!that!the!traditional!categorical!forms!of!proposition!are!semantically!
engaged!simply!by!virtue!of!their!form,!but!also!that!his!own!function/argument!conception!of!the!
proposition!involves!such!engagement.!I!take!up!these!issues!in!Chapter!3.!
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scholastic!forebears!and!unlike!Frege,!thinks!that!negation!and!affirmation!alike!are!
both!forms!of!semantic!engagement!and!are!internal!to!the!structure!of!the!proposition.!
Plato!understands!this!role!of!negation!in!largely!structural!terms,!as!
differentiating!the!kinds!or!forms16!on!which!our!concepts!depend,!and!structuring!
those!concepts!themselves,!although!it!is!also!this!structuring!that!determines!the!
grounds!and!truth!of!predication,!attribution!and!speech!more!generally.!However,!I!will!
argue!that!in!the!Philebus!Plato!also!describes!an!operation!of!delimitation!or!finitization!
that!he!associates!with!the!method,!or!as!we!should!put!it,!the!logic!of!division!
(diairesis),!and!in!the!Sophist*identifies!this!operation!with!the!primary!function!of!
negation.!In!Boethius,!this!structure!becomes!the!more!strictly!regimented!hierarchy!of!
Porphyrian!predicables,!of!genera!and!species,!based!upon!Aristotle’s!table!of!
categories.!At!the!same!time,!through!Boethius’!concentration!on!negative,!privative!
and!infinite*predication,!again!deriving!from!Aristotle’s!accounts!of!the!same,!negation!is!
aligned!more!closely!with!categorical!judgment!and!thus!with!the!primary!act!of!
predicative!engagement,!i.e.,!the!separation!(diairesis/separatio)!of!a!subject!term!from!
a!predicate!term!that!is!subsequently!joined!to!it!via!the!copula.!The!priority!of!
propositional!separation!(diairesis)!over!composition!(synthesis),!however,!is!logical!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!

16

!Throughout!the!dissertation!italicized!uses!of!the!term!“form”!refer!exclusively!to!Platonic!forms!(eidē!
or!ideai).!This!is!simply!an!expedient!to!distinguishing!reference!to!such!specifically!determined!
metaphysical!items!from!reference!to!all!other!kinds!of!aesthetic,!graphic,!logical,!or!structural,!forms!and!
from!the!more!technical!notion!of!form!I!introduce!based!upon!Spencer[Brown’s!calculus*of*forms.!See!G.!
Spencer[Brown,!The*Laws*of*Form!(New!York:!Elsevier[Dutton!Publishing,!1979).!This!last!use!of!the!term!
“form”!will!always!be!explicitly!identified!where!context!is!an!insufficient!indication!of!provenance.!
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rather!than!historical!or!genetic,!and!derives!in!part!from!its!obvious!connection!to!the!
method!or!science!of!division!(diairesis).!All!this!implies!what!we!might!call!a!jigsaw!
picture!of!semantics:!propositions!are!put!together!from!pieces!that!belong!together,!
but!only!because!they!are!contiguous!parts!of!wholes!that!have!been!separated!from!
one!another!in!the!first!place.17!
In!Hegel,!the!deductive!system!of!syllogistic!logic!is!tied!to!the!logic!of!division!
and!freed!from!the!undemonstrated!tables!of!categories!and!predicables.!It!thereby!
becomes!the!expressive!terrain!proper!to!conceptual!and!propositional!determination!
alike.!Here!negation!emerges!as!the!engine!of!thinking!itself,!as!that!by!which!concepts!
are!parsed!and!thought!through!the!propositions!they!ground.!Behind!his!joining!of!
diairetic*and!syllogistic!logic!lies!the!traditional!double[concept!view!of!the!proposition,!
and!so!the!view!that!propositions!themselves!are!still!to!be!understood!as!discursive!
extrapolations!of!their!subject!(and!predicate)!concepts,!even!where!Hegel!considers!a!
subsumption!model!of!predication,!as!he!does!in!the!final!part!of!his!Logic.!If!negation!is!
what!demarcates!our!concepts,!it!is!also!therefore!the!basic!operation!of!predication!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17
!Note!that!these!need!not!be!taken!to!imply!that!the!whole!itself!is!finite,!even!if!we!are!only!privy!to!a!
finite!segment!of!that!whole.!Yet!for!Hegel!this!is!indeed!the!implication.!The!passage!from!whole!to!
totality!that!constitutes!the!extrapolations!of!his!Logic!is!thus!the!finite,!discursive!passage!from!an!
indeterminate!or!abstract!(and!infinite)!universality!to!a!determinate!infinite.!As!Hegel!puts!it!in!the!
Science*of*Logic,!“But!the!process!of!this!finite!cognition!and!this!finite!action!transforms!the!initially!
abstract!universality!into!totality,!whereby!it!becomes!complete!objectivity![i.e.,!the!discursive!correlate!
of!the!infinite*idea].”(12.178).!
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and!attribution,!and!this!is!part!of!what!Hegel!means!in!insisting!that!consciousness!
itself!is!pure*negativity.18!
While!Hegel’s!account!of!negation!provides!the!template!for!the!philosophical!
discourse!of!negation!I!will!be!attempting!to!make!out,!it!will!nonetheless!be!helpful!to!
set!forth!a!few!of!the!theses!that!define!this!discourse!in!more!or!less!neutral!terms,!by!
way!of!providing!a!roadmap!for!the!dissertation.!The!first!of!these!is!that!(1)!negation,!in!
its!fundamental!use,!is!asymmetric,!contextual!and!scalar:19!asymmetric,!because!it!
divides!the!conceptual!or!discursive!field!asymmetrically,!establishing!a!region!in!which!
the!negated!element!is!included!(a!closed!interval!or!boundary),!and!one!in!which!it!is!
not!(an!open!interval!or!boundary);!scalar,!in!the!strict!sense!that!each!application!of!
negation!establishes!a!higher!order!of!determination!(though!it!may!also,!within,!for!
example,!Neoplatonic!metaphysics,!yield!a!lower!ontological!rank);!contextual,!because!
how!each!rank!is!specified!and,!more!importantly,!what!specific!content!negation!yields,!
depends!on!the!immediate!context!in!which!it!is!applied.!A!privative!application!within!a!
Porphyrian!taxonomy,!for!example,!occasions!descent!from!genus!to!proximate!species,!
whereas!a!perfective*application!occasions!ascent!from!species!to!proximate!genus.!In!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18

!G.!W.!F.!Hegel,!Phenomenology*of*Spirit,!translated!by!A.!V.!Miller!(Oxford:!Clarendon!Press,!1977),!§21[
§22.!
!
19
!This!is!broadly!along!the!lines!spelled!out!by!J.!N.!Martin!in!his!presentation!of!scalar*negation!in!
Themes*in*Neoplatonic*and*Aristotelian*Logic:*Order,*Negation*and*Abstraction!(Burlington,!VT:!Ashgate,!
2004),!25[52.!!Though!Martin’s!discussion!focuses!on!the!Neoplatonist!metaphysics!of!Proclus,!and!more!
specifically!on!the!analysis!of!Neoplatonic!causality,!the!central!dependence!of!taxonomic!structure!on!
the!method!of!division!derives!essentially!from!Plato’s!account!of!forms!(specifically!according!to!their!
authoritative!treatment!as!exemplars!or!paradeigmata!in!the!Parmenides)*and!the!complementary!
relation!of!participation!(metechein)!their!efficacy!depends!on,!which!relation!can!be!understood!
structurally.!
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Hegel,!the!dominant!modality!of!negation!is!ascending,!i.e.,!that!marked!by!the!
elevating!inclusion!of!the!negated!term!in!sublation!(Aufhebung).!In!terms!of!the!
determination!of!content,!to!use!one!of!the!more!vivid!examples!from!Hegel’s!
Philosophy*of*Nature,!the!negation!of!space!as!such!yields!the!point,!whose!negation!in!
turn!yields!the!line,!etc.20!From!a!structural!standpoint,!negation!both!illuminates!and!
orders!a!hierarchy,!which!hierarchy!can!be!viewed!either!in!the!direction!of!ascent!or!in!
the!direction!of!descent.!Whether!the!corresponding!role!of!negation!is!privative!or!
perfective!is!thus!a!matter!of!philosophical!perspective!or!concern,!e.g.,!within!the!
Proclean!picture,!descent!(procession!or!proodon)!is!metaphysical!and!ascent!(reversion!
or!epistrophē)!epistemic.21!
Connected!to!thesis!(1),!and!more!significant!from!a!philosophical!standpoint,!is!
a!thesis,!already!hinted!at,!that!(2)!negation!is!fundamentally!discursive,!both!in!the!
sense!that!it!is!what!establishes!what!I!call!the!discursive*interval!between!the!two!
terms!of!the!categorical!proposition!that!provides!the!basic!configuration!of!judgment,!
and!that!it!is!inextricably,!if!secondarily,!linked!to!the!broader!context!of!discourse,!from!
the!ground[level!circumstance!of!dialogic!exchange,!to!the!more!complex!settings!of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!

20

!G.!W.!F.!Hegel,!Hegel’s*Philosophy*of*Nature:*Encyclopedia*of*the*Philosophical*Sciences,*Part*II*(1830),*
trans.!A.!V.!Miller*(Oxford:!Oxford!University!Press,!1970),!§256.!Hegel’s!discussion!of!space!in!this!section!
of!the!Encyclopedia!is!one!of!the!more!illuminating!discussions!of!negation!anywhere!in!Hegel,!for!it!so!
clearly!illustrates!the!fundamentally!contextual!and!the!disclosive/determinative!character!of!negation.!
Hegel!goes!on!to!remark!that!the!negation!involved!here,!since!it!is!to!begin!with!reflexive,!is!the!negation!
of*space!both!in!the!(objective!genitive)!sense!that!it!is!directed!towards!space!and!in!the!(subjective!
genitive)!sense!that!it!is!constituted!by*space,!and!is!thus!itself!spatial.!
!
21
!See,!for!example,!Proclus’!Elements*of*Theology:*With*Translation,*Introduction*and*Commentary,!trans.!
and!ed.!E.!R.!Dodds!(Oxford:!Clarendon!Press,!1963),!25[39.!

!

!

15!

social!and!political!interaction.!The!two!senses!of!discursivity!are!still!more!closely!
connected!if!we!consider!the!form!of!a!simple!judgment!as!the!limiting!case!of!self\
discourse!in!which!the!collation!of!an!object!of!representation!more!immediately!
available!to!consciousness!and!an!abstract!concept!or!universal!more!remote!to!
consciousness!is!exhibited!as!a!possible!content!of!judgment.!
Moreover,!a!seemingly!still!more!primitive!collation!can!be!seen!to!occur!in!the!
mere!act!of!naming,!in!which!the!name,!or!nominal!expression,!is!first!distinguished!
from!and!then!consigned!to!its!immediate,!indexically!ostended!referent.22!“Theaetetus”!
thus!functions!as!a!name!insofar!as!the!indexically!located!person!immediately!before!
us,!or!our!minds,!i.e.,!Theaetetus,!is!distinguished!from!and!linked!to!it.23!This!is!not!to!
suggest,!as!Russell!famously!did!with!regard!to!proper!names,!that!nominal!expressions!
are!all!disguised*definite*descriptions,!since!such!descriptions!are!themselves!indexically!
established,!but!that!they!are,!in!effect,!and!rather!more!surprisingly,!disguised*definite*
ascriptions,!e.g.,!“This!(Theaetetus),!that!is!to!say!Theaetetus,”!in!which!the!ontological!
difference!underlying!the!distinction!between!use!and!mention!is!implicitly!
acknowledged:!Theaetetus,!and!so!not!“Theaetetus,”!through!which!we!nonetheless!
designate!Theaetetus.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!

22

!Arguably,!the!ontological!gap!between!the!name!and!its!extension,!between!signifier!and!signified,!is!
what!underlies!Derrida’s!notion!of!différance.!See!Jacques!Derrida,!Margins*of*Philosophy,!trans.!Alan!Bass!
(Chicago:!University!of!Chicago!Press,!1982),!1[28.!
!
23
!How!reference!is!ultimately!explained!is!of!course!a!more!complicated!matter,!but!this!isn’t!in!principle!
at!issue!for!the!present!point,!which!is!just!that!behind!every!use!of!a!referring!expression,!however!it!
succeeds!semantically,!lies!an!implicit!ascription!of!that!expression!to!its!designatum.!
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The!dialogic,!propositional!and!nomenclatorial!conjoining!of!epistemically!and!

metaphysically!disparate!moments!implies!both!the!presence!of!cognitive!engagement,!
since!diversity!is!defined!relative!to!the!consciousness!or!subject!that!thinks!or!
expresses!itself,!and!its!fundamentally!discursive!orchestration,!which!is!I!believe!why!
Frege,!for!example,!insists!that!assertion!is!the!proper!subject!matter!of!logic.!However,!
since!it!is!the!recognition!of!this!disparity!that!negation!expresses!in!the!first!place,!it!is!
negation!rather!than!assertion!in!which!the!basic!character!of!attribution!and!naming!is!
first!expressed.!
The!discursivity!thesis!lies!at!the!center!of!what!I!attempt!to!defend!here,!and!its!
two!sides!are!captured!by!the!epigraphs!from!Freud!and!Heidegger!that!stand!at!the!
opening!of!this!dissertation.!On!the!one!hand,!the!thesis!expresses!a!claim!about!the!
cognitive!or!psychological!operation!of!configuring!the!content!of!cognition!so!as!to!
make!it!available!for!judgment.!Freud’s!stratification!of!psychic!deployment!into!the!
interrelated!domains!of!conscious,!preconscious!and!unconscious!processes!is!to!be!
contrasted!with!the,!albeit!mythical,!possibility!of!an!immediate,!simple!and!
undifferentiated!registering!of!phenomena,!the!simple!reception!of!the*thread*of*
experience,!in!Bergson’s!illuminating!expression.24!While!Bergson!wants!to!claim!that!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24
!This!phrase!is!taken!from!a!remarkable!passage!in!Henri!Bergson’s!Creative*Evolution!in!which!the!

merely!receptive!basis!of!affirmation!is!contrasted!with!the!complex!ideational!character!of!negation.!For!
reasons!too!bound!up!with!Bergson’s!overall!philosophical!program,!he!instead!charges!negation!with!
introducing!an!element!of!expression!that!is!extraneous*and!foreign!to!cognition.!His!own!remarks!suggest!
precisely!the!opposite:!“Endow!this!mind!with!memory,!and!especially!with!the!desire!to!dwell!on!the!
past;!give!it!the!faculty!of!dissociating!and!of!distinguishing:!it!will!no!longer!only!note!the!present!state!of!
the!passing!reality;!it!will!represent!the!passing!as!a!change,!and!therefore!as!a!contrast!between!what!

!
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negation!introduces!an!element!that!is!foreign*(etranger)!to!intellection,!his!
characterization!of!this!alien!element!suggests,!on!the!contrary,!that!it!pertains!
exclusively!to!intellect,!independent!of!its!consonance!with!some!bit!of!the!world.!
Bergson’s!claim!is!that!negation!“is!an!attitude!taken!by!the!mind!toward!an!eventual!
affirmation.”25!When!I!say!of!a!black!table!“the!table!is!not!white,”!I!say!something!not!
about!the!object!before!me,!i.e.,!the!table,!but!about!the!possible!judgment!that!the!
table!is!indeed!white!(for!why!else!would!I!venture!the!claim!that!it!isn’t?).!
Bergson’s!point!seems!to!be!that!while!affirmation!involves!a!direct,!intentional!
engagement!with!the!world,!negation!is!characteristically!engaged!with!another’s!(or!
one’s!own)!intentional!engagement,!and!a!shift!from!the!former!to!the!latter!reflects!a!
move!from!thought!to!communication,!and!more!specifically!to!legislation,!instruction,!
or!some!other!practical,!and!hence!extra[cognitive,!enterprise.!Yet!it!is!far!from!clear!
why!the!affirmative!statement!is!not!similarly!embedded!in!a!communicative!network!as!
a!matter!of!presumption.!Surely!if!I!declare!that!“the!table!is!black”!I!do!so!in!relation!to!
a!question!concerning!its!color,!or!within!the!context!of!sorting!black!objects!from!
others,!etc.!And,!on!the!other!hand,!expressing!the!absence!or!privation!of!an!attribute!
would!seem!to!be!as!much!about!the!relevant!object!as!expressing!the!presence!of!one.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
has!been!and!what!is.!And!as!there!is!no!essential!difference!between!a!past!that!we!remember!and!a!
past!that!we!imagine,!it!will!quickly!rise!to!the!idea!of!the!‘possible’!in!general.!It!will!thus!be!shunted!on!
to!the!side!of!negation.!And!especially!it!will!be!at!the!point!of!representing!a!disappearance.”!See!Henri!
Bergson,!Creative*Evolution,!trans.!Arthur!Mitchell!(Westport,!Conn.:!Greenwood!Press,!1975),!294.!!
!
25
!Bergson,!Creative*Evolution,!287.!

!
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But!insofar!as!he!points!to!the!extra[referential!context!of!negation!Bergson!is!

surely!right.!He!is!also!right,!as!Heidegger!more!directly!instructs!us,!that!in!the!case!of!
negation!I!exhibit,!for!example,!the!possibility!that!the!table!is!white!and!deny!the!
actuality!of!that!possibility;!or,!though!Bergson!never!considers!the!attributive!use,!I!
exhibit*the!whiteness!of!the!table!as!a!foreclosed,!but!possible,!attribute!of!the!table.!
Since!modality!is!here!connected!to!metaphysical!profile!or!lineage,!i.e.,!to!the!kinds!of!
properties!kinds!of!things!can!have,!negation!also!brings!to!the!fore!the!relevant!field!of!
attribution,!e.g.,!color,!in!a!way!that!the!complementary!affirmation!doesn’t.!We!can!
thus!think!of!the!undifferentiated!recording!of!phenomena!that!is!proper!to!affirmation!
or!positive!attribution!as!contrasted,!in!negation,!with!situating!phenomena!according!
to!the!modalities!of!possibility,!actuality!or!necessity,!and!according!to!categories!of!
attribution!determined!by!metaphysical!lineage.!According!to!Freud’s!picture,!negation!
brackets!the!acknowledgment!of!traumatic!or!psychically!overabundant!experience,!and!
does!so!by!bracketing!the!content!of!judgment.!If!we!project!the!vertical!axis!of!psychic!
transparency!onto!the!horizontal!axis!of!conceptual!or!ontological!modality,!then!
negation!may!be!thought!of!as!analogously!bracketing!the!obligations,!commitments!
and!implications!that!are!tied!to!the!content!of!affirmation.!
However,!there!is!a!still!more!instructive!and!profound!lesson!to!be!learned!from!
Freud.!While!the!sign*of!negation,!the!“not,”!makes!possible!the!bracketed!expression!
of!a!possible!content!of!thought!or!judgment,!for!Freud,!a!content!otherwise!in!the!
psychically!subdued!terrain!of!the!unconscious,!that!terrain!is!itself!already!the!terrain!
!

!

19!

of!an!unspoken,!and!unspeakable,!negation.!The!unconscious,!that!is,!as!the!repository!
of!repression,!is!the!product!of!the!pre[symbolic!instinct!(Trieb)!of!exclusion!that!the!
negation!sign!makes!symbolically!expressible.26!And!of!course!the!unconscious!is!
expressed!symptomatically!and!phantasmatically!(in!dreams),!without!the!expedient!of!
a!symbolic!stamp!of!origin,!i.e.,!made*in*the*unconscious.!Similarly,!what!the!traditional!
Aristotelian!account!of!differentiae!makes!clear!is!that!the!negation!sign!expresses,!in!
the!first!place,!the!differentiating!negation!that!is!already!part!of!the!variegated!terrain!
of!concepts!and!their!interrelation.!In!this!sense,!negation!is!already!at!work!behind!the!
scenes,!and!differentiating!terms!like!rational,!mortal,!etc.,!operate!on!their!own!as!
instruments!of!exclusion!and!thus!negation.!Differentiae!then!are,!as!it!were,!the!logico[
metaphysical!symptoms!of!discursive!determination.27!Finally,!just!as!it!is!the!aim!of!
psychoanalysis!to!unearth!the!negated!content!of!repression!that!obscures!the!self!in!an!
opaque!tissue!of!symptoms,!so!the!aim!of!philosophical!analysis,!one!might!suggest,!is!
to!unearth!the!negated!content!of!thought!that!obscures!the!concept!from!
consciousness!that!conceives!it.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26

!“Negation”!in!The*Freud*Reader,!ed.!Peter!Gay!(New!York:!W.!W.!Norton,!1995),!669.!For!the!German!
text,!see!Sigmund!Freud,!Gesammelte*Werke,!XIV,!ed.!A.!Freud,!E.!Bibring,!W.!Hoffer,!E.!Kris,!O.!Isakower!
(Frankfurt!am!Main:!S.!Fischer!Verlag,!1976),!11[15.!On!the!general!relationship!of!affirmation!and!
negation!to!instinct,!Freud!tells!us:!“The!polarity!of!judgment!appears!to!correspond!to!the!opposition!of!
the!two!groups!of!instincts!which!we!have!supposed!to!exist.!Affirmation![!as!a!substitute!for!uniting![!
belongs!to!Eros;!negation![!the!successor!to!expulsion![!belongs!to!the!instinct!of!destruction.”!!
!
27
!The!subterranean!level!of!negation!also!explains,!for!example,!why!the!instance!of!Hegelian!infinite!
judgment!we!will!be!examining!in!Chapter!3,!i.e.,!“The!spirit!is!a!bone,”!is!indeed!infinite.!“Bone”!here!
encapsulates!a!framework!of!analysis!that!itself!negates!spirit,!and!is!thus!a!negative!or!infinite*
expression,!despite!its!lexical!form:!within!this!context!“bone”!is!the!logical!equivalent!of!“non\spirit.”!

!
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The!discursivity!thesis!thus!appears!to!imply!a!number!of!corollary!theses:!(3)!

that!concepts!and/or!universals!are!delineated!and!differentiated!from!one!another!via!
negation,!and!(4)!that!the!instantiations!of!concepts!and/or!universals!are!also!(in!part)!
distinguished!from!their!covering!concepts!by!negation.!To!these!we!might!add!(5)!that!
the!application!of!negation!to!concepts!yields!a!hierarchy!of!relations!amongst!concepts!
and!between!concepts!and!their!instances,!(6)!that!the!hierarchical!relations!amongst!
concepts!determine!an!order!of!predication,!and!(7)!that!difference,!otherness!or!what,!
in!an!extension!of!Heidegger’s!use!of!the!expression,!I!call!ontological*difference,!is!the!
metaphysical!correlate!of!negation!and!is!as!fundamental!to!the!domain!of!beings!and!
being!as!negation!is!to!the!domain!of!concepts!and!propositions.!To!put!this!more!
strongly,!while!negation!itself!is!a!fundamental!feature!of!cognitive!comportment,!
ontological*difference!is!a!fundamental!feature!of!ontological!disposition,!and!the!
former!expresses!the!latter.!
There!are!also!three!more!general!semantico[metaphysical!theses!that!while!not!
directly!concerned!with!negation!spell!out!the!logic!of!terms!and!(categorical)!
propositions!within!which!the!discourse!of!negation!seems!to!be!naturally!embedded:!
(8)!that!(categorical)!propositions!are!to!be!thought!of!as!linear!expressions!of!the!
hierarchical!relations!between!the!concepts!expressed!by!the!terms!that!comprise!
them;!(9)!that!the!truth!of!such!propositions!derives!from!and!expresses!the!truth!
(understood!as!the!essential!makeup!or!definition)!of!the!concepts!comprising!them,!

!
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and!(10)!that!the!order!of!concepts,!and!hence!of!predication,!mirrors!the!order!of!
things,!i.e.,!logic!and!ontology!are!isomorphic.28!
The!last!of!these,!i.e.,!(10),!can!be!fleshed!out!in!a!number!of!ways,!but!here!
again!Hegel’s!formulation!will!guide!us:!“Logic!thus!coincides*(zusammenfällt)!with*
metaphysics,!i.e.,!the!science!of!things!captured!in!thoughts!that!have!counted!as!
expressing!the!essentiality!(Wesenheit)*of*things.”29!This!has!been!taken!to!express!the!
deflationary!view!that!logic!is!naturalized!metaphysics!(as!Pippin,!Pinkard!et!al!seem!to!
argue30),!which!seems!to!deprive!both!enterprises!of!their!characteristic!concerns,!or!
the!reductive!view!that!logic!just!is*metaphysics!(as!Houlgate,!Zizek!et*al!prefer!it31),!
which!seems!to!simply!muddy!the!distinction!between!the!two.!Yet!if!the!coincidence!
between!logic!and!metaphysics!is!to!have!any!philosophical!significance,!the!basic!
distinction!between!concepts,!propositions!and!implication,!on!the!one!hand,!and!
objects,!circumstances!and!their!interrelation,!on!the!other,!needs!to!be!preserved.!
Hegel’s!point,!and!the!position!I!will!be!trying!to!motivate,!seems!to!me!to!be!best!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28

!It!should!be!obvious!that!some!theses!imply!others,!e.g.,!(7)!is!just!an!instance!of!(10)!as!it!relates!
directly!to!negation.!On!the!other!hand,!some!are!independent!and!thus,!for!example,!a!number!of!rather!
different!and!indeed!inconsistent!semantic!and!metaphysical!programs!might!adopt!the!isomorphism!
postulate,!without!adhering!to!a!two[term!conception!of!propositions.!Frege’s!logic!offers!just!such!an!
example.!
!
29
!Encylopedia*Logic,!§24.!
!
30
!See,!for!example,!Robert!Pippin,!Hegel’s*Idealism:*The*Satisfactions*of*Self\Consciousness!(Cambridge:!
University!of!Cambridge!Press,!1989),!and!Terry!Pinkard,!Hegel’s*Naturalism!(Oxford:!Oxford!University!
Press,!2012).!
!
31
!See!Stephen!Houlgate,!The*Opening*of*Hegel's*Logic:*From*Being*to*Infinity!(West!Lafayette,!Ind.:!
Purdue!University!Press,!2005)!and!Slavoj!Žižek,!Less*Than*Nothing:*Hegel*and*the*Shadow*of*Dialectical*
Materialism!(London;!Brooklyn,!NY:!Verso,!2012).*

!
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understood!then!as!a!claim!about!how!logical!analysis!leads!to!metaphysical!insight!and!
vice!versa.!Hegel’s!claim!is!the!still!stronger!one!that!it!is!only!through!the!logical!
determination!of!concepts,!judgment!and!inference,!etc.,!that!metaphysics!can!be!
accomplished,!i.e.,!that!it!is!only!in!thinking*things*over!(Nachdenken),!the!modus*
operandi*of!logic,!that!the!“true!nature!of!the!object!emerges!in!consciousness.”32!And!
indeed!Hegel’s!Logic,!which!proceeds!from!Being!to!Essence!and!finally!to!Concept,!i.e.,!
from!the!logic!of!metaphysics!to!the!metaphysics!of!logic,!shows!precisely!how!each!
enterprise!is!implicated!in,!without!collapsing!into,!the!other.33!
These!theses!allow!one!to!see!immediately,!for!example,!why!one!standard!
objection!to!the!notion!of!a!determinate!negative!expression,!i.e.,!that!because!negative!
expressions!designate!infinitely!and!thus!improperly!they!are!ill[formed!or!ill[
conceived,34!derives!from!a!mistaken!view!of!the!sort!of!determination!involved,!a!view!
encouraged!by!an!extensional!or!set[theoretical!account!of!concepts!or!universals,!
which!in!effect!leaves!no!semantic!or!metaphysical!place!for!negation!as!such.!If!the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32

!Encyclopedia*Logic,!§23.!

!

33

!In!the!Science*of*Logic,!§21.48,!Hegel!distinguishes!between!objective!and!subjective!logic,!the!former!
developing!into!the!latter,!which!seems!to!show!that!for!Hegel!the!basic!questions!of!metaphysics!have!to!
be!thought!through!as,!and!so!become,!questions!of!logic,!whether!this!is!best!put!in!terms!of!
metaphysics!serving!as!the!basis!of!logic,!or!vice!versa.!While!analytic!philosophers,!following!Quine,!
might!readily!agree!to!this!convergence,!the!terms!have!to!be!reversed!to!express!the!appropriate!
direction!of!reduction:!ontology!just!is!logic,!inasmuch!as!everything!countenanced!by!logic!exists,!pure!
and!simple.!However,!while!the!point!of!Hegel’s!claim!is!to!extend!the!domain!of!logic!to!include,!or!
overlap!with,!that!of!metaphysics,!the!Quinean!point!would!be!to!radically!reduce!the!role!of!metaphysics!
to!semantic!stipulation,!i.e.,!to!specifying!a!domain*of*discourse!for!the!basic!terms!of!a!formal!language.!
!
34
!Abelard’s!is!perhaps!the!most!explicit!formulation!of!this!objection,!although!similar!objections!are!to!
be!found!throughout!scholastic!commentaries!on!Aristotle’s!De*Interpretatione,!the!obvious!source!of!all!
such!objections.!I!discuss!this!at!length!in!Chapter!2.!

!
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extension!or!meaning!of!a!concept!is!just!a!set!(and!not!an!ontologically!discrete!
universal)!defined!by!its!instances!or!members,!then!a!non[x,!if!it!indeed!corresponds!to!
a!concept!at!all,!is!just!given!by!the!collection!or!set!of!things!that!aren’t!x.!Regardless,!
identifying!the!concept!with!its!extension,!just!as!establishing!the!exact!character!of!that!
extension,!is!a!matter!for!argument!not!presumption.!Likewise,!the!level!at!which!
negation!operates,!and!whether,!for!example,!when!applied!to!a!concept!it!produces!a!
new!concept,!are!issues!of!substantial!philosophical!consequence!and!cannot!be!settled!
in!advance!by!assuming!the!transparency!of!extension.!In!this!regard,!the!standard!
objection!is!question[begging.!!
To!pursue!this!polemical!line!a!bit!further,!though!sets,!because!defined!by!an!
axiom!of!extensionality!that!identifies!a!set!with!its!members,!are!thought!an!intuitively!
obvious!way!of!making!sense!of!abstract!entities!(that!is,!by*doing*away*with*them)!
there!are!a!few!obvious!problems!with!set[theoretical!accounts!of!such!entities.!First,!
and!most!obviously,!they!do!away!with!entities!(i.e.,!the!abstract!ones)!with!which!we!
otherwise!seem!to!have!unproblematic!dealings.!Second,!in!order!to!identify!the!
relevant!members!of!the!extension!class!or!set!of!a!given!concept,!there!has!to!be!a!way!
of!identifying!the!property!or!characteristic!that!qualifies!them!for!inclusion!that!doesn’t!
circularly!refer!back!to!members!constitutive!of!the!relevant!class.!Third,!there!are!
properties!of!sets!(of!individuals)!that!cannot!be!properties!of!the!properties!named!by!
concepts!for!which!such!sets!are!supposed!to!provide!the!extension:!the!set!of!all!red!
things,!for!example,!is!defined!by!its!members,!while!the!redness!its!members!possess!
!
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has!no!members!at!all;!redness!belongs!to!anything!that!is!red,!is!better!or!more!vividly!
exemplified!in!some!specimens!than!others,!etc.,!while!equivalent!claims!about!the!set!
of!red!things!make!little!sense.!It!might!of!course!be!argued!that!the!virtues!of!the!
extensional!account!justify!changing!the!way!we!think!and!speak!of!properties,!kinds,!
etc.!However,!fidelity!to!the!language!under!analysis!would!seem!to!be!a!desideratum!of!
any!semantic!model,!and!so!to!insist!on!the!virtues,!in!particular!the!ontological!
parsimony,!of!the!extensional!account!despite!its!incompatibility!with!ordinary!usage!is!
to!abandon!the!very!purpose!for!which!that!model!is!putatively!designed.!
If!abstractions!such!as!mortality,*immortality,!etc.,!are!logically!or!cognitively!
more!intractable!than!the!conglomerates!of!things!to!which!these!abstractions!apply,!
this!is!hardly!a!reason!for!resorting!to!the!artificiality!of!conflating!the!two,!and!this!
holds!equally!for!negative!and!non[negative!expressions.!But!the!point!can!be!made!still!
more!strongly.!Consider,!for!example,!the!expression!infant,!construed!as!a!lexicalized!
form!of!the!negative!(or!infinite)!expression!non\speaking.!If!we!conceive!of!things!in!
purely!extensional!terms!it!would!seem!quite!natural!to!say!that!the!attributive!use!of!
the!expression!infant!distinguishes!the!set!of!things!that!don’t!speak,!comprising!pretty!
much!everything!in!the!world,!including!a!few!human!beings,!from!the!set!of!things!that!
do!speak,!comprising!most!human!beings!and!possibly!some!robots,!even!if!so!dividing!
serves!no!obvious!purpose.!
Yet!purpose!and!context!are!of!the!essence!!The!attributive!use!of!infant,!in!the!
more!restricted!etymological!sense!I!have!just!been!emphasizing,*applies!not!to!
!
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everything!that!doesn’t!speak,!but!only!to!those!who!can!be!expected!to!but!do*not*yet*
speak.!And!the!fact!that!it!is!not!assigned!a!vast!and!heterogeneous!extension!cannot!be!
thought!a!consequence!of!its!lexicalization,!since!the!same!would!hold!true!of!non\
speaking!provided!the!appropriate!context!of!use.!More!precisely,!the!expression!
naturally!applies!to!human!beings!for!whom!the!capacity!to!speak!has!yet!to!be!realized.!
So!understood,!it!is!a!concept!of!the!sort!of!thing!that!Aristotle!identifies!as!a!privation!
(sterēsis),!rather!than!a!negation,!in!the!sense!that!it!is!attributable!to!that!which!
“though!it!would!naturally!have!the![negated]!attribute…!has!it!not.”35!However,!it!is!not!
strictly!privative!in!Aristotle’s!precise!sense!either,!since!it!applies!not!to!things!that!are!
such!as!to!possess!the!property!(i.e.,!speaking)!they!do!not!in!fact!possess,!but!to!things!
that!are!such!as!to!possess!actually!that!property!that!they!for!the!moment!merely!
possess!potentially.!This!has!obvious!relevance!for!understanding!Aristotelian!physics,!
which!rests!fundamentally!on!the!processes!and!terms!of!actualization,!and!therefore!
for!understanding!the!pervasive!Aristotelianism!of!medieval!philosophy.!Negation,!in!
the!sense!under!discussion,!would!seem!inherent!to!all!potentialities!relative!to!their!
corresponding!actualizations,!i.e.,!not!merely!infinite!expressions!such!as!irrational,!
immobile,!etc.,!but!to!non[negative!expressions!as!well,!such!as!cold,!smooth,!etc.36!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35

!Aristotle’s!Metaphysics*IV!1022b27[30.!This!is!the!third!of!the!four!senses!of!sterēsis*Aristotle!lists,!and!
the!only!one!of!direct!relevance.!!
!
36
!I!explore!this!suggestion!at!greater!length!in!Chapter!2.!
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Its!disclosure!of!what!resides!in*potentia!reflects!in!more!specific!terms!the!

general!character!of!what!I!have!referred!to!as!the!determinative*character!of!negation,!
inasmuch!as!it!draws!attention!to!its!unique!mode!of!contextual*determination:!
negation!indicates!what!is!proximately!absent!from,!and!thereby!discloses!what!is!
characteristic!of,!a!given!subject!of!attribution:!saying!that!a!flower!is!not!yellow,!tells!
us,!amongst!other!things,!that!it!is!colored.!What!is!also!thereby!revealed!is!the!
stratification!of!subject!and!substance,!their!divided!disposition!between!potentiality!
and!actuality,!as!between!presence!and!futurity.!Insofar!as!negation!indicates!what!is!
intrinsic!to!or!characteristic!of!a!subject,!but!unrealized,!or!differently!realized,!in!it,!it!
identifies!a!specific!content!and!direction!of!determination,!e.g.,!from!the!undetermined!
capacity!to!speak,!to!the!determinate!realization!of!that!capacity.!
So,!when!applied!in!the!hierarchical!context!of!genus[species!filiation,!negation!
discloses!a!lower!order!concept!inherent!within!a!higher!order!one,!and!no!lower,!or,!
applied!at!the!level!of!the!differentiae,*distinguishes!one!concept!from!its!adjacent!
complement,!though!here!again!the!distinction!remains!hierarchical.(Non\mortal,!for!
example,!does!not!designate!anything!and!everything!that!isn’t!mortal!or!a!man,!such!as!
rocks,!chickens,!etc.!Since!negation!here!operates!within!the!confines!of!the!genus[
species!branch!in!which!it!is!applied,!it!can!only!in!fact!qualify!what!lies!within!that!
branch,!in!this!case!yielding!non[mortal!(or!immortal),!rational,!animate,!corporeal!
being,!or,!in!other!words,!planet,!as!opposed!to!mortal,!rational,!animate,!corporeal!
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being,!or!man.37!Admittedly,!the!hierarchical!model!of!conceptual!differentiation!is!not!
yet!realized,!though!it!is!already!implicit,!in!Plato.!And,!on!the!other!hand,!the!strict!
hierarchical!model!is!discarded!in!Hegel’s!phenomenological!approach!to!logic.!How!
negation!and!division!work!in!the!absence!of!such!a!model!is!part!of!the!story!to!be!told!
in!the!following!chapters.!
I!want!to!argue,!further,!that!the!robust!metaphysical!character!of!disclosive*or!
determinative*negation,!is!still!more!pervasive!both!in!philosophy!and!those!fields!that!
impinge!upon!philosophy,!where!it!is!often!present!without!acknowledgment.!In!the!
first!place,!this!is!because*negation!so!conceived!is!the!basis!of!the!logical!and!
grammatical!roles!it!is!more!conventionally!and!officially!assigned,!e.g.,!the!truth[
functional!conception!of!negation!simply!views!negation!within!the!restricted!context!of!
a!bivalent!semantics!for!propositions.!But!more!significantly,!as!already!suggested,!this!
conception!underpins!the!traditional,!scholastic!notion!of!the!differentia!(what!
paradigmatically!yields!a!species!when!applied!to!a!genus),38!and!the!more!general!
notion!of!ontological*difference*(in!the!non[technical!sense!of!difference!in!ontological!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37

!The!fact!that!the!negative!expression,!i.e.,!non\mortal,!in!this!instance!seems!to!yield!a!higher!ranking!
term!than!the!base!expression!raises!questions!about!the!ordering!function!of!negation.!I!address!this!and!
related!issues!in!the!next!section!of!the!introduction.!It!is!enough!to!point!out!here!that!within!the!
discourse!of!negation,!every*term!is!negatively!determined,!even!where!morphology!obscures!this.!!

!

38

!That!determinative*or!disclosive*negation!underpins!the!traditional,!scholastic!notion!of!difference!or!
differentia*can!be!seen!from!the!way!in!which!difference!is!treated!in!Boethius!and!the!tradition!that!
proceeds!from!him,!despite!the!fact!that!Boethius,!echoing!Aristotle,!insists!that!species!are!related!as!
contraries!rather!than!as!contradictories!to!one!another.!I!take!up!this!claim!in!Chapter!2.!
!
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status)39!to!which!it!is!historically!and!logically!tied.!Despite!its!regular!marginalization,!it!
is!thus!implicitly!present!in!scholastic!philosophy!as!a!whole,!and!so!in!the!philosophical!
lineage!scholasticism!gives!rise!to.!More!specifically,!it!is!inextricably!bound!to!the!
scholastic!model!of!concepts!as!interconnected!and!mutually!differentiated,!to!the!
method*of*division,!and!to!the!double[concept!view!of!the!proposition!and!thought,!
both!first!broached!by!Plato!and!later!formalized!by!Aristotle.!The!method!itself!reflects!
this!symplectic40!model!of!concepts!and!forms,!and!illuminates!their!hierarchical!
relations,!which!relations,!in!turn!govern!the!form!and!unity!of!thinking.!What’s!more,!if!
division!is!indeed!the!method!Plato,!Aristotle!et*al!take!it!to!be,!then!the!articulation!of!
kinds!and!instances!it!makes!possible!is!also!the!articulation!of!what*there*is.!A!veridical!
logic!of!negation!is!therefore!at!the!same!time!a!metaphysics!of!difference,!or!rather,!of!
ontological*difference.!!
Plato!understands!the!role!of!negation!in!largely!structural!terms,!as!
differentiating!the!kinds!or!forms!on!which!our!concepts!depend!and!structuring!those!
concepts!themselves,!though!it!is!also!this!structuring!that!determines!the!grounds!and!
truth!of!predication,!attribution!and!speech!more!generally.!In!Boethius,!this!structure!
becomes!the!more!strictly!regimented!hierarchy!of!Porphyrian!predicables,!of!genera,!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39

!That!ontological*difference*here!is!ultimately!allied!with!Heidegger’s!technical!notion!of!ontological*
difference!would!of!course!require!further!demonstration.!I!turn!to!this!briefly!in!the!Conclusion!of!the!
dissertation.!
!
40
!The!term!derives!from!Plato’s!use!of!the!Greek!symplokē!to!describe!the!relationship!a!given!concept!
bears!to!other!concepts,!as!well!as!the!relationship!between!the!subject!and!predicate!terms!of!a!
sentence!or!proposition!(logos).!
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and!species,!based!upon!Aristotle’s!table!of!categories.!At!the!same!time,!through!
Boethius’!concentration!on!negative,!privative!and!infinite*predication,!again!deriving!
from!Aristotle’s!accounts!of!the!same,!negation!is!aligned!more!closely!with!categorical!
judgment!and!thus!with!what!I!argue!is!the!primary!act!of!predicative!engagement,!i.e.,!
that!of!separation!(separatio)!or!negatio*(apophasis!in!Greek).!In!Hegel!the!deductive!
system!of!syllogistic!logic!is!dislodged!from!the!rigid!and!unproven!structures!of!
categories!and!predicables,!and!becomes!the!instrument!itself!of!conceptual!
organization!and!propositional!expression.!Here!negation!emerges!as!the!engine!of!
thinking!itself,!as!that!by!which!concepts!are!parsed!and!thought!through!the!
propositions!they!ground.!It!will!be!important!to!show,!however,!that!behind!this!lies!
the!traditional!double[concept!view!of!the!proposition,!and!so!the!view!that!
propositions!themselves!are!to!be!understood!as!discursive!extrapolations!of!their!
subject!concepts.!If!negation!is!what!demarcates!our!concepts,!it!is!also!therefore!the!
basic!operation!of!predication.!This!is!part!of!what!Hegel!means!in!insisting!that!
consciousness!itself!is!pure*negativity.!!
As!suggested!above,!the!intrinsic!connection!of!negation!to!cognitive!and!
metaphysical!organization!is!made!evident!in!its!employment!in!that!method!of!
conceptual!analysis!designed!to!map!out!definitions!and!(equivalently)!essences!
(logoi/rationes),!i.e.,!the!method*of*division.!Division!provides!a!view!equally!into!the!
network!of!concepts!through!which!we!cognize!and!form!judgments!about!the!world,!
and!into!whatever!it!is!that!is!thereby!cognized!and!propositionally!assessed,!i.e.,!the!
!
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universals,!particulars,!individuals!and!facts,!to!the!extent!and!insofar!as!these!are!
conceptually!localizable.!While!division,!as!an!analytic!instrument,!reveals!the!hierarchy!
of!relations!amongst!concepts,!it!is!via!negation!that!these!relations!are!established!in!
the!first!place.!On!the!other!hand,!though!negation,!as!indicated!above,!is!basic!to!
predicative!expression,!division!in!effect!provides!a!combinatorial!map!of!the!available!
forms!of!judgment,!inasmuch!as!it!exhibits!the!nodes!and!lines!of!subordination!and!
subsumption!that!govern!the!appropriate!combination!and!separation!of!concepts!in!
judgment.!!
Division!is!therefore!simultaneously!an!instrument!of!logical!and!of!metaphysical!
analysis.!The!virtue!of!this!method,!that!is,!its!making!visible!the!relationship!between!
unit!kinds!or!universals!(genē!or!eidē)!and!the!multiplicities!(ta*polla)41!of!their!
instantiations,!which!Plato!puts!abstractly!in!terms!of!the!relationship!between!the!one!
and!the!many,!lies!precisely!in!its!enabling!us!to!parse!things!as!they!are,!“to!carve!kinds!
at!their!natural!joints!according!to!their!species!(kat’*eidē*…diatemnein*kat’*arthra*hēi*
pephuken),”42!i.e.,!according!to!the!actual!parts,!joins!and!filiations!of!things.!If!it!shows!
that!the!basis!of!all!concepts!is!difference,!and!the!basis!of!difference!negation,!then!it!
also!shows!that!things!themselves,!from!kinds!to!individuals,!are!differentiated!or!
individuated!by!non[being,!or!by!an!equivalently!forbidding!correlate!of!negation.!Of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41

!

!Philebus!16c18.!

42

!Phaedrus*265e1[2.!Unless!otherwise!noted,!all!translations!of!Plato’s!Phaedrus*are!from!Plato,!
Phaedrus,!trans.!A.!Nehamas!and!P.!Woodruff!(Indiana:!Hackett!Publishing!Company,!1995).!
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course!for!Platonists!like!Plato,!Boethius,!Aquinas,!and!Henry!of!Ghent,!to!name!a!few,!
the!logical!dispositions!of!concepts!necessarily!coincide*with,!to!recur!to!Hegel’s!
preferred!expression,!the!metaphysical!dispositions!of!fundamental!existents.!
I!also!argue!that!owing!to!the!intrinsic!relation!between!conceptual!and!
predicative!structure,!division!also!provides!the!basis!for!a!compositional!or!
combinatorial*treatment!of!the!proposition!that!is!fundamentally!different!from!the!
formal!treatment!familiar!from!the!quasi[propositional!logic!of!the!Stoics,!or!more!
clearly!from!the!propositional!logic!contemporary!philosophers!take!for!granted,!but!
which!is!not!evident!before!Ockham!or,!perhaps,!Abelard.43!It!follows!from!this!account!
that!negation!is!an!intrinsic!feature!of!all*propositions,!or!as!Hegel!will!more!or!less!
demonstrate,!infinite*judgment,!of!the!form!A!is!non[B,!exhibits!the!form!of!every!
judgment!and!thus!every!proposition.44!
Yet!if!negation!functions!as!all!this!suggests,!then!it!expresses!the!basic!bounds!
or!limits!within!concepts,!between!concepts,!and!between!concepts!and!their!instances.!
Negation!so!understood!is!an!implicit!feature!of!language!and!thought,!though!one!that!
can!be,!and!indeed!must!be,!made!explicit!in!the!course!of!conceptual!exposition,!
definition!and!application.!Since!what!it!marks!within!individual!referring!expressions!is!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43

!For!a!useful!discussion!of!the!difference!between!the!scholastic!(Boethian)!and!the!modern!conceptions!
of!the!proposition,!see,!amongst!others,!Christopher!J.!Martin's!“The!Logic!of!Negation!in!Boethius,”!
Phronesis!36!(1991):!277[304.!
!
44
!The!relationship!between!judgments!and!propositions!is!a!rather!vexing!one!in!Hegel.!I!do!my!best!to!
explain!the!difference!in!Chapter!3,!although!the!bases!for!explaining!Hegel’s!view!are,!I!hope,!established!
in!the!preceding!chapters!on!Plato!and!Boethius.!
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both!the!broader!conceptual!field!in!which!it!occupies!a!specific!place,!and!the!narrower!
extensional!field!of!its!application,!it!is!also!the!pivot!of!propositional!expansion,!of!the!
discursive*interval!that!is!intrinsic!to!structure!of!the!concept.!This!implies!that!negation!
is!already!at!work!within!the!logically!simple!subject[predicate!array!of!the!categorical!
proposition,!as!what,!in!the!first!place,!provides!for!the!difference!between!subject!and!
predicate!terms!that!supplies!semantic!significance!or!force!to!identity!statements,!and!
secondarily!to!predicative!propositions,!without!which,!as!Hegel!regularly!remarks,!such!
statements!would!be!vacuous.!While!the!standard!shift!in!quality!from!affirmative!
(kataphatikos)!to!negative!(apophatikos),!is!marked!by!the!sign!of!negation,!the!
difference!between!the!two,!as!standardized!by!Aristotle,!can!be!expressed!in!terms!of!
combination!and!division,!with!negation!providing!the!line!of!juncture!(in!the!former!
case)!and!disjuncture!(in!the!latter!case).!
On!the!metaphysical!side!of!things,!negation!has!its!correlate!in!what!Heidegger!
calls!the!ontological*difference,!between!Being!as!such,!and!individual!beings,!in!the!
relation!between!a!given!universal!or!abstract!particular!and!the!complementary!
universals!(or!abstract!particulars)!adjacent!to!it,!and!between!a!given!universal!and!the!
individuals!that!instantiate!it.!As!this!brief!sketch!of!the!corresponding!metaphysics!
makes!clear,!negation!in!the!philosophically!robust!sense!accorded!it!within!the!
tradition!I!am!examining,!implies!a!strong!form!of!realism,!historically!some!form!of!
Platonism.!While!this!is!a!fairly!easy!case!to!make!in!relation!to!Plato!and!Boethius,!
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Hegel’s!Platonism!is!certainly!more!problematic!to!establish,!though!that!is!precisely!
what!I!shall!be!attempting!to!do.!
Section(Three.(Negation(and(the(Ontology(of(Form(
While!my!preference!throughout!is!to!stick!as!closely!as!possible!to!the!language!
of!the!philosophical!traditions!under!examination,!and!while!there!are!certain!terms!
that!enjoy!a!remarkable!consistency!across!these!traditions,!the!relevant!idioms!of!
Greek,!scholastic!and!Hegelian!philosophy!are!significantly!different!from!one!another.!It!
will!thus!prove!helpful!to!have!a!model!set!out!in!neutral!terms!to!discuss!the!
interconnection!between!negation,!division!and!conceptual!determination.!For!that!
purpose,!I!will!regularly!make!use!of!a!model!of!conceptuo[metaphysical!form!derived!
from!Spencer[Brown’s!logic!of!form.45!Beyond!providing!a!formal!picture!of!the!basic!
structure!of!conceptual!form,!for!instance,!this!model!also!helps!brings!into!relief!the!
contextual!and!asymmetric!character!of!negation!described!in!thesis!(1)!above.!
According!to!Spencer[Brown’s!basic!calculus,!a!form!is!constituted!by!an!
operation!of!division,!of!"drawing!a!distinction"!that!divides!a!graphic,!logical,!
conceptual!or!ontological!space!asymmetrically!into!a!contained!and!an!excluded!
domain,!into!the!distinguished!region!of!the!form!proper!and!its!outside!or!environment,!
respectively.!Although!a!form!is!determined!by!the!operation!of!applying!the!distinction!
or!demarcation!itself,!and!is,!by!default,!identified!with!the!interior!or!contained!side!of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45

!The!version!of!Spencer[Brown’s!general!system!I!use!owes!something!as!well!to!Niklas!Luhmann’s!!
adaptation!of!it!in!Art*as*a*Social*System,!trans.!Eva!M.!Knodt!(Stanford:!Stanford!University!Press,!2000).!
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the!partition,!it!encompasses!both!sides!of!the!demarcated!field.!A!form!is!therefore!
double[sided,!comprising!both!interior!and!exterior!sides!of!a!distinction,!or!mark!of!
difference.46!
!

In!the!calculus!of!forms,!all!formal!marks!are!identified!with!the!operations!used!

to!establish!them,!and!all!presupposed!psychological!events!(intention,!motivation,!etc.)!
are!identified!with!the!formal!operations!they!might!underlie.!Thus!organic,!
psychological,!logical!and!pictorial!expressions!of!form!are!logically!equivalent,!and!the!
precise!pictographic!or!ideographic!shape!the!form!assumes!has!no!intrinsic!relation!to!
the!system!of!operations!it!is!used!to!represent!–!each!shape!simply!serves!the!purpose!
of!representing!those!operations.!The!distinction!that!establishes!a!form!is!equivalently!
made!by!a!call!for!distinction,!i.e.,!a!definition!or!stipulation,!a!mark!that!designates!
such!a!call,!or!a!crossing!that!such!a!mark!establishes!the!possibility!of,!i.e.,!the!traversal!
across!a!differentiating!mark!from!one!side!to!another,!from!its!interior!to!its!exterior!or!
vice!versa.!What!is!important,!for!our!purposes,!however,!is!that!an!inscribed,!and!thus!
in!part!internal,!distinction!is!taken!as!fundamental.!It!is!this!that!underlies!every!sign,!
symbol!or!synecdoche!with!which!drawing!a!distinction,!that!is,!marking*a*difference,!
can!be!identified.!
!

Within!the!domain!of!conceptual!forms,!negation,!properly!speaking,!is!the!line,!

or!equivalently,!the!operation!of!demarcation!that!establishes!conceptual!form!by!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46

!Spencer[Brown’s!definition!of!form!is!stipulated!as!follows:!“Call!the!space!cloven!by!any!distinction,!
together!with!the!entire!content!of!the!space,!the!form!of!the!distinction,”!Laws*of*Form,!3.!
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dividing!a!pre[conceptual!or!higher!order!conceptual!terrain!between!an!included!and!
excluded!content!of!a!given!concept.!As!such,!to!anticipate!a!quibble!with!Heidegger’s!
reading!of!Plato,!negation!is!at!once!disclosive!and!exclusive.!The!negative!particle!itself,!
the!sign!of!negation,!e.g.,!ouk,!mē,*non,*not,*nicht,*ne,*etc.,!may!be!used!to!name!or!
mark!such!an!operation,!but,!as!mentioned!above,!negation,!in!its!most!fundamental!
use,!like!the!line!of!demarcation!and!association!between!a!kind!and!its!instances,!
occurs!behind!the!scenes,!even!if!there!are!also!prescribed!signs!for!expressing!it.!
Though!every!concept!is!defined!by!the!configuration!of!boundaries!established!by!
negation,!negation!itself!occurs!neither!within!nor!outside!the!boundaries!marked,!since!
it!simply!is!the!differentiating!operation!of!the!mark!that!divides!them,!albeit!through!
the!enlistment!of!those!contiguous!elements!by!which!a!given!term!is!bounded.!To!put!
this!in!terms!of!the!Hegelian!model!in!which!the!place!of!negation!is!most!fully!realized,!
every!concept!is!infinite*in!structure,!in!the!technical,!Boethian!sense!that!it!has!the!
logical!form!not[x,!and!is!negated!by!contiguous!concepts.!
!

On!the!other!hand,!if!a!conceptual!form,!or!concept,!is!what!is!so!internally!

negated,*it!follows!that!nothing!that!is!not!so!negated!is!a!concept.!More!dramatically,!
perhaps,!it!follows!that!a!Platonic!Form,!on!the!traditional!way!of!conceiving!it,!is!not!a!
form,!and!so!a*fortiori,!is!not!a!conceptual!form.!Thus,!for!example,!in!the!specific!
domain!of!genus[species!relations!with!which!Aristotle!and!the!scholastic!tradition!are!
mainly!concerned,!a!so[called!highest!genus!such!as!being!or!substance,!cannot!be!a!
form,!concept,!etc.,!until!and!unless!it!is!subject!to!division.!Similarly,*being!as!such!is!
!
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not!a!concept,!though!once!situated!within!the!divisions!of!the!Porphyrean!Tree!it!
becomes!one.!This!is!why,!though!it!is!not!the!only!reason!why,!Hegel!identifies!pure*
being!(reine*Sein)!with!nothing:!being*qua*being,!at!least!on!one!way!of!conceiving!of!it,!
is!not!nothing!as!such,!it!is!simply!nothing!conceptually!circumscribable.!This!is!to!begin!
with!simply!a!matter!of!how!being!is!traditionally!regarded.!The!seeming!paradox!does!
not!arise,!for!example,!for!those!who!follow!the!metaphysical!taxonomy!Plato!sketches!
in!the!Republic,!where!the*good!stands!beyond*being!(epekeina*tēs*ousiās)!and!thus!
provides!an!extra[formal!ground!for!a!form!of!being*as!well!as!all!the!forms!or!concepts!
subordinate!to!being.!Here!being!may!well!be!the!most!universal!form,!but!only!because!
there!is!something!more!universal,!or!more!ontologically!fundamental!than!it,!that!is!not!
in!the!strict!sense!a!form.!Though!Plato!says!of!the!good!(to*agathon)!that!in!relation!to!
being*it!is!surpassing*in*rank*and*capacity*(presbeia*kai*dunamei*huperechontos),47!
which!suggests!it!simply!stands!at!the!top!of!the!ontological!scale,!its!role!in!illuminating!
the!other!forms,!on!analogy!with!the!sun,!suggests!a!transcendent!relation!to!forms.!
One!of!the!claims!I!will!argue!for!is!that!in!the!Sophist!Plato!moves!from!the!
ontologically!absolute!notion!of!Form!to!one!that!converges!upon!a!notion!of!conceptual*
form.!
The!calculus!of!forms!offers!a!model!that!exhibits!the!salient!features!of!the!
relationship!between!negation,!(conceptual)!form!and!propositional!structure,!though!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47

!Plato,!Republic!509b7[8.!Unless!otherwise!noted,!translations!from!Plato’s!Republic!are!from!Plato,!
Republic,!trans.!C.!D.!C.!Reeve!(Indiana:!Hackett!Publishing!Company,!2004).!

!

!

37!

at!this!level!of!abstraction!it!cannot!be!precisely!correlated!with!any!of!the!specific!
accounts!I!will!be!examining.!On!this!model,!the!complete!network!of!concepts!or!forms,!
or!any!suitably!circumscribed!region!of!it,!is!itself!a!determined!conceptual!form,!which!
in!its!totality!we!might!identify!with!being,!the!one,!etc.,!provided!these!admit!of!
(negatively)!determined!content.!The!network!is!defined,!or!determined,!by!the!array!of!
concepts!and!the!boundaries!that!separate!these!from,!and!relate!them!to,!one!another.!
The!boundaries!themselves!are!maintained!by!the!differentiating!operation!of!negation,!
which!operation!is!indexically!signaled!whenever!a!concept!is!invoked!or!otherwise!
employed.!As!to!negation!itself,!the!model!is!open!to!both!Platonist!and!intuitionist!or!
constructivist!readings,!though!the!picture!just!sketched!suggests!a!Platonist!construal.!
According!to!this!discourse!the!logical!operation!of!negation,!the!application!of!any!
formal!sign!or!symbol!of!negation,!discloses,!rather!than!establishing,!the!lines!of!
demarcation!that!circumscribe!a!given!concept,!or!the!existent!of!which!that!concept!is!
a!concept.!
What!I!hope!finally!to!make!clear!is!that!the!science!or!method*of*division!is!best!
understood!as!a!logic!of!forms*of!the!sort!just!outlined.!The!aim!of!division!is!to!reveal!
the!lines!of!demarcation,!and!thus!to!map!the!(or!a)!system!of!distinctions,!exclusions!
and!inclusions!that!defines!the!network!of!concepts!or!forms.!It!serves!the!syllogistic!
logic!of!the!categorical!proposition,!for!example,!by!furnishing!it!with!a!map!that!mirrors!
the!“joints!of!nature,”!illuminating!the!lines!of!contiguity!and!ancestry!that!connect!
affiliated!concepts.!The!categorical!proposition!itself,!in!the!simplest!case,!isolates!and!
!
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combines!two!concept!forms!within!this!network,!as!governed!by!the!direction!of!
subsumption!set!by!the!hierarchical!organization!of!the!concepts!themselves!(which!is!
why!individuals!are!not!predicable!of!anything).!In!its!strictest!use,!the!direction!of!
subsumption!is!determined!by!the!asymmetric!character!of!negation,!which,!for!
example,!separates!a!genus!into!its!contiguous!species!(contra!Boethius),!and,!
depending!on!how!one!accounts!for!individuation,!individuates!the!species!themselves.!
As!I!hope!this!brief!sketch!suggests,!Spencer[Brown’s!model!fits!talk!of!concepts!
or!concept[like!entities!particularly!well.!However,!though!I!have!thus!far!spoken!
indifferently!of!concepts,!universals!and!forms,!and!included!a!postulate!of!logico[
metaphysical!isomorphism!amongst!the!theses!of!the!discourse*of*negation,!there!are!a!
number!of!distinctions!to!be!made!out,!especially!if!the!isomorphism!thesis!is!to!amount!
to!anything.!It!is!useful!and!indeed!necessary!to!start!out!speaking!of!concepts,!
universals!and!forms,!though!our!discussion!is!ultimately!directed!towards!an!analysis!
and!presentation!of!Hegel’s!metaphysically!robust!notion!of!the!concept,!which!notion!
can!only!be!understood!as!the!combined!development!of!both!its!logical!and!its!more!
recondite!metaphysical!aspects.!As!Hegel!puts!it:!
The!concept*(Begriff)!is!at!first!to!be!regarded!as!the!third!to!being!and!essence,!to!
the!immediate!and!to!reflection.!Being!and!essence!are!therefore!the!moments!of!its!
becoming,!but!the!concept!is!their!foundation*(Grundlage)!and!truth!as!the!identity!
into!which!they!have!sunk!and!in!which!they!are!contained.”48!
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Because!Plato’s!eidē*!or!ideai,!the!scholastics’!species!or!intentiones,*and!Hegel’s!

Begriff!are!central!to!their!respective!logical!and!metaphysical!views,!and!because,!
though!there!is!much!overlap,!the!ontological!status!of!each!is!somewhat!different,!it!is!
important!to!have!some!basic!distinctions!before!us,!even!if!some!prove!more!difficult!
to!retain.!Again,!basic!ontology!is!crucial!because!this!is!also!the!domain!of!negation!
according!to!the!tradition!I!am!trying!to!describe.!!Whether!one!phrases!things!in!terms!
of!concepts!or!universals!is!of!course!a!matter!of!some!importance,!and!the!distinction!
itself!can!be!drawn!in!several!ways,!depending!on!one’s!views!about!what!each!is.!On!
the!simplest!way!of!conceiving!of!the!distinction,!concepts!are!mind!dependent!and!
universals!are!not.!According!to!the!standard!Aristotelian!account!adopted!by!most!
scholastics!philosophers,!words!refer!to!concepts,!which!in!turn!stand!for!universals!or!
particulars,!though!some!think!concepts!identical!to!universals.!As!far!as!it!goes,!this!
tripartite!semantics!is!nonetheless!metaphysically!neutral.!Nominalists!can!simply!
maintain!that!any!reference!to!universals!is!to!be!cashed!out!in!terms!of!reference!to!
particulars.!On!the!other!hand,!realists,!at!least!scholastic!realists,!distinguish!three!
distinct!ontological!grades!of!universals:!ante*rem*universals,!which!are!metaphysically!
and!epistemically!prior!to!their!instantiations,!e.g.,!Platonic!forms,!in*re!universals,!
traditionally!associated!with!Aristotelian!forms,!or!the!common!quality!or!kind!that!is!in!
each!thing!that!exemplifies!the!universal,!and!post*rem*universals,*concepts!that!
designate!the!in*re!universals!in!those!things!(rēs)!that!fall!under!them.!
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While!scholastic!philosophy!abounds!with!such!distinctions!the!relevant!

oppositions!are!easy!enough!to!canvass:!(1)!real!or!mind[independent!versus!conceptual!
or!mind[dependent,!i.e.,!entia*realia*versus!entia*rationis,!in!the!language!of!scholastic!
philosophy,!(2)!material!versus!immaterial,!(3)!particular!versus!universal!or!general,!
and!(4)!concrete!versus!abstract.!Though!in!the!traditional!discussion!of!universals!such!
distinctions,!even!when!drawn,!are!often!elided,!either!deliberately!or!through!
oversight,!it!would!seem!essential!to!distinguish!them!if!one!is!to!have!any!hope!of!
disambiguating!concepts,!universals,!forms,!etc.,!and!so!of!making!sense!of!the!domain!
and!character!proper!to!negation.!
The!standard!examples!of!distinction!(4),!found!in!both!Plato!and!Aristotle,!are!
mathematical:!while!the!mathematically!conceived!line!is!abstract,!the!visible,!extended!
line!of!the!edge!of!a!table,!for!example,!or!a!line!drawn!between!two!points,!are!both!
concrete;!while!numbers!themselves!are!abstract,!collections!of!things!of!the!
corresponding!cardinality!are!concrete.!Here!what!is!concrete*is!what!is!tangible!or!
perceptible,!and!perhaps!necessarily!thereby!particular.!And!yet!there!are,!ex*hypothesi,!
in*rē*universals,!which!are!both!concrete!and!universal,!and!numbers!(and!perhaps!
Platonic!forms),!for!example,!are!abstract!and!particular.!Thus!(3)!and!(4)!must!be!
distinguished.!Through!the!geometrical!constructions!involved!in!mastering!geometry!
we!learn!about!the!properties!of!geometrical!objects,!though!the!shapes!we!draw!are!
concrete,!while!the!objects!they!teach!us!about!are!abstract.!Both!Plato!and!Aristotle!
think!that!abstract!objects!are!abstracted*from!their!concrete!occurrences,!but!Aristotle!
!
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thinks!they!are!therefore!bound!to!those!occurrences,!whereas!Plato!thinks!the!former!
are!independent!of,!and!indeed!the!models!for,!the!latter.!
It!is!Plato’s!view!that!matters!first!for!the!tradition!under!examination.!Plato!
considers!the!study!of!mathematics!a!pedagogical!prerequisite!for!advancing!to!the!
knowledge!of!forms!(eidē)!in!the!Republic!precisely!because!it!affords!us!the!chance!to!
approach!abstract!entities!indirectly,!through!their!concrete!instances,!e.g.,!triangularity!
itself!and!number!through!triangular!objects!or!images!and!collections!of!things,!and!to!
see,!nonetheless!that!the!abstraction!is!ontologically!prior!to!its!instance.49!For!
abstraction!is!merely!heuristic!to!epistemic!access,!or!rather!recovery,!and!we!ought!not!
to!confuse!it!with!the!results!of!its!application,!as!mathematical!intuitionists!or!
constructivists!might!be!accused!of!doing.!A!triangle!is!not!any!or!all!of!the!concrete!
instances!in!which!triangularity!is!instantiated,!but!neither!is!it!merely!the!common!
feature(s)!abstracted!from!those!instances.!Similarly!a!form!(eidos)!is!not!any!or!all!of!
the!concrete!instances!that!participate!in!or!otherwise!instantiate!it,!although!it!is!
through!the!latter!that!we!come!to!recognize!and!cognize!the!former.!However,!without!
access!to!the!form!of!triangularity,!no!triangle!would!be!recognizable,!even!if!it!is!also!
true!that!traffic!with!triangles!reacquaints!us!with!triangularity,!and!the!act!of!
abstraction!is!vital!to!this!re[acquaintance!(anamnesis).!In!fact!forms!are!not!strictly!
speaking!abstracted!from!their!instances!at!all.!For!if!they!were!so!abstracted,!Socrates’!
disregard!for!instances!in!seeking!definitions!would!be!unprincipled.!Understanding!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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mathematical!objects!can!nonetheless!help!us!to!understand!what!kind!of!thing!a!form!
is!in!relation!to!its!participants.!In!particular!it!can!help!us!to!appreciate!the!prior!reality!
of!things!that!are!in!themselves!unavailable!to!perception.!A!Platonic,!as!opposed!to!an!
Aristotelian,!form!is!an!abstract!entity,!then,!not!in!the!sense!that!it!is!derived!from!
anything!concrete,!but!in!the!sense!that!it!is!beyond!anything!concrete.!
It!should!be!clear,!then,!that!forms!are!not!concepts,!inasmuch!as!concepts!are!
the!products!of!thought!or!intellection,!i.e.,!entia*rationis.!Yet!they!are!conceptual!to!the!
extent!that!they!are!epistemically!grasped,!if!they!are!grasped!at!all,!exclusively!through!
intellection.!More!to!the!point,!from!the!Platonic!perspective,!concreteness!is!inversely!
related!to!ontological!status:!the!more!concrete!a!thing!is,!the!less!real!it!is.!On!the!
other!hand,!for!Hegel,!the!vector(of!concreteness!is!reversed:!the!greater!the!
concreteness,!the!higher!its!ontological!status.!From!Hegel’s!perspective,!!“[t]he!Platonic!
idea!is!nothing!else!than!the!universal,!or!more!precisely,!it!is!the!concept!of!the!subject!
matter/object!(der*Begriff*des*Gegenstandes).”50!!However,!on!Hegel’s!view,!“it!is!only!in!
the!concept”!that!it!“has!actuality,”51!because!it!is!only!there!that!it!finds!its!
determinate,!concrete!content.!Here!concreteness!has!its!more!etymologically!precise!
sense!of!formal*development*and*unity,!from!the!Latin!con\crescere,!to*develop*
together.!Thus,!though!the!Platonic!idea!is!abstract!and!the!Hegelian!Begriff!concrete,!
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both!are!nonetheless!opposed!to!“the!side!of!tangibility!and!of!sensuous!self[
externality,”!which!Hegel!calls!the!side!of!“nullity.”52!
Part!of!what!this!shows!is!that!the!distinctions!above,!though!useful,!are!also!
fluid.!In!particular,!though!an!Hegelian!Begriff!is!certainly!immaterial,!rather!than!
material,!its!being!an!ens*rationis!is!precisely!what!makes!it!an!ens*reale.!!How!more!
precisely!to!parse!the!ontology!of!concepts,!universals!and!individuals!will!occupy!us!
throughout!the!following!chapters.!For!the!moment!it!suffices!to!say!that!whatever!
differences!one!might!make!out!amongst!singular!or!mass!terms,!concepts!and!their!
extensions,!the!connection!between!logical!and!metaphysical!entities!is!an!important!
part!of!what!must!be!rethought!in!assessing!the!discourse!of!negation.!
The!claim!I!argue!for,!essentially!thesis!(8)!above,!namely,!that!beginning!with!
Aristotle!it!is!not!merely!that!categorical!propositions!are!made!up!of!categorical!terms,!
plus!the!copula,!but!that!such!propositions!are!essentially!predicative!expansions!of!
their!subject!terms,!implies!a!still!closer!connection!between!division[defined!terms!and!
syllogistic!argument,!and!thus!between!negation!and!inference.!Commitment!to!
syllogistic!logic!thus!reinforces!dependence!on!the!method!of!division,!which!entails!
commitment!to!a!notion!of!determinate!negation!and!so!to!a!version!of!Hegel’s!
principle!that!we!can!therefore!reformulate!more!precisely!as!follows:!omnis*divisio*est*
negatio.!This!also!provides!yet!further!reason!for!the!claim!that!despite!their!rejection!of!
the!philosophical!conception!of!negation,!Aristotle,!Boethius!and!scholastic!philosophy!
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as!a!whole!are!nonetheless!party!to!it.53!On!the!other!hand,!this!view!of!the!connection!
between!categorical!terms!and!propositions!lies!behind!an!explicit,!guiding!principle!of!
Hegelian!logic,!namely!that!syllogistic!inference!is!driven!by!the!content!of!the!concepts!
employed!in!the!constituent!propositions!of!a!given!syllogism!or!sorites.!
Let!me!conclude!with!a!few!cautions.!What!I!attempt!in!this!dissertation!is!not!an!
exhaustive!study!of!negation,!philosophical!negation,!or!the!more!general!notion!of!
negativity!in!Hegel!or!elsewhere.!Nor!is!it!meant!as!a!philosophical!history!of!negation!or!
negativity,!though!it!is!hoped!it!will!provide!the!basis!for!such!a!history,!and!it!is!my!
intent!to!contribute!something!to!such!a!project!in!subsequent!work.!Nonetheless,!if!the!
focus!is!narrow,!indeed!so!narrow!as!to!be!identifiable,!at!times,!with!the!attributive!use!
of!negation!in!noun!or!adjective!expressions!of!the!form!not\x,!i.e.,!infinite*predicates!in!
traditional!terms,!its!ambitions!and!implications!are!quite!broad.!While!I!concentrate!on!
the!seemingly!limited!use!of!negation!in!the!method!of!division,!this!method!provides!
the!basic!logic!of!the!concept,!and!thus,!as!I!argue,!the!basic!conception!of!the!
categorical!proposition,!from!Plato!through!Aristotle!and!so!the!entire!scholastic!
tradition.!It!also!lies!at!the!heart!of!Hegel’s!engagement!with!Kant!and!the!preceding!
philosophical!tradition,!and!undergirds!much!of!what!is!in!contention!in!recent!and!
contemporary!engagements!with!Hegel,!in!the!work,!for!example,!of!Martin!Heidegger,!
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#
#
CHAPTER#1#
PLATO:#NEGATION#AND#THE#DISCURSIVE#INTERVAL#
Section(One.(Negation,(Logic(and(Metaphysics(
#

In#Plato’s#Sophist#negation#as#such#makes#its#philosophical#debut,#along#with#the#

first#direct#philosophical#treatment#of#concepts,#predication#and#discursive#speech#more#
generally.#That#these#topics#make#their#philosophical#debut#together#is#no#accident,#for#
they#are#intrinsically#connected.#In#the#first#place,#the#predicative.interval,#i.e.,#the#
logical#space#between#concept#and#determination,#is#the#arena#proper#to#negation:#the#
relationship#between#the#subject#and#predicate#terms#of#the#traditionally#conceived#
proposition#is#defined#by#the#specific#combination#of#their#difference#and#identity,#and#
difference#(to.heteron),#Plato#is#first#to#observe,#constitutes#the#fundamental#meaning#of#
negation.#The#reason#for#stating#this#in#terms#of#the#predicative.interval#rather#than#the#
proposition#through#which#that#interval#is#articulated,#to#begin#with,#is#that#difference#
properly#understood#is#what#creates#the#space#that#a#given#predicate,#when#it#functions#
as#a#predicate,#must#cover:#every#predicate#defines#the#difference#opened#up#by#
negation.#The#proposition,#in#turn,#is#the#result#of#traversing#and,#in#part,#closing#that#
space#of#difference,#and#so#is#linguistically#and#logically#secondary.#On#the#other#hand,#to#
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the#extent#that#it#is#in#the#proposition#that#this#interval#is#expressed,#in#another#sense#
the#proposition#is#virtually#simultaneous#with#the#concept(
Indeed,#in#discovering#the#differentiating#function#of#negation,#Plato#also#
uncovers#the#inherently#discursive.character#of#the#concept,#the#logicoTmetaphysical#
successor#of#the#more#exacting#Form#(eidos),#and#a#conception#of#the#proposition,#or#
statement,#as#expressing#what#is#inherent#in#or#otherwise#related#to#the#concept#or#
individual#designated#by#its#subject#term.1#More#dramatically,#albeit#more#
controversially,#if#concepts#are#formally#articulated#in#the#way#I#have#suggested,#then#
Plato’s#discovery#of#discursivity#is#in#essence#a#discovery#of#the#concept#of#the#concept#
itself!#To#reiterate,#negation#is#what#launches#discursivity,#inasmuch#as#it#is#with#
negation#that#the#characteristic#contribution#of#mind#to#the#cognition#of#world#is#made#
apparent.#Whatever#the#relationship#between#mind#and#world#is#taken#to#be,#it#is#
through#negation#that#mind#takes#its#first#step#beyond#the#world#into#the#autonomy#of#
expression.2#This#first#step,#the#emergence#of#the#autonomy#of#expression#is#not#to#be#
identified#with,#but#is#connected#to#what#Freud#describes#in#terms#of#the#constitution#of#
the#unconscious.#As#mentioned#in#the#Introduction,#although#the#unconscious,#according#
########################################################
1

#The#discursiveness#of#the#concept#should#hardly#seem#a#surprising#notion#to#contemporary#philosophers,#
for#whom#Frege’s#treatment#of#the#concept#as#a#function#that#converts#referring#expressions#into#
propositions#is#canonical.#In#his#From.Plato.to.Platonism#(Cornell:#Cornell#University#Press,#2013),#Lloyd#
Gerson#argues,#similarly,#that#a#discursive#line#on#concepts#is#canonical#for#Plato,#Platonists#and#
Neoplatonists#alike.#
#
2
#This#autonomy#can#be#made#out#even#in#the#most#radical#idealism,#since#to#the#extent#that#such#idealism#
is#intelligible#the#distinction#between#world#and#mind#persists,#but#as#an#internal#one#between#the#mind#
and#what#it#constitutes.##
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to#Freud,#knows#no#negation#it#is#itself#the#outcome#of#the#primary#operation#of#
repression#to#which#the#expression#of#negation#is#psychogenetically#and#symbolically#
linked,#and,#owing#to#this#link,#it#is#through#the#conscious#enunciation#of#negation#that#
access#to#the#unconscious#is#made#possible.#
Plato#can#be#thought#of#as#making#the#same#point,#but#from#a#logicoT
metaphysical#standpoint:#although#being#itself,#along#with#every#other#autonomous#
Form,#knows#no#negation,#it#is#made#visible#as#and#in#a#world,#i.e.,#as#an#integrated#
multiplicity,#by#virtue#of#the#difference#negation#makes#expressible#within#it.#To#align#
Plato’s#analytic#remark#with#Freud’s#psychoanalytic#one:#when#one#says#the#things#that#
are#(ta.onta),#it#is#as#certain#that#one#thereby#says#the#things#that#are#not#(ta.mē.onta),#
by#virtue#of#the#fact#that#one#says#anything#at#all.#While#Freud#unveils#the#subterranean#
layer#of#psychic#content#behind#the#use#of#negation,#Plato#unveils#the#subterranean#play#
of#negation#behind#the#scenes,#in#the#multitudinous#world#of#ordinary#speech.#This#
marks#a#significant#divergence#from#Parmenides,#for#whom#there#is#no#world,#since#
there#is#no#multiplicity,#and#from#Plato’s#allegiance#in#earlier#dialogues#to#an#ontology#of#
remote#intelligibles.#
Falsehood,#so#it#will#turn#out,#is#philosophically#important#for#Plato#not#primarily#
because#the#sophist#must#be#accounted#for,#but#because#it#is#through#falsehood#that#the#
role#of#negation#arises#as#a#philosophical#issue,#because#in#explaining#falsehood#we#are#
compelled#to#employ#negation#in#order#to#speak#of#the#categorical#way#in#which#speech#
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and#the#world#diverge.#In#the#much#earlier#Cratylus,#most#famously,#Plato#ventures#
the#idea#that#a#name#or#referring#expression#(onoma)#is#an#educative#(didaskalikon)#
instrument#(organon),#that#is,#one#that#permits#the#discrimination#or#determination#of#
being#(diakritikon.tēs.ousias)3#and#his#acknowledgment#of#the#possibility#that#names#can#
go#astray#might#be#considered#a#recognition#that#naming#itself#is#autonomous,#although#
it#turns#out#that,#properly#construed,#it#is#simply#a#difficult#matter#to#accomplish.4#At#any#
rate,#although#there#may#be#an#analogy#to#be#drawn#between#names#and#statements,#
and,#more#importantly#for#our#purposes,#between#the#possibility#of#misnaming#
associated#with#the#former#and#that#of#falsehood#associated#with#the#latter,#Plato#
neglects#to#draw#it.#
While#the#noetic#record#of#perceptual#encounter#is#of#course#cognitive,#the#mind#
in#this#circumstance#is#an#instrument#of#reception,#simply#registering#what#is#presented#
to#it#through#the#senses.#On#the#other#hand,#both#abstraction#to#the#intelligible#content#
and#the#integration#of#that#content#into#the#structure#of#judgment#require#the#sort#of#
########################################################
3

#Cratylus#388b13Tc1.#I#take#it,#along#with#most#translators,#that#the#kai#conjoining#didaskalikon#and#
diakritikon#is#exegetical,#i.e.,#explanatory,#although#nothing#much#turns#on#whether#there#are#other#
respects#in#which#names#might#be#thought#to#be#educative.#It#is#perhaps#instructive#that#Augustine,#for#
example,#argues#in#De.Magistro#that#names#are#of#little#didactic#value,#but#this#has#to#do#with#their#use#in#
teaching#and#so#is#consistent#with#their#being#revelatory,#which#is#what#Plato#really#seems#to#mean#in#this#
context.#On#the#other#hand,#Proclus,#in#his#commentary#on#this#passage,#uses#precisely#the#same#term#T##
revelatory.(ekphantorikos)#T##to#describe#the#role#of#names#Plato#seems#to#be#getting#at.#See#Procli.
Diadochi#In.Platonis.Cratylum.Commentaria,#edited#by#G.#Pasquali#(Leipzig:#B.#G.#Teubner,#1908),##§XLVIII.##
#
4
#Plato’s#ultimate#position#in#the#Cratylus#has#been#variously#characterized,#with#most#recent#
commentators,#e.g.,#Rachel#Barney,#Names.and.Nature.in.Plato’s.Cratylus#(New#York:#Routledge,#2001),#
disputing#the#conventionalist#view#attributed#to#Plato,#as#a#matter#of#course,#by#the#majority#of#earlier#
commentators.#
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differentiation#whose#principal#operation#is#negation.#As#indicated#in#the#Introduction,#
the#implication#here#is#that#for#Plato#(and#following#him,#Aristotle)#negation#is#
fundamentally,#and#natively,#propositional,#but#not#because#it#is#sentential,#in#the#
familiar#sense#of#being#a#truth#function#on#sentences#or#propositions.5#Rather,#negation#
is#propositional#in#the#sense#that#it#is#what#in#the#first#place#marks#the#boundary#
between#any#two#terms#that#can#be#brought#into#relation#with#one#another,#either#in#the#
unifying#composition#of#the#affirmative,#or#the#differentiating#division#of#the#negative#
proposition.#Another#way#of#putting#this#is#to#say#that#negation#is#what#stands#between#
terms#such#that#they#can#be#brought#into#the#basic#relations#of#difference#and#identity#
with#one#another.#That,#at#any#rate,#is#what#I#will#argue#is#what#Plato#shows#us#in#the#
Sophist,#and#what#Aristotle#gives#a#formal#account#of#in#the#Prior.Analytics.#However,#
between#what#Plato#shows#us#and#what#Aristotle#gives.an#account#of#there#lies#not#
merely#the#distance#between#a#picture#sketched#and#an#explicit,#formal#theory,#but#the#
profound#gap#between#a#view#of#discourse#that#assigns#negation#a#central#role#(Plato)#
and#one#that#marginalizes#its#use#and#importance#(Aristotle).#
########################################################
5

#It#is#perhaps#a#confusion#between#these#two#claims#that#has#led#many#commentators#on#both#Plato#and#
Aristotle#to#insist#that#negation#is#fundamentally#or#exclusively#attributive#for#both.#Robert#Turnbull’s#
assurance,#as#a#matter#of#settled#presumption,#that#“both#Plato#and#Aristotle#think#of#negation#rather#as#
negation#of#terms#than#as#a#sentential#connective”#is#typical#of#the#rather#baffling#expression#of#
confidence#in#a#view#that#is#decisively#contradicted#by#passages#in#the#Sophist#and#in#Aristotle’s#De.
Interpretatione,#where,#for#example,#Aristotle#declares#that#“#‘notTman’#is#not#a#name,#nor#is#there#any#
correct#name#for#it.#It#is#neither#a#phrase#nor#a#negation#(apophasis)”(16a29)#and#later#that#“without#a#
verb#there#will#be#no#affirmation#or#negation”#(19b11).#See#Robert#G.#Turnbull,#The.Parmenides.and.
Plato’s.late.Philosophy:#Translation.of.and.Commentary.on.the.Parmenides.with.Interpretative.Chapters.
on.the.Timaeus,.the.Theaetetus,.the.Sophist,.and.the.Philebus#(Toronto;#Buffalo:#University#of#Toronto#
Press,#1998).#

#
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By#subject,#and#indeed#by#its#traditional#title,#this#dialogue#is#concerned#with#

the#kinds,#degrees#and#facsimiles#of#being#and#nonTbeing#–#nonTbeing#simpliciter#(#to.mē#
on),#nonFbeings#or#thingsTthatTareTnot#(ta.mē.onta),#copies#or#imitations#(mimēmata),#
images#(eidōla),#simulacra#(eikones),#apparitions#(phantasmata),#and,#at#its#center,#an#
apparitional#form#of#human#being,#the#sophist#himself.#Whatever#the#sophist#might#be,#
he#is#not#plainly#visible,#and#the#substantial#philosophical#reason#for#this#is#that#what#he#
does,#what#would#make#him#visible#qua#sophist#is#either#difficult#or#impossible#to#make#
out.#This#is#because#the#characteristic#activity#of#the#sophist,#i.e.,#presenting#falsehoods#
as#true,#“saying#things#but#not#true#ones#(legein.men.atta,.alēthē.de.mē),”6#involves#him#
in#“opining#or#saying#things#that#are#not#(doxazein.ē.legein.ta.mē.onta).”7#Because#the#
sophist’s#métier#is#thus#“what#is#not,”#and#so#what#is#in#principle#unavailable#to#sense#or.
intellect,#he#is#himself,#qua#sophist,#invisible#if#nonTexistent,#in#the#broad#sense#of#not#
being#present#in#or#to#appearance#(phantasia).#
It#is#important#from#the#outset,#however,#to#distinguish#the#broad#sense#of#
invisibility,#absence#or#inapprehensibility#that#pertains#to#the#sophist#from#the#more#
narrow#sense#of#the#invisible#(aoratos)#that#pertains#to#incorporeal#forms#(eidē/ideai),#
which,#though#unavailable#to#the#senses,#are#for#Plato#the#very#essence#of#what#is#
########################################################
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#Sophist#236e2.#All#translations#of#Plato’s#Sophist#are#adapted#from#Plato's.Sophist.or.The.Professor.of.
Wisdom:.Translation,.Introduction,.and.Glossary,#translated#by#Eva#Brann,#Peter#Kalkavage,#and#Eric#Salem#
(Newburyport,#MA:#Focus#Philosophical#Library,#1996),#except#where#indicated.#
#
7
#Sophist#260c3.#

#

52#

present#to#intellection,#and#thus#of#what#can#appear.veridically#(phainetai).8#The#
possibility#of#the#sophist’s#inaccessibility#foreshadows#the#far#more#serious#possibility#of#
the#inaccessibility#of#truth,#in#part#because#the#sophist#himself#may#be#regarded#as#the#
shadowy#double#of#the#philosopher,#committed#to#the#illusion#of#knowledge#and#truth#
rather#than#knowledge#and#truth#themselves,#though#still#thereby#retaining#a#
fundamental#relationship#to#the#latter.#Of#course#both#the#philosopher#and#the#sophist#
are#in#principle#as#available#to#sense#as#any#other#sensible#objects,#qua#men.#What#
separates#the#philosopher#from#the#sophist#is#the#former’s#commitment#to#the#truth,#
and#the#visibility#afforded#him#by#the#ontological#eminence#of#ta.onta,#although#that#
commitment#is#not#on#its#own#enough#to#secure#the#semantic#and#epistemic#access#to#
which#his/her#identity#is#fundamentally#connected.#
The#deeper#issue#at#stake#here,#as#already#suggested,#concerns#the#ontological#
status#of#the#empirically#remote,#under#which#general#rubric#we#ought#to#include#
fictional#and#mathematical#objects#along#with#those#of#immediate#relevance#T#forms,#
meanings,#concepts,#and#the#correlates#of#statements#or#judgments.#Part#of#what#Plato#
is#grappling#with#in#the#Sophist#are#the#diverse#kinds#of#existence#or#being#within#the#
environment#of#our#cognitive#and#perceptual#interactions#that#the#coarse#dichotomy#
between#being#and#nonFbeing#seems#inadequate#to#account#for.#Plato#first#broaches#the#
########################################################
8

#Sophist#247b1T5.#Veridical#appearance#is#the#standard#sense#of#the#Greek#verb#phainetai#plus#a#
participle,#which#thus#through#the#ordinary#resources#of#grammar#marks#a#distinction#between#the#
veridical#and#mere#appearance,#for#which#dokei#plus#the#infinitive#is#typically#used#instead.#
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issue#in#terms#of#the#enumerability#of#existents,#e.g.,#names,#whose#discernibility#from#
their#designata#would#appear#to#grant#them#an#existence#independent#of#the#latter#
(244bT245d).#
There#is#more#to#say#in#this#regard,#for#the#profusion#of#names#and#definitions#
cast#forth#to#capture#the#sophist,#to#render#him#intelligible,#suggests#a#further,#albeit#
equally#coarse,#opposition#between#philosophical#loquacity#and#silence,#or,#more#to#the#
point,#between#the#philosopher#who,#in#the#interest#of#truth,#ventures#pronouncement#
and#the#philosopher#who,#on#the#same#basis,#falls#silent#upon#a#principle#of#parsimony#
applied#in#its#most#radical#form,#in#the#form,#that#is,#of#Parmenides’#edict#against#
attribution.#And#so,#if#the#alternative#paths#of#truth#and#falsehood,#or#of#being#and#nonT
being,#Parmenides#describes9#are#that#of#the#monist#and#that#of#the#sophist,#
respectively,#then#the#Sophist’s#Xenos,#the#foreign#or#unfamiliar#other,#defines,#at#the#
very#least,#a#third#path,#that#of#the#plurality#of#truths,#and#a#third#philosophical#or#
conceptual.persona,10#the#heterologist,#i.e.,#the#philosopher#of#difference,#whose#
########################################################
9

#The#distinction#between#the#two#paths#(hodoi)#is#laid#out#in#Parmenides#fragment#B2.#All#citations#of#
Parmenides#are#from#the#edition#of#the#fragments#in#H.#Diels#and#W.#Kranz,#Die.Fragmente.der.
th
Vorsokratiker,#6 #edition#(Berlin:#Weidmann,#1951T52).#
#
10
#The#expression#“conceptual#persona”#is#borrowed#from#Gilles#Deleuze#and#Felix#Guattari#(see#their#
What.is.Philosophy?,#translated#by#Hugh#Tomlinson#and#Graham#Burchell#(New#York:#Columbia#University#
Press,#1994),#although#talk#of#a#philosopher#of#difference#is#meant,#in#part,#as#a#challenge#to#Deleuze’s#
critique#of#Plato’s#identification#of#negation#with#difference,#in#his#Difference.and.Repetition,#translated#by#
Paul#Ratton#(New#York:#Columbia#University#Press,#1994).#Deleuze’s#argument#is#roughly#that#a#negative.
account#of#difference#robs#difference#of#its#philosophical#significance.#Curiously,#Hegel#complains#about#
Plato’s#account#that#it#fails#to#give#negation#its#due#negativity,#i.e.,#in#the#form#of#contradiction.#The#
polemical#intent#here#is#to#recover#the#philosophical#significance#of#difference#as#negation.#
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pluralism,#to#be#more#precise,#commits#him#not#to#the#relativity#of#truth,#but#to#its#
discursiveness,#to#what#Badiou,#from#an#ontological#perspective,#has#called#the.
multiple.11#Because#difference.as.such.will#turn#out#to#be#expressed#by#negation,#the#
philosopher#of#difference#will#also#turn#out#to#be#the#philosopher#of#negation.#
However,#in#this#interplay#of#proximate#figures#and#problems,#the#crucial#parallel#
concerns#the#official#philosophical#issue#at#the#center#of#the#dialogue#as#a#whole,#i.e.,#the#
possibility#of#falsehood.#The#exploration#of#falsehood#and#its#modes#of#simulation#and#
duplication#reveal#the#still#more#pressing#concern#with#truth#and#its#principal#mode#of#
expression.#For#this#reason#the#account#of#negation#here#constitutes#a#specifically#
philosophical#debut,#one#in#which#it#is#made#the#basis#of#the#philosophical#analysis,#first,#
of#false#speech,#i.e.,#saying.the.things.that.are.not.(legein.ta.mē.onta),#and#second,#and#
more#importantly,#of#discursive#speech#and#thought#tout.court.#Beyond#this,#the#accord#
granted#negation#expresses#a#new#conception#of#the#relationship#between#philosophical#
expression#and#ordinary#language,#and#more#pointedly,#within#philosophy#itself,#an#
alternative#view#of#the#relationship#between#metaphysics#and#logic,#or#dialectic.(hē.
technē.dialektikē.)#as#it#is#usually#designated,#which#Plato#defines#as#“the#art#concerning#
########################################################
11

#How#one#ought#to#understand#“the#multiple”#is#a#crucial#issue#for#Badiou,#and#that#which#separates#him#
from#Deleuze#and#what#has#been#identified#as#the#traditional#metaphysics#of#presence,#to#which#Badiou#
thinks#Heidegger#is#still#beholden,#and#to#which#he#seeks#to#oppose#the#minimalist#ontology#of#the#“pure#
multiple,”#which#he#identifies#with#“algebraic#topology#and#functional#analysis”#i.e.,#the#bare#form#to#
which#anything#that#is#must#conform.#See#Alain#Badiou,#Being.and.Event,#translated#by#Oliver#Feltham#
(London;#New#York:#Continuum,#2005)#14.#(
#
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logoi#(hē.peri.tōn.logōn.technē),”12#or#“the#method#of#logoi#(hē.methodos.tōn.
logōn),”13#where#“hoi.logoi”#may#be#understood#as#referring#either#to#
propositions/statements,#or#collectively#to#discursive#speech#in#general.#
What#I#mean#is#this:#It#is#a#presupposition#of#the#argument#of#Parmenides’#great#
philosophical#poem#that,#to#put#it#simply,#metaphysics#is#the#basis#of#logic,#that#what#
being#is#determines#what#we#can#legitimately#say#of#it,#and#what#we#can#meaningfully#
say#about#anything,#in#purely#formal#terms,#and#this#appears#to#be#an#assumption#shared#
by#Plato#for#much,#though#not#all,#of#his#philosophical#life.#For#both#Parmenides#and#the#
early#and#middle#Plato,#our#ordinary#talk#about#what#things#are#and#how#they#are#to#be#
defined#runs#afoul#of#how#things#actually#are,#although#it#is#also#through#an#examination#
of#the#universal#elements#or#structures#of#speech#that#we#can#lay#claim#to#how#things#
are.#If#ordinary#talk#is#to#be#made#to#accord#with#how#things#are#it#must#be#constrained#
by#the#logical#picture#that#best#corresponds#to#how#things#are,#whether#this#leads#to#the#
unforgiving#monophony#prescribed#by#Parmenides,#or#the#merely#straitened#discourse#
of#forms#defended#by#Plato.#The#metaphysics#of#forms,#i.e.,#the#proper#objects#of#
philosophical#understanding#or#knowledge#(epistēmē),#determines#what#is#to#count#as#a#
philosophically#wellTformed#claim.#Such#claims,#as#we#learn#throughout#the#early#and#
middle#dialogues,#must,#in#particular,#assume#the#logical#form#proper#to#the#
########################################################
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#Phaedo#90b.#

#

13

#Sophist#227a.#
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identification#of#what#a#thing#is,#its#essence,#i.e.,#of#the#ti.esti.or#ho.esti.of#the#
definiendum..This#form#requires#making#the#relevant#item#of#philosophical#analysis#the#
subject#of#predication,#and#the#terms#of#its#definition#the#predicate(s)#of#a#proposition#
(logos),#e.g.,#pleasure.is.(a.kind.of).restoration.#Of#course#grammar#has#a#role#to#play#as#
well,#since#it#is#through#syntax,#inflection#and#the#grammar#of,#for#example,#
demonstratives#and#general#terms,#that#such#roles#are#expressed:#“This#is#x,”#for#
example,#is#formally#inadequate#to#the#task#of#saying#what#Xness#is.#This#general#
privileging#of#metaphysics#over#logic#and#grammar#is#still#evident#in#Plato’s#Parmenides,#
which#nonetheless#represents#Plato’s#most#sustained#examination#of#the#logic#of#being#
and#nonTbeing.#
However,#in#the#Sophist,#Plato#acknowledges,#in#addition,#a#grounding#relation#
that#runs#in#the#opposite#direction,#from#the#general#requirements#of#speech#to#
metaphysics.#In#moving#from#the#combinatory#rules#of#forms#to#those#of#letters#in#words#
(onomata),#and#finally#to#those#of#words#in#propositions#(logoi),#Plato#suggests#a#
correlation#between#phonetics,#grammar#and#logic,#on#the#one#hand,#and#ontology#on#
the#other.#The#suggestion#here#is#not#that#metaphysics#is#determined#by#logic,#but#that#it#
is#exhibited#and#thus#revealed#in#the#basic#logical#structures#of#speech.#The#crux#of#this#
shift#lies#in#the#phenomenon#of#negation,#whose#logical#appearance#seems#initially#
without#any#obvious#or#palatable#ontological#correlate.#To#see#this,#as#well#as#much#else#
that#is#important#for#the#development#in#Plato’s#thought#I#am#trying#to#trace,#depends,#
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in#part,#upon#seeing#the#Sophist#in#relation#to#the#Parmenides,#where#the#behavior#of#
negation#is#examined#from#the#largely#metaphysical#standpoint#of#nonTbeing,#within#the#
context#of#a#semantics#of#naming#and#without#a#direct#examination#of#negation#itself.#
Nonetheless,#on#the#basis#of#metaphysical#considerations#the#discussion#in#the#
Parmenides#establishes#the#framework#for#a#logical#analysis#of#negation#and#thereby#
points#beyond#naming#to#the#logic#of#predication#presented#in#the#Sophist.#I#begin,#
therefore,#with#a#discussion#of#passages#from#the#former#that#are#central#to#our#concern#
with#the#logic#and#metaphysics#of#negation.#
Section(Two.(The(Parmenides:(The(Limits(of(Naming(
Plato’s#Parmenides#is#regularly#and#justifiably,#because#philosophically,#divided#
into#two#parts,#the#first#an#attempt#to#explain#the#participation#relationship#(methexis)#
between#forms#(eidē/ideai)#and#their#instances#or#exemplifications,#the#second#an#
examination#of#the#problem#of#the#one#and#the#many#(which#the#specification#of#the#
participation#relation#was#supposed#to#have#resolved)#through#eight#(or#nine)#
deductions#based#upon#four#hypotheses.#Although#commentators#have#differed#on#how#
best#to#see#the#philosophical#connection,#if#any,#between#the#two#parts,#the#first#part#
can#be#understood#as#giving#way#quite#naturally#to#the#second,#inasmuch#as#the#second#
can#be#seen#as#an#oblique#approach#to#explaining#the#participation#relation#through#the#
terms#that#comprise#it,#once#the#direct#route#of#explaining#this#relation#has#given#way#to#
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impasse.14#Since,#as#Plato#informs#us#in#the#Philebus,15#it#is#via#speech#(logos)#that#the#
problem#of#the#one#and#the#many#arises,#the#issues#at#stake#concern#not#only#the#
relationship#between#forms#and#their#instances,#but#also#the#kinds#of#linguistic#
expressions#that#depend#upon#and#express#that#relationship.#Parmenides#had#famously#
argued#against#there#being#any#relationship#at#all#between#the#one#and#the#many,#in#
effect#claiming#that#any#such#connection#constitutes#a#foray#from#being#into#nonTbeing,#
and#thus#challenged#both#the#metaphysical#possibility#of#multiplicity#and#the#logicoT
semantic#one#of#predication.#
Yet#despite#the#concurrence#of#these#topics#in#a#single#dialogue,#and#the#regular#
association#of#participation#with#predication,#participation#(methexis)#is#never#presented#
here#as#an#account#of#predication.#This#is#in#part#because#before#the#Sophist.Plato#simply#
has#no#descriptive#vocabulary#for,#let#alone#a#theory#of,#predication.16#Furthermore,#
########################################################
14

#My#view#of#the#relation#between#the#two#halves#of#the#text#coincides#roughly#with#Turnbull’s#in#
supposing#that#the#second#half#furnishes#what#Turnbull#calls#the#“logical#structure”#of#the#world.#However,#
I#depart#from#Turnbull#with#regard#to#what#this#logical.structure#amounts#to.#In#particular,#Turnbull’s#claim#
that#“both#Plato#and#Aristotle#think#of#negation#rather#as#negation#of#terms#than#as#a#sentential#
connective”#is#contradicted#by#passages#from#both#Plato#and#Aristotle#and#grossly#underestimates#the#role#
of#negation#in#logical#structure.#Turnbull’s#rejection#of#Cornford’s#construal#of#the#hypotheses#as#claims#
about#forms#rather#than#as#claims#about#“terms”#is#also#partially#correct,#in#my#view#(see#Francis#
MacDonald#Cornford,#Plato.and.Parmenides#(London#and#New#York:#Routledge,#2010).#Yet#it#is#also#
importantly#wrong#in#not#recognizing#that#what#I#call#the#syncategorematic#hypotheses,#which#Turnbull#
calls#“Platonic,”#signify#a#shift#from#forms#to#concepts,#as#I#argue#below.#
#
15
#Philebus#15d4T8.##
#
16
#That#Plato#is#indeed#talking#about#predication#when#he#speaks#of#participation#is#generally#assumed#by#
commentators,#e.g.,#Vlastos,#Ackrill,#Owen,#etc.#It#is#also#a#remarkable#feature#of#these#commentators#that#
having#saddled#Plato#with#an#interest#in#predication#they#then#go#on#to#point#to#one#or#more#fairly#obvious#
distinctions#he#is#alleged#to#have#missed.#Needless#to#say#if#Plato#is#not#giving#an#account#of#predication#in#
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Plato#never#claims#that#to#say#that#“x#is#y”#is#just#to#say.that#“x#participates#in#Y,”17#or#
even#that#“x#is#y”#means,#or#is#true#(if#and)#only#if#“x#participates#in#Y.”#So#although#he#
regularly#uses#participation#to#account#for#what#we#would#consider#predicative#relations,#
he#never#indicates#that#in#doing#so#he#is#providing#an#analysis,#semantic#or#otherwise,#of#
predication#as#such,#or#of#sentences#or#propositions.#What#he#does#seem#to#be#doing,#
quite#explicitly,#is#providing#the#metaphysical#basis#for#an#account#of#naming.#
In#a#familiar#and#characteristic#account#from#the#Phaedo,#to#take#but#one#
example,.participation#in#a#relevant#form#X#is#cited#as#the#explanation#for#something’s#
being.x#and#being#called#or#named#x.#Here,#as#in#many#other#passages,#Plato,#recurring#to#
what#is#surely#more#exemplar#than#mere#example,#speaks#of#“the#many#beautiful#things#
(tōn.pollōn.kallōn),#such#as#human#beings,#or#horses#or#cloaks”#as#homonymous#with#the#
form#of#the#beautiful#in#which#these#many#partake.18#Though#Plato#often#characterizes#
this#relationship#in#terms#of#eponymy#(epōnymia)#rather#than#homonymy#(homōnymia),#
the#point#seems#clear:#participant#objects#are#named#from#that#in#which#they#
participate.#Again,#this#is#not#to#deny,#of#course,#that#things#related#to#one#another#
through#the#expressions#used#to#designate#them#bear#further#relations#to#one#another#
#####################################################################################################################################################################
some#context#then#he#can’t#fairly#be#accused#of#having#failed#to#recognize#that#it#comes#in#two#or#more#
varieties,#e.g,,#“normal”#and#“Pauline”#predication,#as#Gregory#Vlastos#informs#us##(“A#note#on#‘Pauline#
Predications’#in#Plato,”#Phronesis#19#(1974):#95T101).#
#
17
#Throughout#I#use#lower#case#letters#for#the#names#of#nonTforms,#upper#case#letters#to#name#forms.#
#
18
#Phaedo#78d10Te3.#
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that#pertain#to#predication#(a#connection#Aristotle#makes#clear#in#the#Categories).#It#is#
just#to#say#that#methexis#itself#is#fundamentally#ontological,#and#that#this#bears#directly#
on#the#semantics#of#naming,#not#predication.#
So#what#does#this#semantics#amount#to?#We#can#attempt#an#answer#to#this#in#
terms#of#eponymy#or#homonymy,#since#it#is#roughly#in#these#terms#that#Aristotle#will#
venture#an#alternative#view#in#the#Categories.#If#“Beautiful”#names#the#form#of#the#
beautiful#it#does#so#as#a#nominal#expression#“the#Beautiful#(to.kalon),”#and#is#equivalent#
to#“beauty.”#To#say#that#“the#Beautiful#is#beautiful”#is#to#say#something#obviously#true#
because#“the#Beautiful”#and#“beautiful”#name#the#same#thing,#i.e.,#the#form#of#the#
Beautiful.#But#then#it#is#not#to#predicate#“beautiful”#of#“the#Beautiful,”#despite#the#longT
standing#view#that#Plato#accepts#the#selfTpredication#of#forms!#On#the#other#hand,#if#
“Plato#is#beautiful”#is#true,#then#it#is#not#because#“Plato”#names#what#“beautiful”#names,#
but#because#Plato#has,#in#some#appropriate#sense#of#“having”#purportedly#captured#by#
the#participation#relation,#what#“beautiful”#names.#Plato#is#named#“beautiful”#
derivatively,#not#as#an#extension#of#“beautiful”#but#rather#as#something#that#participates#
in#what#“beautiful”#names,#which,#absent#an#account#of#the#predicative#use#of#names,#is#
what#being#named#homonymously#or#eponymously#amounts#to#for#Plato.#It#is#to#the#
extent#that#Plato#permits#the#elision#of#naming#and#predication#that#he#accedes#to#the#
logical#parity#of#“the#Beautiful#is#beautiful”#and#“Plato#is#beautiful”#and#is#thus#drawn#
into#the#thirdTman#consequences#of#selfTpredication.#Logical#parity,#in#other#words,#

#

61#

suggests#ontological#propinquity,#i.e.,#it#suggests#that#the#form#and#its#participant(s)#
are#like#one#another,#resemble#one.another,#and#in#particular#that#they#resemble#one#
another#with#respect#to#the#property#the#former#communicates#to#the#latter.#This#
appears#to#be#the#inference#conceded#in#the#first#part#of#the#Parmenides#itself,#where#
forms.are#characterized#as#paradeigmata.en.tēi.physei,.as.patterns,.paradigms#or#
exemplars#in#nature,#their#participants#as#likenesses#(homoiōmata),#and#the#relation#
between#the#two#(i.e.,#participation)#as#being.made.in.their.likeness.or.image#
(eikasthēnai).19#
Now#whatever#the#ontological#status#of#paradigms.in.nature#might#amount#to,#it#
is#clear#from#the#context#that#their#being#in.nature#represents#a#response,#or#at#the#very#
least#a#marked#alternative,#to#Parmenides’#objection#to#conceiving#of#forms.as#mere#
concepts#or#thoughts#(noēmata).20#Parmenides#is#quick#to#point#out#that#it#is#what#the#
noēma#is#of.or#about#that#things#must#participate#in,#unless#those#things#themselves#are#
also#to#be#regarded#as#mere#thoughts.#Yet#if#the#participant#is#a#likeness#or#icon#(eikōn)#
of#the#form,#then#resemblance#would#appear#to#constitute#its#very#essence,#and,#since#
resemblance#is#symmetric,#so#the#argument#goes,#the#form.will#also#resemble#its#
participant,#which#it#can#only#do#if#both#the#form.and#its#participant#participate#in#
another#form#to#ground#their#resemblance,#which#grounding#form.will#necessitate#yet#
########################################################
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#Parmenides#132d1T4.#
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#“Alla,.phanai,.ō.Parmenidē,.ton.Sōcratē,.mē.tōn.eidōn.hekaston.ēi.toutōn.noēma,”#Parmenides#132b3.#
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another#form#to#explain#the#resemblance#between#itself#and#the#original.form,#and#so#
on#ad.infinitum.#As#Plato#presents#it:#
PARMENIDES:#If#then#something#is#like#(eoiken)#the#form#(eidei),#would#that#form#not#
be#such#as#to#be#like#the#thing#made#in#its#likeness#(tōi.eikasthenti),#to#the#extent#that#
that#thing#was#made#like#(aphōmoiōthē)#it,#or#is#there#some#device#through#which#
the#like#might#not#be#like#a#like#thing?#SOCRATES:#No#there#is#not.#PARMENIDES:#
Then#is#there#not#a#great#necessity#that#that#which#is#like#what#is#like#it#participate#in#
one#and#the#same#form?21#
The#infinite#regress#here#attaches#to#likeness#or#resemblance,#but#while#this#does#indeed#
amount#to#a#reductio#argument#against#conceiving#of#participation#in#terms#of#a#
symmetric#resemblance#relation,#it#does#not#thereby#constitute#an#argument#against#
participation#as#such,#or#against#the#role#of#intelligible#exemplars,#i.e.,#forms.#What#is#
more,#Plato#acknowledges#as#much,#having#Socrates#finally#concede#the#point#that#“it#is#
not#by#likeness#(homoiotēti)#that#the#many#partake#of#(metalambanei)#the#forms.”22#
#

But#if#not#by#likeness.then#by#what?#To#begin#with,#the#conception#of#forms#as#

patterns#or#exemplars#(paradeigmata)#was#introduced#to#forestall#their#inclusion#in#the#
plurality#of#likenesses.(homoiōmata).#A#plurality#of#likenesses,#without#any#exemplar#to#
bind#them,#is#necessarily#heterogeneous,#since#likeness#is#not#transitive,#and#so#not#
susceptible#to#being#known.#Plato#ventures#this#description#of#the#participation#relation#
in#order#to#highlight#the#ontological#divide#between#the#unicity#of#the#original#form#and#
the#plurality#of#its#participants,#following#an#earlier#version#that#makes#no#explicit#
########################################################
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#Parmenides#132d9Te1.#
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#Parmenides#133a5.#
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provision#for#ontological#difference#and#gives#rise#to#a#formulation#of#the#thirdTman#
argument#that#emphasizes#the#unspecified#causal#power#of#forms#to#generate#and#
explain#the#appearance#of#whatever#it#is#they#are#forms#of.#This#earlier#version#is#put#in#
terms#of#the#oneTmany#relation,#specifically,#between#the#totality#of,#for#example,#large#
things#and#the#form#of#largeness#“by.which#all#these#things#appear#large#(hōi.tauta.panta.
megala.phainesthai).”23#Here#the#regress#of#forms.proceeds#directly#from#their#causalT
explanatory#role,#and,#since#Aristotle#first#so#identified#it,24#it#is#this#version#of#the#thirdT
man#argument#that#has#underwritten#its#common#formulation#(beginning#with#
Ammonius)#in#terms#of#selfTpredication:#If#everything#of#which#F#is#predicated#is#F.by#
virtue#of#its#participation#in#the#form.F,#then#if#the#form#F#is#itself#F#(and#how#can#it#not#
be?),#it#must#be#so#by#virtue#of#its#participation#in#a#higher#order#form#F1,#in#which#it#
participates#along#with#its#own#original#participant(s)#and#which,#in#turn,#must#
participate#in#a#yet#higher#order,#form#F2,.in#which#the#lower#order#forms.F.and.F1.and#
its#participants#participate,#and#so#on#ad.infinitum.#
But#having#introduced#a#more#ontologically#freighted#account#of#participation,#
why#then#does#Plato#accede#to#Parmenides’#second#version#of#the#argument,#which#
continues#to#presuppose#ontological#and#logical#parity?#Why#does#he#not#simply#insist,#
as#his#commentators#do,#that#exemplars#and#the#copies#derived#from#them#are,#in#the#
########################################################
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#Parmenides#132a7T8.###
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#Aristotle#discusses#and#so#designates#the#thirdTman#argument#in#several#places,#but#most#notably#in#
Metaphysics#I#990b15T17#and#VII#1038b34.#
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specific#case#of#formTparticipant#exemplification,#ontologically#disparate?#This#is#the#
essence#of#what#Syrianus#claims,#for#example,#in#responding#to#Aristotle’s#criticism#of#
Platonic#forms#in#his#commentary#on#Aristotle’s#Metaphysics,#remarking#that#“the#form#
is#not#synonymous#with#the#many,”#i.e.,#it#does#not#share#its#definition#(logos)#with#the#
many#that#are#its#paronyms.25#The#obvious#problem#with#such#a#rejoinder,#of#course,#is#
that#the#exemplification/facscimile.conception#of#methexis#does#indeed#suggest#
ontological#proximity#–#though#the#model#or#exemplary#instance#of#a#thing#is#unique#in#
serving.as#a#model,#and#perhaps#in#its#temporal#and#ontological#priority,#its#copies,#
facsimilies#or#simulacra,#of#necessity#bear#a#likeness#to#one#another#and#to#that#of#which#
they#are#copies:#likeness.(homoiotēs)#is#precisely#what#the#of#relation#between#a#copy#
and#that#of.which#it#is#a#copy#amounts#to.#And#as#such,#there#is#nothing#wrong#in#saying#
of#any#two#like#things#that#they#are#like#one#another,#without#requiring#a#third#thing#to#
explain#their#likeness.#
The#problem#lies#elsewhere,#in#the#productive.power#of#forms#that#is#one#of#the#
principal#bases#for#positing#their#existence#in#the#first#place:#forms#make#things#appear#
the#way#they#do,#rather#than#simply#being.that#which#copies#or#participants#are#like,#
although#Plato#provides#no#clue#as#to#the#nature#of#this#productive#power.#Parmenides’#
########################################################
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#See#Syrianus#In.Metaphysica.commentaria.in#Commentaria.in.Aristotelem.Graeca.Vol.#6,#ed.#G.#Kroll#
(Berlin:#Reimer,#1902),#111#ff.#Reginald#E.#Allen#points#out#much#the#same#thing#in#an#essay#published#half#
a#century#ago,#though#strangely#without#reference#to#the#Greek#commentators.#See#his#“Participation#and#
predication#in#Plato’s#middle#dialogues,”#in#Studies.in.Plato’s.Metaphysics,#ed.#R.#E.#Allen#(London:#
Routledge#and#Kegan#Paul,#1968),#43T60.#
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argument#is#that#if#forms.generate#likenesses,#and#are#themselves#likenesses,#then,#
given#that#they#are#like#their#likenesses,#they#too#must#be#generated#by#higherTorder#
forms.#On#the#other#hand,#if#forms.are#not#likenesses#with#respect#to#their#facsimiles,#it#
isn’t#clear#in#what#sense#they#can#be#paradeigmata.#
The#issue#is#this:#Forms#need#to#be#close#enough#to,#or#like,#sensible#particulars#to#
allow#for#participation#and#thus#to#explain#our#cognitive#and#semantic#and#epistemic#
commerce#with#ordinary#objects.#But#they#also#need#to#be#suitably#remote#from#
ordinary#objects#to#ensure#their#separateness,#literally#their#being.separate#(einai.
chōris),#to#ground#our#capacity#for#knowledge,#which,#at#least#according#to#the#exacting#
standards#of#the#Republic,#is#epistemically#disjoint#from#belief#(doxa)#and#its#objects,#i.e.,#
the#sensible#particulars#mentioned#above.#In#other#words,#the#competing#requirements#
stem#from#the#competing#metaphysical#and#epistemic#purposes#for#which#forms#are#
invoked#in#the#first#place.26#
Forms#are#defined#on#the#basis#of#the#epistemic,#semantic#and#metaphysical#
roles#they#are#called#on#to#serve,#e.g.,#in#making#the#many#that#exemplify#them#
semantically#representable#and#communicable,#in#constituting#the#proper#objects#of#
episteme,#etc.#Yet#what#forms#do#doesn’t#fully#determine#what#they#are#and#how#they#
do#what#they#do,#and#the#two#primary#roles#just#mentioned#entail#incompatible#
########################################################
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#For#a#useful#account#of#the#philosophical#demands#underlying#Plato’s#development#of#an#account#of#
forms,#see#Russell#M.#Dancy’s#Plato’s.Introduction.of.Forms#(Cambridge:#Cambridge#University#Press,#
2004).#
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features.27#Plato#attributes#to#forms#characteristics#that#are#essential#to#his#general#
metaphysical#and#epistemological#views,#and#so#what#they#are#in#general#terms,#namely,#
transcendent#verities,#and#what#they#make#explicable,#i.e.,#knowledge,#virtue#and#
meaning,#are#more#clearly#articulated#than#what#they#are#essentially,#and#how#we#access#
or#make#use#of#them.#By#the#time#of#the#Parmenides#Plato#had#yet#to#reach#a#definitive#
account#of#what#connects#a#form#to#its#participants,#and#once#he#is#compelled#to#
abandon#casting#participation#(methexis)#as#likeness#(homoiotēs),#the#rather#dire#
consequences#of#having#no#account#are#easy#to#see.##If#no#such#connection#can#be#made#
out,#and#forms.are#made#separate#(aphorizomena)#from#the#things.that.are#(tōn.ontōn),#
that#is,#“the#things#among#us#(ta.par’hēmin),”#they.would#prove#incapable#of#serving#
their#principal#role#as#the#proper#objects#of#knowledge.#Their#transcendence#would#
safeguard#their#unicity,#immutability#and#immiscibility,#but#at#the#expense#of#their#
########################################################
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#This#goes#to#the#heart#of#the#matter#concerning#the#nature#of#Plato’s#commitment#to#forms.#The#view#I#
take#throughout#is#that#Plato#thinks#that#there#must#be#something#like#forms#to#explain#our#capacity#for#
meaning#anything#reliable,#communicable,#intelligible#and#knowable,#despite#the#fact#that#most#of#what#
we#interact#with#and#think#and#speak#about#in#the#world#is#unreliable,#incommunicable,#unintelligible#and#
unknowable.#The#explanatory#demands#of#forms#require#that#they#possess#certain#features,#different#ones#
for#different#grounding#purposes,#and#these#are#the#(changing)#features#we#are#entitled#to#think#of#forms#
as#possessing.#I#am#not#sure#it#is#helpful#to#characterize#Plato’s#commitment#as#commitment#to#a#doctrine#
or#theory#of#forms,#which#we#then#have#to#think#of#as#changing#over#the#course#of#his#philosophical#life,#
rather#than#as#more#heuristic#commitment#to#there#being#something#transcendent#in#the#world#by#which#
we#can#explain#our#occasional#epistemic#or#philosophical#success.#For#a#vivid#example#of#an#approach#that#
insists#on#a#theoretical#commitment,#see#Samuel#C.#Rickless’#Plato’s.Forms.in.Transition.(Cambridge:#
Cambridge#University#Press,#2007).#Rickless’#penchant#for#systematization#is#admirable,#if#ultimately#
barbaric.#It#has#the#unfortunate#consequence#of#deriving#a#“theory#of#forms”#that#no#longer#applies#to#
anything#that#Plato#would#have#recognized#as#a#form.#In#particular,#Rickless’#conclusion#that#the#
arguments#raised#against#the#“theory#of#forms”#in#the#Parmenides#leave#Plato#acknowledging#that#“forms#
are#sensible”#(p.#249)#would#seem#to#rob#forms.of#much#of#the#essential#purpose#they#seem#intended#to#
serve#throughout#Plato’s#work,#i.e.,#to#explain#how#we#can#signify#and#formulate#opinions#about#sensible#
objects#and#how#we#can#advance#to#knowledge#of#what#makes#these#other#capacities#possible.#
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ontological#and#epistemic#accessibility#(to#those#whose#being#and#cognitive#capacities#
belong#to#the#incommensurable#domain#of#the.many).#
The#gist#of#Syrianus’#and#other#Platonists’#disagreement#with#Aristotle#is#that#the#
relationship#between#forms#and#their#participant#instances#is#fundamentally#ontological#
and#asymmetric,#i.e.,#it#holds#between#an#original#reality#and#an#image#or#copy,#between#
things#of#distinct#ontological#orders,#even#if#this#ontological#relationship#is#also.supposed#
to#ground#the#homonymous#or#eponymous#extension#of#a#relevant#name#or#expression#
and,#with#this,#provide#the#veridical#ground#of#predication.#Participation,#like#the#
homonymy.or#eponymy#that#marks#it#linguistically,#is#not.in#fact#symmetric,#and#we#are#
only#inclined#to#think#it#is,#along#with#the#Socrates#of#the#first#half#of#the#Parmenides,#to#
the#extent#that#we#conceive#of#it#in#terms#of#relations#such#as#that#of#resemblance,#and#
to#the#extent#that#we#identify#predicative#relations#with#participation#relations.#28#Yet,#as#
indicated#above,#a#predicative#construal#of#the#argument#runs#up#against#the#simple#fact#
that#forms#themselves#are#not#eponymously#or#paronymously#named,#and#so#can’t#be#
counted#amongst#the#participants#that#are#so#named!#
Some#hint#at#an#alternative,#more#promising#way#of#looking#at#things#can#be#
offered#in#advance#in#terms#of#an#analogy#that#will#prove#fundamental#for#both#Plato#
and#Aristotle,#even#as#Aristotle#seeks#to#correct#what#he#takes#to#be#the#inadequacies#of#
Plato’s#account.#In#the#first#chapter#of#the#Categories.Aristotle#gives,#as#an#instance#of#an#
########################################################
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#For#an#exhaustive#survey#of#approaches#to#the#argument#see,#again,#Rickless,#Plato’s.forms.in.Transition.#
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homonymous#pair,#man.and#picture#(gegrammenon),#which#share#the#name#animal#
(zōon),#but#differ#with#regard#to#“the#definition#of#being#which#corresponds#to#the#
name.”29#It#seems#unlikely#that#this#example#of#a#relationship#tied#to#the#participation#
relation#is#a#matter#of#coincidence,#given#as#well#that#the#question#of#resemblance#
between#pictures#and#men#shows#up#so#in#frequently#Plato’s#dialogues,#and#would#
surely#have#been#a#standard#example#in#the#Academy.#At#any#rate,#it#behooves#us#to#
consider#the#example#more#closely..
Aristotle’s#point#is,#of#course,#semantic,#but#the#ontological#upshot#is#part#of#that#
point.#Though#in#everyday#speech#we#tend#to#speak#otherwise,#a#picture#of#a#man#no#
more#resembles#the#man#of#whom#it#is#a#picture,#than#a#photograph#resembles#its#
subject,#or#a#pond#the#image#reflected#in#it.#Of#course#the#image#registered#in#each#
medium#must#resemble#that#of#which#it#is#an#image,#since#“being#an#image#of”#bears#a#
determinate#relation#to#that#of#which#it#is#an#image.#It#is#the#persistence#of#the#image#
within#a#photograph#or#painting#that#leads#us#to#identify#each#with#its#image,#which#we#
are#not#inclined#to#do,#for#example,#with#reflective#surfaces#such#as#those#of#ponds#or#
mirrors#on#which#reflected#images#quickly#and#(potentially)#interminably#give#way#to#
others.#This,#then,#is#the#relevant#sense#of#participation#(methexis):#each#participant#
reflects#a#part,#the#surface#or#image,#of#what#it#participates#in.#And,#something#like#this#is#
put#most#clearly#in#the#wellTknown#discussion#of#the#“three#beds”#in#the#Republic.#Here#
########################################################
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#Aristotle#Categories#1a4..
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Plato#identifies#the#mirror#as#the#perfect#instrument#of#reproduction,#since#“with#it#
you#can#quickly#make#the#sun,#the#things#in#the#heavens,#the#earth,#yourself,#the#other#
animals,#manufactured#items,#plants,#and#everything#else.”30#Yet#despite#its#versatility,#
which#is#illustrative#of,#and#like,#the#productive#versatility#of#the#sophist,#what#it#
reproduces#are#“appearances…not#the#things#themselves#as#they#truly#are.”31#
#Something#to#note#immediately#about#the#mirroring#relation#between#image#
and#original#is#that#it#requires#no#additional#third#likeness#to#connect#the#two,#because#
the#relevant#reflection#is#asymmetric.#Image#and#original#are#directly#related#to#one#
another#by#virtue#of#the#fact#that#the#former#is#the#reflection#of#the#latter,#and#not#vice.
versa,.and#the#direct#cause#of#the#resemblance#of#the#relevant#image#is#just#the#
reflective#instrument#or#medium#itself,#i.e.,#the#paintbrush,#camera#or#reflective#surface,#
that#produces#it.#Though#Plato#does#call#pictures,#paintings#and#the#like#imitations,#we#
need#not#think#him#committed#to#the#falsehood#that#the#artifact#itself#resembles#the#
subject#painted#or#pictured,#in#the#way#that#a#copy#of#a#painting#resembles#an#original#
painting.#And,#on#the#other#hand,#the#ontological#disparity#between#intelligible#forms.
and#their#sensible#participants#rules#out#any#straightforward#visible.likeness#of#
appearance.#
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In#the#Cratylus,#to#take#another#example,#Plato#remarks#that#a#name#(onoma),#

just#like#a#painting#or#picture,#is#an#imitation#(mimema)#of#what#it#names,#and#certainly#
whatever#relation#holds#between#names#and#their#designata#it#is#not#one#of#symmetric,#
visible#resemblance.32#Since#Plato’s#conception#of#naming#is#ultimately#neither#
conventionalist#nor#naturalist,#what#he#appears#to#mean#here,#and#what#is#strongly#
suggested#by#the#term#mimema#itself,#along#with#the#anamnetic#picture#of#knowledge#
that#no#doubt#furnishes#a#backdrop#to#the#discussion#of#the#epistemic#value#of#names,#is#
that#names#are#reminders#of#the#things#they#name,#though#not#entirely#reliable#ones.#
This#is#in#sharp#contrast#to#the#naïve#naturalism#promoted#by#Cratylus,#for#whom#the#
mimetic#connection#between#name#and#object#is#naturally#determined#in#such#a#way#as#
to#suggest#a#natural#resemblance#between#the#two.#Furthermore,#while#Socrates#
concedes#some#sort#of#resemblance#relation#between#names#and#beings,#he#eventually#
argues#that#we#are#better#off#seeking#the#“truth#of#things#that#are#(tēn.alētheian.tōn.
ontōn)”33#from#“those#things#themselves#(ex.hautōn),”34#rather#than#from#the#sort#of#
etymological#meditation#suggested#by#Cratylus,#recurring#to#the#presumption#of#the#
priority#of#metaphysics#over#language#or#logic.#
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#Cratylus#430e10.#
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#Cratylus#438d8.#
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#Cratylus#439b7.#
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Plato’s#dismissal#of#onomastics#as#a#philosophically#useful#enterprise#has#

significant#implications#for#the#argument#of#this#dissertation.#If#the#analysis#of#names#is#
not#a#guide#to#how#things#are#(though#they#might#still#reflect#how#things#are),#then#the#
method#of#division,#which#serves#precisely#this#purpose,#cannot#amount#to#providing#the#
origin#or#semantics#of#names#as#such.#While#the#method#is,#by#stipulation,#designed#to#
reveal#the#relations#amongst#forms#or#concepts,#it#cannot#be#undertaken#through#an#
analysis#of#the#vertical,#extensional#relations#of#names#for#those#forms#or#concepts.#
Instead,#it#will#be#the#horizontal#or#hierarchical#predicative#relations#that#will#be#at#issue.#
Forms#don’t#explain#resemblance,#they#explain#phenomena,#i.e.,#the#
manifestation#of#existence,#which#is#the#insight#that#defines#the#scala.entis.of#Plotinus#
and#the#Platonists#and#Neoplatonists#that#follow#him.#And#herein#lies#the#difference#
between#a#form#and#a#concept:#a#form#is#something#immaterial,#simple#(as#opposed#to#a#
complex)#and#mindTindependent,#a#concept#is#a#mindTdependent,#logically#complex#
structure#whose#partitioning#is#reflected#in#items#named#in#ordinary#speech.35#The#
degree#of#mindTdependence#can#be#left#open#enough#to#include#conceptions#such#as#
Hegel’s#that#treat#the#concept#not#merely#as#the#correlate#of#an#object#but#as#the#object#
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#It#is#this#distinction#that#Boethius#has#in#mind#in#talking#of#two#kinds#of#forms#in#the#Quomodo,#which#I#
will#discuss#in#the#following#chapter.#The#distinction#is#made#as#well#by#Simplicius,#in#his#commentary#on#
Aristotle’s#Categories,#although#here#in#terms#of#a#distinction#between#three#senses#of#common.notions..
See#Simplicius,#On.Aristotle’s.Categories#1T4,#trans.#Michael#Chase#(Ithaca,#N.Y.:#Cornell#University#Press,#
2003).#

#

72#

itself#as#conceived.#This#is#one#central#implication#of#Hegel’s#claim,#cited#earlier,#that#
logic#coincides#with#metaphysics.36#
Without#arguing#the#matter#here,#however,#it#is#sufficient#to#point#out#that#had#
Plato#recognized#a#clear#distinction#between#naming#and#predication#he#would#have#had#
little#need#to#accept#a#crucial#premise#on#which#the#argument#is#based,#namely#that#
everything#named#by#a#term#is#named#from#the#name#of#a#form#in#which#it#participates.#
While#both#the#beautiful#itself#and#those#things#that#are#derivatively#so#called,#are#all#
called#beautiful,#calling#in#the#former#case#is#just#naming,#while#in#the#latter#it#is#
predicating,#and#simple#naming#itself#does#not#depend#upon#participation,#i.e.,#the#name#
I#apply#to#a#thing#need#bear#no#relation#to#that#thing#beyond#the#conventionally#
determined#semantic#one#of#standing.for#it.#The#Beautiful#itself#is,#strictly#speaking,#the#
only#proper#referent#of#the#nominal#expression#(onoma)#“the.Beautiful.”#On#the#other#
hand,#the#kinds#of#things#that#participate#in#the#form,#e.g.,#beautiful#persons,#horses,#
etc.,#are#not#named#by#“the#Beautiful,”#but#are#the#subjects#of#predicative#propositions#
of#the#form#“…is#beautiful.”#
While#it#is#only#in#the#Sophist#that#Plato#explicitly#recognizes#and#provides#an#
account#of#a#distinction#between#predicates#and#names,#or#between#the#extensional#and#
the#predicative#use#of#names,#there#is#already#an#indication#of#a#metaphysical#version#of#
it#in#Book#5#of#the#Republic,#where#Plato#is#discussing#the#fundamental#difference#
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between#the#objects#of#knowledge#(episteme),#i.e.,#forms,#and#the#objects#of#belief#
(doxa),#i.e.,#the.many.that#participate#in#them.#In#response#to#Socrates’#prompting,#
Glaucon#confesses#about#the#latter#that#“one#cannot#understand#them#firmly#(pagiōs)#to#
be#or#to#not#be,#or#to#be#neither#or#both.”37#Commenting#on#the#passage,#R.#E.#Allen#
once#suggested#that#the#context#makes#it#clear#that#these#formulae#are#shortThand#for#
predicative#claims,#that,#for#example,#such#things#as#participate#in#the#form#of#the#
beautiful#cannot#be#firmly#understood#as#being.beautiful,#or#not.being.beautiful,#etc.38#
However,#the#context#would#appear,#instead,#to#support#a#more#straightforward#reading#
of#the#passage#as#concerning#existence#claims,#albeit#claims#upon#which#predicative#
claims,#or#the#impossibility#thereof,#may#be#thought#to#rest.#The#objects#of#doxa,#unlike#
the#objects#of#epistēmē,#fall#under#the#rubric#of#becoming#rather#than#being.#Because#
they#are#ontologically#ambiguous,#i.e.,#because#they#are#neither#nothing#nor#beings,#they#
cannot#be#identified#with#the#form#of#any#property#that#is#attributed#to#them,#and#thus#
cannot,#strictly#speaking,#be#named#by#them.#Naming,#in#the#strict#sense#proposed#in#the#
Cratylus,#is#veridical,#the#language#of#the#forms,#whereas#predication#belongs#to#the#
province#of#ontological#ambiguity,#the#discursive#language#of#doxai:#each#thing#that#is#
beautiful#thing#is#also#not#the.beautiful,#etc.#What#Plato#affirms#here#is#that#for#the.many.
things#that#are,#for#example,#beautiful#(in#the#derivative,#participatory#sense)#no#relation#
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#See,#for#example,#R.#E.#Allen’s#“Participation#and#Predication#in#Plato’s#Middle#Dialogues”#cited#above.#
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to#the#Beautiful#applies#simpliciter.#Indeed,#this#is#one#way#of#deciphering#what#it#
means#for#something#to#participate#in#a#given#form,#namely,#that#it#has#a#partial#relation#
to#that#form#by#virtue#of#sharing.that#property#exemplified#by#it,#rather#than#by#virtue#of#
being#that#property.#
Another#analogy#might#be#helpful.#Consider#the#concept#prime.number,#and#its#
standard#definition:#a#number#divisible#only#by#itself#and#1#without#remainder.#Someone#
in#possession#of#the#concept#has#to#know#its#definition,#and#to#this#extent#has#to#know#
that#the#proposition#“A#prime#number#is….”#Is#true.#So#much#is#just#a#matter#of#the#
stipulated#definition#of#this#kind#of#mathematical#object.#Now#in#addition#to#the#concept#
prime.number,#there#are#individual#prime#numbers,#e.g.,#2,#3,#5,#etc.,#and#beyond#that,#at#
least#for#Platonists,#there#is#something#that#each#of#these#numbers#is#which#is#also#that#
of#which#the#concept#prime.number.is#a#concept,#namely,#prime.number.itself,#or#what#
Plato#would#call#the#form#of#prime.number,#call#it#prime.numerality.#Now#consider#the#
proposition#that#there#is#no#greatest#prime#number.#Since#Euclid#constructed#a#proof#to#
show#that#there#is#no#such#thing,#there#isn’t#one,#and#hence#the#concept#of#a#prime#
number#includes#its#covering#an#infinite#number#of#instances,#and#so#having#the#concept#
prime.number#would#arguably#have#to#consist#in#knowing#that#there#is#an#infinite#
number#of#them.#But#what#does#it#mean#to#know#this#about#prime.numbers#or#about#the#
form#prime.number?#
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If#the#form#prime.number#is#just#what#it#is#to#be#a#prime#number,#then#if#I#know#

that#form,#I#know,#at#least#implicitly,#whatever#is#true#of#it,#including#that#its#exemplars#
are#infinite,#and#so#if#I#know#the#form#I#don’t#need#to#know#or#to#have#surveyed#any#
proofs#demonstrating#any#of#its#characteristics.#However,#on#another#way#of#
understanding#what#I#know#when#I#know#what#a#prime#number#is,#I#can#no#more#know#
this#without#understanding#the#variety#of#relevant#proofs#establishing#its#characteristic#
attributes#than#I#can#know#what#chairs#are#without#direct#or#indirect#commerce#with#
chairs,#e.g.,#with#sitting#on#them.#Mathematical#proof#thus#corresponds#to#the#everyday#
practical#procedures#for#establishing#the#identity#and#acquiring#knowledge#of#the#objects#
of#sensory#experience.#Frege’s#Begriffsschrift.was#designed#to#make#available#to#the#eye,#
synoptically,#let#us#say,#what#is#contained#in#a#proof,#and#so#what#is#contained#in#the#
concept#that#a#given#proof#illuminates.39#So#it#is#also#possible#to#imagine#the#concept’s#
immediate#synoptic#presence#to#the#mind,#perhaps#facilitated#by#having#the#full#set#of#
proofs#pertaining#to#its#properties#set#out#before#one#in#something#like#the#pictorially#
perspicuous#script#of#Frege’s#Begriffsschrift.#
Along#these#lines,#one#might#think#that#there#are#two#ways#of#thinking#about#
what#it#is#to#know#something#like#a#form,#one#involving#knowing#it#immediately,#through#
something#like#intellectual#intuition,#and#another#involving#knowing#its#discursive.
structure,#i.e.,#its#definition#and#its#relation#to#other#forms.#However,#there#is#also#a#
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#On#the#relationship#between#the#cognition#of#mathematical#objects#and#proof#see#William#W.#Tait,#
“Truth#and#Proof:#The#Platonism#of#Mathematics”#in#Synthese#69#(1986):#341T470.#

#

76#

sense#in#which#these#are#not,#and#cannot#be,#two#ways#of#knowing#the#same#thing,#
but#are#instead#two#distinct#avenues#of#epistemic#approach#to#distinct#but#related#kinds#
of#thing.#I#want#to#suggest#that#concepts#are#the#cognitively#interposed#media#through#
which#we#can#come#to#know#forms,#though#it#may#not#be#the#only#way#we#can#do#so.#In#
short,#Plato#believes#that#it#is#through#concepts#that#we#can#come#to#know#or#to#
recollect#their#corresponding#forms.#Frege#believes#the#same#thing,#but#he#only#believes#
in#two#forms,#the#True#and#the#False.##
In#the#Parmenides,#Plato#has#yet#to#discover#that#the#puzzle#to#which#methexis#
was#to#have#provided#a#solution,#a#puzzle#stemming#from#the#problem#of#the#one#and#
the#many,#could#only#be#resolved#in#terms#of#the#mediating#domain#of#concepts.#
Nonetheless,#having#run#twice#into#the#same#sort#of#difficulty#trying#to#define#the#
participation#relation,#Plato#pursues#a#new#starting#point#in#the#second#half#of#the#
dialogue#in#which#the#assumption#of#logical#and#metaphysical#parity#between#forms#and#
participants#is#simply#suspended,#along#with#an#insistence#on#their#being#bound#together#
by#participation.#Plato#sets#aside#the#project#of#explaining#the#participation#relation,#and#
seems#to#follow#the#more#modest#course#of#delineating#what#relations#one#can#and#
must#make#out#between#something#that#stands#as#a#One#to#its#instantiations#and#those#
many#instantiations.##Since#any#form#stands#as#a#One#in#relation#to#the#many#it#serves#to#
explain,#this#exploration#and#its#results#may#be#taken#as#a#schema#for#any#form#and#this#
is#precisely#how#Parmenides#presents#things,#taking#up#the#hypothesis#of#the#One#after#
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considering#Likeness#(homoiotēs),#Motion#(kinēsis)#and#Rest#(stasis),.etc.,#as#possible#
starting#points#for#the#sort#of#“gymnastic#training”#(hē.gymnasia)#he#urges#upon#
Socrates.40#
Although#the#language#and#logic#of#original#and#copy,#semblance.or#image.will#
continue#to#frame#explanations#of#the#connection#between#forms#and#participants,#the#
second#half#of#the#Parmenides#will#begin#from#the#other#end,#so#to#speak.#Instead#of#
trying#to#define#the#participation#relation,#and#work#out#the#consequences#of#one#
definition#or#another,#Plato#elects#instead#to#specify#the#relevant#logical#and#
metaphysical#connections#a#participation#relation#will#have#to#account#for.#In#particular,#
what#he#explores#are#the#manifold#relations#of#difference#and#identity#that#can#be#made#
out#between#these#two#disparate#ontological#domains.#
In#other#words,#what#occurs#in#the#second#part#of#the#dialogue#is#an#examination#
of#what#follows#from#the#claim#that#a#unit#form.exists#or#does#not,#with#or#without#
regard#to#the#possible#existence#of#the#many#or#others#(ta.alla)#that#might#participate#in#
it.(These#two#claims#–#that#the#One#exists,#and#that#it#does#not#–#are#thus#treated#as#the#
antecedents#of#conditionals#whose#consequents#are#to#be#determined,#yielding#four#
hypotheses,#two#concerned#exclusively#with#the#One,#and#two#with#its#participants.#
These#four#hypotheses,#in#turn,#split#into#eight#deductions,#each#hypothesis#yielding#a#
pair#of#contradictory#results,#depending,#as#I#will#try#to#show,#on#whether#the#subject#
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term#is#approached#as#predicatively#or#ontologically#closed#or#open,#that#is,#whether#it#
is#treated#categorematically.or#syncategorematically,#in#a#sense#that#can#be#seen#to#
apply#indifferently#to#the#domains#of#logic#and#ontology.#In#its#traditional,#scholastic#
sense,#a#categorematic#expression#–#paradigmatically,#the#subject#or#predicate#term#of#a#
categorical#proposition#–#is#semantically#autonomous.#A#syncategorematic#term,#on#the#
other#hand,#only#signifies#in#combination#with#a#categorematic#one.#Analogously,#
anything#whose#determination#depends#upon#another#may#be#thought#of#as#
ontologically#syncategorematic.41#
This#logical#structure#becomes#more#explicit#in#the#second#set#of#hypotheses#(5T
8),#which#argue#from#the#meanings#of#the#elements#of#the#proposition#used#to#express#
the#nonTexistence#of#the#one,#i.e.,#the.one.is.not,#and#the#apophatic#character#of#this#
proposition#changes#matters#significantly,#because,#I#would#suggest,#the#occurrence#of#
negation#indicates#the#irreducible#discursivity#of#the#subject#term.#Plato,#in#a#rather#
startling#anticipation#of#Frege,#seems#to#recognize#this#as#requiring#us#to#consider#the#
extension#(or#intension)#of#the#subject#term#in#the#context#of#the#proposition#in#which#it#
occurs.#Though#it#might#seem#counterintuitive#at#first#blush,#the#fact#that#the#existence#
of#the#subject#is#denied,#while#the#meaningfulness#of#the#negative#proposition#remains#
intact,#suggests,#at#the#very#least,#the#semantic#independence#of#the#proposition.#
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#Robert#Turnbull#offers#an#analogous#way#of#dividing#the#eight#deductions#in#terms#of#a#Parmenidean#and#
a#Platonic##“version”#of#the#four#basic#hypotheses.#The#Parmenidean#version#“requires#that#there#be#no#
predication#at#all,”#whereas#the#Platonic#version#“allows#for#predication,#indeed,#introduces#duality#(of#
One#and#Being),#throughout#everything.”#See#Turnbull,#The.Parmenides#and.Plato’s.Late.Philosophy,#5.#
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The#link#to#Frege’s#context.principle#should#not#be#entirely#surprising,#as#the#

distinction#between#categorematic#and#syncategorematic#terms#already#indicates#the#
interrelationship#between#standalone#and#semantically#dependent#elements:#the#
meaning#of#a#syncategorematic#term#can#only#be#determined#within#the#context#of#the#
composite#expression#formed#in#combination#with#a#suitable#categorematic#term.#The#
categorematic/syncategorematic#distinction#itself#has#been#linked#to#Frege’s#distinction#
between#saturated#and#unsaturated#expressions,42#the#latter#associated#most#
consistently#with#Frege’s#conception#of#the#concept#as#an#open#function,#essentially#one#
that#yields#propositions,#the#basic#unit#of#semantic#determinacy#for#Frege.#It#seems#that#
Frege’s#distinction#and#the#distinction#recognized#by#scholastic#logicians#represent#the#
same,#or#similar,#fundamental#insight#that#there#are#expressions#within#the#context#of#a#
proposition#that#signify#incompletely#or#indefinitely,#yet#provide#for#the#coherence#or#
unity#of#judgment#or#of#the#proposition,#which#semantically#transcends#the#designative#
properties#of#its#parts.#It#is#instructive#for#our#purposes#that#Frege#speaks#of#the#
“predicative#character#of#the#concept”#as#“a#special#case#of#the#need#of#
supplementation,#[i.e.,#its#unsaturatedness],”43#since#he#captures#in#more#explicit#terms#
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#See,#for#example,#Tyler#Burge’s#Truth,.Thought,.Reason:.Essays.on.Frege#(Oxford,#Clarendon,#New#York:#
Oxford#University#Press,#2005),#210#ff.#
##
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#See.Translations.from.the.Philosophical.Writings.of.Gottlob.Frege,#ed.#Peter#Geach#and#Max#Black#
(Oxford,#UK.:#Basil#Blackwell,#1960),#186.#
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what#Plato#is#struggling#to#make#sense#of,#and#so#addresses#succinctly#an#idea#
explored#at#much#greater#depth,#if#more#obscurely,#by#Hegel.#
The#point#here,#however,#is#that#this#idea#of#a#composite#unity#distinct#from#the#
simple#unity#of#a#form#itself,#or#the#seemingly#intractable#relation#of#a#form#to#its#
participants,#is#already#evident#to#Plato#in#the#Parmenides,#though#it#is#perhaps#Boethius#
who#first#touches#on#it#explicitly.44#If#this#establishes#a#link#between#Plato#and#Frege,#as#I#
argue#in#Chapter#3,#it#also#connects#this#observation#in#Plato#to#a#central#drive#of#Hegel’s#
logic,#i.e.,#the#overcoming#of#the#syncategorematic.#I#want#to#make#the#further#hazard#
that#we#see#in#this#alternation#between#categorematic#and#syncategorematic#terms#a#
more#profound#metaphysical#modulation#between#forms#and#concepts,#the#former#
being#fundamentally#categorematic,#the#latter#fundamentally#syncategorematic,#the#
implication#being#that#syncategorematicity#is#fundamentally#conceptual.#This#discussion#
in#Plato#also#anticipates,#without#explicitly#articulating,#the#distinction#he#will#make,#in#
the#Sophist,#between#the#paratactic#listing#of#names#and#the#syntactic#integration#of#a#
predicative#proposition.#Finally,#I#want#to#suggest#that#we#see#here#an#exploration#of#
different#way#of#construing#a#term#logic,#according#to#which#the#terms#of#a#categorical#
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#Boethius,#for#example,#already#anticipates#a#broader#notion#of#syncategorematicity,#though#he#speaks#
instead#of#consignification,#according#to#which#any#term#that#signifies#indefinitely#(requiring#some#further#
determination#to#signify#determinately)#would#count#as#syncategorematic..See#Boethius’(Commentarii.in.
Librum.Aristotelis.Peri.Hermeneias,#ed.#C.#Meiser#(Leipzig:#Teubner,#1887,#1880)#which#I#discuss#in#Chapter#
2.#(#
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proposition#are#each#completed,#so#to#speak,#by#the#copula#that#joins#them.45#But#first#
things#first.#
#

It#will#be#enough#to#establish#this#insight#in#the#Parmenides.to#look#at#the#first#

two#deductions,#since#this#should#make#it#clear#how#the#other#cases#are#to#be#handled.46#
I#will#also#look#at#the#fifth#deduction,#the#first#to#proceed#from#a#negative,#apophatic.
hypothesis,#since#it#both#confirms#the#reading#I#am#suggesting#and#establishes#a#clear#
philosophical#connection#to#the#discussion#of#negation#in#the#Sophist.#The#first#two#
affirmative#or#kataphatic.deductions#proceed#from#the#proposition#that#“the#One#is,”#
the#first#deducing#its#nonTexistence,#the#second#its#existence,#along#with#the#existence#of#
the.many.#In#the#first#deduction,#the#subject#term,#“the#One”#is#treated#
categorematically,#that#is,#as#predicatively#or#propositionally#closed.#In#essence,#
although#syntactically#propositional,#“The#One#is”#is#semantically#concatenative#T#“the#
one,#is.”#The#predicate#“is”#is#thus#taken#as#applying#externally#to#a#subject#that#is#
considered#determined#independently#of#its#predicative#complement,#and,#since#
according#to#its#internal#determination#as#a#singular#unity#the#One#cannot#admit#of#parts,#
change,#temporality,#spatiality,#etc.,#or#any#other#property,#it#turns#out#to#be#intrinsically#
cut#off#from#the#copula#itself.#Since#there#is#nothing#that#it#is,#it#isn’t#anything#that#is,#
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45

#Frederic#Sommers#argues#for#such#a#treatment#of#traditional#logic#in#his#The.Logic.of.Natural.Language#
(Oxford:#Clarendon#Press,#1982)#which#informs#George#Englebretson’s#historical#account#of#this#approach#
in#his#Something.to.Reckon.With#(Ottawa:#University#of#Ottawa#Press,#1996).#
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#The#literature#on#the#Parmenides#is#vast#and#inconclusive,#and#taking#account#of#even#a#small#portion#of#
it#is#quite#beyond#the#scope#of#this#discussion.#(#
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from#which#it#follows#that#“there’s#no#name#for#it#nor#account,#nor…#any#knowledge#
of#it,#nor#perception,#nor#opinion.”47#If#there#is#nothing#for#it#to#be#distinguished#from,#
i.e.,#that#it#is.not,#in#other#words,#including#its#name#or#any#cognitive#or#semantic#
relation#to#it,#the#proposition#“One#is”#stalls#at#the#outset.#If#it#cannot#be#drawn#into#the#
rudimentary#relation#with#the#copula,#naming#itself#is#foreclosed.#As#Hegel#will#put#this#
point#in#the#first#section#of#the#Science.of.Logic,#entitled#the#Doctrine.of.Being,##
we#can#see#how,#starting#from#this#proposition#[that#the#One#is],#[Plato]#performs#the#
transition#to#the#nonTbeing#of#the#One.#It#happens#by#way#of#a#comparison#between#
the#two#determinations#of#the#presupposed#proposition,#namely#of#“the#One#is.”#
This#proposition#contains#“the#One”#and#“being”;#but#“the#one#is”#contains#more#
than#when#one#only#says#“the#One.”#In#this,#in#their#being#distinguished,#the#moment#
of#negation#is#demonstrated.48#
This#approach#to#the#proposition#as#a#“comparison#of#the#two#determinations,”#though#
it#occurs#in#the#first#part#of#the#Science,#belongs,#from#Hegel’s#perspective,#to#the#second#
part,#the#Doctrine.of.Essence,#because#it#is#only#here#that#anything#like#the#distinction#
between#something#and#its#being,#let#alone#some#kind#of#thing#and#its#contingent#
instances,#can#be#accounted#for.#Indeed,#Hegel’s#point#is#that#despite#the#seeming#
elementary#character#of#the#proposition#in#question#it#throws#us#into#the#midst#of#the#
propositional#divide#within#the#concept#itself,#if#not#quite#into#the#domain#of#judgment#
proper.#This#is#the#point#of#Hegel’s#remark#a#few#lines#later#that#“the#dialectical#
treatment#of#the#One#in#the#Parmenides#must#also#be#regarded#rather#as#a#dialectic#of#
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#

48

#See#Hegel’s#Science.of.Logic,#§21.87.#

#

83#

external#reflection.”49#Reflection#in#the#strict#logical#sense#is#the#quasiTdeterminative#
relation#between#essence#and#instance,#and#as#such,#I#would#like#to#suggest,#provides#us#
with#a#way#of#understanding#what#stands#in#for#the#relation#of#participation#at#this#stage#
of#Plato’s#thought.#
#

If#the#moment#of#external,#abstract#negation#is#revealed#in#the#first#deduction,#

isolating#the#One#from#its#predicative#complement,#the#moment#of#internal#negation#is#
revealed#in#the#second,#for#it#is#here,#from#the#same#proposition,#that#Plato,#in#joining#
the#being#of#the#One#to#the#One,#conjoins#its#unicity#with#what#is#not#its#unicity,#i.e.,#its#
being,#and#thus#ushers#in#the#multitude#of#characteristics#and#instances#to#which#it#is#
predicatively#bound:#its#being#in#motion,#at#rest,#whole,#partial,#in#itself,#in#another,#etc.#
The#fundamental#difference#here#is#that#the#One#is#now#treated#syncategorematically,#as#
semantically#and#ontologically#bound#to#its#determinations,#from#which#it#also#removed,#
since#it#is#also#nonFidentical.to#them..
A#quick#look#at#the#first#of#the#four#apophatic#hypotheses,#i.e.,#the#fifth#
hypothesis,#that#“The#One#is#not,”#confirms#this#reading,#and#tells#us#still#more#about#
how#Plato#sees#the#role#of#negation.#While#we#begin,#again,#with#a#categorematic#
construal#of#the#subject,#the#apophatic#hypothesis#yields#what#would#appear#to#be#the#
consequence#of#predicative#engagement,#and#thus#seems#to#proceed#from#a#
syncategorematic#standpoint.#The#reason#for#this#is#simple,#if#surprising,#and#goes#to#the#
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heart#of#the#discursive#character#of#negation:#Parmenides#argues#that#because#the#
proposition#“The#One#is#not#(to.hen.mē.esti)”#can#be#understood,#and,#in#being#
understood,#is#differentiated#from#the#contrary.proposition#(tounantion),#that#“notTOne#
is#not#(mē.hen.mē.esti),”#or#from#any#other#negative#existential,#such#as#“largeness#is#not#
(megethos.mē.esti),”#and#since#these#propositions#only#differ#with#respect#to#their#
subject#terms,#their#subject#terms,#despite#the#hypothetical#assertion#of#their#nonF
existence,#must#be#different#or#other#(heteron)#rather#than#nonTexistent,#since,#by#
presumption,#all#nonTexistent#things,#properly#speaking,#are#identical#nothings.#The#
negative#existential#thus#compels#us#to#consider#the#internal,#contextual#operation#of#
negation.#
What#is#surprising#is#that#the#resolution#of#the#problem#of#empty#reference#Plato,#
through#Parmenides,#proffers#here#seems#to#foreshadow,#if#not#presuppose,#the#
doctrine#of#negation#as#difference/otherness#presented#in#the#Sophist.50#Making#sense#of#
the#negative#existential#requires#starting#from#the#context#of#the#proposition,#since#its#
hypothetical#truth#cannot#be#derived#from#a#nonTexistent#subject,#and#this#shift#in#
semantic#grounding#is#marked#by#a#shift#from#direct#to#indirect#speech,#i.e.,#from#“if#the#
########################################################
50

#This#passage,#amongst#other#considerations,#has#prompted#Kenneth#Sayre(to#place#the#Parmenides#after#
the#Sophist#in#the#order#of#composition.#See#Kenneth#Sayre,#“Dialectic#by#Negation#in#Three#Late#
Dialogues,”#in#Reading.Ancient.Texts.Volume.I:.Presocratics.and.Plato,#edited#by#Suzanne#SternTGillet#&#
Kevin#Korrigan#(Leiden;#Boston:#Brill,#2007),#189T212.#The#absence#of#any#explicit#reference#to#the#account#
of#predication#found#in#the#Sophist#makes#this#a#doubtful#hypothesis#in#my#view.#It#seems#to#me#more#
likely#that#Plato#may#have#arrived#at#the#view#of#apophasis#in#terms#of#difference#before#both#dialogues#
and#explored#this#view#first#in#more#metaphysical#and#then#in#more#logical#terms#in#the#Parmenides.and#
Sophist,#respectively.#
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one#is#not”51#to#“saying#whether#the#one#is#not”52#and#here#the#problem#to#which#the#
Sophist.will#turn#more#directly,#announces#itself:#the#problem#of#saying.what.is.not,#
understood#here,#as#it#will#be#initially#addressed#in#the#Sophist,#as#a#problem#of#semantic#
analysis,#of#saying#what#it#means#to#say#(that)#something#is.not.#
What#it#apparently#means,#in#the#first#place,#is#that#the#One#is#independently#
known#(gnōston),#that#it#is#nonetheless#in#a#certain#state,#or,#more#literally,#disposed.in.a.
certain.way.(houtōs.echei).53#In#other#words,#the#hypothesis#tells#us#what#every#
apophatic#proposition#tells#us#fundamentally,#namely,#that#something#is#differentiated#in.
some.way.#The#relevant#antecedent,#“if#One#is.not,”#amounts#to#the#hypothesis#that#
“whatever#is.not#is#other#than#the#different#things.”54#One#must#already#be#
differentiated,#and#thus#is#recognized.(gnōston),#by#which#Plato#appears#to#mean#that#it#
is#cognized#and#so#designated,#but#the#reason#for#its#being#known#is#obscure,#unless#the#
not#(mē)#tells#us#something#about#the#preceding#One,#namely#that#it#is#distinguished.
from#the#copula#that#would#connect#to#it#and#thereby#from#the.others,#i.e.,#the#
determinations#with#which#the#copula#would#establish#its#association.#
(
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#Parmenides#161e4.#

#

54

#Parmenides#160c5T6.#
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Section(Three.(The,Sophist:(The(Metaphysical(Ground(of(the(Concept(

#

And#now#we#are#in#position#to#see#why,#in#turning#to#Plato’s#Sophist,#before#

discovering#its#central#concern#with#the#discursive#(or#predicative)#interval,#it#is#
concerned#not#merely#with#falsehood,#or#with#speech#as#such,#but#with#the#grounding#
relation#of#participation.#The#problem#of#negation#first#arises#in#the#Sophist#over#the#
problem#of#falsehood,#over#what#Plato#glosses#as#saying.the.things.that.are.not#(legein.
ta.mē.onta),#and#so#it#is#with#this#formula#that#we#must#first#concern#ourselves.#The#
formula#directly#alludes#to#Parmenides'#notorious#proscription#cited#earlier#in#the#text#
against#precisely#this,#i.e.,#legein.ta.mē.onta,#and#predictably,#the#difficulty#turns#out#to#
be#implicated#in#truth#as#well,#in#saying#what.is#(ta.onta),#as#Parmenides#had#long#before#
noted,#and#as#Plato#himself#devotes#some#time#to#acknowledging#in#the#Parmenides.#
Parmenides’#great#poem#had#treated#of#nonTbeing,#without#addressing#negation#
or#predication#directly,#but#behind#his#infamous#proscription#of#talk#or#thought#of#what.
is.not.(to.mē.eon),55#lies#a#recognition#of#the#same#collocation:#if#“being#and#thinking#are#
the#same#(to.gar.auto.noein.esti.te.kai.einai),”56#and#“all#being#is#simultaneous,#
coterminous#(nun.esti.homou.pān),”57#homogenous#(homoion)58#and#indivisible#(oude.
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#Parmenides#B#2.7T8.#
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#Parmenides#B#3.1.#
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#Parmenides#B#8.5.#

#

58

#Parmenides#B#8.22.#
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diareton),59#predication#is#impossible#because#every#claim#beyond#that#of#attributing#
being#to#being#is#necessarily#a#foray#into#what#is#not#simply#being,#and#is#thus#nonFbeing.#
Plato’s#attempt#to#abide,#in#part,#by#Parmenides’#proscription,#to#ground#predicative#talk#
or#thought#in#forms#of#the#same#ontological#purity#as#Parmenides’#One,#one#for#each#
relevant#predicate,#so#to#speak,#is#finally#shown#in#the#Parmenides#to#run#into#similar#
difficulties:#the#ontological#transcendence#of#each#form,#each#a#One,#so#to#speak,#
isolates#it#from#the#very#attribution#it#is#supposed#to#sustain;#any#relevant#association#
with#its#participant#many#robs#it#of#its#formal#character,#determines#it#as#a#nonFform.#The#
predicative#relation,#Plato#will#discover,#depends#upon#a#kind#of#negative#intercalation#of#
the#many#into#the#one,#which#is#the#proper#meaning#of#Plato’s#formula,#legein.ta.mē.
onta#(saying.things.that.are.not).#
But#to#return#to#the#initial#problem,#on#the#extensionalist.model#of#speech#that#
Plato#begins#with,#and#in#terms#of#which#the#problem#of#false#speech#first#arises,#the#
meaning#of#any#simple#expression#(onoma)#is#given#by#its#extension,#whatever#that#
expression#picks#out#in#the#world#(whether#it#be#the#world#of#intelligible#forms,#or#
noēmata,#or#that#of#material#objects)#and#the#meaning#of#any#complex#expression#(a#
sentence,#for#example)#is#given#by#the#extensions#of#the#simple#expressions#comprising#
it,#roughly#speaking.#Extensions,#moreover,#are#directly#expressed,#or#mirrored,#as#the#
locution#"speaking#the.things.that.are/are.not".(legein#ta.onta/ta.mē.onta)#seems#to#
########################################################
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suggest.#Such#talk#accords#with#standard#usage#in#Greek,60#but#the#underlying#
semantics#can#be#seen#to#lead#to#impasse#on#a#number#of#fronts,#and#in#relation#to#false#
speech#in#particular.#If#the#meaning#of#any#expression#is#given#by#its#extension,#then#if#
false#speech,#i.e.,#speaking#what.is.not,#is#indeed#speech#and#not#mere#babble,#then#
what#it#says#(legein),#i.e.,#"the#things#that#are#not#(ta.mē.onta),#exist#somehow,"61#which#
is#to#say#that#false#speech#implies#the#being#of#nonTbeings.#
The#onomastic#conception#of#meaning#is#clear#here:#every#element#of#any#
expression#and#every#complex#expression,#including#that#of#the#proposition,#functions#
more#or#less#as#a#name.#This#conception#is#also#thus#inherently#atomistic:#the#question#
raised#about#the#meaning#of#the#copula#"is,"#and#the#location#of#the#problem#of#
falsehood#in#the#negative#particle#ou#or#mē,#make#this#clear.#Given#such#an#approach#to#
semantics,#it#would#seem#that#the#most#obvious#meaning,#i.e.,#extension,.of#negation,#
"not,"#whether#applied#nominally#or#sententially,#is#itself#nonTbeing,#just#as#being#is#the#
most#obvious#referent#of#“is.”#Plato’s#solution#to#the#problem#of#falsehood#will#involve#
moving#beyond#this#semantics#of#naming#(onomazein)#and#its#atomistic#treatment#of#
negation.#For#if#speaking#falsely#is#just#naming#what#is#not,#then#it#does#seem#to#be#a#
variety#of#speech#that#necessarily#miscarries,#and#thus#certifies#its#own#inexistence.#
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#Constructions#involving#legein/epein.plus#an#accusative#object#are#common#in#Greek,#e.g.,#legein#ti#
(saying#something),#epos.epein.(to#speak#a#word/speech),#an#internal#or#cognate#accusative#construction#
frequent#in#Homer.#
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However,#it#is#Plato’s#own#analysis#of#the#formula,#legein.ta.mē.onta#,.that#

leads#directly#to#the#overturning#of#the#semantic#model#it#serves.#We#can#rule#out#three#
possible#ways#of#construing#this#formula#at#once:#(1)#using#the#phrase#“ta.mē.onta,”#(2)#
speaking#[of]#negative#facts,#or#(3)#speaking#[of]#negative#things#or#beings.#(1)#is#ruled#
out#because#using#the#phrase#"ta.mē.onta"#is#neither#sufficient#nor#necessary#for#
uttering#a#falsehood.##The#second#and#third#are#ruled#out#for#similar#reasons.#If#one#
thinks#there#are#such#things#as#negative#facts#(2),#or#things#(3),#talk#of#them#need#hardly#
involve#one#in#falsehood.#“There#are#no#tenTfoot#ants”#is#likely#true,#and#if#what#makes#
this#true#is#the#fact#that#there#are#no#tenTfoot#ants#then#talking#about#such#nonTexistent#
things#is#consistent#with#saying#something#true#while#saying#ta.mē.onta.#Similarly,#there#
are#nonTAmericans#living#in#America,#and#declaring#this#about#nonTAmericans#is#saying#
something#true,#not#false.#On#the#other#hand,#if#one#is#convinced#such#things#do#not#
exist#and#that#all#talk#of#things#that#do#not#exist#is#false#(a#view#we#will#have#occasion#to#
consider#at#some#later#point),#the#converse#of#the#view#that#all#false#speech#is#directed#
towards#nonTexistent#things,#then#(2)#and#(3)#will#always#amount#to#speaking#falsely.#
However,#this#would#simply#amount#to#one#variety#of#falsehood,#and,#more#importantly,#
Plato#doesn't#express#the#view#here#or#anywhere#else#that#using#such#expressions#
automatically#involves#one#in#falsehood.#In#fact#what#he#does#ultimately#say#about#
negative#expressions#contradicts#any#such#view.#
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This#leaves#us#with#the#following#possible#construals#of#the#formula:#(4)#

claiming#[to#be#the#case]#what#is#not#the#case,#(5)#speaking#[of]#things#that#are#not,#and#
(6)#speaking#[of]#nonTbeings.#If#(4)#seems#to#be#the#most#obviously#relevant#sense#to#
assign#here,#that#is#only#because#it#accords#with#contemporary#philosophical#intuition#
about#what#falsehood#is.#But#it#says#both#more#and#less#than#Plato's#formula,#legein.ta.
mē.onta,#would#seem#to#imply.#It#says#more,#because#it#says#that#falsehood#involves#a#
kind#of#contradiction:#saying#P,#when#~P#is#the#case.#It#says#less,#because#it#does#not#
capture#what#Plato#considers#crucial#to#falsehood,#and#what#generates#paradox,#namely#
that#we#in#fact#speak#(of)#or#refer#to#what#is#not,#not#just#that#we#speak#of#what#is#not#
the#case.#The#difference#here#between#a#fact,#the#circumstance#we#might#take#to#
correspond#to#a#proposition,#and#a#thing,#the#being#or#nonTbeing#we#might#think#the#
possible#extension#of#an#expression#or#referring#term,#is#crucial#to#keep#in#mind,#since#
part#of#what#is#at#issue#here#is#what#kind#of#ontological#commitment#speaking#implicates#
one#in.#
It#is#thus#only#(5)#and#possibly#(6)#that#seem#to#capture#what#more#the#problem#
with#falsehood#might#be.#The#initial#problem,#as#Plato#seems#to#frame#it,#concerns#our#
talk#counting#as#talk,#or#our#propositions#counting#as#propositions,#when#extension#or#
reference#fails.#For#example,#if#it#is#false#that#Theaetetus#is#flying,#then#it#isn't#clear#that#
there's#anything#I'm#referring#to#when#I#declare#that#he#is,#and#if#there#isn't#anything#I'm#
referring#to,#if#what#I'm#attempting#to#refer#to#doesn’t#exist#(5)#or#is#(in#some#manner#
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that#falls#short#of#being)#a#kind#of#nonTbeing#(6),#then#my#talk#is#not#merely#false#but#
empty,#and#so#isn't#talk#at#all.#
#

Now#we#might#wonder#why#the#consequence#just#canvassed#would#be#so#

troublesome#to#Plato.#Could#he#not#simply#accept#the#notion#that#only#true#speech#is#
truly#speech,#that#false#speech#is#not#in#fact#speech#at#all?#The#Sophist#would#then#turn#
out#to#be#someone#who,#though#he#appears#to#be#speaking,#does#not#speak#at#all,#and,#
perhaps#more#dramatically,#it#would#turn#out#that#most,#in#fact#all,#of#us#only#succeed#in#
speaking#some#of#the#time,#i.e.,#when#what#we#say#is#true.#One#obvious#problem#with#
such#an#account#is#that#most#of#what#we#call#speech#will#have#to#be#disqualified#as#
speech,#depending#on#how#strictly#we#construe#the#criteria#of#truth.#In#addition,#whether#
we#are#speaking#or#not#will#regularly#depend#upon#circumstances#beyond#our#mere#
utterance#of#linguistically#recognizable#sounds,#for#indeed#employing#the#same#sentence,#
e.g.,#"Theaetetus#is#sitting,"#when#Theaetetus#is#sitting#and#later#when#he#is#not#will#
qualify#the#first,#but#disqualify#the#second#instance,#as#speech.#Perhaps#more#seriously,#it#
would#void#the#distinction#between#true#and#false#speech,#and#discredit#speech#as#a#or#
the#natural#locus#of#truth,#since#it#isn't#clear#what#we#might#mean#by#a#sentence's#or#
utterance's#being#true#if#there#weren't#any#other#kinds#of#sentences#or#utterances.#My#
contention,#however,#is#that#it#is#not#because,#or#not#primarily#because,#such#an#account#
runs#against#our#intuitions#about#the#nature#of#truth#and#language#that#Plato#feels#
compelled#to#solve#the#conundrum#of#speaking#what.is.not,#but#because#in#a#sense#to#be#

#

92#

made#clear,#all#speech#involves#legein.ta.mē.onta.#
Plato’s#argument#proceeds#from#an#analysis#of#false#speech,#to#negative#
expressions#and#speech#as#such,#to#the#extent#that#these#involve#meaning.or#naming#
what#is#not,#legein.ta.mē.onta,#and#thus#fail#of#reference.#(Because#the#extensional#drift#
is#so#strong#for#Plato,#as#for#Aristotle#and#Boethius,#the#distinction,#loosely#speaking,#
between#object#language#and#metalanguage#is#nowhere#made#explicit.)#He#argues#that#
we#can#avoid#violating#the#Parmenidean#proscription#(aporrhesis)#against#speaking#of#
nonTbeing,#and#so#preserve#reference#to#fundamental#forms,#and#thus#to#anything#that#
falls#under#them,#which#is#to#say#everything#else.#We#can#do#so#by#recognizing#that#the#
extension,#the#ontological#correlate,#of#the#negative#particle,#here,#whether#nominal#or#
sentential#(mē.or#ou,#respectively),#is#otherness#or#difference#(to.heteron/thateron)#
rather#than#contrariety#(t’anantion),#and#so#that#negation#generates#difference#rather#
than#nonTbeing:#
Then#whenever#the#negative#(apophasis)#is#said#to#signify#(sēmainei)#a#contrary#
(enantion)#[of#being],#we#wont'#grant#it,#but#only#this:#that#"non"#and#"not"#(to.mē.
kai.to.ou),#when#placed#before#the#names#that#come#after#them,#disclose#(mēnuei)#
something#other#than#those#names,#or#rather#something#other#(ti.tōn.allōn)#than#the#
things#(pragmata)#to#which#the#names#uttered#after#the#negative#are#set#forth#(keF
ētai).62#
Once#this#is#granted,#the#problem#of#extensional#failure#that#seems#to#have#beset#false#
speech#is#apparently#resolved.#
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This#solution#works,#however,#only#to#the#extent#that#we#can#make#out#a#

difference#between#otherness.and#contrariety,#such#that#saying#what.is.different.from.
being.speech#is#not#tied#to#nonTbeing.#The#immediate#treatment#of#otherness.seems#to#
sidestep#this#issue,#inasmuch#as#it#is#assigned#to#the#pantheon#of#highest#forms#and#so#
vouchsafed#its#being,#but#we#shall#have#cause#to#return#to#this#matter#at#the#close#of#this#
chapter.#The#semantics#of#negation#is#arrived#at#through#an#examination#of#the#
semantics#of#speech#as#such,#and#in#particular#the#ontological#import#of#predicative#
speech,#which,#as#Parmenides#and#Plato#both#insist,#revolves#around#the#problem#of#the#
one#and#the#many,#the#focus#of#the#Parmenides,#as#we#have#seen.#The#stranger#
introduces#the#issue#in#terms#of#the#character#of#everyday#attribution:#
We#speak#of#man,#I#suppose,#but#name#him#many#things#(poll’.atta.eponomazontes):#
we#add#colors#to#him#and#shapes,#etc...#In#all#these#attributions#and#thousands#of#
others#we#declare#him#to#be#not#only#man#but#also#good#and#infinitely#many#other#
things.#And#the#same#holds#for#other#things#as#well:#we#assume#that#each#thing#is#
one,#but#take#it#back#by#speaking#of#it#as#many#and#with#many#names.63#
The#analysis#of#attribution,#of#saying#many#of#one,#leads#to#an#observation#about#what#
licenses#attribution,#which#in#turn#leads#to#a#discussion#of#the#relationship#between#the#
basic#kinds#of#things#to#which#everything#we#speak#about#must#be#related,#and#to#the#
relations#between#those#most.general.kinds#themselves:#being,.motion,.rest,.and#
eventually#otherness#and#sameness..
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The#conclusion#of#this#analysis#is#that#everything#we#speak#or#think#about#as#a#

subject#of#attribution#or#identification#is#both#one#and#many,#and#in#a#number#of#senses,#
but#most#importantly#in#the#two#complementary#senses#that#it#is#an#instance#of#a#kind#or#
form#and#that#it#is#possessed#of#and#identified#by#and#with#its#attributes,#with#which#it#is,#
in#both#cases,#nonTidentical,#and#nonTidentical#because#it#is#also#a#totality#of#all#sorts#of#
other#things#(both#essentially#and#accidentally)#with#which#totality#no#other#instance#of#
that#kind,#nor#the#kind#itself,#is#identical.#An#instance,#or#merely#a#particularization,#of#a#
kind#or#form,#as#a#matter#of#definition,#is#not#that#kind#or#form#itself,#though#its#identity#
derives#from#that#kind#or#form.#The#problem#(explicitly#inaugurated#in#Plato’s#
Parmenides)#lies#in#making#sense#of#instantiation,#explaining#what#it#means#for#an#
instance#or#particularization#to#be#an#instance#of#a#kind,#whether#this#amounts#to#
nominal#or#attributive#exemplification,#such#that#it#is#not#identical#to#that#kind#or#any#
other#of#its#instances.#One#wants#an#account#of#how#things#are#to#be#thought#of#as#ones,#
as#individuals,#and#how#these#ones#are#to#be#connected#to#the#essential#and#accidental#
attributes#they#may#share#with#others.#The#issue#is#thus#at#once#logical#and#
metaphysical.#Every#declarative#proposition#represents#an#attempt#to#draw#multiplicity#
into#unity,#to#conceive#identity#in#difference.#
The#upshot#of#this#discussion#is#that#everything#we#regularly#speak#or#think#of,#
and,#more#importantly,#all#the#forms#that#make#such#talk#or#thought#possible,#insofar#as#
they#are#capable#of#discursive#engagement#involve#things.that.are.not#(ta.mē.onta),#and#
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thus#all#legein#is#legein.ta.mē.onta,#because#nonTbeing#(to.mē.on),#itself#a#genus#
(genos),#is,#as#he#puts#it#“dispersed#(diesparmenon)#amongst#all#things#that#are#(panta.ta.
onta)."64#The#relationship#between#forms#and#their#participants,#i.e.,#the#transient#
objects#of#perception#and#everyday#speech,#is#explicitly#treated#in#discussing#the#battle#
between#the#friends#and#enemies#of#forms.#And#it#is#here#already,#in#reformulating#their#
relationship#to#one#another,#that#the#form#of#negation,#i.e.,#difference.(to.heteron),#will#
be#introduced#as#integral#to#the#interconnection#of#forms,#though#the#interconnection#of#
forms#is#in#turn#established#on#the#basis#of#the#demands#of#cognition.#
Stranger:.And#you#declare#that#with#the#body#(sōmati),#through#sensing#(dia.
aisthēseōs),#we#commune#(koinōnein)#with#becoming#(genesei),#while#with#the#soul#
(psychēi),#through#reasoning#(dia.logismou),#we#stand#in#relation#to#genuine#being#
(pros.tēn.ontōs.ousian),#which#always#persists#in#just#the#same#condition,#while#
becoming#is#in#a#different#condition#at#different#times.65#
If#it#is#through#reason#that#speech#arises,#as#Plato#regularly#insists,#then#statements#
(logoi)#about#transient,#indeterminate#particulars#must#involve#their#translation#into#the#
proper#objects#of#rational#understanding,#i.e.,#forms,#and#we#might#well#suppose#that#
such#statements#are#expressions#of#this#translation,#and#that#it#is#through#such#
translation#that#a#given#subject#is#rationally#determined.#Plato#goes#on#to#argue#that#if#
forms.are#indeed#so#employed#in#cognition,#then#they#cannot#be#unchanging#(akinēta),#
and#that#if#they#are#changeable,#then#they#are#not#simple,#selfTsame#verities,#but#are#
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instead#riven#by#negation#and#hence#by#nonFbeing,#even#if#this#will#finally#be#
understood#as#difference.or#otherness.from.being.#The#argument#extends#over#several#
pages,#but,#in#brief,#runs#as#follows:#
(1)#The#cognition#(to.gignōskein)#of#forms,#i.e.,#ta.onta,#and#their#being#cognized#(to.
gignōskesthai)#is#what#is#meant#by#the#communion#of#the#soul#with#what#is#(hē.
ousia)#properly#speaking.#
(2)#Communing#(koinōnein)#is#“a#being#affected#(pathēma)#or#a#doing#(poiēma)#that#
comes#to#be#(gignomenon)#out#of#some#power#(ek.dunameōs)#and#from#the#coming#
together#of#things,#one#against#the#other#(apo#tōn.pros.allēla.suniontōn).”66#
(3)#Cognition#of#the#forms#and#their#being#cognized#are#kinds#of#doings.(poiēmata)#
and#happenings#(pathēmata),#respectively.#
(4)#If#forms#are#unchangeable#(akinēta)#and#always#selfTsame,#then#they#are#
uncognizable,#as#Plato#puts#it,#“there#is#mind#(nous)#in#nothing,#about#nothing,#
nowhere.”67#
(5)#On#the#other#hand,#if#forms#are#“carried#about#and#moving”#(pheromena.kai.
kinoumena),#then#they#are#also#unknowable,#since#the#objects#of#thought#are#
necessarily#selfTsame.##
(6)#If#forms#are#cognizable,#they#are#necessarily#changeable#(kinēta),#and#so#
participate#in#both#the#form#of#change/motion#(kinēsis)#and#that#of#rest#(stasis).#
(7)#To#the#extent#that#each#form#is#cognizable#it#thus#participates#in#both#change#and#
rest,#yet#because#each,#apart#from#the#forms#of#change#or#rest#themselves,#is#also#
not#either#change#or#rest,#respectively,#and#each#is,#in#addition,#although#not#being#
itself,#each#participates#in#otherness#and#nonFbeing.68#
#

Plato’s#insight#consists#in#seeing#that#precisely#what#makes#falsehood#possible#is#

also#what#makes#the.many#the#many,#and#ultimately#what#makes#speech#possible,#
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namely,#the#otherFthanFitself,#and#the#negation#that#expresses#this,#that#makes#
anything#susceptible#to#determination#or#predication#so#susceptible.69.Parmenides#had#
argued#as#much#about#the#character#of#speech#as#such#on#the#basis#of#the#fact#that#
anything#predicated#of#a#subject#is#either#identical#to#it#or#not,#and#if#not#identifies#that#
subject#with#what#is#nonFidentical#to#it,#and#thus#is.not.#Parmenides#concluded#that#this#
required#us#to#refrain#from#predication,#to#foreclose#the#discursive#interval,#so#to#speak.#
Plato,#on#the#other#hand,#sees#that#this#simply#requires#us#to#provide#a#semantics#of#
negation#that#makes#speaking#of#nonTbeing#intelligible.#Part#of#what#we#have#to#contend#
with#here#is#the#way#in#which#speaking,#including#speaking#about#speaking,#involves#us#in#
negation,#whether#or#not#we#employ#it#formally#or#explicitly.#Further,#if#being#so#
susceptible#is#a#condition#of#both#truth#and#falsehood,#it#follows#that#the#philosopher,#or#
more#precisely#the#philosopher’s#engagement#with#truth,#is#under#threat#along#with#the#
nefarious#being#of#the#sophist.#
To#be#clear,#this#is#not#because#negation#can#be#employed#in#true#statements,#
i.e.,#in#expressing#negative#truths#like#“Socrates#is#not#a#triangle,”#but#because#it#is#an#
implicit#part#of#every#statement,#because#what.is,#at#least#what#“is#said#to#be,”#apart#
from#being#as#such#(ousia),#which#as#such#is#undefined.and#indefinable,#is#defined#in#
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terms#of#generalTparticular,#or#kindTinstance#relations,#which#relations#are#in#turn#
differentiated,#or#more#properly#divided,#via#negation.#While#Plato#does#not#yet#have#at#
hand#the#Aristotelian#formula#of#the#tode.ti,#his#analysis#of#the#basic#form#of#speech#or#
thought#(logos)#places#something#like#the#divided#configuration#of#a#tode.ti#at#the#heart#
of#things.(Conversely,#with#Aristotle’s#rejection#of#negation#as#a#constitutive#element#of#
differentiation,#the#logicoTmetaphysical#configuration#of#the#Aristotelian#tode.ti#remains#
opaque..
And#thus#the#ultimate#philosophical#focus#of#this#dialogue#is#not#the#narrow#one#
of#falsehood,#nor#simply#speech#as#such,#but#the#logic,#and#hence#the#metaphysics,#of#
conceptualization#that#grounds#discursive#speech#and#thought.#However,#if#legein.ta.mē.
onta,#as#a#fact#about#the#semantics#of#speech,#is#involved#not#just#in#speaking#falsely#but#
in#speaking#as#such,#then#it#cannot#in#the#end#be#identified#with#falsehood#either,#as#
Plato#first#suggests.#Plato's#aim#in#this#dialogue,#as#it#turns#out,#is#to#recover#the#
possibility#of#thought#and#speech#from#the#predations#of#negation#apparent#in#
falsehood,#while#preserving#the#distinction#between#true#and#false#speech,#without#
which#philosophy#would#seem#to#be#impossible.#What#he#ends#up#discovering,#according#
to#the#reading#I#am#defending,#is#that#that#thought#and#speech#are,#properly#speaking,#
discursive,#and#that#this#derives#from#the#cloven#structure#of#ordinary#and#transcendent#
names#(onomata)#or#the#concepts#they#designate.#
In#the#first#section#of#the#Phenomenology,#Hegel#makes#this#point,#in#relation#to#
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the#demonstrative#this,#that#it#acquires#meaning,#beyond#its#universal#application,#in#
the#penumbra#of#negations#it#elicits.#In#its#attempt#at#immediacy#it#demonstrates#its#
mediation#through#negation,#and#in#so#doing#exemplifies#the#"Now#that#has#been#
(gewesenes)"#which#he#identifies#with#the#"truth#of#being."#This#should#recall#for#us,#
more#than#anything#else,#Aristotle's#puzzling#expression#for#essence,#to.ti.ēn.einai,#
literally#the.being.of.what.was,.which#in#binding#the#present#of#an#articular#infinitive#(to.
einai)#to#an#imperfective#mode#of#the#ti.esti##formula#(ti.ēn)#suggests#the#confounding#
(in)accessibility#of#the#past#in#the#present.#The#ensuing#passage#from#the#now#that#is,#to#
its#negation#as#the#now#that#has#been,#to#the#now#reinstated#through#the#negation#of#
the#now#that#has#been,#exemplifies,#for#Hegel,#the#ineliminable#dialectic#of#cognition,#
language#and#consciousness.#Hegel#puts#it#as#follows:#"The#‘this’#is#therefore#posited#as#
not.this;#that#is,#as#sublated,#and#thereby#as#not#nothing#but#as#a#determinate#nothing,#
that#is,#as#a.nothing.of.a.specific.content,#namely,#of#the.‘this.’"70#If#Hegel#sees#in#the#use#
of#the#demonstrative#the#gap#and#interplay#between#the#universality#of#the#sign#and#the#
fleeting#singularity#of#the#extension,#Plato#certainly#anticipates#him#in#recognizing#the#
place#of#negation#in#this#interplay,#and#thus#the#dialectical#governance#of#conceptual#
organization.#For#Plato,#as#we#shall#see,#momentarily,#that#dialectic#is#the#captured#in#
the#method#of#division.#
But#before#turning#to#division,#let#us#ret.Phenomenology#Phenomenology#urn#to#
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Plato’s#solution#to#the#problem#of#intrinsic#negation.#Plato,#recall,#argues#that#in#
specifying#the#meaning#of#false#speech,#and#in#determining#the#meaning#of#ordinary#
speech,#the#mē#or#ou.involved#in#semantic#explanation#is#to#be#understood#as#difference#
(to.heteron),#allowing#us#to#reparse#the#phrase#“ta.mē.onta”.as#“what#are#different#from#
what#is.”#Every#individual#kind#or#form,71#in#particular,#is#differentiated#as#such#by#
participation#in#difference#(to.heteron),#in#the#first#place#from#its#mere.being,#and#as#
such#is#a#specific,#differentiated#kind#by#virtue#of#not#being#identical#to#its#mere#being,#or#
to#the#genus#being.#As#Plato#phrases#it:#
with#respect#to#all#kinds#(genē),#the#nature#(phusis)#of#difference,#by#producing#each#
as#other.(heteron).than##Being,#makes#each#notTbeing#(ouk.on),”#the#nature#of#this#
portion.(morion).of#difference,#i.e.,#difference#in#relation#to#being,#being#notTbeing.72##
Plato’s#claim,#however,#turns#out#to#be#not#merely#that#difference,#the#alleged#extension#
of#the#negative#particle,#differentiates#every#kind#by#distinguishing#it#from#being,#but#
that#it#does#so#by#differentiating#each#kind#from#every#other#with#respect.to#its#being:#
we#showed#that#the#nature#(physis)#of#difference#(thateron)#is#and#that#it#is#chopped#
up#and#distributed#through#all#the#things#that#are#in#their#relation#to#one#another,#
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and#we#dared#to#say#about#each#portion#of#this#nature,#in#its.opposition.to.Being,#
that#this#very#portion#is#in#its#very#being#NonTbeing.73#

The#connection#between#semantics#and#metaphysics#is#made#still#more#vivid#by#a#later#
passage#that#repeats#the#stipulation#concerning#the#negative#particle#just#cited#in#
metaphysical#terms,#i.e.,#in#terms#of#“that#which#is#not,”#stating#that#“that#which#is#not”#
(to.mē.on)#has#“no#less#being#than#that#which#is#in#itself,#and#[that]#it#indicates#not#a#
contrary#to#that#but…an#other#than#it.”74#
However,#it#is#only#on#the#assumption#of#negation’s#attaching#directly#not#to#the#
referring#expression#itself#but#to#its#being#that#one#can#make#sense#of#the#demand#that#
what#is#thereby#signified#is#not.contrariety#but#difference.#If#notTbeautiful#did#not#
amount#to#notFbeingFbeautiful,#it#wouldn’t#amount#to#a#case#of#legein.ta.mē.onta,#and#
so#wouldn’t#require#an#alternative#semantics#for#negation.#This#should#be#kept#in#mind#
once#we#turn#to#Boethius,#who#will#argue#instead,#following#Aristotle,#that#contrariety,#
and#not#contradiction,#is#what#enables#us#to#differentiate#species,#precisely#because#
negation#attaches#to#the#being#of#an#expression#rather#than#the#expression#itself.#The#
good,#for#example,#is#individuated#by#virtue#of#its#relation,#amongst#other#forms,#not#to#
nonTbad,#but#to#notFbeingFbad.#In#other#words,#negation’s#point#of#attachment,#so#to#
speak,#is#always#the#specific#being#of#the#kind#or#form.named.#But#why#does#Plato#think#
this?##
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It#should#be#clear#from#what#has#been#said#that#as#long#as#legein.is#

understood#extensionally,#as#simple#naming#(onomazein),#falsehood#cannot#consist#
merely#in#legein.ta.mē.onta,#since#it#would#follow#that#speech#as.such#is#in#some#respect#
false,#and#Plato#clearly#wishes#to#avoid#this#implication.#It#should#be#clear,#that#is,#that#
the#legein#involved#in#false#speech#cannot#be#identified#with#onomazein.#While#the#
semantics#of#negation#as#difference#gives#us#the#basic#framework#for#making#sense#of#
referring#to#things#that#are#not#(ta.mē.onta),#the#discursive#splitting#of#the#concept#
through#the#operation#of#negation#leads#to#a#problem#of#the#unity#of#the#concept,#soT
called#to#associate#it#with,#yet#differentiate#it#from,#its#better#known#congener,#the#
problem.of.the.unity.of.the.proposition,75#to#which#it#is#nonetheless#logically#and#
historically#prior.#To#take#Plato's#example,#the#problem#involved#in#seeing#how#
"Theaetetus#sits"#differs#from#'"Theaetetus,"#"sits"#(one#way#of#putting#the#problem#of#
the#unity#of#the#proposition)#is#that#by#merely#naming#the#subject#and#predicate#one#has#
not#succeeded#in#naming#the#relation#supposed#to#hold#between#them,#because#indeed#
there#is#no#name#furnished#to#do#so.#
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But#even#if#there#were,#the#relation#between#that#first#relation#and#each#of#

the#names#or#terms#flanking#it#would#not#have#been#named,#and#so#on.#Plato's#solution,#
however,#the#fact#that#what#is#said#is#about,#literally#of,#its#subject,#namely#Theaetetus,#
introduces#a#further#problem,#since#what#the#statement#is#about#in#part#depends#upon#
what#we#take#the#actual#relation#between#the#referents#of#its#constituent#parts#to#be.#
This,#I#take#it,#is#why#the#stranger's#second#example#is#not#"Theaetetus#flies,"#but#
"Theaetetus,#with#whom#I#am#now#conversing,#flies."#If#I#am#right,#then#the#problem#
here#lies#in#the#fact#that#the#concept#of#Theaetetus,#if#there#is#one,#is#riven#by#negation.#
It#is#a#composite#of#concepts#that#are#and#are#not#identical#to#it,#and#unless#we#know#
what#makes#that#composite#a#whole#we#cannot#tell#how#any#attributive#property#
ascribed#to#it#relates#to#it,#or,#more#profoundly,#what#concept#or#thing#it#is#that#that#
property#is#being#ascribed#to.76#This#problem,#however,#persists#well#beyond#Plato,#and#
can#be#seen#to#haunt#Fregean#and#postTFregean#semantics#as#well.##
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#However,#it#should#be#noted#that#a#version#of#the#difficulty#involved#here#can#be#generated#even#if#
negation#is#left#out#of#the#equation,#and#perhaps#independently#of#any#other#specific#semantic#constraints#
but#this:#that#the#meaning#of#a#concept#is#given#in#part#by#the#range#of#propositions#in#which#it#is#directly#
or#indirectly#involved.#One#version#of#such#a#semantics#is#to#be#found#in#Frege,#as#grounded#in#a#context.
principle,#which#has#conceptual#content#dependent#upon#the#propositional#context,#i.e.,#the#propositions#
in#which#a#concept#is#sensibly#or#truthfully#employed.#As#Stephen#Yablo#has#recently#written#in#a#paper#
entitled#"Carving#Content#at#the#Joints"#in#Things:.Papers.on.Objects,.Events.and.Properties.(Oxford:#
Oxford#University#Press,#2010),#246T268,#it#is#the#propositional#context#of#use#that#enables#us#to#refine#our#
understanding#of#a#given#concept,#to#"carve"#its#contours.”#The#passage#in#Frege#runs#as#follows:#“The#
judgment#‘Line#a#is#parallel#to#line#b’,#in#symbols:#a##b,#can#be#taken#as#an#identity.#If#we#do#this,#we#obtain#
the#concept#of#direction,#and#say:#‘The#direction#of#line#a#is#equal#to#the#direction#of#line#b’.#Thus#we#
replace#the#symbol#by#the#more#generic#symbol#=,#through#removing#what#is#specific#in#the#content#of#the#
former#and#dividing#it#between#a#and#b.#We#carve#up#the#content#in#a#way#different#from#the#original#way,#
and#this#yields#us#a#new#concept.”#See#Frege,#Foundations.of.Arithmetic:.a.LogicoFMathematical.Enquiry.
into.the.Concept.of.Number,#trans.#J.#L.#Austin#(Evanston:#Northwestern#University#Press,#1980),#§64.#
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And#so,#Plato’s#stranger#finally#observes#that#the#mere#concatenation#of#

“words#spoken#in#sequence#(synechōs.legomena)#do#not#amount#to#speech#in#the#
relevant#sense,77#that#falsity#and.truth#only#arise#when#a#speech#(logos),#in#the#sense#of#
an#evaluable#statement,#moves#beyond#mere#naming,#and##“places#an#end/boundary”#(ti.
perainei),#that#is,#“by#weaving#together#verbs#with#names#(symplekōn.ta.rhēmata.tois.
onomasi),”78#or#as#he#puts#it#a#little#latter##“by#putting#together#a#thing#and#an#action#
through#a#name#and#a#verb#(syntheis.pragma.praxei.di’.onomatos.kai.rhematos),”#i.e.,#
when#a#nominal#and#a#verbal#expression#(onoma#and#rhema)#are#combined#in#such#a#
way#that#a#unity#is#formed,#that#is,#that#the#unit.of#a#statement#or#proposition#(logos)#
arises.79#Only#when#so#constituted#do#“things#uttered#(ta.phōnēthenta)...indicate#(dēlōi)#
the#action#(praxia)#or#inaction#(apraxia)#or#being#(ousia)#of.something.that.is#(ontos)#or#is.
not.(mē.ontos).”80#
There#are#various#ways#we#might#conceive#of#this#shift#from#an#onomastic#to#a#
combinatorial#model#of#speech#and#thought,#and#perhaps#a#comparison#with#
Wittgenstein's#turn#from#the#specular#semantics#of#logicoTmetaphysical#isomorphism#set#
#####################################################################################################################################################################
Hegel’s#preferred#way#of#putting#this#will#be#to#say#that#such#a#procedure#yields#not#a#new.concept,#but#a#
further#determination#of#the#concept#with#which#we#began.#
#
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# #Sophist#262b2T3.#
#
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#Sophist#262d2T5.#
#
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#Sophist#262e12.#
#
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forth#in#his#Tractatus.to#one#of#autonomous#and#dynamic#"forms#of#life"#developed#
in#the#Philosophical.Investigations#is#a#helpful#one.81#The#simplicity#of#the#former#and#its#
guarantee#of#veridicality#are#undercut#by#its#artificiality#(in#particular#its#reliance#on#a#
pictorial#correspondence#between#the#logical#features#of#language#and#the#ontical#
features#of#the#world).#On#the#other#hand,#the#more#plastic#conception#of#logicoT
epistemic#practice#that#belongs#to#the#latter#model#leaves#questions#of#verification#
unanswerable.#It#may#also#be#that#the#distinction#Gilles#Deleuze#draws#between#a#
semantics#of#repetition,#which#replicates#without#mediation,#and#one#of#generality,#
which#operates#through#symbolic#approximation#or#resemblance,#is#more#to#the#point.##
In#any#event,#Plato’s#new#symplokē.or#combinatory#model#implies#that#nominal#
expressions#and#verbs#on#their#own#are#incomplete#elements#of#speech#properly#
conceived.#A#rhema,#as#Plato#construes#it,#is#best#understood#as#a#predicate,#that#is,#as#
anything#that#is#said#of#the#subject#to#which#it#is#attached,#including#what#will#become#
the#standard#form#of#the#predicate,#the#copula#plus#a#noun#or#adjective.#On#the#
onomastic#model,#however,#the#grammatical#distinction#and#the#grammatical#concord#
between#rhema.and#onoma#are#logically#inert.#Each#element#of#a#candidate#proposition#
simply#names#a#discrete#thing,#and#together#they#name#a#group#of#discrete#things#whose#
unity,#if#it#has#any,#reduces#to#the#fact#that#each#is#named#in#compact#succession,#e.g.,#
########################################################
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#An#interesting#comparison#between#Plato's#original#theory#of#forms#and#Wittgenstein's#Tractarian#
semantics#is#first#suggested#by#Elizabeth#Anscombe,#and#was#taken#up#more#recently#in#a#paper#by#Robert#
Pippin#entitled#"Negation#and#NotTbeing#in#Wittgenstein's#Tractatus#and#Plato's#Sophist,"#KantTStudien#70#
(1979):#179T196.#
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Theaetetus,#sits.#But#a#string#of#referring#expressions#does#no#better#at#indicating#
anything#true#or#false#than#a#simple#referring#expression.#Each#functions#as#a#name,#the#
former#as#a#complex#name#of#a#cluster#of#things,#the#latter#as#a#simple#name#of#an#
individual#thing.#Unless#an#utterance#says#of#any#one#element#that#it#belongs#or#does#not#
belong,#is#or#is#not#an#attribute#of,#or#is#or#is#not#identical#to#another#the#question#of#
correctness,#the#question#of#adequacy#or#truth#never#arises.#
Speech#(logos)#thus#has#to#be#understood#as#expressing#a#horizontal#relation#
between#a#subject#and#predicate,#and#not#just#a#vertical#relation#between#expressions#
and#their#referents.#What#this#amounts#to,#remember,#is.ti.perainein,#which#is#
translated,#for#example,#by#Eva#Bramm#as#"bringing#something#to#closure."82#However,#
the#phrase#is#surely#more#accurately#and#transparently#translated#as#determining.
something,#providing#a#peras,#a#limit,#boundary#or#determination,#with#the#indefinite#
pronoun#ti.functioning#as#an#internal#accusative.#In#addition,#as#we#shall#see#in#a#
moment,#this#way#of#formulating#the#aboutness#condition#allows#us#to#see#an#important#
connection#between#predication#and#division.#For#the#moment,#it#suffices#to#point#out#
that#by#contrast#a#list#of#names#determines#nothing,#since#no#distinction#between#what#
########################################################
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#Eva#Brann’s#translation#of#the#Sophist#is#careful#and#thoughtful,#but#is#also,#despite#its#attempt#at#
philosophical#neutrality,#profoundly#tendentious.#See#Plato's.Sophist.or.The.Professor.of.Wisdom:.
Translation,.Introduction,.and.Glossary,#trans.#Eva#Brann,#Peter#Kalkavage,#and#Eric#Salem#(Newburyport,#
MA:#Focus#Philosophical#Library,#1996)..In#this#case,#however,#her#translation#reflects#the#consensus#of#
both#translators#and#commentators,#e.g.,#see#Crivelli,#Cornford.#My#suggested#translation#accords#with#
Seth#Benardete’s,#who#offers#“puts#a#limit#on#something,”#in#his#translation.#See#his#The.Being.of.the.
Beautiful:.Plato’s.Theaetetus,.Sophist.and.Statesman..Translated.and.with.Commentary#(Chicago:#
University#of#Chicago#Press,#1984),#II.60.#It#also#accords#with#the#use#of#perainō#elsewhere#in#Plato,#e.g.,#
Gorgias#472b8,#Symposium#217c1–2,#Republic#4.#426a2,#Theaetetus#180a6–7.#
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is#open#and#what#constitutes#a#peras,#between#a#syncategorematic#element#and#its#
categorematic#supplement,#to#recall#our#reading#of#the#Parmenides,#can#be#made#out.#
Yet#clearly#the#requirement#of#grammatical#and#logical#concord#will#not#be#
sufficient#either.#“Athens#reclines”#combines#elements#of#the#proper#categories,#i.e.,#
name#and#verb,#and#can#be#thought#of#as#expressing#a#determination,#a#peras,#of#
Athens.#Yet#it#isn’t#obviously#either#true#or#false,#since#it#isn’t#clear#what#it#means#at#all,#
or#how#we#would#go#about#determining#its#truth#value.#On#the#other#hand,#though#
“Theaetetus#sits”#is#an#appropriately#constituted#logos,#this#fact#simply#tells#us#that#it#is#
susceptible#to#being#true#or#false,#or#that#it#has#a#truth#value.#Knowing#that#it#is#
grammatically#and#logically#well#formed#does#not#tell#us#anything#yet#about#how#we#
might#go#about#assessing#its#truth#value.#For#this,#the#further#condition#of#relatedness,#of#
the#involvement#of#two#terms#with#one#another,#needs#to#be#satisfied.#In#Plato’s#initial#
formulation#of#this#further#condition,#what#must#be#expressed,#as#we#just#saw,#is#that#of.
which#an#action,#being,#etc.,#is#indicated,#an#of.which#that#is#either#something.that.is.(on).
or#a#something.that.is.not.(mē.on).#
However,#this#formulation#is#puzzling,#since#it#seems#to#suggest#that#nonTexistent#
objects,#however#understood,#can#be#the#subjects#of#predication.#However,#to#return#to#
the#question#of#why#Plato#insists#that#negation#attaches#to#the#being#of#what#it#negates,#
e.g.,#notTbeingFbeautiful,#we#can#make#out#an#answer#in#this#initial#formulation:#negation#
is#attached#to#the#being#of#what#is#negated,#because#its#operation#is#directed#to#the#
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discursivity#of#the#relevant#concept,#to#its#being.x.#When#we#negate#an#expression#
we#are#expressing#its#being.different.from#some#appropriate#subject,#i.e.,#notFbeingF
beautiful#is#a#way#of#expressing#the#predicative#function#or#interval#“...is#not#beautiful.”#
The#initial#formulation#presents#the#predicative#side#of#this#interval,#joining#the#copula,#
whether#in#its#base#or#its#negative#form,#to#the#subject#of#attribution:#the#aboutness#of#a#
proposition#is#represented#by#“...#is”#or#“...is#not,”#which#thus#closes#the#interval#
between#subject#and#attribute.##
In#its#subsequent#formulation,#aboutness#is#given#a#more#circumscribed#
characterization:#“Whenever#there#is#speech#(logos),#it's#necessary#that#it#be#speech#
about/of#something#(tinos.einai.logon),#and#impossible#for#it#not#to#be#about#anything#
(mē.de.tinos.adunaton).”83#Once#more,#however,#this#represents#a#condition#for#being#a#
statement,#and#thus#a#condition#for#being#true#or#false,#but#not#yet#a#condition#for#being#
one#or#the#other.#According#to#the#analysis#Plato#will#finally#offer,#“Theaetetus#sits”#is#
true#just#in#case#sitting#is#amongst#the#things#that#are#about,#or#of,#Theaetetus,#the#
present#interlocutor#of#the#stranger.#“Theaetetus#flies,”#on#the#other#hand,#is#false#of#
this#same#Theaetetus,#but#may#possibly#be#true#of#an#eponymously#named#bird,#because#
while#it#says#something#that#is#other#than,#or#different#from,#the#things#that#are#of#
Theaetetus,#this#something#might#be#found#amongst#the#things#that#are#about#our#
hypothetical#bird.#Now#what#about#“Theaetetus#is#not#flying.”?#Plato#doesn’t#consider#
########################################################
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negative#statements#here,#whether#true#or#false,#but#the#general#characterization#of#
statements#suggests#that#even#these#are#to#be#thought#of#in#terms#of#the#appropriate#
sort#of#combination#or#symplexis.#If#what#determines#truth#or#falsity#is#whether#or#not#
what#is#said#belongs#to#the.things.that.are.about.the#relevant#subject,#then#our#true#
negative#statement#will#be#true.just#in#case#it#is#to#be#found#among#the#things.that.are#of#
or#about#Theaetetus.(
But#how#are#we#to#understand#this?#In#an#earlier#passage,#Plato#tells#us#that#a#
statement#(logos)#is#false#“when#it#says#that#things#that#are#are#not#(ta.onta#mē.einai),#
and#that#things#that#are#not#are#(ta.mē.onta.einai).”84#If#our#negative#statement#is#true,#it#
would#seem#it#says#(of)#things#that#are#not,#that#they#are#not.#However,#the#aboutness#
requirement#relativizes#the#semantic#relation,#and#there#are#two#ways#of#thinking#of#this:#
(1)#either#notFflying.is#amongst#the#things#that#are.about#Theaetetus,#or#(2)#flying#is#
amongst#the#things#that#are.not#concerning#Theaetetus.#In#either#case,#something#that#
isn’t#is,#relative#to#Theaetetus,#whether#it#is#the#specific#nonTbeing#of#nonFflying#or#the#
general#class#of#things#that#are#not,#vis#a#vis#Theaetetus.#At#263b11T12,#however,#Plato#
remarks#that#“there#are#many#things#that#are,#and#many#things#that#are#not#about#each#
thing#(peri.hekaston.einai),”#which#seems#to#point#to#the#latter#construal.#“Theaetetus#is#
not#flying”#is#true#just#in#case#flying#is.one#of#the#things#that#are.not#about#Theaetetus.#
What#we#want#to#know#then,#is#what#this#relation#amounts#to.#How,#in#other#words,#
########################################################
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does#Theaetetus,#or#anything#for#that#matter,#bear#a#specific#relation#to#what#is#not,#
or#to#what#is?#
What#is#on#offer#here#is#an#ontological#theory#of#truth,#one#that#associates#more#
complex#expressions,#such#as#may#be#identified#with#propositions,#with#what.is.[the.
case]#as#well,#and#thus#sees#propositional#truth#as#derivative#of#and#reducible#to#
ontological#truth.#The#truth#of#"Theaetetus#is#sitting,"#for#example,#is#identifiable#with#
what#is#the#case#concerning#Theaetetus#on#the#occasion#of#his#sitting,#just#as#the#truth#of#
"Theaeteus#is#a#man"#is#identifiable#with#what#is#the#case#concerning#Theaetetus#upon#
the#enduring#circumstance#of#his#being#a#man,#but#both#are#true#not.insofar#as#they#
correspond.to#what.is,#but#because#what#they#say#is.#Yet,#the#being#of#Theaetetus#and#
man#or#sitting#is#not#enough#to#guarantee#the#being#of#Theaetetus’#sitting#or#being#a#
man.#Sitting,#or#being#a#man,#has#to#be#connected#to#Theaetetus,#a#relation#Plato#
expresses#grammatically#through#the#genitive#case,#with#or#without#the#preposition#peri.#
Moreover,#this#aboutness#relation#itself#is#indifferent#to#the#kind#of#connection#involved,#
i.e.,#between#the#semantics#of#“Theaetetus#is#sitting”#is#true#and#that#of#"Theaeteus#is#a#
man."#We#want#to#say#that#both#express#what#is.about#Theatetus,#the#former#as#a#
matter#of#circumstance,#the#latter#as#a#matter#of#essence,#yet#nothing#here#allows#to#
make#out#this#distinction#between#accidental#and#essential#predication.#What#is#
nonetheless#clear,#however,#is#that#Plato#thinks#the#analysis#he#has#provided#applies#to#
both#kinds#of#claims.#At#least#there#is#not#indication#that#he#thinks#otherwise.##
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The#aboutness#(peri.tinos.or#tou)#relation#is#an#obvious#precursor#of#

Aristotle’s#being.said.of.something.as.subject.(kath’.upokeimenou.tinos.legomenon)#
relation,#although#Plato#makes#no#distinction#between#essential#and#accidental#
predication,#or#between#individuals#and#universals,#etc.#However,#Plato’s#interest#here#
lies#not#in#cataloging#the#kinds#of#things#that#can#enter#into#such#a#relation,#but#in#saying#
how#things’#being#in#that#relation#enables#us#to#formulate#statements#(logoi)#that#are#
true#or#false.#But#of#course#what#follows#from#the#claim#that#something’s#being#in#the#
appropriate#relation#to#a#subject#of#discourse#is#what#it#means#for#it#to#be#true#or#false#is#
that#determining#whether#a#statement#is#true#or#false#involves#determining#whether#or#
not#it#stands#in#the#appropriate#relationship,#that#is,#determining#whether#what#is#said#to#
be#or#not#to#be#of#a#subject#is.in.fact.one#of#the#things#that#are#or#are#not#of#that#subject.##
Heidegger#was#surely#right#that#in#Plato's#insistence#on#the#aboutness#of#
propositions#or#statements,#his#adding#to#the#accusative#construction#of#legein.ta.onta#a#
genitive#one#of#legein.tinos#(speaking#of.something),85#one#sees#a#recognition#of#
intentionality#as#a#fundamental#feature#of#speech,#though#we#need#not#follow#
Heidegger86#in#thinking#this#is#to#abandon#the#reflective#or#apophantic#model#for#a#
correspondence#model#of#truth.#What#is#implicitly#conceded#is#that#an#apophantic#
########################################################
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#See#Heidegger's#Plato's.Sophist,#trans.#Richard#Rojcewicz#and#André#Schuwer#(Indiana:#Indiana#
University#Press,#2003).##
#

#

112#

language#of#forms.can#never#be#directly#about#the#sorts#of#individual#particulars#that#
language#is#supposed#to#grant#us#veridical#access#to:#if#ta.onta#properly#speaking,#i.e.,#
the#forms,#are#the#proper#extensions#of#such#a#language,#then#we#certainly#cannot#
employ#the#same#language#to#speak#of#the#particulars#that#instantiate#these#forms.#To#
try#to#do#so#is#to#reconceive#forms#as#predicable#universals,#i.e.,#as#something#closer#to#
concepts,#and#it#is#in#admitting#nonbeing,#in#the#guise#of#difference,#into#the#domain#of#
forms#that#this#reconception#is#accomplished.87#The#forging#of#concepts#is#thus#driven#by#
the#demands#of#an#analysis#of#discursive#language#that#allows#us#to#see#the#simple#unity#
of#things#or#beings#through#the#multiplicity#of#their#attributes,#each#of#which#is#neither#
identical#to#any#other#nor#to#the#being#of#which#it#is#predicated.#
I#am#suggesting#that#what#we#ought#instead#to#see#here#is#Plato#recognizing#the#
fundamental#discursivity#of#speech#and#thought,#in#part#autonomous#in#function,#but#
metaphysically#grounded#in#the#way#things#are.#As#such,#speech/thought#is#indeed,#as#
Plato#concludes#in#the#Sophist,#a#species#of#the#imageTmaking#(eidōlopoiikē)#arts,#the#
eikastic.art#of#verisimilitude#honed#by#the#philosopher,#and#the#phantasmatic.one#of#
illusion,#honed#by#the#sophist.88#But#it#is#precisely#because#speech#as#such#is#not#a#
system#of#forms,#but#a#system#of#concepts,#or#conceptual#forms#of#the#SpencerT
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#This#is#a#difficult#claim#to#make#out,#because#Plato,#or#rather#the#Eleatic#stranger#we#take#to#speak#in#his#
stead,#talks#interchangeably#about#forms#and#beings#as#things#and#as#things#that#are#said.#I#believe#it#is#
nonetheless#supported#by#the#text.#
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Brownian#variety,#that#it#can#be#put#to#the#ignoble#use#of#fabrication#that#the#
sophist’s#success#depends#upon.#The#philosopher’s#instrument#of#verification,#of#
ontological#authentication,#as#it#turns#out,#is#precisely#the#method#of#division,#the#
method#by#which#he#will#also#be#permitted#to#demonstrate#the#imposture#of#the#sophist.##
Section(Four.(Division,(Negation(and(Predicative(Form(
#

The#method#of#division#(diairesis)89#is#first#mentioned#in#the#Phaedrus,90#is#

taken#up#again#in#the#later#Philebus,91#in#the#Sophist,#where#it#appears#to#take#center#
stage,#and#in#the#Statesman.#Because#the#most#concise#and#earliest#description#of#it#
occurs#in#the#Phaedrus,#I#begin#with#it:#
SOCRATES:#The#first#[stage/method]#consists#in#seeing#together#(synorōnta)#things#
that#are#scattered#everywhere#and#collecting#them#into#one#kind#(eis.mian.te.idean),#
so#that#by#defining#each#thing#we#can#make#clear#the#subject#of#any#instruction#we#
wish#to#give…#
PHAEDRUS:#And#what#is#the#other#thing#you#are#talking#about,#Socrates?#
SOCRATES:#This,#in#turn,#is#to#be#able#to#carve#through#each#kind#according#to#its#
forms/kinds#along#its#natural#joints#(to.palin.kat’.eidē.dunasthai.diatemnein.kat’.
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#Plato#sometimes#refers#to#Prodicus#of#Ceos#as#a#predecessor#on#matters#concerning#division,#definition,#
and#more#generally#the#topic#of#orthology,#i.e.,#the#correct#employment#of#names#or#words.#But#aside#
from#a#few#attested#titles#none#of#Prodicus'#texts,#nor#any#other#similarly#focused#text#prior#to#Plato,#is#
extant,#and#it#is#Plato#who#is#Aristotle's#and#Plotinus'#reference#point,#who#in#turn,#though#more#
prominently#Aristotle,#inform#the#medieval#tradition#from#Boethius#onwards.#
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arthra.hēi.pephuken),#and#to#try#not#to#splinter#any#part,#as#a#bad#butcher#might#
do…92##

#

Socrates#identifies#two#procedures#here,#the#first#that#of#seeing.together,#the#

second#that#of#carving.#The#first#involves#moving#from#a#dispersed#plurality#to#a#unifying#
form#(idea),#the#second#from#a#unit#form#to#a#natural.plurality,#kat’.arthra.hēi.pephuken,#
literally,#according#to#the#joints#(arthra)#in#virtue#of#which#it#is#naturally#what#it#is.#
Though#these#have#typically#been#identified#as#the#methods#of#collecting#and#dividing,#
respectively,#it#is#important#to#note#that#the#indeterminate#plurality#of#the#first#method#
is#not#the#regimented#plurality#of#the#second,#and#that#the#first#is#less#clearly#a#method#
than#a#kind#of#cognitive#rule,#an#instruction#for#properly#concentrating#the#gaze#of#
cognition#(synorōnta)#from#the#array#of#instances#to#the#kind.#The#demand#for#the#first#is#
characteristic#of#Plato’s#general#approach#to#philosophy:#identifying#and#defining#the#
sort#of#thing#in#question,#rather#than#cataloguing#its#instantiations.#On#the#other#hand,#if#
arriving#at#a#natural#plurality#appears#to#be#required#for#applying#the#method#of#division,#
Plato’s#practice,#when#employing#the#method,#is#rather#to#invoke#the#collection#of#
instances#within#the#course#of,#rather#than#prior#to,#pursuing#the#lines#of#division.93#
#

The#general#procedure#of#division.is#to#articulate,#for#any#kind#(or#class)#under#

examination,#the#network#of#kinds#under#which#it#is#subsumed#and#in#terms#of#which#it#is#
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#Paulo#Crivelli#makes#roughly#the#same#point#in#his#Plato’s.Account.of.Falsehood,#A.Study.of.the.Sophist.#
Cambridge:#Cambridge#University#Press,#2012,#19.#
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logically#and#ontologically#determined.#The#method#involves#beginning#with#the#
highest#genus#or#kind#to#which#the#definiendum.or#explanandum#belongs,#and#
separating.out,#along#the#divisions#natural.to#each#genus,#first#that#highest#genus,#
typically#dichotomously,#and#then#all#subordinate#genera#or#kinds,#always#keeping#to#the#
relevant#side#of#the#dichotomy,#until#the#sought#kind#is#reached.#According#to#the#logic#
of#form#outlined#in#the#introduction,#this#involves#a#succession#of#cuts,#each#of#which#
further#differentiates#the#relevant#form,#dividing#each#successively#divided#logical#space#
into#an#included#region#and#an#excluded#one.#
However,#while#the#Phaedrus#presents#a#concise#account#of#the#method,#it#is#the#
Sophist.that#offers#us#the#most#complete#illustration#of#its#use.#Indeed,#the#Sophist,#on#
one#way#of#reading#it,#is#in#large#part#an#exploration#of#just#how#division#can#be#applied#
in#the#service#of#philosophical#analysis.94#In#brief#outline,#the#Sophist#opens#with#an#
exploration#of#diairesis#as#a#method#of#conceptual#determination#or,#more#precisely,#
definition,#applied#initially,#as#a#test#case,#to#the#definition#of#the#fisherman#(219aT
221c2),#and#then#to#the#Sophist#(221c4T236d3);#it#then#runs#into#a#couple#of#problems#
surrounding#falsehood#and#nonbeing#(237a1T2),#describes#and#then#presents#a#way#of#
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#There#is#some#dispute#about#what#Plato#is#describing#in#the#relevant#passages#from#the#Sophist#(253dTe),#
with#some#commentators#denying#it#is#the#method#of#division#at#all,#e.g.,#J.#R.#Trevaskis,#“Division#and#its#
Relation#to#Dialectic#and#Ontology#in#Plato,”#Phronesis#12#(1967):#118#–29,#A.#Gomez–Lobo,#“Plato’s#
Description#of#Dialectic#in#the#Sophist#253#d1#–e2,”#Phronesis#22#(1977):#29#–47,#S.#J.#Bordt,#“Der#
Seinsbegriff#in#Platons#‘Sophistes’:#Eine#Untersuchung#zu#242#b6#–249#d5,”#Theologie.und.Philosophie#66#
(1991):#493#–529.#In#my#view#it#is#pretty#clear#he#is#talking#about#the#same#method#of#division#and#
collection#he#discusses#elsewhere.#I#hope#this#becomes#obvious#in#what#follows.#
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resolving#these#problems#(237a3T264b3)#that#makes#the#existence#of#the#sophist#at#
least#possible,#and#finally#completes#the#definition#of#the#sophist#that#was#its#intended#
quarry#(264b5T268d4).#According#to#this#sketch#the#method#of#division#would#seem#to#
be#confirmed#as#a#legitimate#tool#of#philosophical#analysis,#inasmuch#it#appears#in#the#
end#to#yield#a#definition#of#the#Sophist#that#is#"true#to#kind,"#literally,#"of#this#breed#and#
blood#(tautēs.tēs.geneās.kai.haimatos).”95#
#

On#the#other#hand,#roughly#three#quarters#of#the#dialogue#is#taken#up#with#the#

problem#of#false#speech,#negation#and#nonbeing,#and#the#method#of#division#seems#
beset#by#more#fundamental#difficulties#than#the#specific#definition#of#the#Sophist#poses#
for#it.#There#are#six#alternative#genealogies#of#the#sophist#on#offer#before#the#Stranger#
pauses#over#his#"inscrutability"#and#the#difficulties#of#falsehood,#and#all,#including#the#
last,#seem#equally#tendentious.#Moreover,#no#nonTarbitrary#way#is#suggested#for#
deciding#amongst#these#or#restricting#their#further#proliferation.#Indeed#the#seventh,#
"true#to#kind"#diairesis#with#which#the#dialogue#concludes#offers#perhaps#the#least#
cohesive#derivation#of#the#Sophist#of#all,#although#the#defining#genus#of#the#eikastic#is#
finally#illuminating.#If#this#diairesis#does#in#fact#represent#the#proper#application#of#the#
method#in#question,#as#the#stranger's#embrace#of#it#suggests#it#does,#then#it#is#far#from#

########################################################
95

#Sophist.268d3.#

#

117#

clear#that#its#purpose#is#to#generate#unique#definitions.#It#is#unclear,#then,#what#such#
a#method#is#a#method#of.96#
#

And#yet,#if,#as#we#have#seen,#what#is#not,#or#its#linguistic#equivalent,#ou#or#to.mē,#

i.e.,#negation,#is#what#divides#things#from#one#another,#which#is#ultimately#how#we#are#
to#understand#negation#as#difference,97#then#it#would#seem#that#the#method#of#division#
is#precisely#the#tool#the#philosopher#needs#to#know#how#to#deploy.#As#Plato#puts#it,#the#
philosophical#art#(technē)#of#dialectic.or#more#literally#dialectical.knowledge#(hē.
dialektikē.epistemē)#requires#knowing#how#"to#divide#according#to#genera#(kata.
genē),"98#i.e.,#according#to#the#actual#parts,#joins#and#filiations#of#things,#and#thus#of#the#
concepts#corresponding#to#them,#a#technē#he#earlier#characterizes#as#"a#purification#
(katharmon)#as#regards#thinking."99#
#

But#if#mastery#of#this#art#amounts#to#knowing#where#the#cuts#are,#so#to#speak,#it#

amounts#to#knowing#how#difference,#or#logically,#negation,#is#distributed.#For#in#the#
account#we#are#given#of#the#differential#interweaving#(symplokē)#of#forms,#
########################################################
#

96

#The#problem#is#clearly#noted#in#Reginald#Hackforth's#classic#monograph#on#the#Philebus,#Plato's.
Examination.of.Pleasure:.A.Translation.of.the.Philebus,.with.Introduction.and.Commentary.(Cambridge:#
Cambridge#University#Press,#1945),#but#see#also#Gilbert#Ryle,#"Letters#and#Syllables#in#Plato,"#The.
Philosophical.Review#69#(1960):#431T451,#and#Stephen#Menn,#"Collecting#the#Letters"#in#Phronesis#43#
(1998):#291T305.##
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paradigmatically#those#that#make#up#the#five#highest#genera#(megiste.gene),#i.e.,#
Being#(ousia),#Difference#(to.heteron),#Sameness#(to.auton),#Motion#(kinesis)#and#Rest#
(stasis),#we#are#told,#as#quoted#above#that#“each#one#[of#the#forms]#differs#from#the#
others#not#because#of#its#own#nature#but#because#of#its#participation#in#the#form#(ideās)#
of#difference#(thaterou#=#tou.heterou).”100#In#principle,#the#method#of#division#thus#
generates#a#logical#picture#of#the#way#the#things#that#are#are,#namely#connected#to#and#
divided#from#one#another,#and#thus#knowing#them#might#indeed#amount#to#knowing#
how#they#are#so#connected#and#divided.#And#if#the#way#that#things#are#fundamentally#is#
in#fact#made#logically#visible#in#the#lines#of#division,#then#so#are#the#proper,#i.e.,#true,#
lines#of#predication.#
#

And,#as#it#turns#out,#Plato#regularly#identifies#the#method#of#division#with#what#

will#come#to#be#identified#with#logic,#namely#dialectic.(dialektikē),#which#he#defines#as#
“the#art#concerning#statements#(hē.peri.tōn.logōn.technē),”101#or#“the#method#of#
statements#(hē.methodos.tōn.logōn).”102#In#the#Phaedrus,#one#finds#the#striking#claim#
that#the#purpose#of#the#method#is#to#enable#one#“to#speak#and#think#(legein.te.kai.
phronein).”103#The#claim,#it#should#be#noted,#is#not#that#the#method#facilitates#speaking#
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or#thinking#well,#truthfully#or#knowledgeably,#but#that#it#makes#it#possible#to#speak#
and#think#simpliciter.#Nonetheless,#it#will#become#clear#that#the#method.or#logic.of#
division#does#indeed#permit#us#“to#carve#through#each#kind#according#to#its#forms/kinds#
along#its#natural#joints#(to.palin.kat’.eidē.dunasthai.diatemnein.kat’.arthra.hēi.
pephuken).”104#In#other#words,#the#distinction,#as#well#as#the#connection,#between#
division#as#the#constitutive#operation#of#discursive#thought#and#speech#and#the#method#
of#division,#as#the#regulative#logic.of#such#thought.#As#we#have#seen,#in#the#Sophist#Plato#
attributes#this#same#pivotal#role#to#negation.#
The#question#still#remains,#therefore,#how#we#can#tell#about#a#particular#genusT
species#line#that#it#is#veridical,#or#how#we#can#in#any#case#know#that#the#method#itself#
has#a#veridical#ground.#If#we#can#never#tell#when#that#ground#is#reached,#if#the#method#
supplies#no#criterion#for#determining#whether#or#not#a#given#division#captures#an#actual#
division#amongst#kinds,#classes,#genera#or#species#of#thing,#then#it#will#be#of#little#use.#
This#is#the#gist#of#Aristotle’s#complaint#about#the#method:#that#it#cannot#demonstrate#
the#necessity#of#the#line#of#divisions#it#purports#to#deduce.105#As#he#puts#it,#“it#is#evident#
that#one#cannot#either#refute#through#this#procedure,#or#deduce#(syllogisasthai)#
something#concerning#an#accident#or#a#peculiarity,#or#concerning#a#genus,#or#deduce#in#

########################################################
#

104

#Phaedrus#265d4T266b4.#

#

105
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those#cases#in#which#it#is#not#known#whether#it#is#this#way#or#that.”106#
One#way#of#putting#this#criticism,#in#terms#of#the#determinative#role#we#are#trying#
to#make#out#for#negation,#is#to#say#that#given#that#most#of#what#a#thing#is.not#provides#
little#or#no#determination#of#what#it#is,#but#to#know#which#attributes#the#negation#of#
which#helps#us#to#hone#in#on#what#a#thing#is#seems#to#presuppose#determinations#that#
are#not#themselves#reached#through#negation.#For#example,#the#first#division#suggested#
by#the#Sophist#in#relation#to#the#angler#is#that#between#the#technical#and#the#
nontechnical,#and#we#do#not#appear#to#derive#this#disjunction#from#any#prior#one,#or#
from#any#prior#instance#of#negation,#and#in#any#case#nothing#is#provided#here#that#assure#
its#relevance#to#the#definition#or#determination#of#the#fisherman.#On#the#other#hand,#
that#skills,#arts#or#vocations#are#so#divided,#seems#right,#and#it#is#the#differentia#of#the#
technical#that#divides#the#genus#at#its#most#general#level.#
And#here#the#determinative#use#of#negation#emerges#in#its#characteristic#guise,#
not#as#the#sign#of#negation#itself#or#a#negative#form#of#the#differentia,#but#in#the#way#
that#the#differentia#operates#in#relation#to#that#of#which#it#is#the#differentia.#A#differentia#
functions#as#the#proximate#negation#of#the#genus,#dividing#the#space#of#that#genus,#so#to#
speak,#into#an#indicated#and#an#excluded#region#that#are#its#two#species,#thereby#
demarcating#a#conceptual#form#(of#the#indicated#species),#of#the#SpencerTBrownian#
variety.#Mortality,#for#example,#hierarchically#negates#and#thereby#divides#rational.
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animal#into#man#and#planet,#in#the#sense#that#what#is#not.merely#rational#animal#is#
proximately#mortal#or#immortal.#If#that#is#the#line#of#division,#then#the#corresponding#
line#of#predication#is#the#reverse:#man#is#a#rational#animal,#although#it#remains#true#that#
man#is#also#not,#because#it#is#also#other#than,#i.e.,#nonTidentical#to,#rational#animal.#
However,#we’re#getting#a#little#ahead#of#ourselves.#The#question#remains#how,#if#
ever,#the#veridicality#of#the#contours#of#a#division#can#be#established.#That#this#method#
does#not#issue#in#results#that#command#conviction#in#the#dialogues#in#which#it#features#
with#any#detail,#i.e.,#the#Sophist#and#the#Philebus,#may#tell#us#what#Plato#ultimately#
thinks#of#it,#despite#his#reverential#endorsement#of#it.#But#it#may#also#reveal,#instead,#
something#about#what#is#under#discussion,#i.e.,#the#Sophist#and#pleasure,#respectively.#If#
it#is#true#of#the#Sophist,#for#example,#that#he#can#be#derived#indifferently#through#any#
number#of#diaireses,#this#may#tell#us#that#there#are#indeed#no#natural#divides#within#his#
nature,#that#he#strictly#speaking#has#no#essence,#and#that#he#therefore#is#not#in#a#strict#
sense#a#kind#of#thing#at#all,#that#he#is#not#to#be#found#amongst#the#things#that#can#be#
known.107#The#method,#then,#in#its#failure,#would#seem#to#provide#us,#at#least,#with#a#
way#of#identifying#false#forms#or#pseudoTbeings.#But#It#is#also#possible,#that#although#the#
final#division#of#the#Sophist.seems#to#run#afoul#of#those#that#precede#it,#it#does#indeed#
capture#the#nature#of#the#sophist,#at#least#insofar#as#this#can#be#discerned#in#relation#to#
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#This#much#coincides#with#the#view,#for#example,#of#Lesley#Brown,#in#his#"Definition#and#Division#in#the#
Sophist,”#in#Definition.in.Greek.Philosophy,#ed.#David#Charles#(Oxford,#Oxford#University#Press,#2010),#151T
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the#nature#of#the#philosopher.#The#preceding#missteps#then#simply#exhibit#the#
difficulty#of#defining#something#so#elusive#as#a#practitioner#of#illusion.#However,#even#if#
the#absence#of#conviction#demonstrates#the#indeterminacy#of#a#thing,#it#doesn’t#follow#
that#the#presence#of#conviction#demonstrates#its#determinacy.#
In#an#especially#careless#dismissal#of#the#method#of#division,#Gilbert#Ryle#once#
insisted#that#“what#Plato#cannot#give#us#is#some#sort#of#decision#procedure#to#tell#us#in#
any#given#case#what#is#and#what#is#not#a#natural#kind.”108#Yet,#setting#aside#the#question#
of#whether#or#not#what#is#required#is#a#decision#procedure,#what#Plato#does#appear#to#
provide#us#with#is#a#method#for#demonstrating#whether#a#given#kind#is#natural#or#not,#
and#what#the#defining#characteristics#of#that#kind#are,#which#does#for#us#what#a#decision#
procedure#would#do#for#us.#The#method,#clearly#on#display#in#the#Sophist,#is#simple:#a#
kind#is#a#natural#kind#if#and#only#if#its#diaireses#yield#a#unique#definition#of#that#kind,#and#
if#it#does#yield#such#a#kind#then#the#terms#of#the#differentiated#line#leading#to#that#kind#
indicate#its#defining#attributes.#Deriving#two#or#more#incongruous#diairetic#lines#shows#
that#there#is#no#natural#articulation#of#a#candidate#kind.#
#

Some#have#argued#that#the#application#of#the#method#of#division#in#the#Sophist.is#

designed#to#highlight#the#dangers#of#proceeding#too#hastily,109#but#the#seven#attempts#at#
definition#here#hardly#suggest#incaution,#and#indeed#no#intermediate#branch#in#any#of#
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these#divisions#is#obviously#incorrect.#The#problem#is#rather#that#there#appears#to#be#
an#indefinite#number#of#ways#of#correctly.proceeding,#though#the#results#may#not#be#
consistent.#That#Plato#would#have#devoted#himself#to#such#a#demonstration#can,#again,#
best#be#explained#in#terms#of#the#persistence#of#the#ontological#deficits#of#the#sophist.#
The#sophist#is#the#condition#of#linguistic#expression#to#the#extent#that#what#he#does#is#
everything#that#is#permitted#by#the#medium#of#such#expression.#This#is#not,#however,#to#
promote#inference#from#the#indeterminacy#of#the#sophist#to#the#indeterminacy#of#what#
the#sophist#concerns#himself#with.#The#suggestion#is#just#that#the#indeterminacy#of#the#
sophist#reveals#the#dangers#of#indeterminacy#that#are#proper#to#the#medium#of#
expression#he#exploits,#i.e.,#the#medium#of#discursive#speech.#
While#contemporary#commentators#have#insisted#that#the#method#is#intended#as#
an#instrument#of#taxonomy#and/or#definition,#and#Aristotle#suggests#a#third,#
complementary,#function,#albeit#one#Aristotle#thinks#it#serves#inadequately,#namely,#
deductive#explanation,#Plato#plainly#indicates#its#role#in#determining#lines#of#predication.#
While#definition#and#taxonomy#are#both#served#by#the#method,#the#former#more#
importantly#than#the#latter,#the#principal#function#of#division#is#to#map#out#the#lines#of#
discursive#expression#proper#to#a#given#concept,#and#to#a#region,#perhaps#the#exhaustive#
totality,#of#concepts#to#which#that#concept#belongs.#
#
(

#
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Section(Five.(Philebus:(Limit((Peras)(and(the(Indeterminate((Apeiron)(
As#to#how#division#is#supposed#to#facilitate#speech#and#thought,#Plato’s#most#

explicit#account#is#presented#in#the#Philebus,#where#we#are#told#that#its#most#general#
virtue#lies#in#its#enabling#us#to#resolve#the#“problem#of#the#one#and#the#many.”##Plato#in#
fact#identifies#three#kinds#of#claims/propositions#alleged#to#involve#oneTmany#
difficulties:#(1)#those#whose#subjects#are#individual#particulars,#e.g.,#Protarchus,#
Socrates,#(2)#those#whose#subjects#are#wholes,#and#(3)#those#whose#subjects#are#
universals.110#He#declares#the#first#two#sorts#of#problem#"commonplace,"#easily#
resolvable#and#so#of#little#moment:##predicating#relative#terms,#like#short#and#tall,#of#
Protarchus,#for#example,#or#predicating#of#him,#as#a#whole,#attributes#that#are#properly#
predicable#only#of#his#parts,#involve#simple#and#resolvable#errors.#
Presumably#the#triviality#of#cases#of#the#first#two#kinds#derives,#in#part,#from#their#
being#about#contingent,#generable#(gignomena)#or#perishable#(apollumena)#things,#
although#it#hardly#follows#from#this#that#the#method#does#not#facilitate#speech#about#or#
even#definitions#of#such#subjects.#And,#as#we#have#seen#in#the#Sophist,#Plato#will#come#to#
think#the#expressive#demands#of#ordinary#speech#of#considerable#significance.#What’s#
more,#Plato#insists#that#the#kind#of#contradiction#involved#here#occurs#in#"everything#
that#is#ever#said,#both#anciently#and#at#present."111#Nonetheless,#he#considers#the#third#
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kind#of#proposition#to#be#of#the#greatest#importance.#This#is#also#clearly#what#he#has#
in#mind#in#speaking#here#of#those#things#that#provide#answers#to#the#ti.esti#(i.e.,#what.is.
it)#questions#his#dialogues#are#typically#organized#around,#e.g.,#What#is#virtue?#What#is#
piety?#What#is#justice?#Their#peculiar#character,#their#being#"both#one#and#many,"#raises#
a#number#of#questions#for#Plato:#
First,#there's#the#question#whether#we#should#suppose#there#are#any#such#units#
(monadas)#in#the#strict#sense;#then#how#they#can#be#such#that#while#each#is#a#unit#
and#remains#unchanged,#admitting#neither#of#generation#nor#destruction,#it#is#
nevertheless#unshakably#one,#but#then#as#found#in#the#indeterminate#number#of#
perishable#things#it#is#questionable#whether#it#has#to#be#posited#as#scattered#abroad#
and#becomes#many#or,#as#itself#while#whole#separated#from#itself,#which#seems#
absolutely#impossible,#becoming#the#identical#one#at#once#in#a#one#and#a#plurality.112#
In#asking#first#about#their#existence#and#then#about#their#manner#of#existence,#Plato#
here#anticipates#the#traditional#formulation#of#the#problem#of#universals#in#Boethius,#
although#Plato#is#concerned#less#with#the#ontological#status#of#monadic#elements#than#in#
how#identity#and#being#are#distributed#between#such#elements#and#their#instances#or#
exemplifications.#
Answering#these#questions,#that#is,#resolving#the#problem#of#the#one#and#the#
many#properly#conceived,#requires#the#method.of.division,#for#which#he#claims#divine#
provenance.#The#description#of#the#method#establishes,#in#simple#form,#pretty#much#the#
entire#range#of#issues#Hegel#will#later#elaborate#on,#and#adds#a#few#key#details#about#the#
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method#and#its#metaphysical#grounding#that#the#Phaedrus#and#the#Sophist#do#not#
provide.#It#is#also#the#most#complete#account#of#the#method#anywhere#in#Plato:#
...#those#things#which#are#always#said#to#be#(tōn.aei.legomenōn.einai)#are#from#the#
one#and#the#many#and...they#have#a#determinant#(peras)#and#an#indeterminacy#
(apeirian)#naturally#united#(symphuton)#in#them.#Therefore,#since#this#is#how#things#
are#ordererd#(toutōn.houtō.diakekosmēmenōn)#we#should#always#posit#one#form#in#
respect#to#everything#on#each#occasion#(aei.mian.idean.peri.pantos.hekastote.
themenous)#and#search#for#it#–#we#shall#find#one#there#–#and#if#we#are#successful#
then#after#the#one#we#should#look#for#two,#if#there#are#two,#or#otherwise#for#three#or#
whatever#the#number#is;#each#of#these#ones#should#be#treated#in#the#same#way,#until#
one#can#see#of#the#original#one#not#only#that#it#is#one#(hen),#many#(polla),#and#an#
indefinite#number#(apeira),#but#also#its#precise#quantity#(hoposa).#But#one#should#not#
attribute#the#form#of#the#indeterminate#(tēn.de.tou.apeirou.idean)#to#the#plurality#
(pros.to.plēthos)#until#one#can#see#the#complete#number#between#the#indeterminate#
and#the#one#(ton.arithmon.autou.panta.katidēi.ton.metaxu.tou.apeirou.te.kain.tou.
henos).113#
The#interpretation#of#this#passage#as#well#as#the#two#illustrative#examples#that#follow#
have#been#the#source#of#much#disagreement#amongst#commentators.#It#is#enough#here#
to#give#some#indication#of#how#negation,#in#its#recasting#as#difference#(to.heteron),#and#
thus#as#what#differentiates#kinds,#genera,#species,#etc.,#from#one#another,#provides#the#
paradigm#of#negation#as#an#instrument#of#discursive#determination.#
For#our#purposes,#the#key#to#interpreting#this#passage#is#finding#an#appropriate#
sense#for#peras#and#apeiria,#translated#above#as#determinant#and#indeterminacy,#
respectively.#Literally,#a#peras#is#a#limit#or#boundary,#apeiria#the#state#of#not#having#a#
peras,#but#the#more#specific#philosophical#resonance#of#such#terms#would#certainly#have#
been#paramount#for#Plato.#Anaximander#had#spoken#of#to.apeiron#as#a#first#principle,#as#
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that#out#of#which#everything#in#the#world#had#come#to#be,#and#the#idea#of#an#
indeterminate#or#undifferentiated#beginning#is#to#be#found#in#Anaxagoras#as#well,#who#
also#speaks#of#to.apeiron.#Anaxagoras,#whom#Plato#mentions#in#several#dialogues#with#
some#admiration,#as#well#as#disappointment,#is#of#particular#interest#here#since#he#thinks#
it#is#through#the#operation#of#nous,#mind#or#intellect#that#discrete#kinds#and#individuals#
are#brought#into#existence#out#of#the#apeiron.#Plato’s#complaint#about#Anaxagoras#is#
that#he#treats#nous.as#a#mere#causal#principle#that#does#nothing#to#explain#the#
phenomena#it#effects.#Yet#the#notion#that#the#ordering#of#the#world#requires#some#sort#
of#principle#of#intelligibility#was#what#Plato#found#appealing#to#begin#with,#and#this#must#
be#the#starting#point#for#any#interpretation#of#this#passage.#
As#Plato#tells#us#later#in#the#Philebus,#it#is#reason#that#orders#and#assigns#
proportion#to#what#is#without#limit#(apeiron),#and#it#is#precisely#through#the#imposition#
of#limit#(peras)#that#such#ordering#occurs.##Since#we#are#told#here#that#such#elements#are#
components#of#things#themselves,#it#matters#little#whether#we#speak#of#conceptual#or#
ontological#boundaries.#If#we#get#things#right#conceptually,#we#will#have#succeeded#in#
designating#a#boundary#in#things#themselves.#The#interpretation#I#am#suggesting#takes#
its#cue#from#the#discussion#of#predicative#speech#in#the#Sophist,#in#particular#from#the#
specification#of#the#unity#proper#to#such#speech#in#terms#of#its#ti.perainei,#its#providing#a#
boundary#or#limit.#If#a#verb#or#predicate#tells#us#something#about#“something#that#is,”#it#
specifies#a#delimitation#of#that#thing,#and#in#the#case#of#indicating#its#proximate#genus#
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and#species,#expresses#what#the#thing#itself#is,#i.e.,#its#essence.#As#we#shall#see,#in#
Hegel#it#is#negation#as#such#that#constitutes#such#a#limit.#
Section(Six.(Conclusion:(Division(and(Platonic(Formalism(
The#Philebus.account#is#focused#on#how#the#method#of#division#allows#us#to#
order,#and#therefore#understand,#the#relationship#between#indefinite#multiplicities#and#
ordered#multiples#and#unities,#between,#for#example,#the#indeterminate#multiplicity#of#
vocalizable#sounds#(ta.phōnēenta)#and#its#differentiated#multiples,#i.e.,#vowels,#
consonants#and#individual#letters,#to#take#Plato’s#most#famous#illustration.114#While#this#
provides#us#with#a#way#of#making#sense#of#the#otherwise#intractable#profusion#of#oneT
many#attributions#speech#ordinarily#involves#us#in,#it#also#thereby#provides#us#with#a#
model#of#what#is#involved#in#predicative#speech#and#thought#as#such,#i.e.,#of#discursive#
rationality,#of#which#the#proposition#(logos)#is#the#most#basic#expression.#In#other#words,#
if#the#method#or#science.of#division#is#that#logical#organon#that#enables#us#to#evaluate#
our#everyday#attributions,#this#is#because#division#is#the#very#procedure#through#which#
the#apeiron.is#rationally#organized#in#speech#in#the#first#place.#In#its#most#basic#form,#the#
operation#involved#in#such#delimitation,#in#determining#the#unlimited,#is#negation.#This,#I#
want#to#argue,#is#the#crucial#discovery#of#the#Sophist:#to#see#in#the#logic.of#division#the#
procedures#of#attribution#that#constitute#discursive#thought#and#speech,#and#to#observe#
in#both#the#ineluctable#operation#of#negation.#
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Of#course#the#recasting#of#negation#as#difference#does#not#assure#us#that#

nonTbeing#is#no#longer#anything#we#need#worry#about,#although#Plato’s#argument#for#so#
conceiving#of#negation#is#supposed#to#provide#just#such#a#demonstration.#It#is#meant#to#
show#that#nonFbeing#is#not#the#infernal#gateway#to#nonTexistence#we#had#worried#it#
might#be,#because#it#“has#as#much#being#as#being.”#The#question#is#whether#this#really#
dispels#the#concern#about#nonTbeing#and#hence#negation.#And#indeed#we#might#wonder#
whether#we#are#any#better#off#with#something#that#is#other#than#being,#or#rather#we#
might#wonder#what#this#might#amount#to#if#it#isn’t#nonFbeing.#To#put#it#simply,#we#might#
wonder#how,#in#other#words,#something#might#be,#while#being#different#from#being?#
Plato#initially#suggests#that#otherness.than#being#is#understandable#in#terms#of#
imaging,#more#specifically#in#terms#of#images#(eidōla),#which#he#then#distinguishes#from#
likenesses#(eikona).#This#provides#us#with#two#senses#in#which#something#might#be#
thought#to#differ#from#being#while#somehow#still#being:.illusion#and#verisimilitude.#Yet#
we#are#also#told#that#false#speech#(logos)#is#not#merely#the#naming#of#one#or#the#other#of#
these,#but#predicating#of#what#is#not#that#it#is,#or#of#what#is#that#it#is#not#(241a).#Thus#
there#seem#to#be#two#varieties#of#falsehood:#(1)#naming#to.on,#and#saying#of#it#that#it#is#
not#(mē.einai),#and#(2)#naming#to.mē.on,#i.e.,#an#image#of#what#is,#and#saying#of#it#that#it#
is#(einai).#Whether#discord#with#how#things#are#is#how#we#ought#to#have#understood#the#
initial#account#of#falsehood#as#saying.what.is.not,#it#now#seems#that#it#is#just#this#
ontological#discord#between#the#two#parts#of#a#speech,#between#what#is#named#and#
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what#is#said#or#predicated#of#what#is#named#that#constitutes#falsehood.#The#question#
would#seem#to#arise,#however,#why,#when#we#say#of#what#is#not,#insofar#as#this#involves#
not#naming#“utter#nonTbeing,”#but#merely#something#that#has#a#modicum#of#being,#by#
virtue#of#its#being#an#image#(or#likeness?)#of#being,#it#is#false#to#say#that#it#is.#It#may#be#
the#case#that#it#isn’t#in#the#sense#that#it#isn’t#being#as#such,#but#then#nothing#but#being#as#
such#is!#As#for#negative#falsehoods,#the#question#remains#what#it#means#to#say#that#
something#that#is#isn’t#(mē.einai),#since#one#way#of#not#being#is#to#be#like.what.is,#in#
which#saying#that#what#is#is.not#isn’t#entirely#false,#again#unless#what#one#is#talking#about#
is#just#being.#
Plato#tells#us#that#“it#is#owing#to#the#interweaving#(sumplokē)#of#Forms#with#each#
other#that#speech#has#arisen#for#us."115#But#how#are#we#to#understand#this,#since#
symplokē#relations,#which#are#horizontal,#seem#quite#different#from#participation#
relations,#which#are#vertical?#He#also#claims,#at#260b5,#that#"notTbeing#came#to#light#for#
us#as#some#one#genus,#of#others,#that#is#(on),#and#is#dispersed#(diesparmenon)#amongst#
all#things#that#are#(panta.ta.onta)."#If#forms#are#both#divided#from#one#another#by#to.
heteron,#and#so#interwoven#with#it,#and#interwovenness#amounts#to#participation#as#
well,#then#it#is#not#merely#that#all#Forms#differ#from#one#another#but#that#they#all#differ#
from#being,#which#seems#to#leave#us#with#the#potential#problem#of#making#sense#of#a#

########################################################
115

#Sophist#259ε3.#

#

131#

Form#as#being#an#image#of#being#(since#it#can’t#be#different#from#it#in#the#sense#of#
being#contradictory#to#it,#i.e.,#not#being).#
One#answer#to#this#problem#would#run#roughly#as#follows:#It#is#by#virtue#of#the#
fact#that#Forms#are#interwoven#that#we#are#capable#of#stringing#together#meaningful#
sentences#(logoi),#although#this#does#not#mean#that#our#stringing#together#logoi#is#the#
same#kind#of#interweaving,#just#that#if#all#Forms#were#either#identical#or#immiscible#there#
would#be#no#relation#between#things,#properties,#etc.,#either#because#the#Forms#
corresponding#to#things#would#bear#no#relation#to#one#another,#yielding#a#kind#of#
atomism#of#Forms,#or#because#there#would#be#no#actual#relata#to#stand#in#relation#to#
one#another.#Carving.things.properly,#we#should#recall,#must#proceed#kat’.eidē,#
according#to#the#Forms,#not#merely#according#to#the#natural#joins#of#things.#While#the#
latter#applies#to#the#ordinary#objects#of#nature#and#common#discourse,#the#former#
applies#to#the#relations#among#Forms.#Division,#then,#must#be#attentive#to#the#
fundamental#logic#and#ontology#of#Forms,#as#it#attends#to#dividing#kinds#and#individuals#
according#to#their#essential#and#contingent#attributions#or#determinations.#For#Aristotle,#
it#is#the#former#that#will#constitute,#in#effect,#the#logic#of#categories.#The#distinction#
between#the#logic#of#Forms#and#the#division#of#kinds,#I#would#like#to#suggest,#is#also#the#
basis#of#the#distinction#it#will#take#two#centuries#to#fully#unpack,#between#formal.logic,#
i.e.,#the#calculus,#though#not#a#purely#abstract#one,#of#the#basic#forms#of#expression#and#
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thought,#and#material.logic,#i.e.,#the#logic#of#discursive#thought#in#the#rich,#natural#
environment#of#propositional#expression#and#inference.#
At#253c#Plato#makes#explicit#the#connection#between#knowledge#of#the#
communion#of#kinds#(genē)#and#the#knowledge#of#division,#which#he#calls#dialectic,#
remarking#that#“there#are#some#kinds,#which,#present#throughout#many#(dia.pantōn),#
hold#the#other#kinds#together#(synechonta),#so#that#they#can#intermix#(symmeignusthai),#
and#again…other#kinds#which,#where#there#are#divisions#(diairesi),#are#causes#of#division#
(tēs.diareseōs.aitia)#throughout#the#whole.”116##“Dialectical#knowledge#(episteme.
dialektikē),”#i.e.,#knowing#how#to#“divide#according#to#genera#and#not#regard#the#same#
Form#as#other#nor#the#other#as#the#same.”#Further,#we#are#told:#
…if#a#person#can#do#that,#he’ll#be#capable#of#adequately#discriminating#a#single#form#
(mian.idean).spread#out#(diatetamenēn)#all#through#[the]#many#(dia.pollōn),#each#of#
which#stands#separate#from#the#others.#In#addition#he#can#discriminate#forms#that#
are#different#from#each#other#but#are#included#within#a#single#form#that’s#outside#
them,#or#a#single#form#that’s#connected#as#a#unit#throughout#many#wholes,#or#many#
forms#that#are#completely#separate#from#others.##That’s#what#it#is#to#know#how#to#
discriminate#by#kinds#how#things#can#commune#(koivōnein)#and#how#they#can’t.117#
#
As#we#learn#a#few#pages#later,#at#260b8,#it#is#the#Form.(idea)#of#difference#(to.heteron)#
that#will#turn#out#to#be#scattered#amongst#all#the#things#that#are#(kata.panta.ta.onta.
diesparmenon),#and#it#is#negation#that#designates#this#Form.#
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On#the#reading#I#am#defending,#Plato#thinks#that#it#is#because#difference#is#

part#of#the#structure#of#things,#at#least#the#sorts#of#properly#defined#things#that#are#the#
appropriate#objects#of#philosophical#or#scientific#knowledge#(episteme),#that#negation#is#
part#of#what#structures#discursive#speech.#It#is#precisely#because#things#are#determinate#
with#regard#to#one#another,#i.e.,#because#they#are#discretely,#rather#than#fuzzily,#
differentiated#from#one#another,#that#negation#is#the#proper#operation#for#marking#the#
boundaries#or#joints#between#things,#and#that#the#method#of#division#enables#us#to#
“carve#things#at#the#joints.”#In#short,#negation,#on#this#reading,#is#the#very#instrument#of#
dividing#or#carving.#The#divine#character#Plato#attributes#to#it#derives#from#the#otherwise#
inexplicable#fit#between#ontological#and#conceptual#organization.#Though#it#turns#out#to#
be#a#more#complicated#matter#to#apply#the#method#than#Plato#at#first#suspects,#in#part#
because#language#is#divided#everywhere,#so#to#speak.#
In#the#first#half#of#the#Sophist,.Plato#formulates#the#problem#of#false,#
propositional#speech#in#terms#that#more#properly#expresses#the#persistence#of#naming,#
because#the#semantics#of#naming#is#still#the#only#semantics#at#work#until#the#second#half#
of#the#Sophist,#where#he#discovers#the#essential#otherness#of#predication.#It#is#here#that#
the#role#of#division#can#finally#be#fully#explored#because#the#relationship#between#the#
indeterminate#and#limiting#elements#of#concepts#and#forms#only#becomes#clear#here.#A#
subject#concept#in#the#act#of#naming#is#functionally#monadic,#and#unitary;#in#the#context#
of#predication#its#syncategorematic#nature#is#brought#to#the#fore,#or#rather#the#
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indeterminacy#inherent#to#it#is#invoked,#requiring#its#determination#by#an#
appropriate#syncategorematic#peras#or#limit.#Here#is#what#Plato#tells#us:#
But#you#concede,#I#suspect,#that#some#of#'the#things#that#are'#are#spoken#of#by#
themselves,#and#some#are#always#spoken#of#in#relation#to#different#things…# Yes,#but#
the#other#(is)#always#relative#to#another,#isn't#it?#...#They#wouldn't#be,#if#'that#which#
is'#and#"the#other"#did#not#differ#entirely#from#one#another.#But#if#the#other#
(thateron)#participated#in#both#of#the#pair#of#species,#just#as#'that#which#is'#does,#
then#at#some#time#or#other#there#would#also#be#some#other#of#the#others#not#in#
relation#to#another,#but,#as#it#is,#it#has#simply#(artlessly)#turned#out#for#us#that#
whatever#is#other#is#of#necessity#that#which#it#is#as#of.another…#Then#among#the#
species#which#we#choose,#the#nature#of#the.other#(to.heteron)#must#be#counted#as#
being#the#fifth…And#we'll#assert#besides#that#it#has#gone#through#all#of#them,#for#it's#
not#on#account#of#its#own#nature#that#each#one#is#different#from#all#the#rest,#but#on#
account#of#its#participation#in#the#form#(idea)#of#the#other.118#
#
This#“of#another”#relation,#as#it#turns#out,#is#precisely#what#Plato#develops#as#the#basic#
structure#of#a#declarative#logos,#the#structure#that#will#draw#the#syncategorematic#
elements#of#a#propositional#array#into#the#logical#unity#of#a#proposition#proper.#The#unity#
of#the#proposition,#then,#is#established#by#the#simultaneous#disseveration#and#
composition#accomplished#by#negation,#the#sign#of#the#form#of#difference.#
The.logic#of#diairesis.is#not#formal#in#the#sense#that#Aristotle’s#syllogistic#is.#It#
does#not,#as#Aristotle’s#does,#provide#a#formal#language#into#which#sentences#or#
propositions#of#ordinary#language#can#be#translated#and#evaluated#for#inferential#
significance#on#the#basis#of#their#formal#character.#However,#in#his#method.of.division#
Plato#provides#a#way#of#determining#the#boundaries#of#concepts#and#their#integration#in#
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the#constellation#of#concepts#through#which#we#cognize#and#communicate#about#the#
world#and#ourselves,#and#to#this#extent#it#is,#for#all#intents#and#purposes,#a#logic.of.the.
concept,#or#at#the#very#least#a#semantics#of#names#built#upon#a#model#of#forms,#the#first#
in#a#lineage#that#concludes#most#famously#with#Frege’s#rather#different#but#recognizably#
Platonic#Begriffschrift.#If#this#logic#exhibits,#amongst#other#things,#the#limitations#of#the#
atomic,#onomastic#approach#to#the#analysis#of#discursive#speech,#it#also#points#beyond#
those#limitations#and#provides#the#basis#for#an#account#of#predicative#relations.#It#thus#
shares#the#broader#philosophical#intentions#of#both#Wittgenstein’s#and#Frege’s#
approaches#to#logic,#though#split#between#two#works,#the#Parmenides#and#the#Sophist.#
Like#Wittgenstein,#Plato#thinks#that#a#formal#account#of#language#that#abstracts#from#
ordinary#usage#yields#either#identity#or#contradiction#(the#lesson#of#the#second#part#of#
the#Parmenides),#but#like#Frege#he#thinks#that#when#the#structure#of#the#concept#itself#is#
properly#expressed#the#discursive#unity#of#the#basic#components#of#speech#(logos)#is#
made#apparent#(the#lesson#of#the#Sophist).#However,#contrary#to#Frege,#Plato#thinks#it#is#
negation,#rather#than#assertion,#that#emerges#as#the#principal#discursive#operation,#that#
which#differentiates#the#concept#and#establishes#what#I#have#called#the#predicative.
interval,#i.e.,#the#ligature#between#a#concept#and#its#determinations.#In#this#regard,#it#is#
Plato’s#method.of.division,#rather#than#Aristotle’s#syllogistic,#that#is#the#originaly#
precursor#of#Hegel’s#phenomenological#logic.#

#

136#
Division#thus#emerges#not#as#an#ad#hoc#instrument#of#analysis,#as#some#

commentators#have#suggested,#but#as#one#intrinsically#bound#to#the#model#of#
conceptuoTmetaphysical#exemplarity#that#underlies#Plato’s#theory#of#participation#
(methexis),#on#the#one#hand,#and#to#the#account#of#predication#he#first#arrives#at#in#the#
Sophist,#on#the#other.#The#transition#from#the#vertical#ontology#of#participation#to#the#
horizontal#ontology#of#congruence#or#community#(koinōnia),#and#more#importantly#the#
corresponding#transitions#from#the#vertical#semantics#of#naming#to#the#horizontal#
semantics#of#predication,#which#will#ultimately#have#to#be#approached#as#operations#
rather#than#structures,#are#an#important#part#of#the#story#to#be#told,#and#division#is#
fundamental#to#both#transitions.#
Plato#comes#to#see#negation#as#central#to#division#and#so#to#predication,#yet#he#
discovers#this#only#in#addressing#Parmenidean#qualms#about#speaking#of#what#is#not#(to.
mē.on),#which#leads#him#to#recast#negation#as#to.heteron:#otherness#or,#less#literally,#
difference.#Such#qualms#persist,#however,#since#even#as#difference#negation#will#involve#
reference#to#what#is#other#than#being.#It#is#for#this#reason,#that#Aristotle#isolates#the#
relevant#sense#of#to.heteron#(heterotēs)#in#diaphora,#explaining#that#“difference#
(diaphora)#is#different#from.something,#in.something.(tinos.tini.diaphoron),”#that#is,#the#
specific#use#of#difference#involved#in#the#speciation#of#a#genus.119#In#explaining#
difference#in#relation#to#another,#as#opposed#to#the#being#of#that#other,#Aristotle#
########################################################
119

#Aristotle’s#Metaphysics#X#1054b22.#

#
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obscures#the#link#between#the#method#of#division#and#negation,#although#the#role#of#
diaphora.in#the#categorical#system#continues#to#carry#the#logical#and#metaphysical#
weight#of#its#association#with#negation.#This#is#the#legacy#Boethius#will#in#turn#transmit#
to#the#following#centuries#of#scholastic#philosophy.#
Finally,#that#there#is#a#shift#in#Plato’s#thinking#from#the#Parmenides#to#the#Sophist.
is#quite#clear,#and#I#think#this#can#be#made#out#in#a#number#of#ways.#While#prior#to#the#
Sophist,#Plato#had#thought#of#the#community#of#forms#as#both#the#metaphysical#and#the#
logical#anchor#of#veridical#speech#and#thought,#the#Parmenides.revealed#its#fundamental#
shortcomings#as#a#model#for#discursive#speech.#While#there#are#a#number#of#historically#
useful#shifts#to#compare#this#to,#Wittgenstein’s#turn#from#the#austere#rigors#of#the#
Tractatus#to#the#rich#phenomenological#descriptions#of#the#Philosophical.Investigations,#
is#perhaps#the#most#revealing.#While,#in#typically#provocative#fashion,#Slavoj#Žižek#has#
suggested#that#we#read#the#“passage#from#the#first#to#the#second#part#of#Parmenides.as#
homologous#to#the#Hegelian#passage#from#phenomenology.to#logic,”120#I#would#suggest#
that#this#passage#is#only#properly#managed#in#the#Sophist,#where#the#logical#and#
metaphysical#dimensions#of#predication#are#simultaneously#explored,#while#in#the#
Parmenides#logical#structure#is#still#bound#to#the#semantics#of#naming,#and#predicative#
relations#remain#obscure#at#best.#Though#Žizek’s#suggestion#seems#to#be#confirmed#by#
Hegel’s#own#remarks#on#the#Parmenides#in#the#Encyclopedia.Logic,#this#is#because#Hegel#
########################################################
120

#Less.Than.Nothing:.Hegel.and.the.Shadow.of.Dialectical.Materialism#(London;#Brooklyn,#NY:#Verso,#
2012),#51.#

#
reads#the#logic#of#naming#in#the#Parmenides#as#though#it#were#already,#albeit#in#
preliminary#form,#the#logic#of#predication#in#the#Sophist.#
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!
CHAPTER!2!
BOETHIUS:!CONTRADICTION,!DIVISION!AND!THE!DIS(UNITY)!OF!THOUGHT!
Section(One.(Introduction(
!

As!we!have!just!seen,!Plato!attends!to!three!types!of!statement!or!proposition,!

distinguished!according!to!the!three!types!of!subject!involved:!(1)!specific!natural!or!
cultural!kinds!(such!as,!and!in!particular,!the!philosopher!and!the!sophist),!(2)!forms!
(eidē/ideai),!in!particular,!the!greatest!(=!most!general)!kinds!(megista.genē),!i.e.,!being,.
sameness,!etc.,!and!(3)!individuals,!such!as!Theaetetus,!Socrates,!etc.!Though!the!
method!of!division!is!only!explicitly!applied!to!statements!of!the!first!type,!its!
applicability!to!the!other!two!is!directly!implied,!can!readily!be!made!out,!and!in!other!
dialogues,!such!as!the!Philebus,!is!in.fact!applied!to,!for!example,!the!form.of!pleasure.!
Boethius,!who!praises!and!proceeds!directly!from!Porphyry’s!Isagōgē,.and!likely!from!his!
muchVcited!but!now!lost!commentary!on!the!Sophist!as!well,!gives!us!a!clear!indication!
that!the!use!of!the!method,!what!he!calls!the!science.of.dividing.(scientia.dividendi),!
extended!to!cases!other!than!those!of!essential!or!universal!attribution.!In!particular,!
Boethius,!following!Porphyry,!following!Plato,!lists!sitting.(sedēre),!and!standing!(stare),!
as!statim.relinquentes!differentiae,!literally!immediately.departing,!or!what!we!might!
call!transient.contingent.differentiae.!Such!differentiae,!like!all!differentiae,!are!
differentiating!features,!but!belong!to!the!more!general!class!of!accidental,!per.accidens!
differentiae,!which!general!class!also!includes!concomitant.differentiae!(consequentes!
139
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differentiae),!which!though!they!also!apply!per.accidens,!are!enduring!features,!such!as!
curly.hair!or!grey.eyes,!which!we!might!call!permanent.contingent!differentiae.1!Thus!
while!Boethius,!like!Aristotle,!is!principally!concerned!with!definition,!and!thus!with!
essential!or!per.se.differentiae,!he!makes!it!clear!that!the!science!of!division!yields!
accidental!differentiae!as!well,!and!indeed!suggests!a!way!of!distinguishing!the!former!
from!the!latter.!(Aristotle,!recall,!had!already!indicated!the!usefulness!and!limitations!of!
division!in!establishing!the!lines!of!essential!predication,!e.g.,!Posterior.Analytics,!
96b30.)!
The!view!of!division!as!providing!a!discursive!map!of!the!possible!lines!of!
predication!for!a!given!subject!of!thought!or!talk!thus!acquires!further!detail!in!Boethius,!
and!confirms!an!account!of!predication!that!covers!both!the!static!conditions!of!
essential!attributes!and!the!dynamic!conditions!of!accidental!ones.!That!is,!it!is!relevant!
to!providing!definitional!statements!like!“Man!is!a!rational,!mortal!animal”!and!
contingent!truths,!like!“Theaetetus!is!sitting.”!As!for!the!role!of!negation,!which!
Boethius!proscribes!at!the!moment!of!acknowledging!its!appearance,!once!again!we!will!
have!cause!to!return!to!Freud’s!observation!concerning!the!sign!of!negation!(das.
Verneinungssymbol),!that!beyond!its!specific!therapeutic!value!of!allowing!for!the!
expression!of!repressed!material,!it!also!has!the!much!broader!function!of!enabling!
judgment!in!the!first!place.!It!does!so!by!giving!symbolic!form!to!the!instinctual!drive!of!
exclusion!that,!as!Freud!understands!it,!establishes!the!unconscious.!So!conceived,!the!
1

!De.Divisione,!880d7V881a1.!
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unconscious!is!to!be!understood!as!a!domain!of!included!exclusions.!As!suggested!in!the!
introduction,!this!fundamental!psychical!structure!can!be!seen!as!repeated!symbolically!
in!the!categorical!proposition,!which!discursively!differentiates!and!combines!the!
elementary!expressions!that!comprise!it.!The!proposition!can!therefore!be!understood,!
in!turn,!as!the!linear!representation!of!an!included!exclusion,!when!affirmative!
(kataphatic!),!or!an!excluded!inclusion,!when!negative!(apophatic).!
Both!the!psychic!system!and!the!discursive!system!it!gives!rise!to!can!be!thought!
of!in!terms!of!a!SpencerVBrownian!logic.of.form!of!the!sort!outlined!in!the!introduction:!
the!form!of!the!psyche!includes!both!the!unconscious!and!the!conscious!(with!the!preV
conscious!marking!the!bondary!between!them),!just!as!the!proposition!is!the!unit!form!
of!subject!and!predicate.!Negation,!or!more!precisely!the!operation!of!negating,!is!in!the!
first!instance!the!basic!operation!of!division,!and!the!sign!or!symbol!of!negation!is!just!
the!logical!record!of!that!basic!operation.!If!the!act!of!negation!makes!visible!the!form!in!
the!first!place,!the!negation!sign!makes!visible!what!makes!that!form!visible.!When!I!
speak!of!the!sophist,!for!example,!I!do!so!by!virtue!of!the!chain!of!disjunctions!that!in!
effect!make!up!his!logical!and!ontological!genealogy;!when!I!say!of!the!sophist!that!he!is!
not!a!fashioner!of!veridical!images,!or!that!he!is!a!fashioner!of!nonVveridical!images,!I!
thereby!show!something!internal!to!the!determination!of!that!chain.!
The!importance!of!Boethius,!and!in!particular!the!text!I!will!be!focusing!on!in!this!
chapter,!his!De.Divisione,!lies!precisely!in!the!negation!that!lies!at!its!center,!that!is,!the!
negation!of!the!role!of!negation!in!division.!The!proscription!of!negation!that!this!
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amounts!to!derives!from!a!recognition!of!the!fundamentally!propositional!character!of!
negation!and!the!difficulty!of!reconciling!this!with!the!attributive!use!of!negation,!and!
thus!with!the!discursive!nature!of!concepts!themselves,!which!is!fundamentally!at!odds!
with!Boethius’!Platonist!commitments.!This!work!constitutes!the!canonical!treatment!of!
the!method!of!division,!and!thus!establishes!the!basis!for!the!treatment!of!predication!
throughout!scholastic!philosophy.!Its!proscription!of!negation,!along!with!its!discursivity,!
thus!becomes!a!tacit!postulate!of!the!term!logic!(and!its!underlying!metaphysics)!that!
dominates!medieval!philosophical!thought,!despite!the!ineluctable!place!of!negation!in!
the!science!of!division!from!which!that!logic!is!understood!to!proceed.!Yet,!it!is!precisely!
because!negation!is!proscribed!that!the!logic!it!underpins!retains!its!authority!up!
through!Kant,!beyond!the!turn!to!propositional!logic!that!begins!with!Abelard!and!
Ockham.!As!we!shall!see!in!the!next!chapter,!it!is!Hegel!who!will!decipher!the!principle!
of!negation!encoded!within!the!logic!that!proscribes!it.!The!argument!of!the!present!
chapter,!then,!is!that!it!is!through,!though!not!by,!Boethius!that!the!enunciation!of!this!
principle!is!transmitted,!albeit!under!the!guise!of!its!repudiation.!
Section(Two.(Division,(Contradiction(and(the(Discursive(Logic(of(Terms(
!

In!his!De.Divisione,!Boethius!promises!to!provide!not!merely!a!technical!account!

of!the!scientia.dividendi,!but!an!exhaustive!classification!and!discussion!of!the!
philosophically!relevant!kinds!of!division!(divisio).!By!way!of!justifying!his!efforts!he!cites!
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as!a!precedent!a!book!of!the!same!title!by!Andronicus!of!Rhodes2!that!attests!to!the!
great!benefits!(magnos.fructus)!of!the!method!and!the!esteem!accorded!the!subject!by!
the!peripatetic!tradition!(disciplinam.peripateticam),!by!which!Boethius!and!Andronicus!
would!primarily!have!meant!Aristotle.!He!reports!that!Plotinus!expresses!the!same!high!
regard!for!division!in!his!Enneads!(II.6)!and!that!Porphyry!praises!its!utility!(utilitas)!in!his!
commentary!on!Plato’s!Sophist3!and!in!his!Isagoge,!the!introduction!to!Aristotle’s!
Categories!already!discussed.!
!

This!catalogue!of!antecedents!is!also!an!inventory!of!Boethius’!principal!

philosophical!influences,!with!St.!Augustine!being!the!only!notable!omission.!It!is!helpful!
to!have!such!an!inventory!before!one!from!the!outset,!as!his!interest!in!harmonizing!the!
seemingly!divergent!metaphysical!and!logical!positions!of!his!predecessors!is!what!
governs,!and!so!often!explains,!the!views!he!ultimately!defends.!On!the!figures!of!
greatest!influence,!Plato!and!Aristotle,!Boethius!is!entirely!clear.!He!tells!us!in!his!second!
Commentary!on!Aristotle’s!De.Interpretatione!that!he!intended!to!translate!and!write!
commentaries!on!the!works!of!Plato!and!Aristotle4!in!order!to!bring!their!opinions!

2

th

!Andronicus!of!Rhodes!(circa!100!B.C.)!is!traditionally,!perhaps!apocryphally,!identified!as!the!11 !
successor!of!Aristotle’s!Academy!and!is!credited,!by!Porphyry!(Vita.Plotini,!§24),!with!having!provided!the!
first!critical!edition!of!Aristotle’s!works.!His!De.Divisione!is!not!extant,!and!is!otherwise!unattested.!
!
3
!Again,!this!commentary!is!unfortunately!no!longer!extant!and!is!otherwise!unattested.!
!
4
!While!his!commentaries!on!the!Categories.and!De.Interpretatione!are!extant!and!were!available!
throughout!the!scholastic!period,!his!translations!and!paraphrases!of!the!rest!of!the!Organon!were!lost!
and!only!recovered!in!the!middle!of!the!twelfth!century.!On!the!range!and!purpose!of!Boethius'!
translations!and!commentaries!see!Sten!Ebbesen’s!"The!Aristotelian!Commentator,"!in!The.Cambridge.
Companion.to.Boethius,!ed.!John!Marenbon!(Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press,!2009),!34V55,!and!
his!"Manlius!Boethius!on!Aristotle's!Analytica.Posteriora,"!Cahiers.de.l'Institut.du.Moyen.Age.Grec.et.Latin,!
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(sententias)!into!a!“single!concordance!(unam.concordiam)”!and!to!"demonstrate!their!
consistency!on!the!majority!of!issues!and!certainly!on!those!most!important!in!
philosophy!(his.in.philosophia.maximis),"5!a!familiar!Neoplatonist!aspiration!he!no!doubt!
inherited!from!Porphyry,!or!from!Proclus,!Alexander,!or!Ammonius,!with!whose!writings!
he!seems!to!have!had!some!familiarity.6!It!is!Boethius’!Platonism,!as!has!already!been!
suggested,!that!will!be!the!key!to!deciphering!a!key!passage!of!this!text.!
!

The!complete!philosophical!background!of!this!text!would!thus!include!the!

relevant!works!of!Plato,!Aristotle,!Plotinus,!Porphyry!(specifically!his!Isagoge!and!In.
Aristotelis.Categorias.Expositio),!St.!Augustine,!and!a!Neoplatonist!text!or!two.!The!
summary!significance!of!this!background!can!be!put!as!follows:!Boethius!approaches!the!
topics!of!division!and!negation!as!an!orthodox!Aristotelian,!yet!within!the!broader!
framework!of!a!Platonist!metaphysics!and!semantics.!It!is!Plato’s!model!of!division!
together!with!Aristotle's!Categories!and!De.Interpretatione,!which!he!translated!and!
wrote!commentaries!on,!that!provide!the!basic!principles!that!define!Boethius’!views!
and!dictate!the!issues!of!real!philosophical!concern:!the!structure!and!ontology!of!
relations!between!genus!and!species,!essence!and!accident,!universal!and!particular.!
Copenhagen!8!(1973),!3V32,!as!well!as!Margaret!Gibson's!"Latin!Commentaries!on!Logic!Before!1200,"!
Bulletin.de.Philosophie.Médiévale!24!(1982):!54V64.!
!
5
!Commentarii.in.Lbrum.Aristotelis.Peri.Hermeneias,!edited!by!C.!Meiser!(Leipzig:Tuebner,1887,!1880),!79V
80.!This!and!all!translations!of!the!De.Interpretatione.commentaries!are!my!own,!unless!otherwise!
indicated.!
!
6
!On!the!question!of!whether!Boethius’!contact!with!Ammonius!or!his!commentaries!on!Aristotle!is!direct!
or!derived,!see,!for!example,!Pierre!Paul!Courcelle,!Late.Latin.Writers.and.their.Greek.Sources,!translated!
by!Harry!E.!Wedeck!(Cambridge,!Mass:!Harvard!University!Press,!1969),!and!Johh!Marenbon,!Boethius!
(New!York:!Oxford!University!Press),!208.!!
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Likewise,!his!outright!dismissal!of!the!role!of!negation!in!division!is!an!expression!both!
of!his!commitment!to!an!Aristotelian!account!of!differentiae!and!his!sensitivity!to!the!
metaphysical!worries!associated!with!the!grounding!of!Platonic!and!Neoplatonic!
semantics!in!an!ontology!of!eternal!forms!or!exemplars.!
!

The!strategy!of!this!chapter!is!to!spell!out!Boethius’!views!on!the!method!of!

division!and!negation!through!an!analysis!of!passages!in!De.Divisione!where!these!views!
are!most!explicitly!expressed,!namely!those!passages!dealing!with!the!logic!of!
definition.7!I!also!compare!the!views!expressed!here!with!remarks!on!negation!and!
division!that!appear!elsewhere!in!Boethius’!writings.!While!the!general!framework!of!
Platonic!and!Aristotelian!views!has!already!been!provided!for!in!the!previous!chapter,!
here!I!briefly!discuss!germane!passages!from!Plato!and!Aristotle!where!called!for.!Since!
Boethius’!views!are!still!not!always!easy!to!make!out!I!also!discuss!passages!from!
Porphyry!and!Ammonius,!whose!writings!Boethius!certainly!knew,!as!well!as!later!
medieval!commentaries!on!Boethius!and!on!the!use!of!negation!in!concepts!and!
propositions,!where!doing!so!helps!illuminate!an!otherwise!less!intelligible!point!or!has!
bearing!on!the!reading!I!am!arguing!for.!
!

But!first!a!few!preliminaries:!Boethius'!divisio,!which,!despite!the!slight!

difference!in!etymology!and!connotation,!we!can!take!as!a!more!or!less!transparent!
translation!of!Plato’s!and!Aristotle’s!diairesis,!is!used!both!of!the!logical!procedure!of!

7

!What!I!offer!here!is!not!intended!as!a!reading!of!the!text!as!a!whole,!in!part!because!Magee’s!edition,!
translation!and!commentary!on!De.Divisione,!to!which!I!shall!regularly!refer,!already!provides!such!a!thing.!
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dividing!relevant!terms!and!of!the!results!of!so!dividing,!i.e.,!the!ontological!hierarchy!
thereby!articulated,!and!so,!as!we!saw!with!Plato!and!Aristotle,!the!issues!that!arise!are!
simultaneously!logical!and!metaphysical.!Unlike!the!more!or!less!unspecified!terms!of!
division!in!Plato,!however,!here!both!the!domain!of!application!and!its!terms!are!
narrowly!demarcated,!largely!according!to!the!Aristotelian!model!to!which!Porphyry!had!
given!canonical!form,!as!discussed!in!chapter!1.!As!we!saw!for!Aristotle,!the!definition,!
at!least!the!predominant!variety!of!essential!definition!and,!equivalently,8!the!essence!
of!a!given!object!of!cognition,!is!arrived!at!through!the!delineation!of!its!genus/species!
filiations,!and!it!is!in!the!service!of!formulating!definitions!that!divisio!is!primarily,!
though!not!exclusively,!employed.!It!is!thus!in!the!correspondence!between!essence!and!
definition!that!division!most!clearly!reveals!both!its!metaphysical!character!and!its!
epistemological!value.!However,!if!Plato!is!the!first!philosopher!to!recognize!this,!and!
Aristotle!the!first!to!set!forth!the!requirements!of!definition!in!detail,9!only!with!
Boethius!does!the!method!of!division!itself,!and!with!it!the!construction!of!definitions,!
come!to!occupy!so!central!a!position!in!the!philosophical!enterprise!as!a!whole.!This!
happens!despite!Aristotle’s!criticism!of!the!explanatory!power!of!the!method!in!
8

!The!conception!of!definition!as!specifying!the!essence!of!the!definiendum!is!taken!over!from!Aristotle's!
discussion!in!the.Topics!and!Prior.Analytics.!Plotinus,!as!we!have!seen,!and!Porphyry!as!well,!despite!their!
differences!with!Aristotle,!take!much!the!same!position.!As!Plotinus!puts!it,!"the!diairesis!of!Plato!is!used!
for!the!discrimination!(diakrisis)!of!Forms!(eidōn)!and!in!relation!to!the!'what!is!it?'!question,!to!the!
first/highest!genera!(prōta.genē)!and!noetically/intellectually!(noērōs)!weaves!together!(plekousa)!those!
things!that!are!derived!from!these"!(Enneades.I.III.4,!in!Volume!1!of!Plotinus..7.Volumes,!trans.!A.!H.!
Armstrong!(Cambridge,!Mass.:!Harvard!University!Press,!1966V1988)).!
!
9
!See!Aristotle’s!Posterior.Analytics.2.13!96b15–97a6!and!Metaphysics.7.12!
1037b27–30..
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comparison!with!his!own!syllogistic,!and!in!part!owing!to!the!absence!of!Aristotle’s!Prior.
and!Posterior.Analytics!from!the!philosophical!canon!until!its!retrieval,!through!Arabic!
translations,!towards!the!end!of!the!twelfth!century.!
!

As!we!have!seen,!the!topic!of!division,!on!its!own,!carries!with!it!a!host!of!

metaphysical!assumptions,!including!assumptions!concerning!negation.!It!follows!that!
before,!or!rather!without!ever!deliberately!staking!out!any!specific!ontological!or!
semantic!position,!Boethius!already!finds!himself!in!fairly!deep,!if!ambiguous,!
metaphysical!waters.!What!I!mean,!in!the!first!place,!is!this:!of!the!six!kinds!of!divisio!
classified!in!De.Divisione,!all!except!the!semantic!variety!concern!the!five!predicables!
(rhētheisai.in!Aristotle's!Greek,10!praedicabilia!in!Boethius'!Latin!translation)!Porphyry!
discusses!in!his!Introduction!(Isagoge)!to!Aristotle's!Categories,11!that!is,!genus,!
difference,!species,!accident,!and!property.!By!presumption,!given!the!metaphysical!
character!of!Aristotle's!categories!(katēgoriai,!or!praedicamenta!in!Boethius’!Latin),!at!
least!in!their!canonical!presentation!in!the!Categories,!the!predicables,!all!of!which!fall!
under!one!or!another!of!the!categories,!are!also!things!rather!than!expressions,!though!
10

!Aristotle!Topica,!103b20V25,!in!Aristotelis.Topica.et.Sophistici.Elenchi,!edited!by!W.!D.!Ross!(Oxford:!
Oxford!Clarendon!Press,!1958).!
11

!In!his.Porphyry.Introduction,.translated,.with.a.commentary.by.Jonathan.Barnes!(Oxford:!Oxford!
University!Press,!2003),!J.!Barnes,!amongst!others,!questions!whether!Porphyry!really!intends!this!work!as!
an!introduction!to!Aristotle's!Categories,!and!suggests!it!is!only!incidentally!so,!since!Aristotle’s!Categories.
is!itself!studied!as!the!first!treatise!on!logic.!However,!his!reasons!for!doubting!its!intended!use!are!
puzzling!at!best.!He!claims!that!Porphyry!himself!tells!us!that!it!is!preparatory!for!“the!study!of!the!theory!
of!predication,!and!the!construction!of!definitions,!and,!in!general,!matters!connected!with!division!and!
with!proof!(1!.3!–6),“!which!he!takes!to!mean!that!“Porphyry!presents!his!essay!as!a!preparation!for!the!
study!of!logic”!(XV).!If!Aristotle’s!Categories!is!indeed!the!basic!logic!textbook,!as!it!surely!is,!given!its!
place!in!the!Organon,!then!an!introduction!to!logic!is!ipso.facto!an!introduction!to!the!Categories,!if!not!to!
the!categories!as!such.!!
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as!predicables!they!are!just!the!things!that!our!expressions!can!pick!out!or!express.!With!
regard!to!definition,!moreover,!the!relevant!predicables!V!species,!genera.and!
differentiae!V!are!substances,!albeit!secondary.(deuterai)!ones,!from!an!Aristotelian!
perspective.12!
!

Now!Boethius!tends!to!follow!Porphyry,!who,!though!he!brackets!metaphysical!

questions!in!the!Isagoge,!adopts!a!primarily!linguistic!or!semantic!reading!of!the!
categories!in!his!commentary!on!Aristotle's!Categories,!where!he!is!metaphysically!more!
partisan.!What!this!amounts!to,!however,!is!hardly!the!clearVcut!view!he!suggests,!along!
with!most!ancient!and!medieval!discussions!of!semantics!before!Ockham,!that!semantic!
and!metaphysical!questions!are!inextricably!connected.!In!this!commentary,!Porphyry!
opposes!the!metaphysical!character!of!the!predicables!to!the!principally!linguistic!
character!of!the!categories!(katēgoriae),!arguing!that!since!“beings!and!their!genera!and!
species,!and!differentiae!are!things!(pragmata),!not!words!(phōnai)”!one!ought!not!to!
admit!On.the.Genera.of.Being!or!On.the.Ten.Genera!as!alternative!titles!for!the!

!

12

!See!Aristotle’s!discussion!of!substance!at!Categories!2b8V9:!“A!substance!–!that!which!is!called!a!
substance!most!strictly,!primarily,!and!most!of!all!–!is!that!which!is!neither!said!of!a!subject!nor!in!a!
subject,!e.g.,!the!individual!man!or!the!individual!horse.!The!species!in!which!the!things!primarily!called!
substances!are,!are!called!secondary!substances,!as!also!are!the!genera!of!these!species.”!As!remarked!
earlier,!on!Aristotle’s!view!the!ontological!hierarchy!runs,!in!order!of!primacy,!from!individual,!to!species,!
to!genus:!“Of!the!secondary!substance!the!species!is!more!a!substance!than!the!genus,!since!it!is!nearer!
to!the!primary!substance,”!in!Categories.and.De.Interpretatione,.trans.!J.!L.!Ackrill!(Oxford:!Clarendon!
Press,!1963).!
!
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Categories,!since!the!latter!is!not!“about!things!qua!things,!but!instead!is!about!the!
words!that!are!used!to!signify!things.”13!
!

Porphyry’s!argument!for!a!semantic!reading!of!the!Categories!is!rather!

unconvincing,!however,!and!amounts!to!pointing!out!that!in!introducing!the!ten!
categories!Aristotle!focuses!on!the!extensions!of!categorical!terms,!i.e.,!on!what!they!
signify,!which!he!would!not!have!done!had!he!been!interested!in!ontological!
classification.!Yet!even!if!semantics!is!the!principal!concern!of!this!text,!a!list!of!the!
significata!of!simple!expressions!is!nonetheless!a!list!of!things!(chrēmata!or!rēs),!not!
expressions!(onomata).!So!in!the!end!it!seems!all!Porphyry!needs,!wants!and!is!entitled!
to!claim!is!that!while!Aristotle’s!Categories.is!concerned!with!semantics,!and!in!
particular!the!extensions!of!simple!(i.e.,!nonVcompound),!referring!expressions,!the!
categories!themselves!are!just!the!kinds!of!things!that!such!expressions!can!signify.!
Porphyry’s!approach!to!the!Categories.(and!categories)!is!no!doubt!shaped!by!that!of!
Plotinus,!who!attacks!Aristotle!for!departing!from!Plato’s!robust!realism!with!regard!to!
Forms.14!All!the!same,!even!if!a!semantic!construal!of!the!categories!is!poorly!supported,!
not!required!by!a!semantic!reading!of!the!Categories!and!at!odds!with!a!metaphysical!
construal!of!the!predicables,!it!is!clear!that!as!far!as!the!predicables!are!concerned!
Porphyry!holds!that!they!are!things!(chrēmata),!and!Boethius,!following!Porphyry,!takes!
the!same!view.!
13

!Porphyry,!On.Aristotle’s.Categories,!trans.!Steven!K.!Strange,!56.34V57.6!(Ithaca,!N.Y.:!Cornell!University!
Press,!1992).!
!
14
!Plotinus!Ennead!6.1.1V24,!in!Volume!6!of!Plotinus,.7.Volumes.!
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!

But!that!the!predicables!are!things!tells!us!nothing!yet!about!what!sorts!of!things!

they!are.!Accordingly,!Porphyry!famously!poses,!and!then!brackets,!as!lying!beyond!the!
scope!of!his!Isagoge,!a!set!of!three!ontological!questions!that!Boethius,!equally!
famously,!takes!up!in!his!commentaries!on!Porphyry’s!text,!his!In.Isagoge.Commentaria.!
Since!we!will!have!reason!to!turn!to!Boethius’!account!of!universals!later!on,!it!will!be!
useful,!as!we!proceed,!to!have!in!mind!Porphyry’s!three!ontological!questions!
concerning!genera!and!species:!(1)!whether!they!subsist!(hyphestēken/subsistunt)!and!
are!situated!(keitai/posita.sunt)!in!bare!thoughts!alone!(en.monais.psilais.epinoiais/in.
solis.nudis.purisque.intellectibus),!(2)!whether,!if!they!subsist!(beyond!mere!thought),!
they!are!bodies!(sōmata/corporalia)!or!incorporeal!(asōmata/incorporalia)!and!(3),!if!
the!latter,!whether!they!are!separate!(chōrista/separata)!or!subsist!in!perceptible!things!
(en.aisthētois/in.sensilibus)!and!in!relation!to!them.15!
If!we!take!it!that!to!be!a!thing!(chrēma.or!rēs)!is!minimally!to!be!more!than!a!
mere!product!of!intellection!or!conceptualization,!literally,!residing!in!bare!thought!
alone!(en.monais.psilais.epinoiais),!then,!on!the!assumption!that!genera,!species,!etc.,!
are!such!things,!we!need!answers!to!questions!(2)!and!(3),!that!is,!whether!they!are!
corporeal!or!incorporeal,!and,!if!incorporeal,!whether!they!are!independent!of!or!
resident!in!things!that!are!corporeal!or!sensible.!Since!Boethius!offers!an!explicit!answer!
to!these!questions!in!his!much!discussed!views!on!universals!in!his!commentary!on!the!

15

Porphyry,!Isagoge,!eds.!Alain!de!Libera!and!A.!Ph.!Segonds!(Paris:!Vrin,!1998),!2.!

!
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Isagoge,!to!finally!determine!his!position!on!the!ontological!status!of!the!praedicabilia,!it!
will!be!necessary!to!examine!these!texts,!and!to!take!a!brief!detour!through!Porphyry!
(and!still!more!briefly!through!Plotinus).16!But!before!venturing!such!detours!there!is!a!
fair!amount!to!be!learned!directly!from!De.Divisione!itself.!
!

Boethius!begins!his!discussion!by!identifying!two!broad!classes!of!division:!

division.according.to.itself.(secundum.se),!which!we!might!call!internal!or.essential.
division,!inasmuch!as!it!yields!what!is!intrinsic!to!the!dividendum!(what!is!divided),!and!
division.according.to.accident!(secundum.accidens),!which!we!might!call!external.or!
accidental.division,!inasmuch!as!the!results!of!division,!the!dividentia,!bear!a!contingent,!
nonVintrinsic!relation!to!the!dividendum.!He!identifies!three!subclasses!of!secundum.se!
division!and!one!of!secundum.accidens!division,!under!which!he!in!turn!distinguishes!
three!modes.!The!full!classification!then!looks!like!this:!
!
!
!
!
.
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

I.!Essential(Division((Secundum(se)!
1.!Speciating!V!of!genus!into!species!(genus.in.species)!
2.!Mereological!V!of!whole!into!its!proper!parts!(totum.in.proprias.partes)!
3.!Semantic!V!of!spoken!sound!into!its!proper!significations!(vox.in.significationes..
proprias)!
II.!Accidental(Division((Secundum(accidens)!
4a.!of!subject!into!accidents!(subiectum.in.accidentia)!
4b.!of!accident!into!subjects!(accidens.in.subiecta)!
4c.!of!accident!into!accidents!(accidens.in.accidentia)!
While!each!variety!of!division!is!of!some!philosophical!interest,!it!is!the!

discussion!of!1!that!contains!the!most!explicit!evidence!for!his!views!on!the!

16

!See!Section!Four!below.!
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metaphysical!dimension!of!division!and!negation.!What!is!established!in!this!context,!
however,!applies!across!the!board!to!all!varieties!of!division,!and!whatever!the!role!of!
negation!may!turn!out!to!be,!it!is!thereby!established!as!serving!in!all!varieties!of!
division,!which!I!would!suggest!cover!every!context!of!discursive!expression.!
Boethius,!presumably!following!Aristotle!(who!insists,!in!Metaphysics!Z,!for!
example,!that!“the!differentiae!by!which!the!genus!is!divided!are!contrary!
(enantiae),”17)!thinks!it!necessary!in!this!context!to!establish!contrariety,!and!to!rule!out!
contradiction,!as!the!variety!of!opposition!involved!in!speciation,!that!is,!the!division,!or!
differentiation,!of!genera!into!species!or!kinds!(divisio.generis.in.species),!which,!as!he!
later!tells!us,!is!required!for!the!analysis!and!definition!of!genera,!species,!and!thus!
essence.!In!the!course!of!trying!to!prove!this!point,!he!proscribes!the!use!of!negation,!
arguing,!in!stark!metaphysical!terms,!that!rather!than!designating!or!determining!a!
complementary!species!negation!destroys!the!substance!of!the!species!it!is!applied!to:!
not.being.man!(non.esse.hominem)!is!not!a!species;!for!every!species!constitutes!
being!(esse),!but!negation!disjoins!(disiungit)!being!(esse)!from!something!that!is,!no!
matter!what!it!presents.!For!example,!when!I!say!'man,'!I!have!spoken!as!if!there!is!
something;!but!when!I!say!"nonVman!(non.homo),"!with!the!negation!I!have!
destroyed!(destruxi)!the!substance!(substantiam)!of!man.!So!it!is,!then,!that!the!
division!of!a!genus!into!species!has!per.se!nothing!to!do!with!negation.18!
He!will!ultimately!argue!that!if!negation!cannot!be!used!to!constitute!(name!or!
establish?)!complementary!species,!then!the!defining!relation!between!such!species!
cannot!be!that!of!contradiction,!since!contradictories!are!related!to!one!another!
17

!Metaphysics.Z!§12!(1037b19V10).!

!

18

!De.Divisione,!882b.!
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precisely!as!negations!each!of!the!other.!The!complete!argument!then!runs!roughly!as!
follows:!

!
!

1.!If!something!is!a!species!it!constitutes!being!(constituit.esse).
2.!For!any!X!that!is,!the!non!of!nonXX.disjoins!being!(esse)!from!that!X!.
3.!Whatever!disjoins!being!(esse)!from!X,!destroys!the!substance!(substantia)!of!X.
4.!Whatever!disjoins!being!(esse)!from!X!does!not!constitute!being!(esse)!(from!3!and!
the!meaning!of!destroy).
5.!For!any!species!X,!non.esse.X.(or!nonVX)!destroys!and!so!does!not!constitute!esse!
(from!2,!3!and!4).
6.!For!any!species!X,!non.esse.X!(or!nonXX)!is!not!a!species!(from!1!and!5).
7.!Therefore:!The.division.of.a.genus.into.species.has.per.se.nothing.to.do.with.
negation!(from!6).
8.!Contradiction!is!an!opposition!between!terms!that!are!each!the!negation!of!the!
other!(definition!of!contradiction).
9..Divisio.generis.in.species!is!not!effected!through!contradiction!(from!7!and!8).
For!present!purposes,!what!concerns!us!is!the!argument!for!7,!which!I!will!attend!

to!first,!focusing!initially!on!premises!1,!the!logicoVmetaphysical!thesis!on!which!the!
argument!turns,!2,!the!complement!of!1,!and!3,!its!metaphysical!upshot.!I!think!it!can!be!
shown!that!a!proper!understanding!of!1!does!not!allow!us!to!conclude!6,!but!that!even!if!
we!accept!the!argument!up!through!6,!7!doesn’t!follow.!Similarly,!even!if!7!does!indeed!
follow!from!the!preceding!premises,!it!doesn’t,!with!8,!imply!9.!Briefly,!the!argument!
concerning!contrariety!depends!upon!extending!a!relation!that!is!well!defined!with!
respect!to!propositions!to!the!terms!that!comprise!propositions.!A!term!is!the!contrary!
of!another!just!in!case!the!proposition!ascribing!the!first!and!one!ascribing!the!second!to!
the!same!subject!cannot!both!be!true,!though!they!can!both!be!false.!A!term!is!the!
contradictory!of!another!if!each!of!two!such!propositions!always!takes!the!opposite!
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truth!value!of!the!other.!However,!the!distinction!applies!only!roughly,!because!two!
apparently!contradictory!terms,!such!as!black!and!nonVblack,!just!like!two!contrary!
terms,!might!very!well!simultaneously!be!applied!to!the!same!subject,!and!thus!the!
statements!ascribing!each!to!that!subject!might!both!be!false.!For!example,!eyesight!is!
neither!black!nor!nonVblack.!As!I!will!try!to!show,!the!proscription!of!negation!and!
contradiction,!though!it!appears!to!!!!This!is!likely!the!result!of!forgetting!that!the!
hierarchies!of!categories!or!genera!and!species!are!fundamentally!predicative!rather!
than!nomenclatorial.!
Nonetheless,!despite!the!fact!that!Boethius’!argument!falters!on!several!fronts,!it!
remains!of!great!philosophical!interest,!since!the!reasons!for!its!failing!are!a!direct!
consequence!of!its!commitment!to!the!discursivity!of!concepts!(and!so!universals),!
which!in!turn!implies!the!very!role!of!negation!Boethius!is!at!pains!to!deny.!It!is!
paradoxically!in!this!very!argument,!therefore,!that!Boethius!installs!within!the!
scholastic!canon!of!the!logica.vetus!the!determinative!conception!of!negation!that!I!
argue!lies!at!the!heart!of!Hegel’s!logic!and!dialectic.!
!

We!begin,!then,!with!premise!1,!according!to!which!“every!species!constitutes!

esse.”!The!first!thing!to!notice!about!this!claim!is!what!it!does!not!say.!In!particular,!it!
does!not!say,!as!we!might!have!expected!it!to,!that!every!species!is!or!constitutes!a!
substance.!Now!we!might!suppose!that!this!is!because!Boethius,!in!an!egregiously!
careless!moment,!conflates!esse!and!substantia,!so!that!by!the!infinitive!esse!he!simply!
means!substantia.!However,!identifying!esse!with!substantia!would!amount!to!a!truly!
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remarkable!lapse!on!Boethius’!part.!For!although!there!is!no!explicit!discussion!of!these!
terms!in!De.Divisione,!the!distinction!between!substantia,!in!the!relevant!sense!of!a!
universal!predicable,!and!esse,!Being.as!such,19!is!adduced!as!one!of!the!seven!logicoV
metaphysical!principles!or!rules!(regulae)!from!which!the!most!metaphysically!explicit!
and!important!of!his!theological!tractates,!the!De.Hebdomadibus,!i.e.,!Concerning.the.
Seven,!derives!its!traditional!title.!Given!his!principled!recognition!of!the!ontological!
difference,!i.e.,!of!the!distinction!between!beings!and!Being,!attributing!a!conflation!of!
expressions!for!the!two!to!Boethius!would!be!uncharitable!at!best.!On!the!other!hand,!
he!can!hardly!be!claiming!that!every!being!constitutes!Being!as!such,!since!this!status!is!
reserved!for!Being.itself,!which!is!neither!a!genus!nor!a!species.!
A!clue!to!the!proper!construal!of!this!first!premise,!however,!is!in!part!given!us!
by!the!second!premise.!Premise!2!claims!that!non!disjoins!esse!from!whatever!it!is!
applied!to,!and!again,!as!a!general!claim!about!the!logic!of!negation!it!is!puzzling!
enough,!and!is!particularly!baffling!in!this!context,!where!we!are!putatively!considering!
the!status!of!negative!nominal!expressions!of!the!form!nonVX.!And!with!this!we!arrive!at!
the!crux!of!the!matter:!the!intermediate!conclusion!(6),!with!which!Boethius’!
presentation!of!the!argument!actually!begins,!states!not!that!“non.homo”!is!not!a!
species,!but!that!“non.esse.hominem”!is!not!one.!The!claim!seems!to!be!that!when!
“non”!is!applied,!for!example,!to!the!expression!“homo”!it!produces!an!expression!
19

!This!point!is!made!more!complicated!by!the!fact!that!Boethius’!use!of!the!term!substantia!is!equivocal.!
He!sometimes!uses!it!to!refer!to!a!typical!Aristotelian!primary!or!secondary!substance,!i.e.,!that.which.is!
(id.quod.est),!and!elsewhere!uses!it!to!refer!to!absolute.Being.!It!is!clear,!at!any!rate,!that!a!substance!in!
the!first!sense!cannot!be!Substance!in!the!second!sense.!
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whose!meaning!is!non.esse.hominem,!for!Boethius!cannot!be!claiming!that!“non.esse.
hominem”!is!itself!the!form!of!the!expression!thereby!generated,!since!it!patently!isn’t.!
But!if!that!is!indeed!the!semantics!of!such!expressions!on!offer,!then!either!the!esse!is!
part!of!the!meaning!or!extension!of!“non,”!or!it!is!part!of!the!meaning!or!extension!of!
the!base!expression,!“homo.”!However,!since!we!are!told!(in!premise!2),!that!non.
disjoins!esse!from!“something!that!is,”!esse!has!to!be!part!of!the!meaning!of!the!base!
expression!“homo.”!As!the!name!of!an!exemplary!predicable,!then,!the!term!“homo”!is!
quasiVpropositional,!its!meaning,!or!conceptual!content,!i.e.,!esse.hominem,!discursive,!
although!it!is!through!the!application!of!negation!that!this!discursive!interval!is!exhibited!
in!the!first!place.!How!does!this!help!us!make!sense!of!Boethius’!vivid!talk!of!the!
destruction!of!substance?!
While!the!terms!involved!V!constituo,!destruo,!esse.and!substantia!–!are!
decidedly!metaphysical!in!hue,!clearly!suggesting!a!focus!on!ontology!and!ontological!
relations,!it!is!just!as!clear!that!Boethius!is!not!talking!about!the!biblical!possibility!of!
destruction!(or!creation)!through!speech!or!language,!i.e.,!his!talk!of!noun!phrases,!
species!and!genera,!etc.,!is!semantic!in!focus.!On!the!other!hand,!the!simultaneous!
concern!with!metaphysical!and!semantic!issues,!or!more!specifically!the!presumption!of!
the!metaphysical!grounding!of!logic!and!language,!will!hardly!be!surprising!to!anyone!
familiar!with!Aristotle,!Porphyry!or!the!Neoplatonic!tradition!Boethius!relies!upon.!Any!
reader!of!the!Categories.has!to!contend,!for!example,!with!the!fact!that!it!is!things!and!
not!their!names!that!Aristotle!calls!homonymous,!synonymous!and!paronymous,!even!
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while!they!are!so!called!according!to!how!they!are!designated.!In!general,!for!this!
tradition,!logical!facts!reflect,!or!had!better!reflect,!metaphysical!ones.!While!for!
contemporary,!analytic!philosophers,!on!the!other!hand,!the!reverse!dependency,!the!
logical.basis.of.metaphysics,!to!borrow!from!the!title!of!Michael!Dummett’s!classic!text,!
is!perhaps!more!readily!intelligible,!the!tendency!is!still!to!set!metaphysical!issues!aside,!
because!they!are!considered!irrelevant,!insoluble,!or,!as!Carnap!most!famously!argued,!
a!matter!of!logical!confusion.20!We!can!only!make!sense!of!Boethius!if!we!resist!this!
tendency.!
The!gist!of!the!above!interpretation!is!that!Boethius’!proscription!of!negation!in!
speciation!follows!from!his!conceiving!of!it!as!fundamentally!discursive!in!function:!
negation,!properly!speaking,!belongs!to!the!domain!of!propositions,!not!names.!In!its!
logically!proper!employment,!negation!serves!to!separate!or!divide!the!two!terms!of!a!
given!proposition!that!are!otherwise!joined!together!by!the!copula,!esse.!However,!
when!applied!outside!the!propositional!context,!negation!simply!severs!the!copula!from!
the!predicative!expression!that!might!otherwise!have!been!joined!to!an!appropriate!
subject!term.!And!so!we!might!well!ask!why!Boethius!doesn’t!simply!tell!us!that!
negation!is!inappropriately!applied!to!nominal!expressions.!The!answer,!as!it!turns!out,!
is!that!he!simply!doesn’t!believe!this!to!be!the!case!!

20

!See!Rudolf!Carnap,!“The!Elimination!of!Metaphysics!through!logical!analysis!of!language,”!in!Logical.
Positivism,!ed.!A.!J.!Ayer!(New!York:!Free!Press,!1959).!
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In!his!commentaries!on!Aristotle’s!Categories!and!De.Interpretatione,!as!in!his!De.
Syllogismo.Categorico!and!Introductio.ad.Syllogismos.Categoricos,!Boethius!articulates!
what!I!will!call!a!copulative!conception!of!negation,!according!to!which!negation!is!
understood!as!attaching!to!the!copula!of!a!categorical!proposition,!transforming!an!
instrument/sign!of!composition!into!one!of!decomposition!or!separation!(divisio).!
However,!he!also!seems!to!recognize!an!attributive!use!of!negation!in!the!construction!
of!infinite!or!indefinite.expressions!(nomina.infinita.or!sermones.infinitae).!He!thus!
appears!to!recognize!both!a!quasiVpropositional!and!a!nominal!use!of!negation.!Yet!
Boethius!never!speaks!of!a!distinction!between!these!two!uses!and!there!is!no!other!
ground!for!thinking!he!regards!them!as!logically!or!grammatically!distinct.!Although!he!
acknowledges!the!existence!of!infinite.or!indefinite.expressions,!on!the!one!hand,!and!
negative!propositions,!as!opposed!to!affirmative!ones,!on!the!other,!their!difference!
seems!to!derive!from!a!difference!in!the!grammatical!or!logical!context!of!application,!
not!from!a!distinction!between!two!types!of!negation.!The!relevant!context,!I!would!
suggest,!is!that!of!the!sort!of!logical!analysis!afforded!by!the!scientia.divisionis,!which!
has!its!principal!use!in!the!delineation!of!the!proper!lines!of!predication,!and!treats!
genera!and!species!primarily!as!predicables,!and!thus!as!discursively!deployed.!
On!the!other!hand,!C.!J.!Martin!has!argued!in!a!number!of!recent!publications!
that!Boethius!does!not!in!fact!recognize!what!we!would!regard!as!a!propositional!use!of!
negation,!since!he!has!no!relevant!notion!of!the!proposition!as!a!formal!unit!of!logical!
operation,!and!thus!no!strictly!logical.conception!of!negation!as,!in!essence,!a!truth!
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function!that!takes!true!or!false!propositions!as!arguments!and!issues!false!or!true!ones,!
respectively,!in!return.21!A!recognizable!distinction!between!a!propositional!and!a!nonV
propositional!use!of!negation!is!not!explicitly!drawn!before!Abelard,!who!distinguishes!
between!intrasentential!or!separative!negation,!and!extrasentential!or!extinctive.
negation,!the!first!applying!to!the!copula,!and!thus!operating!within!the!sentence,!the!
second!applying!to!the!proposition!or!sentence!as!a!whole.22!
However,!Martin’s!point!is!overstated.!Rather!than!claiming!of!Boethius!that!he!
has!no!relevant!notion!of!the!proposition!as!a!formal!unit,!one!ought!instead!observe!
that!he!has!no!notion!of!the!proposition!as!a!simple!logical!unit.!For!Boethius,!as!for!
Aristotle!and,!implicitly,!Plato,!the!formal!character!of!the!proposition!is!fundamentally!
composite,!consisting!of!two!terms,!in!the!typical!case,!and!a!copula!conjoining!them.!
Negation,!from!this!perspective,!is!fundamentally!a!negative.copula,!expressing!the!
relation!of!separation,!but!is!for!all!that!nonetheless!propositional!in!the!intrasentential!
sense.!If!this!captures!the!fundamental!and!exclusive!use!of!negation,!then!the!
attributive!or!nominal!use!of!negation!in!infinite!names!involves!an!extension!of!this!use!
to!nonVpropositional!contexts.!However,!if!this!is!right,!and!if!the!rejection!of!the!use!of!
negation!in!the!speciation!of!a!genus!follows!from!thinking!this!extension!of!the!use!of!

21

!See,!in!particular,!his!“The!Logic!of!Negation!in!Boethius,”!Phronesis!36!(1991):!277V304.!

!

22

!See!Abelard,!Logica!Ingredientibus.in!Peter.Abaelards.philosophische.Schriften,!ed.!by!Bernhard!Geyer!
(Münster:!Aschendorff,!1933),!396.!
!
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negation!illegitimate,!then!one!would!expect!to!find!in!Boethius!a!rejection!of!nominal!
or!attributive!negation!tout.court.!However,!no!such!thing!is!to!be!found.!!
Section(Three.(Nominal(Negation:(Infinite(and(Indefinite(Expression((
To!begin!with,!Boethius!doesn’t!appear!to!think!that!all!infinite,!i.e.,!nonXx,!
expressions!are!empty,!i.e.,!that!they!designate!nothing.!They!seem,!rather,!to!designate!
too!many,!indeed!a!potentially!infinite!number!of,!things.!“NonXhomo,”!for!example,!
would!appear!to!apply!to!apple,!goat,!and!any!number!of!other!substances!that!are!nonV
identical!with!homo,!though!it!might!also!apply!to!nonVsubstances.!Second,!this!claim!to!
an!overabundant!extension!is!precisely!what!Boethius!argues!elsewhere.!In!particular,!in!
his!discussion!of!such!indefinite!(infinita).expressions!in!his!second!commentary!on!
Aristotle’s!De.Interpretatione,!Boethius!says!of!such!expressions,!whether!names!
(nomina)!or!predicates!(orationes),!that!they!signify!(significant)!an!infinite!number!of!
things!(infinita),!not!that!they!signify!nothing!or!no!substance!at!all.23!Third,!though!such!
infinite!terms!may!not!on!their!own!be!used!to!determine,!constitute!or!differentiate!a!
complementary!species,!there!hardly!seems!to!be!a!problem!using!them!predicatively!
of,!and!so!to!designate,!such!species,!albeit!equivocally,!precisely!in!order!to!pick!out!
that!of!which!they!are!complementary!species.!If!indefinite!terms!can!be!so!used,!then!it!
simply!isn’t!true,!as!Boethius!is!trying!to!establish,!that!speciation!has!nothing!to!do!with!
negation,!unless!designating!complementary!species!has!nothing!to!do!with!negation,!
23

!“Cum.vero.dico.‘nonXhomo’,.significo.quidem.quiddam,.id.est.id.quod.homo.non.est,.sed.hoc.infinite..
Potest.enim.et.canis.significari.et.equus.et.lapis.et.quidcumque.homo.non.fuerit.”!Boethius,!In.De.
Interpretatione,!ed.!IIa,!rec.!Meiser,!61,!30V62,!7.!
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but!the!assumption!of!this!interpretation!is!precisely!that!constituting!is!to!be!
understood!semantically,!as!picking!out!or!otherwise!designating.!
On!the!other!hand,!the!language!of!constituting!and!destroying!substance!would!
seem,!at!best,!a!misleading!way!of!speaking!about!merely!semantic!relations.!Where!
Boethius!is.explicitly!engaged!in!semantic!talk,!as!he!is!in!the!passage!from!his!De.
Interpretatione!commentary!just!cited,!he!uses!the!familiarly!transparent!language!of!
signification,!i.e.,!significare,!ponere,.etc.!This!naturally!pushes!in!the!direction!of!a!
semantic!construal,!and!there!is!a!passage!in!chapter!2!of!Aristotle’s!De.Interpretatione.
that!Boethius!certainly!knew,!commented!on,!and!may!very!well!have!had!in!mind!in!the!
remark!on!negation!we!are!discussing,!that!falls!on!the!semantic!side!as!well,!and!
perhaps!suggests!a!way!of!avoiding!the!pitfalls!of!our!first!attempt!to!make!sense!of!
Boethius’!proscription.!At!16a29!Aristotle!says:!
“NotVman”!(to.d’.ouk.anthrōpos)!is!not!a!name!(onoma),!nor!is!there!any!name!we!
ought!to!call!it,!for!it!is!neither!a!proposition!(logos)!nor!a!negation!(apophasis).!Let!
us!call!it!an!indefinite!name!(onoma.aoriston).24!
We!have!an!instance!of!prima.facia.contradiction!here!that!is!almost!identical!to!the!sort!
Boethius!commits,!and!the!straightforward!way!of!handling!it!in!Aristotle’s!remarks!
might!readily!be!applied!to!explain!away!the!apparent!contradiction!in!Boethius.!For!
Aristotle,!“notVman”!is!not!strictly.speaking!a!name!because!it!doesn’t!do!what!names!
are!designed!to!do,!namely!name.or!designate!(sēmainei).!A!name,!Aristotle!tells!us,!is!a!
“spoken!sound!that!is!significative!by!convention,!without!time,!and!that!of!which!no!
24

!Aristotle!De.Interpretatione,!16a29.!
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part!is!independently!significative!(phōnē!sēmantikē.kata.sunthēkēn.aneu.chronou,.hēs.
mēden.meros.esti.sēmantikon.kechōrismenon).”25!If!negative!or!infinite!names!fall!short!
of!this!definition,!it!cannot!be!because!they!violate!the!last!constraint,!since!the!
negative!particle!is!not!independently!significative,!and!the!substantive!expression!
“man”!which,!though!on!its!own!has!the!extension!man,!does!not!make!an!extensional!
contribution!to!the!indefinite!expression,!in!the!way!it!would!in!the!expression!“tall!
man.”!It!must!be!that!it!fails!to!satisfy!the!first!condition,!i.e.,!that!of!being!significative!
as!a!whole,!and!thus!that!being!significative!requires!determinacy.!In!other!words,!such!
terms!do!not!signify!in!the!proper!sense,!i.e.,!determinately,!and!this!is!just!what!
Boethius!observes!in!his!commentary!on!these!lines.!As!he!goes!on!to!say,!such!names!
do!nonetheless!designate!incompletely!or!indeterminately,!and!to!this!extent!may!be!
called!indefinite!or!indeterminate!names.!An!indefinite!name,!in!other!words,!is!not!a!
special!kind!of!name,!in!the!way!that!a!deciduous!fruit!is!a!kind!of!fruit,!or!a!bad!idea!a!
kind!of!idea.!It!is!rather!more!like!a!plastic!fruit,!or!a!vague!concept,!something!that!
possesses!incompletely!the!characteristics!or!capacities!that!define!the!unqualified,!
proper!instances!of!a!kind.!
We!might!argue!similarly,!on!Boethius’!behalf,!that!what!makes!such!a!name!
indefinite!is,!as!a!matter!of!definition,!the!negative!particle,!and!that!such!indefinite.
names!are!illVformed,!because!negation,!strictly!speaking,!does!not!properly!apply!to!
names.!So!applying!it!yields!a!logically!illVformed!expression!that!while!it!performs!
25

!Aristotle!De.Interpretatione!16a19.!
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semantically!does!so!defectively.!While!the!resulting!expression!is!not!a!name!in!the!
strict!sense,!it!isn’t!a!proposition!(logos)!either,!since!the!resulting!expression!lacks!the!
temporal!index!required!of!propositions.!More!to!the!point,!it!isn’t!a!negative.
proposition!(apophasis),!the!proper!milieu,!so!to!speak,!of!negation.!Note!that!in!the!
case!of!alphaV!or!inVprivative!expressions,!illVformedness!hardy!seems!an!appropriate!
charge,!since!such!forms!are!grammatically!natural!and!readily!comprehended.!The!
charge,!in!these!instances,!would!have!to!be!that!inasmuch!as!such!prefixes!are!standV
ins!for!non!(or!ouk)!they!are!nonetheless!logically!illVformed,!though!this!might!raise!
questions!about!what!else!such!prefixes!might!be!doing!and!why,!if!they!are!doing!
something!else,!the!negative!particle!itself!might!not!be!operating!similarly,!and!thus!
differently!from!the!way!we!are!accustomed!to!thinking!of!it!as!operating.!
Aristotle!makes!a!related,!but!superficially!more!puzzling!claim!about!future!and!
past!tensed!verbs,!namely,!that!they!are!not,!strictly!speaking,!verbs.!This!case!is!a!little!
more!difficult!to!understand,!since!such!inflected!forms!would!appear!to!meet!the!
condition!of!temporal!determinacy,!and!are!otherwise!exactly!like!finite!verb!forms!in!
the!present!tense.!In!his!commentary!on!this!line!of!De.Interpretatione,!Ackrill!offers!the!
explanation!that!Aristotle!considers!the!present!tense!primary,!and!that!of!which!the!
secondary!past!and!future!tenses!are!inflections,!and!thus!not!temporal!references!in!
their!own!right,!just!as!inflected!nouns!are!not!considered!referential!in!their!own!right,!
but!depend!on!the!reference!of!the!default!nominative!form.!Yet!Ackrill!points!out,!as!
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well,!that!Aristotle!does!not!draw!this!connection!between!nominal!and!verbal!
inflections,!and!thus!leaves!us!without!much!of!an!explanation!at!all.!
An!explanation,!however,!is!forthcoming!if!we!consider!Aristotle’s!discussion!of!
future!contingent!propositions!in!DI!9,!where!the!same!strict!notion!of!designation!or!
designative!power!appears!to!be!at!work.!Though!I!cannot!argue!the!point!at!length!
here,!one!way!of!making!sense!of!Aristotle’s!arresting!claim!that!future!contingent!
propositions!are!neither!true!nor!false,!i.e.,!that!the!law!of!excluded!middle!fails!in!such!
cases,!is!to!see!that!such!propositions!fail!of!semantic!reach,!and!in!particular!that!they!
fall!short!of!being!assessable!for!truth!because!neither!the!corresponding!state!of!affairs!
nor!the!contradictory!state!of!affairs!yet!obtains.!But!what!is!true!of!future!tensed!verbs!
is!also!true!of!pastVtensed!ones:!both!purport!to!but!fail!to!refer!to!what!does!not!exist,!
because!what!they!purport!to!refer!to!does!not!yet!exist,!in!the!former!case,!or!no!
longer!exists,!in!the!latter.!The!apparent!inconsistency!with!Aristotle’s!treatment!of!
past,!true!contingent!propositions!is!merely!apparent.!Past!true!propositions!are!made!
true!by!past!states!of!affairs,!and!so!are!true!now!by!virtue!of!having!been!assigned!the!
truth!value!true!when!those!states!of!affairs!obtained.!And!indeed!this!is!the!precise!
point!Aristotle!seems!to!be!making!about!verbs!(rhemata)!in!chapter!3!of!DI:!“it!
additionally!signifies!(prossēmainei)!what!obtains!at!present!(to.nun.uparchein).!And!it!is!
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always!a!sign!(sēmeion)!of!things!that!obtain/are!the!case!(tōn.uparchontōn),!that!is,!of!
things![said]!of!a!subject!(tōn.kath’.hypokeimenou).”26!
Designation,!on!this!view,!is!irreducibly!indexical:!inflected!nominal!expressions!
fail!of!designation!because!there!is!no!indexically!accessible!correlate!of!the!dative,!
genitive!or!accusative!case,!just!as!there!is!no!indexically!accessible!correlate!of!the!
future,!aorist,!pluperfect,!etc.,!tense!of!a!verb.!Similarly,!then,!indefinite!names!do!not,!
strictly!speaking,!designate!because!there!is!no!indexically!accessible!correlate!of!the!
negated!referring!term,!since!the!relevant!referent!is!too!ontologically!diffuse.!A!term!
that!purports!to!refer!to!an!infinite!number!of!things,!or!alternatively!to!something!
infinite,!i.e.,!a!set!or!collection!of!an!infinite!number!of!things,!is!simply!not!a!referring!
term.!All!such!cases!involve!indexical!miscarriage,!grammatical!in!the!first!instance,!
temporal!in!the!second,!and!metaphysical!in!the!last.!Indeed,!in!his!commentary!on!De.
Interpretatione,!Boethius!draws!this!very!comparison!between!nomina.infinita!and!the!
oblique!cases!(obliqui.casus)!of!common!nouns,!explaining!that!while!the!former!fail!
because!part!of!the!name!is!not!a!name,!the!latter!fail!because!adding!a!verb!fails!to!
yield!a!statement:!
In!truth!these!oblique!cases,!when!joined!with!“is”!or!“is!not”!on!no!account!
completes!a!statement!(enuntationem).!For!in!fact!a!statement!is!the!completion!of!
an!intelligible!utterance!to!which!truth!or!falsity!apply.!So!if!someone!should!say!“Of!
Cato!there!is,”!it!is!not!yet!a!complete!sentence.!For!what!is!“of!Cato’!is!not!said.27!

26

!De.Interpretatione,!16b9.!

!
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Nonetheless,!in!assimilating!infinite!expressions!to!the!oblique!forms!of!common!nouns,!
he!seems!to!suggest!that!the!sign!of!negation!itself,!like!the!case!endings,!is!nonV
designative,!but!that!it!nonetheless!changes!the!meaning,!perhaps!the!intension,!of!the!
expression.28!!
!

One!immediate!problem!with!this!account!is!that!Boethius,!in!the!passage!from!

his!commentary!on!De.Interpretatione.cited!above,!claims!not!that!infinite!expressions!
fail!to!refer,!but!that!they!refer!to!an!infinite!number!of!things.!While!associating!such!
expressions!with!inflected!forms,!Boethius!also!provides!a!curious!reason!for!treating!
the!former!and!not!the!latter!as!a!kind!of!name.!Unlike!in!the!case!of!Catonis.est,!he!tells!
us,!adding!the!verb!est!to!non.Socrates,!for!example,!generates!an!expression,!namely,!
Socrates.non.est,!which!is!indeed!a!statement!(locutio),!because!it!satisfies!the!sufficient!
condition!of!being!susceptible!to!truth!or!falsity,!because!it!is!in!fact!true,!if!Socrates!is!
mortuus,!and!false!if!he!is!alive.!This!is!a!curious!argument!because!Boethius!seems!to!
assimilate!Non.Socrates.est,!i.e.,!nonVSocrates!exists,!to!Socrates.non.est,!Socrates!does!
not!exist,!and!on!the!infinite.extension.construal!of!infinite!expressions,!the!former!is!

27

!“Hi.vero.obliqui.casus.iuncti.cum.est.vel.non.est.enuntationem.nulla.ratione.perficiunt..Enuntiatio.
namque.est.perfectus.orationis.intellectus.in.quem.veritas.aut.falsitas.cadit..Si.quis.ergo.dicat:.Catonis.est,.
nondum.plena.sententia.est..Quid.enim.sit.Catonis.non.dicitur.”!Commentaria!De.Interpretatione,!64.!
!
28
!This!is,!for!example,!is!the!reading!De!Rijk!suggests!in!“The!Logic!of!Indefinite!Names!in!Boethius,!
Abelard,!Dun!Scotus,!and!Radulphus!Brito,”!in!Aristotle’s.Peri.Hermeneias.in.the.Latin.Middle.Ages..Essays.
on.the.Commentary.Tradition,!ed.!Henk!A.!G.!Braakhuis!and!Corneli!Henri!Kneepkens!(Groningen:!
Ingenium!Publishers,!2003),!207V233.!!
!!
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true!as!long!as!anything!that!isn’t!Socrates!exists,!regardless!of!whether!Socrates!is!dead!
or!alive.!
!

Abelard,!in!his!Ingredientibus,!will!later!censure!Boethius!for!precisely!this,!for!

taking!infinite!expression!to!designate!infinitely!rather!than!indefinitely,!in!effect,!for!
misconstruing!infinitus!and!its!adverbial!form,!infinite.!Abelard!argues!that!a!referring!
expression!designates,!and!is!only!designative!to!the!extent!that!it!designates,!one.thing!
(res).!If!an!infinite!expression!designated!infinita.(i.e.,!an!infinite!number!of!things)!then!
it!would!properly!be!said!to!designate!some!infinite!thing!(res),!which,!by!presumption,!
it!cannot!do!since!there!are!no!such!things!(God,!though!infinite,!is!not!a!thing).!What!is!
infinitus!about!such!expressions!is!not!their!significata!but!the!way!they!signify!
(significare),!what!Abelard!here!calls!the!force.of.signification.(vis.signifactionis):!
Boethius,!however,!in!his!first![commentary]!on!the!Categories!says!that!expressions!
of!this!sort!are!called!infinite.because!they!signify!an!infinite!number!of!things…But!
in!truth!Boethius!paid!more!attention!to!the!reason!for!the!translation!of!this!kind!of!
expression,!which!is!infinite,!than!to.the!force!(vis)!of!its!signification!and!the!
property!in!virtue!of!which!it!applies!to!expressions..For!it!is!not!applied!to!
expressions!in!accordance!with!the!fact!that!they!signify!infinite!things,!but!because!
they!signify!indefinitely,.that!is!remotely,!as!we!have!said.!Otherwise,!a!thing,!since!it!
contains!everything,!would!be!something!infinite.29!
What!Abelard!means!by!remotely!(remotive,!i.e.,!by!removal),!and!thus!by!infinite,!is!
roughly!this:!A!designative!term!is!a!term!that!designates!a!thing!(res),!but!an!infinite!
expression,!in!purporting!to!refer!to!whatever!is!not!referred!to!by!its!base,!definite!
29

!“Boethius.autem.in.primo.Categoricorum.huius.modi.voces.infinitas.appellari.ideo.dicit,.quia.infinita.
significant…At.vero.Boethius.magis.ad.causam.translationis.huius.modi.quod.est.infinitum,.respexit.quam.
ad.vim.significationis.eius.et.ad.proprietatem.ex.qua.ipsum.convenit.vocibus..Non.enim.secundum.hoc.
datum.est.vocibus.quod.infinita.significant,.sed.quod.infinite,.id.est.remotive,.ut.diximus..Alioquin.‘res’,.
quod.Omnia.continet,.esset.infinitum.”!Abelard,!Logica.Ingredientibus,.in!Peter.Abaelards.philosophische.
Schriften,!ed.!Bernhard!Geyer!(Münster:!Aschendorff,!1933),!355,!23V30.!
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term,!designates!not!everything!nonVidentical!with!that!term’s!referent,!but!what!is!left!
over!from!the!remotio.finiti,!that!is,!from!the!removal!of!the!referent!of!the!
corresponding!finite!expression!(rem.sui.finiti.perimendo,30!an!observation!he!also!
credits!to!Aristotle!(DI!10,!19b9),!and!not!the!removal!of!the!finite!expression!itself.!It!
thus!designates!any!one!of!those!things!(res),!though!none!specifically,!and!thus!
designates!nonVspecifically.!What!Abelard’s!claim!to!univocality!seems!to!mean!here!is!
that,!though!the!infinite!expression!may!be!used!of!any!number!of!objects,!its!reference!
is!just!what!is!picked!out!of!each!such!thing!in!common,!i.e.,!its!not!being!X.!
!

We!can,!I!think,!reconcile!all!three!positions.!Abelard,!in!effect,!tells!us!that!

numerosity!of!reference!amounts!to!indefiniteness!of!reference,!but!both!he!and!
Boethius!may!be!taken!as!offering!accounts!that!assign!such!terms!an!attentuated!
capacity!to!refer,!and!it!seems!natural,!following!Aristotle’s!example,!to!say!that!
attentuated!reference!isn’t!reference!strictly.speaking.!Abelard!just!provides!us!with!a!
better!explanation!than!Boethius!of!why!one!ought!to!say!such!a!thing!of!indefinite!
terms.!So!this!furnishes!us!with!a!way!of!making!sense!of!what!Boethius!has!to!say!
about!indefinite!expressions.!Unfortunately,!to!return!to!our!passage!from!De.Divisione,!
Boethius!doesn’t!claim!here!that!the!species!terms!generated!through!negation!are!
indefinite,!nor!does!he!say!of!such!terms!that!they!fail!to!designate!or!that!they!do!so!

30

!Peter!Abelard,!Dialectica,!I,!111,!in.Petrus.Abaelardus:.Dialectica,.ed.!L.!M.!De!Rijk!(Assen:!Van!Gorcum,!
1970).!
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infinitely.!If!something!like!this!is!what!he!ought!to!say,!means!to!say!and!has!the!
resources!to!say,!why!doesn’t!he!just!say!so?!
!

The!answer,!I!want!to!suggest,!is!that!the!charge!of!referential!diffuseness!

cannot!be!raised!in!this!context!because!what!is!stake!here!are!the!sorts!of!terms!that,!
for!different!reasons,!appear!to!have!a!related!semantic!property!of!referential!
diffuseness,!i.e.,!universal!terms.!Genus!and!species!terms,!we!should!remember,!are!
terms!that!apply!to!many,!indeed!an!indefinite!(if!finite)!number!of,!things!differing!in!
species!or!number,!respectively.!But!unless!being!said!of!or!applying!to!many!things!is!
supposed!to!mean!something!different!from!designating!many!things,!then!requiring!
univocal!extension!of!such!terms!would!disqualify!universals!as!designative!expressions,!
and!thus!as!expressions!as!such.!What!Boethius!seems!to!be!arguing!is!not!that!such!
expressions!don’t!designate,!but!that!they!don’t!designate!species.!The!real!reason!then!
is!indeed!that!a!given!species,!as!a!substance,!is!not!to!be!identified!with!its!instances.!
There!is!indeed!a!difference!between!what!a!species!term!applies!to!and!what!it!
designates,!which!is!after!all!what!the!opposition!between!realists!and!nominalists!turns!
on,!with!the!latter!claiming,!in!effect,!that!there!is!no!such!distinction!to!be!drawn.!To!
appreciate,!however,!why!the!use!of!negation!is!so!strictly!proscribed!and!why!it!is!
expressed!in!such!patently!metaphysical!terms!it!is!helpful,!so!I!want!to!argue,!to!turn!
back!to!Plato,!to!the!real!precursor!of!Boethius’!De.Divisione,!namely!the!Sophist.!
!

Recall!that!for!Plato!it!turned!out!that!negation!always!attaches!to!the!being,!to.

the!einai!(esse)!of!a!given!kind.!He!is!therefore!at!pains!to!point!out!that!the!extension!
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of!negation!is!not!to.enantion,!what!is!typically!translated!as!contrariety,!though!in!
Aristotle!this!becomes!the!general!term!for!opposition,!but!to.heteron,!difference!or!
otherness.!The!suggestion!in!the!previous!chapter!was!that!in!Aristotle’s!notion!of!
diaphora!the!connection!to!negation,!and!thus!the!real!ontological!import!of!
differentiation,!division,!etc.,!is!lost,!but!that!the!link!to!negation!and!the!metaphysical!
risks!it!represents!nonetheless!remain!part!of!the!Platonic!inheritance!that!defines!the!
method!of!division.!A!sense!of!the!residue!of!negation,!and!in!particular!the!negation!of!
being,!in!difference,!or,!more!technically,!in!the!differentia,!persists!in!Boethius.!
Boethius'!claim!appears!to!be!that!negation!nullifies!instead!of!determining!the!
complement!of!the!species!it!qualifies,!and!thus!that!contradiction!cannot!be!used!to!
differentiate!(divide)!the!species!of!a!given!genus.!And,!on!the!face!of!it,!the!justification!
for!making!such!a!claim!seems!compelling!enough.!It!is!difficult!to!make!sense!of,!much!
less!differentiate,!a!being!or!substance!that!is!just!the!nonVsubstance!or!being!of!
another!substance,!say,!man.!Relative!to!the!genus!animal,!man!has!as!its!special!
complement!planet,.and!certainly!this!does!not!seem!to!be!determinable!simply!as!what.
is.not.man.!Negation!is!just!too!blunt!an!instrument!to!carve!out!anything!specific!
enough!to!count!as!a!species.!
!

Compelling!or!not,!however,!the!above!considerations!are!fundamentally!

wrongheaded.!While!a!planet,!for!example,!is!not!definable!as!nonXman,!if!nonXman!is!
not!predicable!of!it,!that!is!if!"A!planet!is!a!nonVman"!is!not!true,!then!it!is!unclear!it!
constitutes!an!appropriately!discrete!species,!and!thus!a!species!at!all.!The!disjunction!
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between!any!two!complementary!species!must!be!exhaustive,!that!is,!either!something!
falls!under!a!species!s.or!it!falls!under!its!complement!~s,!and!if!it!falls!under!one!it!does!
not!fall!under!the!other.!Thus!even!were!negation!not!employed!as!an!instrument!of!
speciation,!it!remains!relevant!to!determining!whether!a!species!is!indeed!a!species.!At!
the!very!least,!it!would!seem!a!necessary!condition!of!being!a!species!that!the!negation!
of!any!complementary!species!of!a!given!genus!be!predicable!of!it.!This!is!important,!
because!any!overlap!between!divisions!of!a!proximate!genus!would!disqualify!them!for!
use!in!definition,!since!they!will!not!satisfy!the!exclusivity!condition!of!providing!all!and!
only!what!is!essential!to!the!definiendum.!
!

Yet!Boethius!is!not!merely!claiming!that!negation!cannot!function!

determinatively,!or!that!its!use!is!always!parasitic!on!an!already!determined!concept,!
content,!or!substance,!etc.!He!is!not!merely!observing,!as!Aristotle!does!in!the!
Categories,!that!negation!produces!indeterminate!or!what!will!come!to!be!called!infinite.
(aoristoi)!expressions,!designating!indeterminate!substances,!or!failing!of!reference!
altogether.!Rather,!he!is!arguing!that!it!nullifies!whatever!it!is!applied!to,!and!it!is!much!
less!clear,!upon!further!consideration,!what!this!claim!amounts!to.!For!one!thing,!though!
a!negated!substance!may!not!define!its!complement,!on!its!own,!the!negation!of!every!
substance!with!which!that!complement!is!nonVidentical!would,!it!seems,!define!the!
complement.!Though!so!specifying!a!substance!might!be!too!cumbersome!to!be!useful,!
cumulatively,!negation!would!indeed!serve!to!identify!a!given!species,!just!as!removing!
all!nonVapples!from!a!bowl!of!fruit!would!serve!to!identify!all!and!only!the!apples!in!it,!
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assuming!the!bowl!contains!apples!in!the!first!place,!and!this!need!not!mean!knowing!
beforehand!what!apples!are,!although!it!would!require!knowing!something!about!apples!
or!about!each!of!the!other!fruits!present!in!the!bowl.!
!

Finally,!however,!Boethius!cannot!be!making!a!claim!so!obviously!at!odds!with!

the!logic!of!speciation!Aristotle!had!already!made!standard,!namely,!that!species!are!
differentiated!by!differentiae.!Indeed!Boethius!makes!clear!his!recognition!of!this!
standard!procedure!in!an!earlier!passage!in!De.Divisione:!"just!as!bronze!changes!into!a!
statue!upon!the!reception!of!form,!so!genus!changes!into!species!upon!the!reception!of!
a!difference/differentia!(sicut.aes.accepta.forma.transit.in.statuam,.ita.genus.accepta.
differentia.transit.in.speciem)."31!So,!if!“nonXman”!is!indeed!the!name!of!a!
complementary!species!it!is!nonetheless!not!formed!from!that!species!but!from!a!genus!
and!a!differentia,!which!differentia,!however,!one!of!the!two!generated!species!will!
possess,!and!the!other!not.!The!relevant!differentia!in!the!case!of!homo!is!mortalitas,!
which!belongs!to!one!side!of!the!proximate!genus!rational.animal,!namely!homo,!and!
not!to!the!other,!namely!planeta.!Now!since!it!does!indeed!appear!that!once!one!has!a!
relevant!differentia!at!hand!the!complementary!species!is!indeed!constituted!by!
negation,!it!seems!the!point!Boethius!should!have!been!arguing!for!here!is!that!not!
having!the!differentiating!property,!in!this!case!mortalitas,!is!not!to!be!identified!with!
having!the!negative!property,!nonmortalitas!or!immortalitas.!

31

!De.Divisione,!879c10V11.!

!
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!

Now,!while!this!might!be!because!either!nonmortalitas!or!immortalitas!is!an!

illegitimate!form,!this!is!not!the!point!Boethius!in!fact!makes,!and!indeed!he!seems!
perfectly!happy!to!endorse!the!use!of!immortalis.!If!we!take!the!proximate!genus!to!
which!nonXman!would!presumably!belong,!namely!rational.animal,!the!appropriate!
division!to!be!generated!at!this!node,!according!to!Boethius,!is!that!between!mortalis!
and!immortalis,32!and!it!seems!obvious!enough!that!the!privative!inX!of!immortalia,!the!
equivalent!of!the!Greek!alphaVprivative!in!athanatos,!functions!as!an!attributive!use!of!
"non."!!Thus,!if!nonVman!is!not!a!substance,!then!neither!is!immortal.rational.animal,!
which!would!certainly!trouble!Boethius,!who!believes!there!are!indeed!such!immortal!
beings,!namely!the!planets!just!mentioned.!
!

It!thus!appears!that!both!in!those!cases!where!there!is!a!recognizable!species,!

but!no!ready!nonVnegative!expression!for!it,!but!also!in!those!cases!where!such!an!
expression!is!conventionally!available,!negation,!or!at!least!the!grammatical!equivalent!
of!the!negative!particle!non,!does!not!destroy!the!substance!of!the!species!it!qualifies.!
The!seemingly!plain!contradiction!involved!here!is!not!obviously!helped!by!two!
qualifications!Boethius!quickly!inserts:!(1)!that!it!is!"necessity!that!sometimes!requires!
this,!not!nature,"!and!(2)!that!when!negation!is!so!employed!it!must!follow!a!kind!of!
logical!or!cognitive!rule!of!sequence,!i.e.,!that!the!negative!or!infinite.expression!must!
follow!the!simple!or!affirmative!one,!since!negation!(negatio)!is!posterior!to!and!
unintelligible!without!affirmation!(affirmatio).!The!first!of!these!tells!us,!in!effect,!what!
32

!De.Divisione,!877c5.!
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we’ve!already!been!given!reason!to!infer,!that!there!are!no!negative!substances!to!
ground!the!use!of!negative!expressions!of!this!kind,!although!something!compels!us!to!
employ!language!that!implies!otherwise.!The!second!qualification,!though!hardly!novel,!
suggests!that!negation!does!nonetheless!leave!us!with!some,!if!minimal,!content,!such!
that,!for!example,!non.homo!and!non.planeta,!are!not!coextensive,!or!at!least!not!
cointensive,!for!otherwise!it!wouldn’t!matter!much!what!substance!term!followed!the!
negative!particle,!and!so!wouldn’t!matter!whether!or!not!the!extension!or!intension!of!a!
positive!substance!term!had!been!established!beforehand.!
As!just!remarked,!the!discursive!force!of!negation!is!part!of!what!links!negation!
inextricably!to!the!method!of!division!(diairesis)!Boethius!inherits!from!Plato.!It!also!
appears!that!the!unpalatable!metaphysical!and!logical!consequences!of!its!discursivity!
are!an!important!part!of!why!negation!is!proscribed.!For!Plato,!these!consequences!
have!to!do!with!the!threat!of!disunity!to!forms;!for!Boethius,!following!Aristotle,!it!is!the!
disunity!of!essence,!what!corresponds!to!the!definition!of!a!thing,!that!is!at!stake.!While!
Boethius!does!not!speak!of!definition!in!this!passage,!the!real!philosophical!value!of!
differentiating!species!(and!thus!of!division)!lies!precisely!in!its!use!as!a!method!for!
generating!definitions.!As!he!tells!us:!"we!may!pretty!well!say!that!division!and!
definition!are!in!essence!concerned!with!the!same!thing!(literally,!the!task!of!division!
and!definition!are!involved!with!the!same!sphere!(in.eodem.divisionis.definitionisque.
ratio.versetur),!since!a!unit/compact!definition!(una.definitio)!is!composed!of!conjoined!
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divisions!(divisionibus.iunctis)."33!What!enters!into!a!definition,!i.e.,!the!speciation!of!
genera!via!differentiae,!is,!as!he!puts!it!"a!matter!of!nature!(ad.naturam.pertineat),"34!
and,!more!precisely,!because,!on!the!Aristotelian!model!Boethius!follows,!definition!is!
identified!with,!and!states,!the!essence!of!a!thing,35!which,!as!Aristotle!tells!us,!"is!in!
every!case!universal!and!affirmative,"36!precisely!what!is,!and!in!no!way!is!not.!Indeed,!it!
is!because!it!enables!us!to!identify!what!a!thing!is,!not!merely!to!stipulate!the!meaning!
of!a!term!designating!it,!that!Plato!thinks!the!method!"divine,"!because,!as!he!puts!it!in!
the!Sophist,.it!enables!us!to!"divide.according.to.the.genera,"!that!is,!according!to!how!
things!are!divided!in.reality.!Given!all!this,!it!would!then!be!quite!natural!to!think!that!
conceding!a!place!for!negation!in!division,!and!thus!definition,!amounts!to!conceding!a!
place!for!nonVbeing!in!what!most!properly!is,!which!remains!troublesome!despite!Plato’s!
recasting!of!nonXbeing!as!otherXthanXbeing.!
Now!if!a!definition!states!the!essence!of!a!thing,!and!the!essence!of!thing,!its!
quid.est!and!quale!est.(Aristotle’s!to.ti.ēn.einai),!is!above!all!a!qualitative!unity,!then!

33

!De.Divisione,!880c9V11.!

!

34

!De.Divisione,!879b1.!

!

35

!The!conception!of!definition!as!specifying!the!essence!of!the!definiendum,!though!deriving!from!Plato,!
finds!its!first!clear!articulation!in!Aristotle,!who!defines!definition!as!a!logos!signifying!the!to.ti.ēn.einai,!his!
difficult!formula!for!essence,!both!at!Topics.1.5!101b38V102a1!and!Metaphysics!7.5!1032a12.!Porphyry!
and!Plotinus,!despite!their!differences!with!Aristotle,!take!much!the!same!position.!Plotinus,!for!example,!
says!that!"the!diairesis!of!Plato!is!used!for!the!discrimination!(diakrisis)!of!Forms!(eidōn)!and!in!relation!to!
the!'what!is!it?'!(i.e.,!essence)!question,!to!the!first/highest!genera!(prōta.genē)!and!
noetically/intellectually!(noērōs)!weaves!together!(plekousa)!those!things!that!are!derived!from!these"!
(Enneades.I.III.4).!
!
36
!Aristotle,.Posterior.Analytics,!trans.!Jonathan!Barnes!(Oxford:!Clarendon!Press,!1975),!90b4.!

176

there!is!at!least!one!way!in!which!the!linguistic.expression!for!an!essence!and!the!
essence!itself!diverge.!While!it!may!be!true!that!there!is!no!composition!within!the!
essence,!there!is!indeed!some!such!a!thing!in!the!definition!that!designates!it,!and!the!
same!would!hold!true!for!any!species!term,!considered!as!part!of!a!definition!or!not!–!it!
too!is!a!composite!of!the!hierarchy!of!genusVspecies!relations!that!lead!to!it.!Certainly,!
then,!if!negation!is!applied!to!such!a!term!we!might!imagine!it!directed!at!any!number!of!
these!Porphyrean!cuts.!But!consider,!for!example,!the!mortality!that!is!part!of!the!
definition!of!man.!On!the!more!likely!way!of!construing!the!possibility!Boethius!abjures,!
its!meaning.derives!directly!from!the!negation!of!the!immortality!of!planets,!i.e.,!of!the!
species!immortal,.rational.animal.!Man’s!mortality,!then,!amounts!to!his!nonV
immortality,!and!thus!despite!its!positive!lexical!register,!“mortal”!is!logically,!i.e.,!
according!to!the!logic!of!division,!a!negative!or!infinite!expression.!The!negation!
Boethius!is!worried!about,!in!other!words,!is!not!what!is!expressed!by!the!negative!
particle!“non”!or!any!of!its!lexicalized!equivalents;!rather,!it!is!precisely!the!negation!
inherent!in!the!differentia.that!establishes!the!opposition!between!coordinate!species,!
which!Boethius!maintains!is!present!only!if!the!differentiated.opposition!is!conceived!of!
in!terms!of!contradiction.!More!to!the!point,!Boethius’!proscription!of!negation!is,!
properly!understood,!a!denial!that!differentiae.are!schismatic,!that!they!divide,!and!so!
determine!the!space!of!a!given!genus!into!contradictory!species,!i.e.,!ones!that!stand!to!
one!another!as!negations!each!of!the!other.!In!other!words,!the!argument!as!presented!
above!gets!things!a!bit!backwards:!it!is!the!purported!fact!that!differentiated!species!are!
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not!related!to!one!another!as!contradictories!that!is!supposed!to!show!that!negation!
has!nothing!to!do!with!speciating!division,!rather!than!the!other!way!around.!It!remains!
to!say!whether!either!claim!is!true!or!supports!the!other..
Section(Four.(Separative(Negation:(The(Discursive(Suture(
!

Boethius’!seeming!inconsistency!in!the!treatment!of!negation!derives!from!the!

fact!that!the!discussion!of!infinite!expressions!is!primarily!logical!in!focus,!while!the!
discussion!of!contradiction!in!division!is!primarily!metaphysical.!In!the!former!context,!it!
is!the!character!of!the!expression!itself!and!what!this!tells!us!about!its!designative!
power!that!are!at!issue.!In!the!!latter!context,!the!concern!is!with!the!nature!of!what!is!
designated,!i.e.,!a!species.!Because!the!question!for!Boethius!here!is!not!what!the!
expression!nonXhomo!designates,!but!whether!it!is!a!possible!designation!of!a!species!
term,!and!so!whether!that!term!is!incorporable!into!a!definition,!its!occurrence!within!a!
genealogical!tree!is!crucial.!Within!such!a!tree,!however,!it!is!not!simply!false!that!the!
relevant!nonXhomo!is!not!a!substance,!but!obvious!what!substance!it!is,!namely!a!
planet!!What!Boethius!seems!to!want!to!reject!here!is!that!a!planet!is!a!nonVman,!and!
more!generally!that!any!species!can!be!the!contradictory!of!another.!Since!
contradictories!are!each!the!negation!of!the!other,!the!example!Boethius!chooses!to!
make!this!point!might!well!conceal!another!real!basis!of!concern,!that!man!is!a!nonV
planet,!and,!the!logically!more!precise!formulation!of!such!a!claim,!that!man!is!a!nonX
immortal.!
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Whatever!else!he!thinks,!Boethius!believes,!with!Aristotle!and!Porphyry,!that!

genera!and!species!are!substances,!as!we!have!already!seen,!but,!as!against!Aristotle!
who!calls!them!secondary!(deuterai),!he!also!believes!that!they!are!ontologically!prior!to!
the!individuals!that!instantiate!them,!ontological!priority!moving!from!highest!genus!to!
the!lowest!species,!whereas!for!Aristotle!ontological!primacy!belongs!to!the!individual!
instance!of!the!more!universal!natural!species!it!instantiates.37!Still,!Boethius!parses!
ontological!priority!much!the!way!Aristotle!does,!in!terms!of!what!survives!the!
extinction!or!nonVexistence!of!what:!"Hence!it!is!true...that!if!the!genus!is!destroyed!
(interimatur)!the!species!immediately!perish!(depirire),!but!if!a!species!is!destroyed!
(interempta),!the!genus!is!not!destroyed!and!remains!unaltered!in!its!nature!(in.natura.
consistere)."38!On!the!other!hand,!Boethius!also!claims!that!"a!genus!is!always!a!whole!
in!relation!to!its!proper!species!and!more!universal,"39!and!that!in!the!case!of!partVwhole!
divisions!the!"more!universal"!(universalius)!element,!the!dividendum,!in!this!case!the!
whole,!is!ontologically!subordinate!to!its!dividentia,!i.e.,!its!parts,!and!thus!the!whole!
does!not!survive!the!destruction!of!its!parts.!It!thus!follows!that!taken!as!wholes!genera!
are!ontologically!subordinate!to!their!species!and!so!perish!with!their!destruction.!
!

The!apparent!contradiction!is!resolvable,!though!no!such!resolution!is!in!fact!

undertaken,!either!in!terms!of!a!distinction!Boethius!draws!following!Aristotle!between!
37

!Aristotle!Categories.5,!2b8V9.!

!

38

!De.Divisione,!879c2V4.!

!

39

!De.Divisione,!878d11V12.!
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natural!and!perspectival!priority,!between!what!is!prior!(proteron/prius)!and!more!
knowable!(gnōrimōteron)!by!nature!(tēi.physei)!or!simpliciter!and!what!is!prior!relative!
to.us!(Posterior.Analytics,!70b34V72a5),!or!in!terms!of!a!distinction!between!quantitative!
and!qualitative!difference.!The!first!concerns!quality!and!essence,!the!second!quantity,!
and!it!is!in!terms!of!quantity!and!quality,!amongst!other!things,!that!Boethius!
distinguishes!genusVspecis!from!partVwhole!division.!The!claim!might!be!that!qua.genus,!
as!a!matter!of!its!nature!or!essence,!a!genus!is!ontologically!prior!to!its!species,!but!not!
quantitatively,!qua!whole,!or!relative!to!us.!Thus!though!the!genus!of!rational!animal!is!
not!as!such!affected!by!the!existence!of!its!species,!considered!as!a!whole,!as!made!up!
of!the!two!species,!mortal!and!immortal,!its!existence!is!directly!dependent!upon!the!
existence!of!its!species.!Perhaps!we!might!think!of!the!situation!as!follows:!If!there!were!
no!species!of!man,!of!mortal!rational!being,!then!the!genus!of!rational!being!would!
simply!not!be!the!quantitatively!specific!genus!consisting!of!mortal!and!immortal!
rational!beings,!though!there!would!still!be!a!genus!of!rational!beings,!a!kind!that!
includes!anything!that!is!rational.!We!would!then!say!(or!would!we?)!that!while!for!us,!
or!alternatively!quantitatively,!the!genus!has!no!being!beyond!its!species,!to!the!extent!
that!it!is!through!the!species!that!we!come!to!know!the!genus,!qualitatively,!or!in!its!
essence,!the!existence!or!being!of!a!genus!is!independent!of!its!speciation.!
!

The!trouble!with!such!a!solution!is!that!it!creates!more!problems!than!it!solves,!

since!it!fails!to!tell!us!how!these!two!kinds!of!priority!are!connected!to!one!another.!Is!
merelogical!dependency!subordinate!or!prior!to!genusVspecies!dependence?!And,!given!
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that!kinds!of!relation!are!directly!connected!to!the!kinds!of!relata!the!relation!links,!is!
mereological!(quantitative)!existence!subordinate!or!prior!to!essential!(qualitative)!
existence,!and!is!a!distinction!to!be!drawn!between!two!types!of!being,!or!between!
(essential)!being!and!(quantitative!or!partVwhole)!existence?40!Boethius!makes!no!such!
attempt!to!resolve!the!initial!contradiction,!and!so!none!of!these!further!difficulties!are!
addressed.!Thus!within!the!confines!of!this!text!itself!we!are!left!with!the!rather!
unsatisfactory!view!that!the!ontology!of,!and!ontological!relations!between,!genera!and!
species!are!either!description!relative!or!muddled!or!both.!Yet!this!is!more!or!less!what!
Boethius'!account!of!universals!would!have!led!us!to!expect.!
!

Briefly,!Boethius'!account!of!universals,!as!presented!in!his!second!commentary!

on!Porphyry’s!Isagoge,!is!that!they!are!incorporeal,!universal!entities!insofar!as!they!are!
grasped!by!the!intellect,!and,!so!grasped,!subsist.in.themselves.(per.se),!but!that!they!
subsist!in!sensible,!singular!things,!and!depend!upon!them!for!their!existence,!insofar!as!
they!are!sensed.41!To!explain!the!coincidence!of!universality!and!singularity!in!a!single!
subject,!Boethius!invokes!the!curious!analogy!of!the!simultaneous!occurrence!of!a!
convex!and!a!concave!line!in!a!given!object.!This!suggests,!however,!that!the!intelligible!
universality!and!the!sensible!singularity!of!universals!are!merely!two!aspects!of,!or!two!
ways!of!viewing,!the!same!thing,!i.e.,!the!universal.!Yet!Boethius!also!confesses!that!in!
40

!On!this!question,!see!Brann,!Eva!T.!H.,!The.Ways.of.Naysaying:.No,.Not,.Nothing,.and.Nonbeing!
(Lanham,!MD:!Rowman!and!Littlefield!Publishers,!2001).!
!
41
!See!Boethius,!Anicii.Manlii.Severini.Boethii.In.Isagogen.Porphyrii.Commenta,!ed.!Samuel!Brandt!
(Vindobonae:!F.!Tempsky,!1906).!
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the!context!of!a!commentary!on!the!Isagoge!it!is!natural!to!highlight!the!Aristotelian!
picture,!since!it!is!Aristotle’s!Categories!that!Porphyry’s!text!is!intended!to!introduce,!
while!in!other!texts,!in!particular!the!Quomodo,!where!Boethius!is!expressing!his!own!
views!on!such!matters,!he!adopts!a!more!explicitly!Platonic!stance.!At!any!rate,!if!
Boethius’!broad!concern!to!reconcile!Platonic!and!Aristotelian!views!often!generates!
inconsistency,!it!may!also!reveal!something!about!the!philosophical!issue!itself.!The!
interplay!between!universality!and!singularity,!for!example,!is!precisely!what!the!
application!of!concepts!to!individuals!seems!to!allow!us!to!express,!a!point!that!Hegel!
will!insist!upon,!as!we!shall!see!in!the!next!chapter.!
!

The!point!here,!however,!is!not!only!that,!however!more!precisely!construed,!

genera!and!species!are!substances!for!Boethius,!and!thus!beings,!but!that!division!itself!
establishes!or!at!any!rate!reflects!an!ontological!hierarchy!amongst!such!substances.!
One!question!to!be!raised!here!is!what!kind!of!hierarchy!this!amounts!to,!whether,!as!
Platonists!such!as!Plotinus!and!Proclus!will!maintain,!divisional!descent!is!indeed!
isomorphic!with!ontological!descent,!every!division!involving!a!diminution!in!the!degree!
of!being,!or!whether!the!relations!between!dividenda!and!dividentia!are!to!be!
understood!purely!in!terms!of!dependency,!without!ontological!degree!or!scale.!And!
here!we!come!upon!the!most!compelling!reason!for!Boethius'!interdict!against!negation:!
if!speciation!is!indeed!accomplished!through!negation,!in!the!metaphysically!significant!
sense!that!a!differentia.differentiates!a!genus!into!species!that!are!each!the!negation!of!
the!other,!and!together!the!negation!of!the!genus,!i.e.,!a!mortal!rational!animal,!is!not.a!
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mere!rational!animal,!then!there!is!an!obvious!sense!in!which!it!involves!ontological!
decline!of!the!sort!Platonists!and!Neoplatonists!are!at!pains!to!explain.!We!might!then!
understand!Boethius'!proscription!as!a!rejection!of!the!Plotinian,!or!more!broadly!the!
Platonist,!model!of!ontological!descent.!
!

Regardless!of!the!precise!focus!of!Boethius’!metaphysical!or!semantic!

apprehension,!we!can!now!make!out!its!likely!provenance.!While!Boethius!makes!no!
reference!to!Plato’s!treatment!of!negation!in!the!Sophist,!he!mentions!the!dialogue!and!
Porphyry’s!commentary!on!it,!and!certainly!must!have!known!the!dialogue!itself.!
Inasmuch!as!he!recognizes!the!exclusive!disjunctive!relation!between!any!two!species,!
he!recognizes!the!separative!character!of!differentiation.!His!insisting!on!contrariety!
rather!than!contradiction!to!characterize!the!relation!between!the!designata!of!
differentiated!terms!simply!registers,!as!already!noted,!his!agreement!with!Aristotle’s!
views,!but!the!categorical!character!of!this!insistence!is!simply!a!way!of!formally!stating!
Plato’s!semantic!principle!that!the!force!of!negation!in!such!contexts!is!differential,!that!
it!indicates!difference,!not!the!notness.or!nonVbeing!of!the!designatum!of!the!
differentiated!term.!That!he!construes!negation!discursively,!that!is,!in!terms!of!
contradiction,!is!to!be!expected,!since!the!native!context!of!contradiction!is!the!
proposition,!not!the!singular!term.!
The!seeming!inconsistency!of!Boethius’!views!on!negation!is!thus!rather!
attributable!to!his!failing!to!distinguish!the!analysis!of!expressions,!e.g.,!infinite.nominal!
or!adjectival!terms,!from!the!analysis!of!the!reference!and!predicative!roles!of!such!
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expressions.!In!the!discussion!of!speciating!division,!Boethius!is!clearly!interested!in!the!
ontological!relations!that!hold!between!complementary!species!of!a!common!genus,!not!
in!the!semantics!of!not!in!one!or!another!of!the!expressions!that!designate!these!
species.!Indeed,!this!amounts!to!the!obverse!of!Abelard’s!acute!observation!about!
Boethius’!account!of!infinite!expressions.!Here!he!does!indeed!attend!to!the!logical!
force.(vis)42!that!contradiction!would!impose!upon!divided!species,!but!fails!to!take!
sufficient!note!of!the!determinate!expressions!that!designate!these!species.!It!is!thus!
that!Boethius,!instead!of!embracing!the!differentiating!force!of!negation!and!
acknowledging!its!role!in!determination,!translates!Plato’s!declaration!that!all!negation!
is!difference!into!what!he!no!doubt!regards!as!the!equivalent!pronouncement,!that!
where!we!think!we!see!contradiction!in!division!it!is!rather!contrariety!that!reigns.!
Yet!contrariety,!no!less!than!contradiction,!or!privation!(the!third!variety!of!
opposition!Boethius!considers)!for!that!matter,!has!plenty!to!do!with!negation.!None!of!
these!would!appear!to!be!intelligible!if!it!is!not!expressible!in!terms!of!negation.!If!
planet,!or!cow!or!elephant!are!not!nonXman!it!isn't!at!all!clear!that!these!are!species!
separable!from!man.!In!other!words,!it!would!seem!to!be!a!necessary!condition!of!being!
a!species!that!the!negation!of!any!complementary!species!of!a!given!genus,!or!of!any!
genealogically!more!remote!species,!be!predicable!of!it.!This!is!important,!because!any!
42

!For!a!discussion!of!this!way!of!construing!vis.in!Boethius’!semantics!see!Taki!Suto,!Boethius.on.Mind,.
Grammar.and.Logic:.A.Study.of.Boethius’.Commentaries.on.Peri.Hermeneias.(Leiden:!Brill,!2012),!142.!
Gabriel!Nuchelmans!and!John!C.!Magee!argue!for!an!alternative!construal!of!vis.as!logical!function:!see!
Nuchelmans,.Theories.of.the.Propositions..Ancient.and.Medieval.Conceptions.of.the.Bearers.of.Truth.and.
Falsity!(Amsterdam:!NorthVHolland,!1973)!and!Magee,!Truth,.Discourse.and.Mind.in.Boethius!(PhD!
dissertation,!1986)..
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overlap!between!divisions!of!a!proximate!genus!would!disqualify!them!for!use!in!
definition,!since!they!will!not!satisfy!the!exclusivity!condition!of!providing!all!and!only!
what!is!essential!to!the!definiendum.(Negation,!in!other!words,!marks!the!fundamental!
separation!between!classes,!and!the!method!of!division!maps!the!degree!and!terms!of!
separation,!even!if!it!does!not!provide!for!the!qualitative!particularity!of!a!given!class.!
But,!on!the!other!hand,!if!negation!still!seems!the!most!plausible!candidate!for!capturing!
the!determinate!separation!between!species!or!kinds,!and!thus!for!grounding!the!
operations!of!division!and!composition!that!delimit!our!acts!of!cognition!and!
predication,!we!are!compelled!to!acknowledge!in!the!familiar!habits!of!naming,!
attribution!and!inference!by!which!we!continue!to!identify!ourselves!as!rational!animals!
a!kernel!of!inveterate,!if!not!constitutive,!nihilism,!whether!this!is!the!profound!
metaphysical!acknowledgment!of!nonbeing,!or!the!more!palatable!possibility!of!logical!
or!conceptual!cancellation.!
Section(Five.(Conclusion(
While!what!is!of!direct!concern!to!Boethius!might!initially!appear!to!be!the!fairly!
narrow!topic!of!genusVspecies!and!subjectVaccident!relations,!it!should!be!clear!at!this!
point!that!the!real!framework!of!concern!is!the!much!broader!one!of!the!fundamental!
constituents!of!speech!and!thought,!extending!from!the!sensible!domain!of!images!and!
singularity,!to!the!intelligible!domain!of!concepts,!universals!and!truth.!Organizing!
epistemological!and!metaphysical!concerns!around!the!classification!of!things!and!
names!or!concepts!begins,!as!already!indicated,!with!Aristotle's!table!of!ten!kategoriae,!
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categories,!which!have!been!transmitted!to!us!as!predicaments.(praedicamenta)!in!
Boethius’!Latin!translation.!This!translation!of!the!term!katēgoria,!and!even!more!so!its!
familiar!transliteration,!however,!obscures!its!etymological!and,!as!it!turns!out,!its!
philosophical!significance,!since!the!word!has!a!juridical!and!thus!a!normative!use!whose!
philosophical!implications!cannot!be!entirely!ignored.!
In!its!principal!use!in!Classical!Greek.katēgoria!is!a!technical!term!for!accusation.!
The!cognate!nominal!form,!katēgoros,!designates!the!respective!accuser,!prosecutor!or!
critic,!and!a!variety!of!cognate!verbal!forms!are!found!in!accounts!of!legal!contest,!most!
famously!in!Plato's!account!of!Socrates'!trial!in!the!Apology.!Socrates'!katēgoroi!are!
clearly!not!Aristotle's!katēgoriai,!and!the!latter!would!have!done!little!good!against!the!
former,!who!accused!Socrates!in!the!empty!formulae!of!political!and!religious!censure.!
Nonetheless!the!root!shared!by!these!terms!shows!up!as!well!in!the!common!noun!
agora,!the!assembly,!the!economic!and!cultural!marketplace,!what!Hegel!envisions!as!
the!communal!space!of!the!"spiritual!daylight!of!the!present,"!and!in!the!verb!agoreuo:!
to!address,!to!call!to!assembly.!The!full!address,!the!enunciating!injunction!(to!borrow,!if!
somewhat!incongruously,!two!Lacanian!notions!whose!proper!province!is!rather!the!
symbolically!situated!subject)!is!the!collective!discourse!of!communities!or!institutions,!
even!if!that!of!Socrates'!kategoroi!issues!in!the!infamous!discourse!of!political!expulsion.!
Aristotle's!kategoriae,!understood!in!the!loosely!Lacanian!sense!of!their!governing!
interrogatory!intent,!are!the!basic!elements!of!address,!nomination,!predication!and!
thought.!
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!

To!follow!the!lessons!of!etymological!analysis!a!little!further,!if!the!juridical,!

communal!and!rhetorical!meanings!are!still!present!or!recoverable!in!the!matterVofVfact!
designation!of!what!can!be!said!and!meant,!then!what!we!have!in!the!kategoriae!is!a!
logical!decalogue,!the!tenfold!laws!of!speech!and!thought,!of!thinking!about!and!saying!
what!there!is!and!what!is!true!or!false!of!what!there!is.!Yet!the!Aristotelian,!unlike!the!
Mosaic,!decalogue,!addresses!itself!not!to!the!possibility!of!(logical!and!metaphysical)!
infringement,!nor!to!the!community!of!those!for!whom!this!possibility!is!a!matter!of!
instinct,!but!to!those!for!whom!the!rules!of!abstraction,!division!and!composition!are!
already!established!and!internalized,!though!they!have!not!yet!been!formally!expressed!
or!concretely!realized.!
The!Aristotelian!decalogue,!in!other!words,!is!neither!strictly!normative,!nor!
descriptive,!but!has!instead!the!character!of!pure!enunciation,!or!if!one!prefers,!of!a!
kind!of!belated!philosophical!performative.!Aristotle!speaks!not!of!what!ought!to!be!the!
case,!but!of!what!is!already,!albeit!implicitly,!the!case,!though!the!is!here!betokens!the!
magisterial!authority!of!the!Philosopher's!voice:!the!Categories,!i.e.,!the!text!itself,!
begins!and!ends!with!talk!of!things!that!"are!said"!(legetai),!both!in!the!more!technical!
sense!of!being!predicated!and!in!the!more!colloquial!sense!of!being!customarily!
asserted.!The!point!I!wish!to!make!here!is!that!the!Categories!is!not!an!ethnographic!
mapping!of!logical!practice,!or!even!ontology!–!to!recall!again!that!it!is!things,!rather!
than!the!expressions!standing!for!them,!that!are!said!to!be!predicable!of!one!another!or!
not,!essentially!or!accidentally!V!but!that!in!its!cataloguing!of!predicaments!and!
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predicative!relations,!and!thereby!providing!the!basis!for!distinguishing!individuals!from!
universals,!substances!and!subjects!from!their!attributes!and!predicates,!it!records!as!
much!as!it!announces!a!particular!kind!of!thinking,!one!epitomized!in!the!verb!form!
most!often!used!to!describe!it:!kategoreitai.!That!this!is!a!third!person,!middle!form,!
employed!impersonally,!establishes!a!crucial!difference!both!from!Plato’s!more!
idiomatic!legetai!(which!Aristotle!also!employs!synonymously!with!katēgoreitai),!and!
from!the!modern,!Cartesian!cogito,!whose!grammar,!i.e.,!its!first!person,!active!form,!
emphasizes!the!prerogatives!of!the!subject!of!thought,!while!kategoreitai!focuses!on!the!
ordinances!of!the!predicate!and!discursivity!in!general.!From!this!perspective!legetai!is!
the!unmarked!term!for!discursive!expression,!its!semantic!coverage!equally!dispensed!
between!subject!and!predicate.!
From!Aristotle's!perspective,!the!community!in!question,!though!historically!the!
philosophical!community!of!Athens,!is!logically!the!universal!community!of!human!
beings,!anthropoi,!as!animals!possessed!of!speech!and!(equivalently)!reason!(logos):!any!
rational!being!will!recognize!the!elements!of!his!or!her!own!discursive!comportment!in!
the!categories!addressed!to!him/her.!Yet!the!fact!that!we!intuitively!acknowledge!the!
hold!this!table!of!categories!has!over!us!is!hardly!justification!for!its!legislative!force.!
What’s!more,!there!are!features!of!the!table!that!defy!intuition!rather!than!immediately!
enlisting!its!assent.!First,!there!is!included!in!the!list!of!kategoriai,!as!its!first!member!
and!thus!as!the!highest!genus,!a!category!that!is!not!indeed!a!kategoria!at!all,!for,!as!we!
learn,!it!meets!neither!of!the!two!criteria!established!for!predicates:!it!is!neither!said!of,!
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nor!present!in!a!subject.!This!category,!that!of!substance!(ousia),!corresponds!to!the!
universal!"being,"!and!to!the!individuated!beings!of!a!given!species,!to!man!as!such,!and!
to!the!particular!man,!for!example.!To!the!extent!that!we!commit!ourselves!to!the!
system!of!predicables,!or!are!addressed!as!though!we!had!done!so,!despite!finding!
ourselves!at!once!within!and!beyond!its!parameters,!we!bear!the!relation!of!
incommensurability!to!a!transcendent!performative!that!defines!us!as!subjects!of!the!
discursive!law.!
The!anchors!of!metaphysics!and!epistemology,!primary!substance!and!the!
substantial!universal,!respectively,!lie!both!within!and!constitutively!beyond!the!system!
of!categories,!and!define!two!different!but!crucial!unities:!the!simple!unity!of!the!
universal,!and!the!composite!unity!of!the!hylomorphic!subject.!This!contradictory!
position!of!ontological!and!epistemic!primacy!is!achieved!through!two!kinds!of!negation:!
the!divisive!or!separative!negation!of!differentiae!that!produces!and!so!includes!them!in!
the!system!of!predicables,!and!the!abstractive!negation!that!removes!and!places!them!
beyond!it!(and!here!we!might!recall!the!quotation!from!Schelling!with!which!Zizek!
begins!the!third!chapter!of!The.Ticklish.Subject:!"The!beginning!is!the!negation!of!that!
which!begins!with!it."!If!there!is!always!something!that!begins!what!is!begun,!and!is!thus!
before!what!begins,!we!can!say!as!well!that!there!is!always!something!that!determines!
what!is!determined,!and!thus!ultimately!something!that!is!not!determined.!This,!I!would!
claim,!is!precisely!how!negation,!or!the!consciousness!that!negates,!is!to!be!identified.!
While!we!may!learn!here!that!the!particular!human!being!is!thus!a!unity!of!the!
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hylomorphic!variety!and!that!its!ontological!status!is!the!product!of!a!double!negation,!
this!does!not!tell!us!what!he!or!she!might!be!as!the!object!of!his!own!selfVreflection.!If!
we!can!say!that!the!subjectivity!of!this!subject!is!here!identifiable!in!the!third!person!
kategorei,!he/she/it.predicates,!that!is,!as!that!visible!agency!present!in!the!granting!and!
withholding!of!attributes!and!essences,!we!have!not!yet!identified!anything!that!can!be!
distinguished!as!an!interiority,!as!a!subject!or!I.!
Neither!Plato!nor!Aristotle!is!directly!concerned!with!subjective!interiority!or!
selfVknowledge!of!this!or!any!other!subject,!and!this!remains!true!for!Boethius!and!the!
medieval!tradition!as!well,!despite!the!resounding!influence!of!Augustine,!in!whose!
exploration!of!the!modalities!of!sensuous!and!affective!temptation,!and!in!particular!of!
the!self's!dispersion!in!molestia,.in!book!ten!of!the!Confessions,!Heidegger43!discerns!an!
analytic!inventory!of!the!lineaments!of!Dasein's!facticity.!Yet!we!might!say!that!while!
Plato!discovers!in!negation!the!fundamental!operation!of!discursive!consciousness,!and!
its!attunement!to!ontological!structure,!and!Aristotle!provides!us!with!the!ordinances!of!
discourse!and!ontology!themselves,!i.e.,!the!categories,!it!is!Boethius,!via!Porphyry,!who!
brings!out!the!legislative!character!of!the!predicables!and!categories,!who!attempts,!at!
any!rate,!to!tell!us!how!these!must!be!arrived!at,!first!as!a!matter!of!methodological!
consistency,!and!indirectly!on!the!basis!of!fundamental!ontological!relations.!

43

!See!Heidegger's!Phenomenology.of.Religious.Life,!translated!by!Matthias!Fritsch!and!Jennifer!Anna!
GosettiVFerencei!(Bloomington!and!Indianapolis:!Indiana!University!Press,!2004).!
!
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In!short,!we!cannot!consider!it!an!inessential!circumstance!that!the!disclosure!of!
negation!as!the!fundamental!operation!of!cognition!is!delivered!in!a!concentrated!
spectacle!of!denial.!For!properly!speaking!what!is!disclosed!here!is!not!simply!a!logical!or!
cognitive!maneuver,!but!that!interior!moment!of!dissent!and!decision,!that!might!or!
might!not!conform!to!the!categorial!edict(s).!Neither!Boethius!nor!the!tradition!that!
follows!him!can!quite!acknowledge!the!authority!of!ontology!in!the!prerogative!of!
negation,!although!Freud!has!alerted!us!to!the!modes!of!resistance,!so!that!we!can!
recognize!disclosure!in!Boethius'!denial.!Thanks!to!Freud,!we!can!also!recognize!in!
negation!not!merely!the!instrument!of!dissent,!but!the!founding!instinct!of!
subjectivity.44!The!predicative!array!is!that!through!which!both!the!world!and!the!
subject!become!intelligible!and!knowable,!each!according!to!its!own!limits.!The!question!
we!finally!arrive!at!is!whether!this!happens!through!the!construction!or!the!
accommodation!of!what!I!have!called!the!Aristotelian!decalogue,!or!of!whatever!system!
of!genera!and!species!succeeds!or!displaces!it.!
The!question!I!propose!to!address!in!in!the!following!chapter!can!be!considered!
a!more!specific!formulation!of!the!question!just!posed,!but!now!in!direct!conversation!
with!Hegel,!concerning!in!part!the!notions!of!division!and!composition,!lexically!
reformulated!by!Kant!as!those!of!analysis!and!synthesis,!respectively.!This!lexical!shift!is!
44

!Although!this!is!not!of!course!the!primary!concern!of!this!dissertation,!what!I!hope!to!have!shown!thus!
far,!is!that!before!the!successive!elaborations!of!subjectivity!in!Descartes,!Kant,!Hegel!and!Freud,!to!say!
nothing!of!Lacan,!there!is!already!between!Plato!and!Boethius!a!subject!of!negation,!even!if!it!makes!its!
appearance!exclusively!in!the!third!person.!
!
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reflected!as!well!in!the!succession!of!verbs!that!supplant!the!Aristotelian!katēgorein,!
Boethius’!praedicare,!literally!to.speak.before.or!say.what.is.prior,!and!finally.the!verb.
that!with!Descartes!becomes!the!signature!of!the!modern!subject:!cogito,!cogitare,!in!its!
etymological!sense,!to.drive,.compel.or.marshal.together,!though!arguably!it!will!take!
Kant!to!tease!out!the!priority!of!synthesis!its!morphology!implies.!While!both!cogitare.
and!katēgorein.imply!combination!and!assembly,!the!Greek,!etymologically,!presumes!
the!assembly!under!address,!whereas!the!Latin!expresses!an!operation!that!itself!
establishes!an!assembly!or!community,!as!Augustine!had!observed!much!earlier!in!the!
Confessions,!where!he!offers!the!following!philosophical!etymology:!
[things]!have!to!be!brought!together!(cogenda)!so!as!to!be!capable!of!being!known;!
that!means!they!have!to!be!gathered!(colligenda)!from!their!dispersed!state.!Hence!
is!derived!the!word!cogitate.!To!bring!together!(cogo)!and!to!cogitate!(cogito)!are!
words!related!as!ago!(I!do)!to!agito!(agitate)!or!facto!(I!make)!to!factito!(I!make!
frequently).!Nevertheless!the!mind!claims!the!verb!cogitate!for!its!own!province.45!
As!already!suggested,!the!cogito.proceeds!in!the!name!or!authority!of!the!first!person,!
whereas!kategoreitai!proceeds!in!the!name!of!the!third,!idiomatically!the!impersonal,!
and!perhaps!universal,!subject!of!logical!authority.!
!

In!Hegel!we!shall!see!a!third!lexical!shift,!and!with!this!a!philosophical!

reorientation,!from!the!Latin!cogitare!to!the!German!Andenken,!to.think.through,!and!to!
a!distinctive!incorporative!mode!of!negation,!sublation!(Aufhebung),!through!which!the!
complementary!procedures!of!division!and!collection!that!define!the!logic!of!division!are!
reconceived.!Thinking.through!is!fundamentally!historical!and!local,!bound!to!the!
45

!St.!Augustine,!Confessions,!trans.!Henry!Chadwick!(Oxford:!Oxford!University!Press,!2009)!X.18.!
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broader!cultural!discourse!of!its!epoch!and!its!more!immediate!philosophical!context.!It!
is!in!its!historicity,!and!more!specifically!with!its!insistence!on!the!immanence!of!
negation!to!the!specific!context!of!philosophical!development,!that!Hegel’s!Logic!will!
seek!a!ground!for!the!basic!elements!of!thought!and!being!that!will!avoid!the!charge!of!
arbitrariness.!

$
$
CHAPTER$3$$
HEGEL:$NEGATION$AND$THE$LOGIC$OF$THE$CONCEPT$
Section(One.(Introduction(
$

If$the$method$of$division$is$the$method$by$which$definitions$are$established,$and$

definitions$conform$to,$and$indeed$state,$the$essence$of$a$thing,$then$it$is$through$
division$that$the$homology$between$logic$and$metaphysics$is$most$clearly$
demonstrated,$all$the$more$so$since$though$division$primarily$serves$the$interests$of$the$
systematic$knowledge$of$general$truths,$it$is$also$in$principle$applicable$to$the$full$range$
of$predicables,$including$accidents,$and$so$makes$visible$a$link$between$ontology$and$
ordinary$talk$about$contingent$truths$and$particulars$as$well.$So$much$is$clear$in$both$
Plato$and$Boethius,$and$thus$for$the$conception$of$logic$that$prevails$throughout$
scholastic$philosophy,$yet$it$is$precisely$the$ontological$import$of$negation,$as$we$have$
seen,$that$drives$Boethius$to$abjure$what$is$clearly$entailed$by$the$method$he$
champions$as$the$centerpiece$of$the$logica,vetus,$namely,$the$operation$of$negation$
involved$in$parsing$the$divisions$of$a$given$genusOspecies$lineage.$This$is$why$his$
proscription$of$negation$is$framed$in$terms$of$a$rejection$of$contradiction.$
Boethius’$argument$that$the$application$of$negation$issues$in$the$destruction$of$
being$turns$out$to$have$depended$upon$a$conception$of$negation$that,$while$Platonic$in$
terms$of$the$ontological$import$it$assigns$negation,$sidesteps$Plato’s$more$specific$
193$
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identification$of$negation$with$ontological$difference.$More$significantly,$the$conception$
of$negation$relevant$to$the$generation$of$contraries$in$division$is$at$odds$both$with$the$
extinctive$conception$Boethius$neglects$to$recognize$and$the$separative,conception$he$is$
apparently$bound$to.$Rather,$what$drives$Boethius’$proscription$is$the$looming$threat$of$
ontological$disunity$in$the$fabric$of$those$things$about$which$philosophy$and$theology$
are$most$urgently$concerned:$being,$truth$and$essence.$Together,$the$system$of$
predicables,$the$conception$of$the$proposition$and$thought$that$system$is$supposed$to$
ground,$and$the$method$of$division$that$reveals$the$permissible$lines$of$attribution$
imply$a$principle$at$odds$with$the$largely$Aristotelian$account$of$determination$that$
prevails$from$Boethius$onwards,$the$principle,$namely,$that$all,determination,is,negation$
(omnis,determinatio,est,negatio).$
As$suggested$in$the$introduction,$this$principle,of,negative,determination$(PND),
can$be$seen$as$following$from$two$principles$that$precede$it$historically:$(1)$all$division$is$
negation,$and$(2)$all$determination$is$division.$Thus$far$I$have,$in$effect,$argued$that$(1)$
is$more$or$less$Plato’s$principle$and$that$(2)$is$roughly$Boethius’.$On$the$familiar$
Hegelian$model$of$phenomenological$dialectic,$Hegel$himself$comes$to$the$principle$by$
way$of$a$kind$of$deductive$inheritance,$which$is$to$say$not$that$he$deduces$it$from$the$
principles$of$his$philosophical$forebears,$but$that$he$arrives$at$it$through$the$inferential$
force$of$the$tradition$itself,$just$as,$for$example,$the$formalism$of$Stoic$logic$can$be$seen,$
from$Hegel’s$perspective,$to$imply$the$development$of$selfOconsciousness$by$realizing,$in$
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effect,$(a$law$of)$the$autonomy$of$calculative$thought,1$although$this$implication$was$
unavailable$to$the$Stoics$themselves,$for$whom$the$relation$between$thought$and$
consciousness$remained$to$be$thought.$To$this$extent,$Stoic$logic,$or$Stoicism$more$
generally,$is$to$be$thought$of$as$a$formal$expression$whose$determinate$meaning$awaits$
its$realization$in$subsequent$philosophical$or$cultural$discourse.$
Likewise,$Plato’s$discovery$of$the$role$of$negation$in$the$differentiation$of$forms$
and$concepts$amounts$to$a$formal$expression$of$the$negativity$of$discursive$thought,$
which,$though$also$implicit$in$the$foundations$of$scholastic$logic$and$metaphysics,$as$we$
have$seen,$is$first$explicitly$realized$and$articulated$in$Hegel,$and$encapsulated$in$the$
logicoOmetaphysical$law$he$ascribes$to$Spinoza,$i.e.,$PND.2$In$the$Science,of,Logic,$Hegel$
tells$us$that$the$principle$is$the$“basis$of$the$absolute$unity$of$substance”$but$that$
Spinoza’s$mistake$was$to$have$conceived$negation$as$mere$“determinateness,
(Bestimmtheit),or$quality”$and$not$“as$absolute,$that$is,$self9negating$negation.”3$This,$
according$to$Hegel,$is$to$understand$the$determinative$role$of$negation$as$limited$to$
particularization$(Besonderung),$that$is,$as$external$to$substance,$which$qua$substance$
admits$of$no$particularization.$But$if$negation$remains$an$operation$external$to$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
1

$Phenomenology,of,Spirit$§197O§200.$Unless$otherwise$indicated,$all$translations$of$the$Phenomenology,
of,Spirit$are$from$G.$W.$F.$Hegel,$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$trans.$A.$V.$Miller$(Oxford,$1977).$Translations$
of$the$two$Logics$are$from$the$Cambridge$Hegel$Translations$editions,$The,Science,of,Logic,$trans.$George$
Di$Giovanni$(Cambridge,$2010)$and$Encyclopedia,of,the,Philosophical,Sciences,in,Basic,Outline,,Part,I:,
Science,of,Logic,$trans.$Klaus$Brinkmann$and$Daniel$O.$Dahlstrom$(Cambridge,$2010).$$$
$
2
$As$mentioned$in$the$introduction,$Hegel$cites$a$version$of$this$principle$from$Spinoza,$but$its$intended$
use$in$Spinoza$is$far$more$restricted.$
$
3$Science,of,Logic,$11.376.$
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substance,$then$substance$itself$stands$against$whatever$is$particularized$in$relation$to$
it,$and$to$this$extent$remains$undetermined.4$To$be$sure,$it$remains$thereby$the$very$
exemplar$of$pure$being$(inasmuch$as$it$is$unqualified$by$negation)$and$unity$(inasmuch$
as$it$is$therefore$internally$undifferentiated).$Yet$substance$is$also$thereby,$so$Hegel$
insists,$something$devoid$of$content,$and$so$is$the$complement$of$a$world$that,$in$
actuality,$has$no$worldly,reality.$Hegel,$apparently$following$Salomon$Maimon,5$calls$
such$a$view$acosmism,6$inasmuch$as$“according$to$this$philosophy$there$is$actually$no$
world$at$all$in$the$sense$of$some$positive$being$(eines,positiv,Seienden).”$
$

This$account$of$individuation,$which$in$some$form$or$other$makes$its$appearance$

in$Porphyry,$Boethius,$Eriugena,$Odo$of$Tours,$Anselm,$Gilbert$of$Poitiers,$and$others,$
has$been$called$the$“standard$theory$of$individuality”$in$medieval$philosophy.7$The$basis$
for$this$account$is$the$proposition$that$what$makes$an$individual$substance$individual$is$
the$specific$set$of$properties$and$accidents$possessed$by$that$and$no$other$substance.$
The$view$that$Hegel,$in$effect,$attributes$to$Spinoza$is$that$the$relationship$between$
these$accidents$and$the$substance$they$individuate$is$that$of$negation.$His$complaint$is$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

4$See$his$remarks$in$the$Lectures,on,the,History,of,Philosophy:,The,Lectures,of,182591826,$Volume,III,$ed.$

Robert$F.$Brown$(Berkeley:$University$of$California$Press,$1990),$154.$
$
5
(The$opposition$between$atheism$and$acosmism$can$apparently$be$traced$back$to$Salomon$Maimon’s$
discussion$in$his$autobiography.$See$Salomon,Maimons$Lebensgeschichte,$edited$by$Zwi$Batscha$
(Frankfurt$am$Main:$Insel,$1984).(
$$
6
$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§50.$
$
7
$This$designation$and$an$extensive$discussion$of$the$principal$claims$of$such$a$theory$are$to$be$found$in$J.$
J.$E.$Gracia’s$Introduction,to,the,Problem,of,Individuation,in,the,Early,Middle,Ages$(Philosophia$Verlag,$
1984).$See$also$Peter$King’s$“The$Problem$of$Individuation$in$the$Middle$Ages,”$Theoria$66$(2000):$159O
184.$
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that$because$the$relation,$and$so$the$attributes$themselves,$are$external$to$the$
substance$in$question,$they$fail$to$determine$it$at$all,$and$simply$define$a$nonO
substance.$At$the$heart$of$this$complaint$lies$an$objection$of$the$sort$familiar$from$
contemporary$critiques$of$what$is$typically$called$the$bundle,theory$of$individuation,8$
i.e.,$that$individuals$are$defined$by$the$unique$set$of$properties$they$possess,$although$
most$bundle$theorists$claim$not$that$the$relevantly$bundled$properties$are$negations$of$
the$substance$they$individuate,$but$rather$that$there$is$no$substance$apart$from$such$
bundles.$Another$way$of$putting$Hegel’s$objection,$then,$would$be$to$say$that$Spinoza’s$
view$of$the$relationship$between$properties$and$substance$implies$a$conception$of$
individuation$that$leaves$the$relevant$substance$untouched$by$the$properties$that$
would$determine$it,$or$leaves$a$world$of$property$clusters$(bundles)$without$substance,$
and$therefore$without$being$(since$being,$in$this$instance,$is,$as$a$matter$of$stipulation$
external$to$the$properties$determined$in$relation$to$it).$
While$spelling$out$and$assessing$Spinoza’s$position$are$not$our$direct$concern,$it$
is$nonetheless$helpful$in$trying$to$make$sense$of$Hegel’s$view$on$negative$determination$
to$see$what$he$finds$inadequate$in$Spinoza’s,$and,$if$he$does$misrepresent$Spinoza,$to$
understand$why$he$might$be$inclined$to$do$so.$Now$Spinoza$does$indeed$cite$a$
quantificationOfree$version$of$the$principle,$i.e.,$determinatio,est,negatio,$in$his$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
8

$See,$for$example,$Michael$Loux’s$discussion$of$the$objection$in$Metaphysics:,A,Contemporary,
Introduction$(New$York:$Routledge,$1998),$93.$Loux$poses$the$objection$in$terms$of$a$difficulty$bundle$
theories$have$explaining$the$meaning$of$ordinary$subject$predicate$propositions$that$purport$to$attribute$
a$property$to$an$object$that$possesses$them.$
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correspondence$with$a$certain$Jarig$Jelles9$in$defense$of$the$claim$that$"figura,negatio,
[est],"$where$figura$is$contrasted$with$integram,materiam$(matter$as$a$whole).$Since$
Spinoza$appears$to$take$the$position$that$substance$is$itself$an$undivided$whole$
(integra),this$claim$about$figura$might$well$be$thought,$on$analogy,$to$imply$that$its$
modes,$understood$as$determinations,$may$to$this$extent$be$regarded$as$negations$of$
that$substance.$
However,$in$the$context$of$Spinoza’s$response$to$Jelles,$determinatio$clearly$
carries$a$far$more$restricted$sense.$The$(roughly)$geometrical$relationship$between$
materia,and$figura$is$analogous$not$to$the$relationship$between$substance$and$mode,$
but$to$individual$things$or$modes$and$their$“extrinsic$denominations,$relations$or,$at$
best,$circumstances$(denominationes,extrinsecas,,relationes,,aut,ad,summum,
circumstantias).”10$Here’s$what$Spinoza$writes$to$Jelles:$

$

…figure$applies$only$to$finite$and$determinate$bodies.$For$he$who$says$that$he$
apprehends$a$figure,$thereby$means$to$indicate$simply$this,$that$he$apprehends$a$
determinate$thing$and$the$manner$of$its$determination.$This$determination$
therefore$does$not$pertain$to$the$thing$in$regard$to$its$being;$on$the$contrary,$it$is$its$
nonObeing.$So$since$figure$is$nothing$but$determination,$and$determination$is$
negation,$figure$can$be$nothing$other$than$negation.11$

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

9$Epistola$L,$dated$June$2,$1674.$For$translations$of$this$and$other$letters,$see$The,Letters,$translated$by$S.$

Shirley;$introduction$and$notes$by$Jacob$Adler,$Steven$Barbone,$and$Lee$Rice$(Indianapolis:$Hackett,$
1995).$Jelles$was$a$Dutch$merchant$and$a$member$of$a$small$circle$of$intellectuals$with$whom$Spinoza$
regularly$met$and$corresponded.$
$
10
$Spinoza,$Tractatus,De,Intellectus,Emendatione,$§101,$in$Spinoza,Opera,$ed.$Carl$Gebhardt$(Heidelberg:$
Carl$Winter,$1925).$For$the$English$translation$see$Spinoza:,Complete,Works,$trans.$Samuel$Shirley$
(Indianapolis:$Hackett$Publishing$Company,$2002).$
$
11
$Epistola$L.$
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While$he$cites$determinatio,est,negatio$as$a$general$principle,$the$notion$of$
determinatio$he$has$in$mind$here$is$that$of$finite$limit,$i.e.,$that$which$confers$the$
specific$shape,$boundary$or,$more$abstractly,$finitude$upon$what$is$finite,$and$so$has$
nothing$obvious$to$do$with$being$or$substance$as$such,$or$with$the$essence$of$the$
modes.$
If$negation$plays$a$role$in$particularization$or$individuation,$i.e.,$in$making$
something$the$contingent$particular$it$is,$as$it$seems$to,$it$is$certainly$not$by$way$of$
establishing$the$determinations$(or$actualizations)$of$being.$At$best,$negation$produces$a$
finite$reflection$of$the$absolute$attributes$or$modes$of$the$divine$substance.$12$This$still$
amounts$to$construing$negation$as$a$mechanism$of$particularization,$but$presumably$
without$acosmist$consequences.$On$this$account,$Spinoza$holds$that$the$entire$cosmos$
is$actually,$and$infinitely,$present$in$divine$substance,$but$is$also$finitely$reflected$in$the$
determinations$used$to$cognize$it.$Yet$since$such$reflective$determination$is$necessarily$
external$to$substance,$this$still$does$not$yield$an$actual$world,$even$if$it$presupposes$an$
actual,$ontologically$replete,$substance.$If$what$we$mean$by$the$world$is$what$we$think$
we$mean,$that$is,$something$we$finitely$inhabit,$cognize,$etc.,$then$it$will$have$only$as$
much$reality$as$our$reflected$determinations$can$muster,$which,$if$negation$functions$as$

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
12

This,$in$its$essentials,$is$the$interpretation$of$Spinoza’s$use$of$the$principle$of$negative$determination$
offered$by$Yitzak$Melamed$in$his$"$'Omnis,determinatio,est,negatio'$–$Determination,$Negation$and$SelfO
Negation$in$Spinoza,$Kant,$and$Hegel,"$in$Spinoza,and,German,Idealism,$ed.$E.$Förster$and$Y.$Melamed$
(Cambridge:$Cambridge$University$Press,$2012),$195.$More$specifically,$Melamed$argues$that$the$use$of$
negation$yields$a$“partial$negation”$of$the$absolute$attribute,$though$it$isn’t$quite$clear$what$the$partiality$
of$negation$amounts$to.$
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this$construal$of$the$principle$says$it$does,$isn’t$quite$enough$to$make$it$something$
existent,$let$alone$something$sufficiently$unified$to$count$as$a$world$or$cosmos.$
To$treat$negation$as$an$instrument$of$particularization,$from$Hegel’s$perspective,$
is$thus$to$misidentify$the$locus$and$range$of$negation,$namely,$to$hold$that$it$has$no$
intrinsic$relation$to$substance,$which$substance,$in$turn,$admits$of$no$negation$or$
differentiation$within$it.$When$applied$to$substance$so$conceived$(as$pure$being),$
without$differentiated$content,$it$therefore$yields$simple$non9being,$if$it$yields$anything$
at$all.$And$thus$if$being$is$all$that$is,$then$however$rich$in$delimiting$determinations$(i.e.,$
particularizations)$the$world$constituted$in$relation$to$it$might$be,$it$strictly$speaking$
isn’t.$If$this$is$the$case,$then$negation$so$applied$is$a$determination$not$in$the$sense$of$
providing$or$realizing$the$content$of$substance,$but$in$the$sense$of$externally$delimiting$
what$is$already$substantially$determined$by$other$means.$
Alternatively,$if$negation$is$instead$taken$to$be$virtually$internal$to$substance,$
i.e.,$as$the$potential$medium$of$cognition,$then$substance$itself$might$instead$be$
conceived$as$possessing$a$kind$of$potential,$virtual$or$rational$(that$is,$discursively$
realizable)$plenitude$that$can$be$actualized$through$its$successive$determinations.$On$
such$a$view,$substance$is$already$a$Stimmung,$a$potentiality$for$all$the$determinations$
(Bistimmungen)$that$can$be$determinately$expressed$or$derived$from$it.$In$one$sense,$
then,$substance$here$is$already,$in,potentia,$all$the$determinations$that$can$be$drawn$
from$it.$On$the$other$hand,$it$would$not$be$determinately,$in,actu,$any$of$these$
determinations,$taken$individually$or$collectively.$Hegel$attributes$something$like$this$
$
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position$to$Leibniz,$whom$he$thinks$presents$an$inevitable$counterpoint$to$Spinoza,$or$
more$pointedly,$whose$Monadology$he$thinks$remedies$“the$lack$of$immanent,
reflection$that$affects$both$the$Spinozist$exposition$of$the$absolute$and$the$doctrine$of$
emanation.”13$The$problem$with$Leibniz’s$view$is$that$while$granting$the$immanence$of$
determination$–$each$monad$is$“the$totality$of$the$content$of$the$world,”$but$is$only$“a$
negative$reflected$into$itself”14$–$determination$is$assigned$an$external,principle,$that$is,$
in$Hegel’s$terms,$it$is$in,itself,$but$not$for,itself,$the$requisite$plenitude$of$substance.$
For$Hegel,$by$contrast,$negation$is$immanent$both$to$substance$and$thought,$
and$is$thus$an$internal$principle$of$conceptual$and$ontological$realization$alike,$or$more$
precisely$it$is$the$internal$principle$of$the$latter$because,it$is$the$internal$principle$of$the$
former.$This$follows$from$the$fact$that$for$Hegel$the$logic$that$“coincides$with$
metaphysics”$is$finally$a$logic$of$the$concept.$For$its$part,$negation$is$not$merely$that$
which$“propels$the$concept$onward,”15$but$is$present$in$“reality$itself.”16$Negation$is$
thus$internal$to$the$concept$itself$and$corresponds,$as$Plato$first$made$apparent,$to$the$
internal$otherness$of$every$substance,$i.e.,$its$being$a$totality$of$determinations$that$are$
both$other$than$it$and$constitutive$of$its$totality.$Hegel,$unlike$Plato,$however,$will$insist$
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$Science,of,Logic$II.378.$

$
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$Science,of,Logic$II.378.$
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$Science,of,Logic$21.39.$
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$Science,of,Logic$21.102.$
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on$the$interior$contradiction$this$entails,$rather$than$taking$refuge$in$the$more$benign$
notion$of$affine$alterity.$
To$begin$with,$Hegel$links$negation$to$propositional$expression,$but$also$
develops$the$inherence$conception$of$the$proposition$he$inherits$from$the$scholastic$
tradition,$according$to$which$the$proposition$is$grounded$in,$and$is$an$expression$of$
what$inheres$in,$the$concept$(Begriff),$which$Hegel$identifies$as$the$“general$form”$of$
philosophical$or$speculative$thought.17$Hegel$describes$the$crucial$role$of$negation,$or$
more$specifically$determinate,negation,$as$follows:$
The$one$thing$needed$to$achieve$scientific$progress$–$and$it$is$essential$to$make$an$
effort$at$gaining$this$quite$simple$insight$into$it$–$is$the$recognition$of$the$logical$
principle$that$negation$is$equally,positive,$or$that$what$is$selfOcontradictory$does$not$
resolve$itself$into$a$nullity,$into$abstract$nothingness,$but$essentially$only$into$the$
negation$of$its$particular$content;$or$that$such$a$negation$is$not$just$negation,$but$is$
the$negation$of$the$determined$fact$which$is$resolved,$and$is$therefore$determinate$
(bestimmte)$negation;$that$in$the$result$there$is$therefore$contained$in$essence$that$
from$which$the$result$derives$–$a$tautology$indeed,$since$the$result$would$otherwise$
be$something$immediate$and$not$a$result.$Because$the$result,$the$negation,$is$a$
determinate$negation,$it$has$a$content.$It$is$a$new$concept$but$one$higher$and$richer$
than$the$preceding$–$richer$because$it$negates$or$opposes$the$preceding$and$
therefore$contains$it,$and$it$contains$even$more$than$that,$for$it$is$the$unity$of$itself$
and$its$opposite.$–$It$is$above$all$in$this$way$that$the$system$of$concepts$is$to$be$built$
(bilden)$–$and$it$has$to$come$to$completion$in$an$unstoppable$and$pure$progression$
(Gange)$that$admits$of$nothing$extraneous.18$
$
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$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§9.$
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$Science,of,Logic,$21.38.$
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And$here,$in$brief,$is$the$full$logic$of$conceptual$form,19$cast$in$much$the$same$terms$as$
Plato$casts$the$hodos,diaireseōs,$the$method$of$division,$as$that$through$which$
“everything$that$has$been$discovered$pertaining$to$technē$has$come$to$transparency$
(phanera,gegone).”20$At$its$center$lies$the$differentiating$instrument$of$determinate,
(bestimmte)$negation,$which$is$positive$in$just$the$sense$that$it$brings$about,$and$so$in$
effect$posits,$a$new$content,$and$thus$a$new,$higher,and,richer$concept,$since$it$retains,$
while$superseding,$the$content$of$its$negated$precursor.$This$basic$mode$of$such$
negation,$the$process$through$which$it$builds$content,$is$what$Hegel$calls$sublation$
(Aufhebung),$and$in$its$establishing,$as$a$result,$an$ordered$system$of$concepts$it$is$no$
longer$a$mere$instrument$of$discovery$(heuresis).$Aufhebung,$then$is$negation$as$a$
formative$principle$of$differentiation.$However,$its$operation$and$the$conceptual$
“progression”$Hegel$speaks$of$here$will$turn$out$to$depend$fundamentally$on$the$
engagement$of$the$concept$in$the$proposition$(Satz),$what$amounts$to,$for$Hegel,$
judgment$(Urteil).$It$is$therefore$with$Hegel’s$treatment$of$judgment$that$we$must$
begin,$inasmuch$as$it$is$here$that$negation$exhibits$this$characteristic$mode$of$
operation.$
(
(
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$The$reference$here,$it$should$be$clear,$is$to$the$logic$of$form$based$on$SpencerOBrown’s$Laws,of,Form,$
which$I$discuss$in$the$Introduction.$
$
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$Plato$Philebus$16c2O3.$
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Section(Two.(Infinite(Judgment(and(the(Immanence(of(Negation(

$

In$a$curious$section$of$the$Phenomenology,of,Spirit$entitled$Observing,Reason,$

Hegel$generates$one$of$the$more$curious$pronouncements$of$occidental$philosophy,$
what$would$appear$to$be$a$moment$of$surpassing$philosophical$bathos:$"The$Spirit$is$a$
bone."21$Appearances$notwithstanding,$this$aphorism,$and$the$breadth$of$its$meaning$
earn$it$such$a$designation,$is$the$crystallization$and$critique$of$a$philosophical$tendency,$
depending$on$how$one$records$its$history,$that$begins$with$Anaxagoras,$as$Plato$alerts$
us$in$the$Phaedo,$and$continues$in$the$raft$of$contemporary$explorations$of$naturalism$
in$epistemology,$philosophy$of$mind$and$metaphysics.22$
So$construed,$it$expresses,$on$Hegel’s$first$gloss,$the$fact$that$"the$universality$
that$each$individual$as,such$attains$is$pure,being,,death."23$If$we$seek$an$empirical$
record$of$consciousness,$mind$or$Spirit$we$will$indeed$find$one$in$its$appearance,$acts$
and$effects,$but$in$none$of$these$will$one$find$the$vital$individuality$of$that$
consciousness$or$Spirit$itself.$The$phenomenon,$here$the$visible$materiality$of$an$
immaterial$substance,$in$its$dead$if$accessible$particularity,$is$in$the$first$place$the$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
21

$The$original$form$of$the$proposition$is$"The$being$of$Spirit$is$a$bone,"$which$serves$to$highlight$its$
connection$to$the$Aristotelian$identification$of$individual$substance$as$the$subject$proper$of$predication.$
In$other$words,$insofar$as$"the$Spirit"$properly$serves$as$the$subject$of$predication$it$is$precisely$its$being,$
its$substance,$that$awaits$determination,$as$I$hope$will$be$brought$out$in$what$follows.$
$
22
The$thoroughgoing$naturalism$contemporary$analytic$philosophers$such$as$Pinkard,$Pippin$and$Forster$
attribute$to$Hegel$seems$to$me$fundamentally$mistaken.$Yet$the$failure$of$the$kind$of$brute$empiricism$on$
display$in$Observing,Reason$does$not$on,its,own$discredit$these$readings,$and$there$is$much$of$great$
interest$and$value,$for$example,$in$Michael$N.$Forster’s$Hegel’s,Idea,of,a,Phenomenology,of,Spirit$
(Chicago:$The$University$of$Chicago$Press,$1998).$
$
23
$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§452.$
$
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material$residue$of$conscious$life,$and$in$the$second$place,$evidence$of$a$departed,$
empty$transcendence,$its$mere,existence,$that$is,$its$lost$relation$to$the$category$of$
being,itself,$the$genus,generalissimum.$Yet$because,$as$Hegel$remarks$in$the$preceding$
section$on$Self9consciousness,$death$is$also$“the$natural,negation$of$consciousness,”24$
the$bone,$as$it$turns$out,$is$not$simply$the$residue$of$consciousness,$but$its$negation,$
which$is$why$this$judgment,$for$all$its$uncouth$irregularity,$is,$according$to$the$formal$
requirements$of$such$judgments,$infinite$(undendlich).$
Yet$Hegel$also$tells$us$that$as$an$instance$of$infinite$judgment$(unendliche,Urteil)$
our$proposition$"would$be$the$fulfillment$of$life$that$comprehends$itself,"25$that$is,$the$
fulfillment,$or,$more$precisely,$the$actualization,$of$the$promise$of$what$he$calls$
absolute,knowing.$It$thus$stands$as$a$kind$of$sphinx$at$the$crossroads,$or,$what$amounts$
to$the$same$thing,$as$a$riddle$whose$answer$leads$either$to$the$end$of$philosophical$
thought,$or$to$its$proper$beginning$in$the$restoration$of$logic$as$a$medium$of$veridical$
expression$and$so$as$an$instrument$of$speculative$metaphysics.$For$Hegel,$that$
restorative$logic,$elaborated$first$in$the$Science,of,Logic,$and$then$in$the$more$succinct$
Encyclopedia,Logic,$will$ultimately$reconceive$the$traditional$logical$relationship$
between$concept$and$proposition/judgment,$seeing$the$latter$as$the$necessary$
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$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§188.$
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$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§346.$
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elaboration$of$the$former.$This$is$reflected$in$Hegel’s$insistence$that$“[j]udgment$is$the$
determinateness,of$the$concept$posited,(gesetzte)$in$the$concept,itself.”26$
In$the$preceding$chapters$I$argued$that$the$picture$of$the$concept$as$the$
stratified$ground$of$the$proposition$is$first$sketched$in$Plato’s$Sophist$and$subsequently$
transmitted$to$the$scholastic$tradition$in$its$more$developed$Aristotelian$form$by$
Boethius.$Hegel’s$logic$is$thus,$in$its$essentials,$a$recovery$of$a$semantic$model$that$is,$so$
to$speak,$buried$in$the$tradition.27$It$is$Hegel’s$achievement,$however,$to$have$applied$
this$model$outside$the$Aristotelian$and$Porphyrian$network$of$categories,$genera$and$
species,$and$as$against$Kant’s$reconfigured$table$of$a$priori$concepts.$What$will$emerge$
is$a$more$purely$conceptual$precursor$of$Frege’s$Begriffsschrift,,a$concept$logic$that,$like$
Frege’s,$grants$pride$of$place$to$semantic$engagement,$but$locates$such$engagement$in$
negation$rather$than$assertion.$
If$Hegel’s$conception$of$logic$looks$forward$to$Frege,$however,$it$also$points$
backwards$not$merely$to$Aristotle’s$syllogistic$but$to$Plato’s$diairetic$logic.$As$Hegel$puts$
things$in$the$Science,of,Logic:$
…because$it$is$absolute$negativity,$the$concept$divides$and$posits$itself$as$the$
negative$or$the$other$of$itself…in$this$division$the$unity$of$the$concept$is$still$only$an$
external$connection.$Thus,$as$the$connection$of$its$moments$posited$as$selfO
subsisting$and$indifferent,$the$concept$is$judgment.28$
$
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$Science,of,Logic,$12.53.$

$
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$This$is$argued$for$in$Chapters$1$and$2.$
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28

$Science,of,Logic,$12.31.$
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Because$the$concept,$for$Hegel,$is$to$begin$with$unthought,$and$so$a$virtually$undivided$
unity,$judgment$(Urteil),$to$begin$with,$“is$the$originative,division,(Teilung)$of$an$
originative$unity.”29$On$the$other$hand,$the$division$that$brings$the$concept$to$
propositional$form$is$driven$by$the$concept$itself,$or$rather$by$the$thinking$initiated$by$
its$“absolute$negativity.”$$Parsing$the$lines$of$division$within$a$given$concept$amounts$to$
thinking$through$the$judgments$to$which$the$concept$gives$rise.$In$Hegel’s$version$of$
Platonic$diairetic,$therefore,$division$discloses$the$conceptual$and$inferential$relations$
that$are$immanent$to$the$specific$stage$of$philosophical$development$in$which$a$given$
concept$is$deployed,$rather$than$adumbrating$a$received$lineage$that$transcends$the$
contingencies$of$local$discourse.$The$form$of$infinite$judgment,$i.e.,$A$is$nonOB,$exhibits$
the$negative,$diairetic$dynamic$of$judgment$as$such,$and$therefore$the$divided$character$
of$the$concept$as$well.$To$show$that$this$is$the$case$for$Hegel$is$to$explain$the$riddle$of$
infinite$judgment,$which$will$be$the$task$of$the$first$section$of$this$chapter.$
While$negation$is$the$basic$mode$of$conceptual$determination$and$the$principal$
instrument$of$analytic$division$in$general,$the$gist$of$the$present$argument$is$that$the$
formal$progression$of$infinite$judgment$in$the$Phenomenology$illustrates$the$
immanence,of$negation$in$the$procession$of$conceptual$thought$and$so$thought$as$such.$
A$complete$picture$of$Hegel’s$adaptation$of$the$method$of$division$requires$seeing$both$
how$it$is$connected$to$the$process$of$sublation$(Aufhebung)$and$how$the$structures$of$
Aristotelian$syllogistic$facilitates$the$exposition$and$rationalization$of$the$concept,$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$Science,of,Logic,$12.55.$
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which,$though$touched$on$in$this$section,$will$not$be$spelled$out$until$the$last$section$of$
this$chapter.$$
Section(Three.(Infinite(Judgment(and(the((Dis)unity(of(the(Proposition(
In$order$to$uncover$the$logic$of$“The$Spirit$is$a$bone,”$it$is$necessary,$for$reasons$
I$hope$will$become$clear,$to$first$say$something$about$the$immediate$context$of$its$
derivation$and$about$the$broader$deductive$framework$to$which$that$derivation$
conforms.$With$regard$to$the$former,$it$is$the$evidentiary$force$of$properties$and$
expression$that$is$at$issue$in$this$section$of$the$Phenomenology.$The$central$question$
under$discussion$here$is$whether$material$appearance$is$the$manifestation$of$an$interior$
essence,$and$if$so,$whether$this$manifestation$expresses$that$essence$exhaustively$or$
inadequately,$or$displaces$it$entirely.$Since$in$phrenology,$the$exemplar$here$of$
empirical$science,$the$relevant$essence$is$that$of$the$soul,$mind$or$Spirit,$it$is$not$simply$
the$absurd$and$irrelevant$pseudoOscience$history$has$judged$it$to$be.$Its$concern,$on$the$
face$of$it,$is$identical$to$the$concern$of$the$Phenomenology$itself:$the$historical$
occurrence$of$consciousness,$subjectivity$and$spirit$in$the$material$world.$
$

As$a$summary$conclusion$of$that$discussion,$a$preliminary$construal$of$the$

proposition$would$make$it$a$claim$about$the$epistemic$and$metaphysical$primacy$of$
appearance,$understood$here$as$its$visible$materiality.$So$understood,$the$proposition$
would$constitute$an$inversion$of$the$traditional$hylomorphic$order,$metaphysically$and$
syntactically,$since$the$form$of$spirit$is$revealed$in$and$as$the$matter$of$the$bone,$and$
inferentially$as$well,$since$though$on$its$Aristotelian$conception$the$premises$of$a$
$
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syllogism$stand$to$its$conclusion$as$matter$to$form,$our$formula$would$instead$appear$to$
deliver$its$premises,$whatever$they$might$be,$to$the$indeterminate,$or$incalculable,$
materiality$of$its$conclusion.$On$this$construal,$the$force$of$the$predicate,$and$of$the$
logical$form$of$identity$in$general,$is$meant$to$furnish$for$its$indeterminate$subject$a$
determinate$immanence$in$experiential$or$experimental$encounter.$The$reconstructed$
syllogism$might$run$as$follows:$
$

$

The$matter$(i.e.,$material$form)$of$the$spirit$is$a$bone$(i.e.,$the$skull)$
The$Spirit$is$(just)$its$matter$
$
$
The$Spirit$is$a$bone$
$
$
$
However,$in$its$elevation$of$matter,$in$its$identification$of$instantiation$or$realization$
with$material$form,$the$proposition,$along$with$the$rule$of$empirical$science$that$
governs$it,$succumbs$to$incoherence.$Matter,$as$what$qua$matter$is$devoid$of$
determination,$is$in$the$end$evidence,$in$its$open$potentiality,$of$everything,$and$thus$
the$form$of$nothing,$unless$of$course$it$is$the$materiality$of$some$determinate$form,$in$
which$case$it$is$not$matter$at$all,$strictly$speaking.30$
$

Yet$the$overt$logical$incoherence$of$the$judgment$is$arguably$more$important$

than$its$metaphysical$inversion,$for$it$is$precisely$the$incongruence,$what$Hegel$
describes$as$the$“complete$inadequacy,”$between$subject$and$predicate$that$initially$
marks$an$infinite$judgment$as$infinite.$31$Aristotle,$who,$as$we$have$seen,$was$first$to$
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$While$Aristotle$is$nowhere$mentioned$in$this$context,$his$presence$in$this$text$and$in$Hegel’s$thinking$is$
ubiquitous.$The$discussion$of$the$category$of$being$and$the$extensive$meditation$on$matter$in$this$section$
make$the$identification$of$matter$with$Aristotle’s$conception$irresistible.$
$
31
$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§173.$
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classify$such$judgments,$did$so$in$terms$of$the$negative$terms$(of$the$form$non9x)$
comprising$them,$calling$them$indefinite,(aoristoi)$expressions.$He$applies$the$term$first$
to$names$(onomata)$and$verbs$(rhemata)$and$then$derivatively$to$propositions$
containing$such$expressions.32$When$Boethius$renders$the$Greek$term$in$Latin$by$
infinitus,33$the$ambiguity$between$indefinite$and$infinite$enters$into$the$treatment$of$
such$expressions,$and$it$is$in$part$this$ambiguity$that$Hegel$is$still$grappling$with$in$his$
unendliche,Urteil.$Such$judgments,$for$Hegel,$are$indeed$indefinite$or$indeterminate,$but$
they$are$also$infinite,$i.e.,$without$Ende,,oros,,finis,,terminus,$or$limit,$in$the$sense$that$
the$terminations$and$determinations$they$provide$their$subject$concepts$are$openO
ended,$inviting$further$determination,$ad,infinitum.$Indeed$for$Hegel,$this$feature$of$
infinite$judgment,$and$so$its$inadequacy,$is$implicit$in$all$judgments,$in$part$because,$as$
he$puts$it,$every$judgment,$in$retaining$its$traditional$categorical$structure,$expresses$
the$general$proposition$that,$or$as$we$might$put$it,$has$the$general$logical$form,$“The,
individual,is,the,universal.”34$On$the$face$of$it,$then,$infinite$judgment$is$simply$a$formal$
expression$of$the$logic$inherent$to$judgment$as$such.$
$

The$problem$with$the$categorical$proposition,$through$which$judgment$

proceeds,$lies$in$its$inadequate$negotiation$of$the$competing$demands$of$content,$which$
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$See$Aristotle’s$De,Interpretatione,$16a31O16b15$and$19b5O19b18,$in$Aristotelis,Categoriae,et,Liber,De,
Interpretatione,$ed.$Lorenzo$MinioOPaluello$(Oxford:$Clarendon$Press,$1936).$
$
33
$See$Boethius’$Commentarii,in,Librum,Aristotelis,Peri,Hermeneias,$ed.$C.$Meiser$(Leipzig:$Teubner,$1887,$
1880).$
$
34
$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§166.$
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depends$on$a$difference$between$its$component$terms,$and$unity,$which$depends$on$
their$identity.$Frege$introduced$his$twoOtiered$semantics$of$sense$and$reference$in$
response$to$precisely$this$difficulty,$arguing$that$making$sense$of$the$informational$
content$of$sentences$such$as$“The$morning$star$is$the$evening$star”$requires$
differentiating$between$the$divergent$senses,(Sinne),and$common$reference$
(Bedeutung)$of$the$two$expressions$flanking$the$copula.35$The$problem,$however,$
persists$even$with$this$distinction$in$place,$because$once$identified$as$true,$such$
statements$resume$their$formal$status$as$tautologies,$as$truths$without$assertible$
content.$
$

Syntax$or$inflection$might$appear$to$settle$the$issue$grammatically,$but$grammar$

is$a$matter$of$convention$and$has$nothing$directly$to$tell$us$about$logic,$and$neither$
enables$one$to$discriminate$between$identity$and$attribution,$or,$for$example,$between$
substance$and$accident.$Much$the$same,$we$might$imagine,$goes$for$the$medieval$
distinction$between$categorematic$and$syncategorematic$terms,$and$for$the$original$
Aristotelian$one$between$rhemata$and$onomata.$The$trouble$in$each$case$is$that$the$
structures$of$the$categorical$proposition$ensure$identity$regardless$of$the$ontological$or$
epistemic$difference$intended$or$otherwise$signified,$and$despite$the$opacity$of$the$
unity$that$is$thereby$established.$

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$See$Gottlob$Frege’s$“On$Sinn$and$Bedeutung”$in$The$Frege,Reader,$ed.$Michael$Beaney$(Oxford,$U.K.;$
Cambridge,$Mass.:$Blackwell$Publishers,$1997),$151O171.$,
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On$the$other$hand,$if$identification$somehow$miscarries,$if,$for$example,$the$

component$terms$are$fundamentally$incommensurable,$as$they$are$for$the$infinite$
judgment$under$discussion,$and$difference$prevails$over$the$logical$force$of$the$copula,$
then$it$is$the$unity$of$the$proposition$that$becomes$an$issue.$In$this$case,$once$again,$it$is$
not$enough$to$say$that$the$relevant$identity$statement$is$false,$for$in$some$sense$no$
statement$arises$at$all,$even$if$the$form$and$expression$of$the$proposition$persist$in$
suggesting$otherwise.$The$problem,of,the,unity,of,the,proposition$is$just$the$other$side$
of$the$problem$of$semantic$indifference.$
$

Hegel$observes$that$identity$and$difference$are$formally$undermined$in$the$

propositions$that$express$them,$and$in$particular$by$the$logical$laws,$or$laws$of$thinking$
(Denkgesetze)$as$he$calls$them,$of$identity$and$nonOcontradiction$that$apparently$govern$
all$such$propositions.$He$says$of$the$former,$in$particular,$that$"...it$is$nothing$but$the$
law$of$the$abstract,understanding"$that$"the$propositional,form,already$contradicts."36$
This$is$because,$
a$proposition$(Satz)$also$promises$a$difference$between$subject$and$predicate,$but$
this$proposition$does$not$accomplish$what$its$form$requires.$But$it$will$be$sublated$in$
particular$by$the$subsequent$soOcalled$laws$of$thinking$that$make$into$laws$the$
opposite$of$this$law.$–$If$one$maintains$that$this$proposition$cannot$be$proven$but$
that$each$consciousness$proceeds$in$accord$with$it$and$experientially$concurs$with$it$
as$soon$as$it$hears$it,$then$it$is$necessary$to$note,$in$opposition$to$this$alleged$
experience$of$the$school,$the$general$experience$that$no$consciousness$thinks,$has$
representations,$and$so$forth,$or$speaks$according$to$this$law,$that$no$concrete$
existence$of$any$sort$exists$according$to$this$law.37$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$Encyclopedia$Logic,$§115.$
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$Ibid.$
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,
The$"universal$experience"$Hegel$refers$to$here$is$that$of$the$vacuousness$of$identity$
statements,$which,$though$allegedly$governed$by$the$principle$of$identity,$Hegel$here$
tells$us$confirms$“the$contrary$of$this$law,”$the$principle$of$difference.$In$addressing$
different$but$related$concerns,$Wittgenstein$will$later$diagnose$a$philosophical$hazard$of$
the$same$kind$in$terms$of$the$tautologization$of$truth,$which$he$claims$is$an$inevitable$
outcome$of$logical$analysis.$Wittgenstein$puts$the$matter$starkly:$“The$identity$of$the$
meaning$of$two$expressions$cannot$be$asserted.”38$For$Hegel,$identity$can$indeed$be$
asserted,$but$in$being$so$asserted$initiates$an$interchange$between$identity$and$
difference$that$is$in$principle$interminable.$To$put$this$more$precisely,$while$judgment$
(Urteil)$can$and$indeed$must$assume$the$form$of$identity,$it$cannot$do$so$merely$
through$the$proposition$(Satz)$used$to$express$it.$
$

In$the$Phenomenology,$the$problem$takes$on$a$slightly$different$shape,$since$the$

logical$subject$of$relevance$here$is$that$of$Spirit,or$consciousness.$Nonetheless,$what$
remains$of$concern$is$still$the$structure$and$economy$of$judgment$itself,$and$thus$the$
relationship$between$judgment$and$the$propositional$form$it$assumes,$for$it$is$in$this$
form,$in$the$interval$between$subject$and$predicate$terms,$that$Hegel$locates$both$the$
condition$of$thought$and$the$source$of$its$immobility.$It$is$only$in$reconceiving$
propositional$form$in$terms$of$the$speculative$proposition$(der,spekulativ,Satz),$which$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
38

$Ludwig$Wittgenstein’s$Tractatus,Logico9Philosophicus,$trans.$D.$F.$Pears$and$B.$F.$McGuinness$(London$
and$New$York:$Routledge$&$Kegan$Paul,$1974),$6.2322.$$$$
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properly$understood$is$simply$the$speculative$(begreifende)$apprehension$of$a$given$
proposition,$that$thinking,$as$selfOconscious$conceptualization,$can$be$realized:$
Usually,$the$Subject$is$first$made$the$basis,$as$the$objective$fixed$self;$thence$the$
necessary$movement$to$the$multiplicity$of$determinations$of$predicates$proceeds.$
Here,$that$Subject$is$replaced$by$the$knowing$'I'$itself,$which$links$the$Predicates$
with$the$Subject$holding$them.$But,$since$that$first$Subject$enters$into$the$
determinations$themselves$and$is$their$soul,$the$second$Subject,$viz,$the$knowing$'I',$
still$finds$in$the$Predicate$what$it$thought$it$had$finished$with$and$got$away$from,$
and$from$which$it$hoped$to$return$into$itself;$and,$instead$of$being$able$to$function$
as$the$determining$agent$in$the$movement$of$predication,$arguing$back$and$forth$
whether$to$attach$this$or$that$Predicate,$it$is$really$still$occupied$with$the$self$of$the$
content,$having$to$remain$associated$with$it,$instead$of$being$for$itself.39$
$
This$is$an$account,$in$outline,$of$the$dynamic$of$categorical$or$predicative$judgment$for$
Hegel,$albeit$not$the$formal$outline$given$in$the$Logic.$It$is$also,$more$specifically,$a$
breathtaking$synopsis$of$the$scattering$of$subjectivity$(both$metaphysically$and$
psychologically$conceived)$in$the$orderly$process$of$attribution,$of$which$Lacan's$analysis$
of$the$divided$self$and$its$fractured$entry$into$the$symbolic$is$an$obvious$descendent$
(though$not$so$obviously$an$heir,$as$Slavoj$Zizek$and$Mladen$Dolar$have$insisted40).$Its$
immediate$philosophical$predecessor$is,$and$quite$obviously$is,$the$Kantian$observation,$
with$its$accompanying$deduction,$that$judgment$is$"nothing$other$than$the$way$to$bring$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§60.$

$

40

$This$is$not$entirely$fair$to$either$Zizek$or$Dolar,$who$both$have$much$to$say$about$the$connection$
between$Hegel$and$Lacan$that$is$subtle$and$interesting.$But$their$hagiographic$reading$of$Lacan$leads,$in$
my$view,$to$an$overly$psychological$reading$of$the$Phenomenology.$I'll$save$my$fairness$to$them$for$
another$occasion,$but$for$a$marvelous$account$of$the$philosophical$kinship$between$Hegel$and$Lacan$see$
M.$Dolar’s$“Hegel$as$the$other$side$of$psychoanalysis”$in$Jacques,Lacan,and,the,other,side,of,
Psychoanalysis.$Reflections,on,Seminar,XVII,$ed.$Justin$Clemens$and$Russell$Grigg$(Durham:$Duke$
University$Press,$2006).$For$Zizek’s$latest$discussion$of$Hegel’s$importance$for$Lacan$see$his$Less,than,
Nothing.$
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given$cognitions$to$the$objective$unity$of$apperception."41$For$Hegel,$on$the$contrary,$it$
is$the$concept$and$the$full$compass$of$its$philosophical$cognition$that$will$provide$the$
relevant$unity.$
$

What$Hegel$says$in$this$passage$does$more$than$simply$disband$the$unity$of$

apperception$Kant$had$thought$the$linchpin$of$judgment.$It$would$seem$to$make$of$the$
Kantian$account$of$cognition,$from$the$recruitment$of$categories$and$concepts,$through$
the$inventions$of$the$schematism,$to$the$intuitive$register$of$phenomena,$a$mechanics$
of$immobilization.$Of$course$it$is$not$specifically$or$merely$Kant$that$Hegel$alludes$to$
here.$Aristotelian$and$scholastic$logic$as$a$whole$are$equally$at$issue,$since$the$
indifference$problem$resides$in$the$structure$of$the$categorical$proposition$itself.$Still,$
there$is$little$question$that$Kant$is$profoundly$implicated.$Hegel's$further$elucidation$of$
the$passage$makes$this$still$more$clear:$$
Formally,,what,has,been,said,can,be,expressed,thus:,the,general,nature,of,the,
judgment,or,proposition,,which,involves,the,distinction,of,Subject,and,Predicate,,is,
destroyed,by,the,speculative,proposition,,and,the,proposition,of,identity,which,the,
former,becomes,contains,the,counter9thrust,against,that,subject9predicate,
relationship.42,
The$doubleOconcept$model$of$the$proposition,$which$both$Kant$and$Hegel$inherit$from$
the$scholastic$tradition,$formalizes$attribution$as$inclusion$or$union,$and$so$at$least$
formally$establishes$what$we$might$call$a$semantics,of,indifference,$the$propositional$
expansion$of$the$concept$“characterized$by$the$reciprocal,indifference,of$its$moments,”$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
41

$Immanuel$Kant,$Critique,of,Pure,Reason,$eds.$Paul$Guyer$and$Allen$W.$$
Wood$(Cambridge:$Cambridge$University$Press,$1999),$B141.$
$
42
$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§61.$
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as$Hegel$will$put$it.43$The$problem$is$that$nothing$in$either$of$the$two$concepts$
comprising$a$given$proposition$differentiates$them$logically,$i.e.$allows$one$to$see$or$
determine$either$the$logical$difference$between$"A$is$B"$and$"B$is$A,"$or$any$distinction$
between$statements$of$attribution,$identity$or$definition,$etc.$On$the$other$hand,$if$they$
were$to$be$so$differentiated,$the$copula$nonetheless$confounds$in$identity$whatever$
distinction$is$supposed$thereby$to$have$been$established.$
$

While$both$Hegel$and$Kant$recognize$the$need$to$redress$the$indifference$of$

logical$structure$to$metaphysical$or$epistemic$fact,$Kant$thinks,$along$Aristotelian$lines,44$
that$the$solution$lies$in$the$categorial$differentiation$and$subsumption$of$the$relevant$
terms,$and$ultimately$upon$the$apperceptive$grounding$of$the$categories.$In$particular,$
as$regards$the$subject$term,$he$says:$
Through$the$category$of$substance,$however,$if$I$bring$the$concept$of$a$body$under$
it,$it$is$determined$that$its$empirical$intuition$in$experience$must$always$be$
considered$as$subject,$never$as$mere$predicate;$and$likewise$with$all$the$other$
categories.45$
Categorical$assignments$determine$specific$roles$within$the$specific$forms$of$judgment$
with$which$they$are$correlated.$In$a$categorical$proposition$of$the$form$"A$is$B,"$though$
formally$indistinct,$either$A$or$B$cannot$be$anything$other$than$a$substance$(substantia)$
and$if$so$then$either$B$or$A,$respectively,$cannot$occur$as$anything$but$a$predicate,$given$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$Science,of,Logic,$12.31.$

$

44

$I$am$referring$here,$of$course,$to$Aristotle's$metaphysical$differentiation$between$substance$and$
accident$in$terms$of$the$opposition$between$the$relations$of$"being$in"$and$"being$said$of."$
$
45
$Critique,of,Pure,Reason,$B129.$

$

$

217$

its$subsumption,$for$example,$under$the$category$of$accident$(accidens).$Thus$if$"A$is$B"$
is$the$canonical$means$of$expressing$this,$then$the$converse$"B$is$A"$necessarily$
expresses$something$else,$and$moreover$something$necessarily$incoherent$because$
logically$illOformed.$For$Kant,$the$categorical$proposition$bridges$the$gap$between$
intuition$and$concept.$
$

However,$there$are$some$obvious$difficulties$with$such$a$solution.$First,$it$

remains$unclear$how$the$distinction$is$maintained$through$the$passage$of$attribution$or$
identity$the$copula$is$supposed$to$signify.$We$might$call$this$the$puzzle$of$logical$or$
discursive$opacity.$Second,$it$seems$to$replace$the$old$logical$quandary$with$a$new$
metaphysical$one,$which$we$might$accordingly$call$the$problem$of$metaphysical,
indifference:$the$puzzle$concerning$how$the$logical$distinction$between$subject$and$
predicate$is$expressively$maintained$is$simply$replaced$by$one$concerning$how$the$
copula$itself$or$its$linear$syntax$differentially$identifies$and$conjoins$substance$and$
accident.$More$to$the$point,$while$one$concept's$(e.g.,$that$of$a$body)$falling$under$
another$(e.g.,$the$category$of$substance)$might$readily$be$seen$as$lawOgoverned,$what$
regulates$subsumption$of$an$object$or$content$of$empirical$intuition$under$either$is$
more$difficult$to$make$out.$Finally,$it$isn’t$clear$how$the$content$of$an$empirical$intuition$
can$enter$into$the$proposition$or$judgment$in$the$first$place$without$taking$on$the$
minimal$conceptual$structure$required$of$names.$If$it$acquires$no$such$structure,$on$the$
other$hand,$then$bridging$the$gap$between$intuitive$content$and$conceptual$form$seems$
difficult$to$explain.$
$
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$

The$invocation$of$substance$and$accident$here,$and$their$inclusion$in$Kant's$table$

of$categories$itself,$underscores$the$abiding$influence$of$Aristotelian$metaphysics$in$
Kant$as$well,$and$more$specifically$in$this$case$Aristotle's$account$of$the$four$senses$of$
"substance"$in$Metaphysics,Z.3,$where$subject$is$identified$as$its$most$characteristic$
sense,$according$to$which$it$is$"that$of$which$the$other$things$are$said,$but$which$itself$is$
never$said$of$any$other$thing."$Its$being$exclusively$the$subject$of$predication$is$
furthermore$connected$to$its$being$a$singular$unity,$a$tode,ti.46$In$the$Categories$its$
preeminent$role$as$the$subject$of$predication$and$its$singularity$are$tied$to$primary,
substance,$which$expresses$as$well$the$metaphysical$sense$of$substance$as$essence.$But$
since$it$is$substance$and$accident$that$determine,patterns$of$logical$and$grammatical$
employment,$and$not$the$other$way$round,$what$we$need,$as$it$were,$are$the$
ordinances$of$substance,$which$the$copula$on$its$own$patently$fails$to$express,$and$
which$failure$of$expression$cannot$be$remedied$by$stipulation,$since$stipulation$is$
characteristically$arbitrary.$
$

Yet$while$the$copula$is$supposed$to$both$distinguish$and$unite$subject$and$

predicate$for$Kant,$what$it$does$most$importantly$is$to$express$the$fact$that$both$belong$
to$the$object$of$representation,$the$object$=$X.$It$does$this$by$expressing$the$fact$that$
judgment$is$a$judging$of$some$particular$consciousness,$of$a$single,$unitary$I.$As$he$puts$
it:$"For$this$word$["is"]$designates$the$relation$of$the$representations$to$the$original$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
46

$The$complicated$sense$in$which$a$tode,ti,is$a$unity$at$all$raises$further$difficulties$for$the$burden$of$
propositional$organization$Kant$reserves$for$it.$I$discuss$the$composite$character$of$the$tode,ti,$as$both$
immediate$particular$(tode)$and$universal$kind$(ti)$in$Chapter$2.$
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apperception$and$its$necessary$unity."47$The$copula,$in$other$words,$is$an$expression$of$
apperceptive$engagement$that$Kant$thinks$objectively$differentiates$substance$from$
accident$through$the$asymmetric$relation$it$bears$towards$each,$and$presumably$in$
particular$through$the$epistemic$priority$it$assigns$the$former.$It$tells$us$where$the$
articulating$subject$begins,$i.e.,$necessarily$with$what$is$metaphysically$prior,$and$where$
it$ends,$i.e.,$with$what$is$metaphysically$posterior.$In$other$words,$it$establishes$the$
order$of$cognition$and,$ipso,facto,$the$direction$of$judgment$and$attribution.$
$

How$it$does$so,$however,$remains$obscure.$For$if$syntactic$primacy$reflects$

epistemic$primacy$which$in$turn$reflects,$or,$to$put$it$more$plainly,$represents,$
metaphysical$primacy,$then$the$ultimate$ground$of$logical$ranking$would$appear$to$be$
the$inaccessible$domain$of$things$in$themselves.$The$categories$are$indeed$supposed$to$
be$ordered$on$a,priori$grounds,$independently$of$their$application$to$the$objects$of$
experience,$but$the$point$is$that$their$employment$in$judgment$obscures$this$intrinsic$
ordinality.$This$is$of$no$small$consequence,$since$the$deduction$of$the$categories$needed$
to$ground$Kant's$critical$philosophy$proceeds$from$the$very$structure$and$operations$of$
judgment.$
$

As$regards$the$empirical$use$of$the$categories,$Kant$does$indeed$have$an$

account,$for$example,$of$how$certain$manifolds$of$intuition$are$cast$as$substances$and$
others$as$attributes$or$accidents,$etc.,$but$again$the$logical$form$of$judgments$
confounds$such$ontological$discriminations$and$so,$more$importantly,$points$to$their$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$Critique,of,Pure,Reason,$B142.$

$

$

220$

groundlessness.$If$phenomenological$criteria$such$as$continuity$and$persistence$are$
what$license$the$categorical$identification$of$substance,$for$example,$it$remains$unclear$
what$governs$the$determination$of$continuity$and$persistence.$To$put$it$plainly,$
continuity$and$persistence$are$paradigmatically$subject$to$the$kind$of$inductive$
indeterminacy$Nelson$Goodman$famously$defined$in$terms$of$projectability.48$The$
concept$or$name$applied$to$a$substance$having$property$p$intermittently,$i.e.,$
accidentally,$before$and$at$time$t$is$no$more$projectable$than$the$concept$or$name$
applied$to$that$same$substance$until$time$t$but$possessing$this$same$property$p$
persistently,$and$so$essentially,$after$time$t.$In$other$words,$no$finite$stretch$of$
persistence$or$continuity$is$inductively$sufficient$to$establish$the$unity,$essence$or$
substantiality$of$anything$to$which$a$substance$term$is$to$be$applied.$$
$

Yet$even$if$we$set$aside$the$puzzle$of$substanceOaccident$differentiation,$the$

problem$that$Kant$seems$to$ignore$and$that$Hegel$seems$attuned$to$remains,$that$is,$a$
problem$residing$in$the$very$form$of$judgment$itself.$Regardless$of$how$subject$and$
predicate$are$differentiated$to$begin$with,$within$the$predicative$framework$of$
judgment$that$is$the$hallmark$of$thinking,$or$at$least$of$discursivity,$logical$differences$of$
this$sort$are$dissolved.$For$as$already$observed,$on$the$traditional$model$the$logical$
form$of$every$such$judgment$is$that$of$identity.$From$Hegel's$perspective,$the$problem$is$
not$form$as$such,$but$form$conceived$as$empty,$contentless$structure,$something$he$

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$See$Nelson$Goodman’s$Fact,,Fiction,and,Forecast$(Cambridge,$Mass.:$Harvard$University$Press,$1983).$
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detects$in$Kant$but$which$will$only$find$its$full$expression$in$the$mathematical$and$logical$
formalisms$explored$at$the$end$of$the$19th$century.$
$

Questions$of$form$are$paramount$for$Hegel$since$it$is$through$the$forms$they$

assume$that$concepts$are$realized,$and$not$in$the$weak$sense$of$merely$achieving$
materiality$or$visibility,$but$in$the$robust$Aristotelian$sense$of$becoming$the$actualized$
concepts$they$are$beforehand$merely$potentially.$Hegelian$phenomenology$is$thus$
directed$less$towards$the$visibility$of$truth$than$towards$its$actualization.$This$is$why,$for$
example,$Hegel$can$speak$so$naturally$of$propositions,$judgments$and$epistemic$states,$
along$with$political,$aesthetic$and$religious$movements$and$institutions,$as$shapes$or$
forms$of$consciousness,$or,$equivalently,$of$the$concept$or$truth.$Hegel’s$solution$to$the$
troubles$of$the$categorical$proposition$will$depend$upon$shifting$the$burden$of$semantic$
differentiation$from$the$logical$form$of$the$proposition$to$the$accumulated$shapes$of$
conceptual$determination.$This$is$what$lies$behind$Hegel’s$rejection$of$the$strict$
opposition$between$form$and$content,$and$his$insistence$that$“the$form$is$content$and,$
in$keeping$with$its$developed$determinacy,$it$is$the$law,of,appearance$(das,Gesetz,der,
Erscheinung).”49$$
Section(Four.(Judgment,(Cognition(and(the(Semantics(of(Difference(
$

The$passage$from$the$Phenomenology,cited$above$(PS$§61)$suggests$that$Hegel’s$

solution$to$the$indifference$problem,$and$implicitly$to$the$unity$problem$as$well,$is$to$be$
found$in$the$notion$of$the$speculative$proposition,$and$ultimately,$as$he$will$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§133.$
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subsequently$make$clear,$the$speculative,concept$(what$he$will$later$call$the$Idea)$from$
which$its$corresponding$proposition$expands.$Yet,$as$this$passage$also$indicates,$what$
Hegel$means$by$such$a$proposition$has$little$to$do$with$propositional$form$or$structure$
at$all,$since$no$such$structure$survives$its$speculative$recasting.$What$Hegel$is$gesturing$
at$here,$rather,$is$the$speculative$grasp$of$concept$and$proposition,$what$he$calls$
speculative$thought,(das,begreifende,Denken),$in$which,$as$he$informs$us,$“the$negative$
belongs$to$the$content$itself$[of$the$proposition]…both$as$the$immanent$movement$and$
determination$of$the$content,$and$as$the$whole$of$this$process.”50$Yet$inasmuch$as$such$
thinking$is$begreifende,,i.e.,$conceptual,$it$necessarily$unfolds$in$the$medium$of$the$
proposition.$
And$therein$lies$our$first$clue$concerning$the$philosophical$virtue$of$infinite,
judgment:$its$graphic$display$of$the$discursivity$and$plasticity$of$(speculative)$thought,$
i.e.,$of$its$elastic$and$simultaneous$accommodation$and$refusal$of$propositional$form.51$
It$manages$this$feat$of$presentation$by$recording$the$incongruity$of$terms$and$the$
operative$presence$of$negation$in$the$evolving$forms$of$the$categorical$proposition.$The$
claim,$in$short,$is$that$infinite,judgment,$in$its$distinctive$Hegelian$variant,$is$the$
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$The$allusion$to$Catherine$Malabou’s$The,Future,of,Hegel:,Plasticity,,Temporality,,and,Dialectic,$trans.$L.$
During$(New$York:$Routledge,$2004)$reflects$a$philosophical$appreciation,$though$far$from$an$embrace,$of$
the$notion$of$plasticity$introduced$in$this$important$reading$of$Hegel.$Her$notion$of$plasticity$as$“the$
excess$of$the$future$over$the$future”$is$meant$as$an$interpretive$cipher$for$the$Hegelian$project$in$its$
totality.$I$apply$the$term$“plasticity”$far$more$specifically$to$the$sensitivity$of$a$logical$or$cognitive$system$
to$local,$historical$context.$It$is$then$just$the$logicoOepistemic$correlate$of$what$I$see$as$the$immanence$of$
truth,$negation$and$determination$in$Hegel.$
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exemplary$form$of$speculative$thought,$and$so$of$thinking$itself$as$the$unfolding$of$a$
subject$concept,$albeit$still$cast$in$the$formal$garb$of$the$categorical$proposition.$That$it$
can$be$both$true$and$incoherent,$depending$on$its$context$and$form,$is$an$indication$of$
the$double$role$it$plays$in$expressing$truth,$perhaps$the,truth,$within$an$historically$
specific$philosophical$setting$and$exhibiting$the$logicoOgrammatical$form$of$discursive$
expression$as$such.$
Its$ambiguous$status$is$further$revealed$in$the$dramatically$opposed$treatments$
Hegel$accords$it$within$a$single$text,$whether$it$be$the$Phenomenology$itself$or$either$of$
the$two$Logics.$In$the$Encyclopedia,Logic,$for$example,$under$Qualitative,Judgment,$
Hegel$compares$infinite$judgment$to$the$kind$of$transgression$involved$in$radical$evil,$
remarking$that$while$the$propositions$such$judgments$express$"are$indeed$the$truth$of$
the$immediate,$soOcalled$qualitative$judgment"$they$are$nonetheless$"not$really$
judgments$at$all."52$On$the$other$hand,$in$the$final$section$of$the$same$text$infinite$
judgment$is$identified$with$the$Idea$itself,$that$is,$with$the$determinate$realization$of$
the$concept:$
The$Idea$is$the$infinite$judgment,$of$which$the$sides$are$each$the$independent$
totality,$while$(precisely$because$it$completes$itself$in$this$way)$each$of$them$has$
also$passed$over$into$the$other.$None$of$the$concepts$that$are$determined$
otherwise$is$this$totality$that$is$completed$in$both$of$its$sides$–$both$as$the$Concept$
itself$and$as$objectivity.53$
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What$this$identification$amounts$to,$however,$is$complicated$by$the$fact$that$the$Idea,$
unlike$the$judgment,$“is$essentially$a$process,”$and$thus$the$totality$of$the$latter$is$a$
mere$snapshot$of$the$incessant$movement$within$the$Idea$between$the$concept$it$
begins$with$and$the$instantiations$that$successively$determine$it.$
Nonetheless,$if$for$Aristotle$and$the$scholastic$tradition$there$are$two$basic$kinds$
(qualities)$of$categorical$proposition,$affirmative$(kataphasis,)$and$negative$(apophasis),$
corresponding$to$two$kinds$of$cognitive$operation,$composition$and$separation$or$
division,$for$Hegel$judgment$is$fundamentally,$that$is$to$say,$constitutionally,$negative,$
or$apophatic,$a$vivid$counterpoint$to$the$Fregean$(and$since$Frege$our$own)$intuition$
about$such$things,$mentioned$above,$that$all$judgments$are$assertoric.$This$does$not$yet$
amount$to$saying$that$all$judgments$are$infinite,$nor$even$that$all$are$formally$negative$
(as$opposed$to$affirmative)$in$quality,$but$only$that$judgment,$as$we$have$seen,$is$
fundamentally$driven$by$the$negation$of,$and$within,$the$concept$it$extrapolates.$It$
therefore$also$underpins$a$correlation$between$the$primacy$of$negation$in$the$
constitution$of$the$proposition$and$the$fundamental$place$of$the$method$of$division$in$
Hegelian$logic.$
As$I$have$argued$in$the$preceding$chapters,$negation$is$fundamental$to$the$
traditional$method$of$division,$since$it$is$negation$that$divides$genus$into$species$and$
thus,$through$its$iteration,$places$the$subject$of$a$judgment$within$the$conceptual$
lineage$that$successively$defines$it.$Judgment$so$understood$is$the$linear$abbreviation$of$
one$branch$or$another$of$the$extended$Porphyrian$tree$that$constitutes$the$totality$of$
$
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concepts$and$the$individuals$these$delineate.$Within$this$categorical$framework,$
judgment$follows$and$expresses$the$hierarchical$lines$of$subsumption.$Yet$if$Socrates$is$
subsumable$under$man,$and$thus$under$rational,$since$man$falls$under$the$latter,$this$
only$gives$us$part$of$the$picture,$indeed,$as$stated,$merely$the$bare$essentials,of$the$full$
picture$of$Socrates’$defining$features.$How$are$we$to$understand$division$and$
subsumption$outside$the$narrow$Porphyrian$framework?$In$part,$this$is$also$to$ask$how$
we$can$understand$how$the$formal$relations$of$subsumption$expressed$by$a$derived$
division$and$the$propositions$expressing$these$are$employed$in$judgment.$
$

For$the$tradition$I$have$been$tracing$(from$Plato,$through$Boethius,$to$the$

scholastics,$etc.),$there$is$no$clear$distinction$to$be$drawn$between$judgment,$statement$
and$proposition,$and$the$affirmative$or$negative$quality$of$a$proposition$just$expresses$
the$route$of$its$composition.$To$judge$that$x$is$y,$just$as$to$judge$that$x$is$not$y,$is,$as$we$
saw$Plato$putting$it$in$the$Sophist,$to$provide$the$boundary$(peras)$of$an$incomplete$
(apeiros)$expression,$to$delimit$it$(ti,perainei),$and$so$to$make$of$it$a$complete$
proposition,$a$logos.54$For$Boethius$and$the$scholastic$tradition,$as$we$have$seen,$
negation$separates$while$affirmation$unites$the$terms$that$make$up$the$proposition,$
and$both$are$thus$principally$acts$of$semantic$engagement,$and$only$secondarily$
lexically$expressed$features$of$the$spoken$or$inscribed$proposition.55$$The$combination$
or$separation$of$terms$is$always$also$an$act$of$subsumption$because$the$terms$
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themselves$are$already$hierarchically$structured$(although$this$is$less$obvious$in$Plato,$
whose$new$horizontal$semantics$of$delimitation$in$the$Sophist,both$depends$upon$and$
departs$from$the$vertical$semantics$of$participation$he$is$partial$to$elsewhere).$
$

Though$Hegel$likewise$regularly$conflates$judgment$and$proposition,$often$using$

the$same$German$expression$(Satz)$for$both,$he$does$in$fact$distinguish$between$the$
two,$just$as$he$discriminates$between$content$and$form,$while$ultimately$claiming$that$
the$latter$is$just$the$realization$of$the$former.56$In$the$Science,of,Logic,$for$example,$he$
draws$a$vivid$distinction$between$judgment$and$proposition$that$highlights$this$very$
aspect$of$his$conception$of$logic,$namely$that$its$primary$concern$is$not$the$structure$of$
subsuming$instances$under$a$concept,$but$with$the$act$of$so$associating$them:$
…a$proposition,can$indeed$have$a$subject$and$predicate$in$a$grammatical$sense$
without$however$being$a$judgment$for$that.$The$latter$requires$that$the$predicate$
behave$with$respect$to$the$subject$in$a$relation$of$conceptual$determination,$hence$
as$a$universal$with$respect$to$a$particular$or$singular.$And$if$what$is$said$of$a$singular$
subject$is$itself$only$something$singular,$as$for$instance,$“Aristotle$died$at$the$age$of$
73$in$the$fourth$year$of$the$115th$Olympiad,”$then$this$is$a$mere$proposition,$not$a$
judgment.$There$would$be$in$it$an$element$of$judgment$only$if$one$of$the$
circumstances,$say,$the$date$of$death$or$the$age$of$the$philosopher,$came$into$doubt$
even$though$the$stated$figures$were$asserted$on$the$strength$of$some$ground$or$
other.$In$that$case,$the$figures$would$be$taken$as$something$universal,$as$a$time$
that,$even$without$the$determinate$content$of$Aristotle’s$death,$would$still$stand$on$
its$own$filled$with$some$other$content$or$simply$empty.57$
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$It$is$a$standard$complaint$leveled$against$Hegel$(as$against$Kant),$that$he$failed$to$distinguish$the$
cognitive$act$of$judging$from$the$logical$content$of$such$an$act,$i.e.,$the$proposition$expressed.$The$basis$
for$this$claim$involves$ignoring$the$possibility$that$treating$the$proposition$as$the$residue$of$cognition$
represents$an$insight$rather$than$an$oversight.$
$
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$

$

227$

What$would$advance$the$propositional$chronicle$of$Aristotle’s$death$to$the$status$of$
judgment$would,$for$example,$be$a$universalized$use$of$the$expression$“the$fourth$year$
of$the$115th$Olympiad”$as$a$determination$of$Aristotle’s$death,$and,$as$we$have$
repeatedly$seen,$such$determination$begins$in$difference,$with$the$hypothesized$
negation$of$the$determining$concept,$and$its$corresponding$division$from$the$subject$to$
be$determined,$in$this$case$Aristotle’s,death.$In$other$words,$what$would$be$required$is$
overcoming$the$presumed$negation$of$what$is$not$specifically$identical$with$that$death$
is$its$time,$place,$significance,$etc.,$although$these$are$precisely$the$coordinates$through$
which$Aristotle’s$death$must$be$delineated.$The$judgment$would,$in$effect,$express$the$
fact$that$Aristotle’s$death$is$a$fourth9year9of9the9115th9Olympiad$kind$of$thing,$or$that$it$
falls$under$the$universal$fourth9year9of9the9115th9Olympiad.$However,$it$would$do$so$not$
by$citing$the$established$subsumption$of$the$former$under$the$latter,$but$precisely$
through$successively$negating$itself$as$identical$to$its$time,$place,$significance,$etc.$
$

Yet$the$difference$between$the$immobile$proposition$and$the$determining$

judgment$is$surely$not$simply$a$matter$of$how$the$terms$of$the$proposition$are$formally$
construed.$The$“doubt”$Hegel$speaks$of$here,$like$the$interrogative$background$Frege$
points$to$in$bringing$out$the$distinctive$character$of$assertoric$engagement,58$reflects$a$
grounding$not$in$skeptical$unrest$but$in$semantic$indeterminacy.$Judgment$occurs$by$
way$of$restoring$or$specifying$the$indeterminate$content$and$truth$of$a$given$
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$See$Frege’s$“Negation,”$in$The,Frege,Reader,$ed.$Michael$Beaney$(Oxford,$U.K.;$Cambridge,$Mass.:$
Blackwell$Publishers,$1997),$346O361,$discussed$below.$
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proposition,$or$rather$by$way$of$employing$a$proposition$to$establish$a$determinate$
content.$Whether$the$starting$point$is$epistemic$or$semantic$privation,$it$is$clear$that$
the$interest$and$vantage$of$the$speaking$subject$or$consciousness$is$pivotal.$It$is$also$
clear$that$how$we$formally$construe$the$elements$of$the$proposition$is$for$Hegel$a$
matter$of$their$conscious,$historical$recruitment.$
It$is$for$this$reason$that$Hegel,$although$he$initially$identifies$the$general$form$of$
the$proposition$as$“The,individual,is,the,universal,”$which$reflects$the$paradox$present$in$
the$basic$order$of$cognition,$insists$that$the$elements$of$the$judgment,$which$are$jointly$
involved$in$the$determination$of$the$concept,$are$logically$fluid.$Thus$initially$“the$
subject$is$indeed$an$existent$or$the$singular,$while$the$predicate$is$the$universal.$But$
because$the$judgment$connects$the$two,$and$the$subject$is$determined$as$universal$by$
the$predicate,$the$subject$is$then$the$universal.”59$Indeed,$as$we$learn$later$on,$through$
the$inferential$movement$of$the$syllogism,$subject$and$predicate$terms$are$each$capable$
of$assuming$any$of$the$three$possible$logical$quantities$–$singular,$particular$and$
universal.$What’s$more,$the$full$determination$of$the$concept$occurs$precisely$through$
the$exchange$of$quantity$that$marks$the$transition$from$one$syllogism$to$the$next.$The$
present$point,$however,$is$just$that$logical$form,$for$Hegel,$is$an$artifact$of$judgment.$It$
is$fundamentally$a$matter$of$cognitive,$conceptual$and$inferential$engagement,$which$is$
to$say$that$is$the$product$of$both$understanding$and$reason,$in$Kantian$terms.$
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This$way$of$distinguishing$judgment$from$proposition$is$crucial$to$understanding$

both$the$form$and$the$mobility$of$Hegel’s$aphorism,$the$synoptic$truth$of$Observing,
Reason.$In$particular,$as$regards$its$propositional$form$there$is$an$apparent$irregularity$
worth$examining,$namely,$the$clear$absence$of$the$formal$signature$of$infinite,
judgment,$the$sign$of$negation.$The$standard$form$of$such$propositions$is$thus:$X,is,non9
Y.$Yet$all$of$Hegel’s$examples$of$infinite$judgment$in$the$two$Logics$as$well,$e.g.,$“the$
elephant$is$not$a$rose,”$emphasize$the$incommensurability$of$subject$and$predicate,$
rather$than$the$negative$form$of$the$predicate$itself.$What$is$infinite$in$this$instance,$for$
example,$“rose,”$is$so$by$virtue$of$its$relation$to$the$subject,$not$by$virtue$of$its$logical$
form.$This$is$demonstrably$not,$however,$because$Hegel$is$inattentive$to$the$traditional$
form$of$such$judgments.$Rather,$it$is$because$he$thinks$the$defining$element$of$negation$
in$a$judgment$consists$in$the$constitution$of$the$predicate$as$a$determination,,whether$
or$not$that$element$is$an$inscriptional$feature$of$the$term$or$not.$From$this$perspective,$
the$negative$form$of$the$infinite$predicate$is$just$the$lexical$record$of$its$cognitive$
constitution.$
Thus$although$"The$spirit$is$a$bone"$(like$“The$elephant$is$not$a$rose”)$lacks$the$
standard$form$of$an$infinite$judgment,$it$is$nonetheless$logically$infinite,$and$its$
canonical$rendering$is$attested$in$Hegel's$subsequent$remarks$on$this$judgment$towards$
the$end$of$the$Phenomenology:$
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And$we$saw$Observing$Reason$at$its$peak$express$its$specific$character$in$the$infinite$
judgment$that$the$being$of$the$'I'$is$a$Thing...That$judgment,$taken$as$it$stands$is$
nonOspiritual$or$rather$is$the$nonOspiritual$itself.60$
$
The$logical$form$of$“The$Spirit$is$a$bone”$is$thus$made$explicit$in$“The$Spirit$is$a$nonO
Spirit,”$which$exhibits$the$recognizable$shape$of$the$infinite$judgment:$X,is,non9X.$It$
nonetheless$remains$a$question$in$what$sense$the$predicate$“bone”$itself$is$to$be$
regarded$as$infinite,$and$in$particular$as$the$infinite$predicate$“nonOSpirit.”$
In$the$hyperOempirical$context$of$Observing,Reason$in$which$this$proposition$is$
produced,$a$Spirit$or$consciousness$is$a$non9spirit$in$the$precise$sense$that$it$is$reducible$
to$the$material$evidence$available$to$direct$observation,$and$so$is$not$in$fact$a$spiritual$
substance$at$all,$but$rather$a$thing,$albeit$a$thing$determinately$realized$as$the$skull$that$
serves$as$evidence$for$the$spiritual$substance$it$contains.$That$negation$produces$this$
specific$content$is$thus$a$consequence$of$the$broader$discursive$environment$in$which$it$
operates,$and$from$which$it$proceeds,$in$this$case$the$preceding$discourse$of$Self9
consciousness,$and$the$narrow$predicative$structure$to$which$it$must$conform.$In$other$
words,$“bone”$is$the$infima$species$of$thing$arrived$at$within$the$discourse$of$empirical$
reason,$and$as$such$is$the$determinate,$defining$content,$within$this$discourse,$of$spirit.$
But$as$that$determinate$content,$it$is$precisely$what$the$negation$of$spirit,$what$non9
spirit$amounts$to$in$this$discursive$environment.$
As$I$have$argued$in$the$earlier$chapters$of$this$dissertation,$the$contextual$
character$of$negation,$in$its$original,$determinative$guise,$is$fundamental$to$its$
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operation.$In$the$categorical$hierarchy$of$Porphyrian$predicables$(i.e.,$that$of$genera$and$
species)$that$Boethius$bequeaths$to$scholastic$philosophy,61$negation$is$an$ordering$
principle,$determining$the$taxonomy$of$genera$and$species,$descending$from$being$to$
infima,species,$and,$to$the$extent$that$these$are$conceptually$localizable,$to$individuals$
as$well.$Within$the$scholastic$schema$of$the$Porphyrian$tree,$man,$for$example,$is$
successively$identifiable$with,$and$differentiated$from,$animal,,rational,$and$mortal.$We$
might$say,$albeit$in$a$decidedly$Hegelian$idiom,$that$man$is$in$turn$the$non9man$that$is$
identified$with$each$of$the$successive$determinations$of$its$definition$or$essence.$
In$Hegel’s$Phenomenology,$as$in$the$two$Logics,$the$context$of$determination$is$
no$longer$the$regimented$array$of$eternal$categories$and$predicables$(just$as$it$is$not,yet$
such$a$thing$for$Plato).$Here$negation$operates$from$within$the$discourse$that$is$
contingently$in$play,$and$the$results$of$its$application$are$thus$immanent62$to$that$
discourse.63$As$Hegel$puts$this,$applauding$Heraclitus$for$recognizing$so$important$a$
truth,$“the$moment$of$negativity$is$immanent,$and$that$is$what$the$concept$of$
philosophy$as$such$is$concerned$with.”64$It$is$this$immanence$of$negation$and$concept$
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$See$in$particular$Boethius’$De,Divisione,$ed.$John$Magee,$and$Porphyre$Isagoge,$ed.$Alain$de$Libera.$
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$The$immanence$of$negation$is$of$course$related$to$the$broader$immanence$of$determination$and$thus$
dialectic$itself.$A$useful$discussion$of$the$latter$is$to$be$found$in$Karin$De$Boer’s$On,Hegel:,The,Sway,of,the,
Negative$(Basingstoke;$New$York:$Palgrave$Macmillan,$2010).$
$
63
$In$effect,$negation$runs$through,$and$is$governed$by,$the$deductive$machinery$of$syllogistic$logic$itself,$
removed$from$the$unproven$structures$of$categories$and$predicables.$This$part$of$the$story$is$filled$out$in$
the$next$section$of$the$present$chapter.$
$
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$G.$W.$F.$Hegel,$Lectures,on,the,History,of,Philosophy,,Volume,1,$trans.$E.$S.$Haldane$(Lincoln$and$
London:$University$of$Nebraska$Press,$1995),$284.$$$
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alike$that$explains$not$only$why$“The$Spirit$is$a$bone”$is$itself$infinite,$but$why$it$recurs$
under$several$guises$before$it$finally$emerges,$at$the$end$of$the$Phenomenology,$in$an$
absolute$form,$the$accomplished$selfOidentity$of$concept$and$consciousness$in$the$Idea,$
as$“’I’$=$‘I’.”$What$remains$difficult$to$understand,$and$what$I$will$attempt$to$explain$
briefly$below,$is$that$for$Hegel$the$incoherent$proposition$with$which$we$began$and$the$
seeming$tautology$with$which$the$Phenomenology,ends$are$not$merely$alternative$
engagements$with$the$same$infinite,proposition,$but$that$in$some$sense$they$are$the$
same,infinite,judgment,$expressing$the$same,$albeit$diversely$determined,$truth!$
An$initial$explanation$is$to$be$found$in$the$observation$that$the$“progress$of$
judgment$into$a$diversity$of$judgments,”$that$is,$the$movement$of$the$Phenomenlogy$as$
a$whole,$is$just$the$“progressive$determination$of$the$concept”65$from$which$the$original$
judgment$flows.$The$seeming$tautology$at$the$close$of$the$Phenomenology,$in$other$
words,$is$the$truth$of$the$seeming$barbarism$in$Observing,Reason,$owing$to$the$
conceptual$limitations$that$define$each$stage$of$philosophical$and$cultural$development$
through$which$Spirit$is$gradually$determined,$though$it$can$only$be$recognized$as$such$
from$the$standpoint$of$absolute,knowing$to$which$the$Phenomenology$finally$accedes.$
Indeed,$the$Calvary$(Schädelstätte),$literally$the,place,of,skulls$(or$bones),$of$absolute$
Spirit,$with$which$the$Phenomenology$ends$suggests$not$that$the$“Spirit$is$a$bone”$has$
been$superseded,$but$that,$in$the$context$of$Science$(Wissenschaft),$i.e.,$philosophy$
properly$conceived,$it$is$retained$but$elevated$to$the$form$of$the$pure,$epistemically$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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realized$selfOidentity$of$Spirit$or$Consciousness.$It$remains$true,$in$other$words,$that$the,
Spirit,is,a,bone,$but$here$in$the$context$of$Hegelian$Science,$the$infinite$predicate$bone,$
as$nonOSpirit,$is$the$repository$of$the$totality$of$determinations$with$which$Spirit$is$
individually$nonOidentical,$but$collectively$united.$
The$three$forms$of$the$“The$Spirit$is$a$Bone”$are$reformulated$in$the$final$pages$
of$the$Phenomenology,as$"The$'I'$is$a$thing,"$"The$thing$is$an$'I',"$and$"'I'$=$'I',"66$and$the$
passage$from$the$first$to$the$last$demonstrates$precisely$the$economy$of$negative$
predication$as$conceptual$realization$in$Hegel.$The$identity$of$subject$and$thing$in$the$
first$judgment$yields$an$‘I’$as$a$thing$in$the$second,$which$in$turn,$in$the$philosophical$
transition$from$The,Ethical,Order$to$Morality$negates$itself$as$mere$instrumentality.$The$
negation$of$the$subject$as$thing$is$therefore,$within$the$discourse$of$Morality,$the$
reestablishment$of$the$‘I’$or$subject$as$“moral$selfOconsciousness,”67$as$expressed$in$the$
judgment$“The$thing$is$an$‘I.’”$This$morally$selfOconscious$subject$will$in$turn$be$negated,$
but$in$the$context$of$philosophy$proper,$that$is,$in$the$context$of$Hegel’s$own$
Wissenschaft,$negation$will$yield$the$consummate$philosophical$subject,$the$Self$as$
accomplished$epistemic$agent,$or$as$Hegel$puts$it$quite$simply,$the$subject$qua$Absolute,
Knowing.68$
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$This$is$obviously$a$drastically$abbreviated$account$of$the$course$of$infinite$judgment$in$the$
Phenomenology.$A$more$complete$account,$presented$in$part$in$the$next$section,$depends$upon$making$
clear$the$deductive$structure$traversed,$which$Hegel$thinks$has$to$be$understood$in$syllogistic$terms.$
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The$emptying$out$or$externalization$(Entäußerung),and$reconstitution$of$the$

subject$(both$as$consciousness$and$as$determinable$concept)$in$its$infinite$predicate,$
exhibited$in$this$epitome$of$Hegelian$dialectic,$demonstrates$at$once$the$philosophical$
role$of$infinite$judgment$and$the$nature$of$the$predicative$act$as$such$for$Hegel.$The$
emptying$and$replenishment$of$the$concept$in$its$propositional$expansion$is$the$very$
essence$of$discursivity$for$Hegel,$in$that$every$philosophically$relevant$phenomenon,$
shape$or$form$is$precisely$a$static$impression$or$representation$of$thought$itself,$
realized$within$the$interval$between$kenosis$and$plenitude.$But$then$this$is$to$say$that$
semantic$engagement,$or,$as$we$might$put$it$more$simply,$the$thinking$of$Spirit$or$
consciousness,$is$both$the$"restless$process$of$superseding$itself,$or$negativity,"69$the$
continuous$provision$of$determinations,$and$the$cessation$of$philosophical$thought$in$
the$proposition$through$which$thinking$finds$its$moments$of$dead$repose.$Philosophical$
thinking$is$thus,$strictly$speaking,$the$exchange$between$concept$and$proposition,$and$
as$such,$it$is$both$Spirit$and$Bone.$
The$immanence$of$conceptual$determination$and$of$truth$has$regularly$been$
remarked$upon$by$recent$commentators$on$Hegel,$and$is$variously$conceived$in$terms$
of$communal$consensus$(Forster70),$discursive$coherence$(Longuenesse71),$or$pragmatic$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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$See$M.$Forster,$The,Idea,of,Hegel’s,Phenomenology.$
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$See$B.$Longuenesse,$Hegel’s,Critique,of,Metaphysics,$translated$by$Nicole$J.$Simek$(Cambridge:$
Cambridge$University$Press,$2007).$
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attunement$(Brandom72).$What$I$would$point$out,$however,$is$that$the$fact$of$
communal$dependence,$discursive$immanence,$etc.,$entails$neither$the$pragmatism$
insisted$on$by$Brandom$nor$the$varieties$of$naturalism$promoted$by$Forster,$Pinkard,$
Pippin,$et,al.$If$the$resources$and$contours$of$a$given$concept$are$given$by$the$discourse$
in$which$it$occurs,$or$its$negative$determination$is$arrived$at$through$a$community$in$
which$that$discourse$is$articulated,$this$only$shows$how$the$truth$of$the$concept$is$
reached,$not$that$its$truth$amounts$to$or$is$fundamentally$grounded$in$the$path$it$takes$
to$reach$it.$Analogously,$that$a$proof$is$required$to$make$sense$of$a$mathematical$
proposition,$or$to$demonstrate$its$truth,$does$not$thereby$show$that$the$truth$or$
meaning$of$that$proposition$consists$in$its$demonstration$(though$of$course$intuitionists$
and$constructivists$will$insist$otherwise).$
I$have$thus$far$tried$to$show$that$for$Hegel$negation$operates$within$the$
contingent$array$of$concepts$that$defines$the$philosophical$discourse$of$a$given$
historical$moment.$Negation$is$in$this$sense$historically$immanent,$and$so$generates$
conceptual$and$propositional$determinations$and$truths$that$are$similarly$immanent.$
However,$the$fact$that$negation$is$not$applied$against$the$backdrop$of$an$established$
conceptual$firmament,$whether$this$be$the$Aristotelian$Decalogue,73$a$Porphyrian$tree$
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72

$See$R.$Brandom,$Tales,of,the,Mighty,Dead:,Historical,Essays,in,the,Metaphysics,of,Intentionality$
(Cambridge,$Mass.:$Harvard$University$Press,$2002).,
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or$the$Kantian$table$of$categories,$should$not$be$taken$to$indicate$that$truth$itself$is$
contingent$or$relative.$$
The$progress$of$infinite$judgment$exhibits$an$internal$necessity$that$I$have$tried$
to$make$out$in$the$present$section,$and$in$the$more$universal$progress$of$logic$Hegel$is$
at$pains$to$demonstrate$in$his$Logic,$and$which$will$occupy$us$in$the$following$sections$
of$this$chapter.$In$my$view,$and$as$I$hope$the$overall$thrust$of$this$dissertation$serves$to$
establish,$this$necessity$suggests$a$semantic$and$epistemic$Platonism$that$is$quite$at$
odds$with$most$contemporary$views$of$Hegel$and$perhaps$with$Hegel’s$own$avowed$
philosophical$disposition.$However,$it$is$only$in$the$light$of$the$remarkable$reconceiving$
of$Aristotelian$syllogistic$undertaken$in$his$Logic$that$this$Platonism$can$properly$be$
made$out,$and$that$Hegel’s$achievement,$in$freeing$logic$and$metaphysics$from$the$
constraints$of$its$traditional$categorical$setting,$can$be$adequately$assessed.$
Section(Five.(Hegel(versus(Frege(on(Noetic(and(Semantic(Engagement(
However,$before$turning$to$the$syllogistic$reconstitution$of$the$concept,$let$me$
try$to$say$something$more$about$the$relationship$of$negation$to$formalism$and$the$
invisible$ground$of$predication$and$truth,$by$way$of$a$comparison.$The$comparison$is$
illuminating$because$Frege$makes$the$issue$of$cognitive$engagement$the$centerpiece$of$
the$logical$enterprise,$where$this$remains$implicit$in$Hegel,$although$he$thinks$it$is$
assertion$rather$than$negation$through$which$such$engagement$is$undertaken.$Frege$is$
also$committed,$like$Hegel,$to$isolating$the$formal$and$logical$constraints$on$language$
without$abandoning$the$notion$that,$as$an$expressive,$not$a$productive,$instrument,$
$
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language,$whether$logically$pure$or$errant,$is$constrained$by$the$things$and$
circumstances$it$is$intended$to$be$about.$Unlike$the$unapologetic$formalists$he$
contended$with$Frege$thus$thinks$there$are$ontological$constraints$and$implications$
associated$with$both$formal$and$natural$languages.$In$his$Begriffsschrift$and$the$twoO
tiered$semantics$he$develops$to$support$it$we$see$what$a$more$or$less$purely$logical$
approach$to$negation$looks$like,$but$also$what$metaphysical$issues$nonetheless$seem$to$
remain,$even$when$these$are$formally$bracketed.$If$Frege$dismisses$negation$in$this$
context,$he$also$shows$us$the$importance$and$difficulties$involved$in$expressing$the$very$
function$Hegel$identifies$with$it.$
$

In$his$remarkable$essay$on$negation,$entitled$simply$"Negation,"$Frege$argues$

that$the$content$or$sense$(Sinn),$i.e.,$the$thought,$of$what$he$calls$a$"propositional"$
interrogative,$i.e.,$one$that$questions$the$truth$or$falsity$of$a$proposition$and$is$thus$
amenable$to$a$yes$or$no$answer,$can$be$either$true$or$false,$but$that$its$falsity$cannot$
consist$in$its$not$being,$in$its$not$in$particular$being,a,thought,$since$if$false$contents$had$
no$being,$no$questions$containing$false$claims$could$meaningfully$be$asked,$and$thus$no$
genuine$inquiry$could$be$undertaken,74$because$only$questions$with$known$affirmative$
answers,$i.e.,$those$with$true$senses,$would$be$considered$wellOformed,$and$thus$no$
question$would$ever$arise$once$a$thought$was$entertained;$the$same$would$apply,$and$
with$perhaps$more$severe$consequences$for$scientific$endeavor,$to$counterfactuals,$
which$presume$the$falsity$of$their$antecedents.$In$fact,$Frege$maintains$that$thoughts$
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are$precisely$what$truth$and$falsity$properly$apply$to,$precisely$that$in$declarative$
speech$for$which$"the$question$of$truth$arises."75$
$

He$also$maintains$that$thoughts$are$objective$and$eternal,$and$that$their$truth$

values$are$equally$so.$It$follows,$according$to$Frege,$that$sentences$involving$indexicals$
such$as$"I,"$"now"$or$"here,"$etc.,$do$not$express$thoughts,$for$example,$because$of$the$
irreducibly$specific$and$ephemeral$access$each$speaker$has$to$himO$or$herself,$though$it$
is$puzzling$they$can$be$made$to$express$thoughts$by$replacing$the$indexical$element$
with$rigidly$referring$expressions$of$time,$place$and$person,$and$so$on.$This$view$finds$a$
curious$parallel$in$Hegel's$argument$in$the$Sense,Certainty$section$of$the$
Phenomenology$that$the$immediacy$of$cognition$we$anticipate$in$restricting$our$
epistemic$claims$to$indexical$ostension$in$fact$yields$nothing$of$the$sort.$
$

Yet$aside$from$telling$us$that$there$are$both$true$and$false$thoughts,$that$a$false$

thought$has$as$much$being$as$a$true$one,$and,$in$the$roughly$contemporary$essay$
“Thought,”$that$thoughts$are$not$ideas$or$bound$by$the$specific$indices$of$
demonstratives,$pronouns$and$adverbs,$that$is$by$the$subject,$time$and$place$of$
utterance,$Frege$tells$us$little$about$what$kind$of$being$it$is$that$they$do$have.$What$he$
is$interested$in$establishing$is$that$negation$presents$no$special$problem$for$his$account$
of$sentential$sense$or$his$account$of$assertion$and$judgment.$In$particular,$if$he$is$right$
that$negation,$in$its$most$common$sentential$use,$simply$switches$the$truth$value$of$a$
given$thought,$then$as$long$as$falsehood$is$not$a$problem,$neither$is$negation.$On$the$
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other$hand,$if$we$want$to$preserve$the$standard$truthOfunctional$operation$of$negation$
then$we$have$to$accept$the$unproblematic$existence$of$false,thoughts:$whether$they$are$
the$starting$points$or$termini$of$a$logical$operation$there$can$be$no$such$operation$
without$them.$
$

It$is$perhaps$surprising$in$the$first$place$to$find$Frege$concerned$with$what$would$

appear$to$be$metaphysical$issues,$but$he$follows$Leibniz$not$only$in$his$attempt$to$
develop$a$lingua,characterica,$a$universal$language$fashioned$for$scientific$discourse,$
but$in$embracing$the$metaphysical$implications$of$the$semantic$puzzles$he$is$committed$
to$solving$in$the$service$of$constructing$such$a$language.$There$must$be$senses$(Sinne),$
for$example,$because$the$contentful$character$of$identity$statements$requires$that$there$
be$more$to$the$terms$that$make$up$such$statements$than$their$reference.$In$this$
instance,$there$must$be$false$senses/thoughts$because$counterfactuals,$propositional$
questions$incorporating$false$propositions,$and$the$truthOfunctional$use$of$negation$are$
both$commonplace$and$intelligible,$and$ought$to$remain$so$in$any$logic$we$hope$to$put$
to$mathematical$or$scientific$use.$In$the$end,$however,$while$we$know$that$negation,$
truth$and$falsehood$both$belong$to$the$level$of$thought,$we$never$learn$from$Frege$
what$kind$of$being$thoughts$have$so$as$to$be$subject$to$such$modification.$Nonetheless$
we$do$see$how$the$senseOreference$distinction$helps$him$out:$falsehood$exists$at$the$
level$of$the$thought,$which$is$to$say$it$exists$at$the$level$sense,$not$reference.$So$we$
seem$to$have$a$way$of$avoiding$the$thorny$problem$of$nonObeing$by$embracing$an$
ontology$of$thoughts$or$intensions.$A$falsehood$doesn't$represent$anything$that$is$not$
$

$

240$

the$case;$it$is$simply$a$thought$that$isn't$true.$But$rather$than$being$a$shortcoming$of$
falsehood,$this$is$just$an$indication$of$the$inadequacy$of$representation,as$a$semantic$
relation.$A$truth$doesn't$represent$anything$that$is$the$case$either;$it$is$simply$a$thought$
that$is$true.$
$

A$few$things$are$significant$about$Frege's$account.$First,$it$divorces$questions$of$

truth$from$questions$of$existence.$Second,$it$places$negation$outside$the$domains$of$
both$judgment$and$being.$Negation,$here,$as$for$much$of$the$scholastic$tradition,$is$a$
creature$of$intension$or$thought,$an$ens,rationis.$Finally,$though$this$is$only$discussed$in$
the$companion$essay$"Thought,"$there$are$all$sorts$of$sentential$elements$that$have$no$
effect$on$the$identity$of$the$thought$expressed.$For$example,$Frege$tells$us,$"Alfred$has$
still$not$come"$expresses$the$same$thought$as$"Alfred$has$not$come,"$since$the$fact$that$
no$one$is$expecting$Alfred$would$not$render$the$former$false,$though$the$latter$"hints$
(deutet)"$at$this$expectation.$Though$I$shall$return$to$this$at$greater$length$below,$the$
notion$that$sentential$expressions$are$more$fine$grained$than$those$of$thought,$seems$
deeply$problematic.$In$particular,$one$might$argue$that$the$truth$conditions$and$thus$
the$implicative$range$of$"$Alfred$has$still$not$come$"$are$importantly$different$from$"$
Alfred$has$not$come,"$since$the$first$is$in$fact$equivalent$to$"Alfred$was$expected$to$have$
already$come$and$he$has$not$come"$and$the$second$isn’t$(though$context$might$make$it$
so).$To$say$that$expectation$is$not$part$of$the$truth$conditions$of$either$statement$is$to$
miss$the$thought$expressed$by$the$first,$or$at$any$rate$to$beg$the$question$whether$or$
not$words$like$"still"$affect$the$truth$value$of$a$proposition,$and$more$generally$the$
$

$

241$

question$as$to$what$grammatical,$syntactical$and$lexical$elements$do$and$do$not$have$
their$correlates$in$truth$conditions.That$we$are$so$accustomed$to$conceiving$of$logic$is$
not$inevitable$and$indeed$has$a$specific$historical$provenance:$Frege's$Begriffsschrift.$
But$what$I$hope$to$show$in$the$second$half$of$this$paper$is$that$the$model$of$logic$as$an$
instrument$of$formal$clarification$and$the$model$of$logic$Hegel$attempts$to$develop,$
though$radically$different,$derive$from$a$common,$if$differently$construed,$insight,$
namely,$that$thought$as$such$and$logic$as$its$more$or$less$formal$expression,$insofar$as$
they$are$concerned$with$truth,$are$necessarily$concerned$with$the$activity$of$attribution,$
i.e.,$with$a$species$of$cognitive$engagement$that$is$specific$to$holding,true.$Moreover,$if$
we$understand$why$this$insight$gives$rise$to$the$formalism$Frege$introduces$but$
nonetheless$resists$developing$to$its$final$conclusion,$we$can$better$understand$why$it$
also$gives$rise$to$the$more$thoroughgoing$conceptual$logic$Hegel$will$attempt$to$set$
forth.$Moreover,$Frege$gives$us$an$explicit$and$clear$justification$for$the$primacy$of$
assertion$that$is$nowhere$articulated,$though$it$is$often$implied,$in$Hegel.$
$

But,$as$hinted$at$earlier,$the$more$substantive$reason$for$turning$to$Frege$is$this:$

While$the$puzzles$of$metaphysical,$ethical$and$semantic$access$that$take$center$stage$in$
Kantian$transcendentalism$lie$clearly$in$the$background$of$much$of$Hegel's$critical$
recapitulation$of$philosophy,$the$formalist$consequences$of$the$transcendental$program$
are$much$more$clearly$seen$in$Frege,$who$is$justifiably$viewed$as$the$culmination$of$
Kantian$formalism.$Because$Frege$is$focused$precisely$on$the$relationship$of$
propositional$form$to$truth,$he$sees$explicitly,$as$Hegel$does$implicitly,$that$the$
$
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categorical$form$of$the$proposition$and$judgment$has$to$be$overcome$although$it$
remains$the$fundamental$configuration$of$thought.$However,$Frege,$as$we$shall$
discover,$seems$ultimately$unable$to$dispense$with$the$predicative$model$of$judgment,$
even$as$he$declares$otherwise.$Hegel,$I$want$to$argue,$sees$that$the$more$profound$
problem$with$propositional$logic$is$that$it$treats$propositions$as$the$static$loci$of$truth,$
and$attempts$to$show$us$why$no$such$treatment$is$viable.$Frege's$masterwork$on$the$
logic$of$the$concept,$his$Begriffsschrift,$demonstrates$this$as$well,$although$it$is$of$
course$intended$to$demonstrate$quite$the$opposite.$In$other$words,$it$shows$us$what$a$
purely$formal$accommodation$of$truth9directedness$looks$like,$and$in$doing$so$it$shows$
why,$in$principle,$such$a$project$is$unworkable.$
$

$

In$the$paper$that$takes$its$title$from$the$formal$language$it$describes,$a$

Begriffsschrift,$literally$a$concept9script,$Frege$sets$out$the$rudiments$of$what$he$hoped$
would$function$as$a$lingua,characterica,$a$language$free$from$the$logical$and$lexical$
ambiguities$of$ordinary$language,$and$sufficiently$rich$to$express$any$proposition$of$the$
mathematics$of$numbers$(arithmetic$and$analysis,$to$begin$with)$and$provide$for$the$
transparent$deduction$of$its$theorems.$Like$Hegel,$Frege$thinks$one$of$the$principal$
failings$of$traditional$categorical$logic$lies$in$its$treatment$of$the$proposition$as$a$
concatenation,$and$thus$first$the$decomposition,$of$subject$and$predicate$terms,$which$
leaves$unexpressed$and$inexplicable$the$unity$of$the$truth,at$which$attributive$judgment$
aims.$

$

$
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To$address$this$shortcoming$he$recasts$the$proposition$as$the$combination$of$an$

unsaturated,concept$and$its$correlative$object,$an$object$that$saturates,the$gap$in$the$
concept$so$to$speak.$Frege$supposes$that$so$formulated$the$composite$surface$of$the$
proposition$exhibits$the$structural$unity$required$to$express$truth$(or$falsity).$Yet$in$
addition$to$the$concept/object$reformulation,$he$includes$amongst$the$logical$symbols$
of$his$concept9script,$along$with$those$for$quantification,$conjunction,$disjunction,$
concepts,$etc.,$a$right$turnstile$symbol$"⊢,"$$which$is$intended$to$express$the$assertoric$
use$of$the$proposition$to$which$it$is$affixed.$To$assert$P,$in$Frege's$view,$as$we$shall$see,$
is$to$employ$P$in$the$service$of$truth,$to$posit$it$as$a$name$of$the$True.$What$then$is$the$
relationship$between$these$two$distinct$means$of$exhibiting$semantic$readiness,$i.e.,$an$
aptness$for$expressing$truth?$
$

In$its$initial$presentation$this$assertion$sign$or$judgment$stroke$(Urteilstrich)$is$in$

fact$treated$syntactically$as$a$"combination$of$signs,"$the$horizontal$stroke$indicating$the$
propositional$unity$of$what$followed,$the$vertical$stroke$expressing$its$"affirmation$
(Bejahung)."$In$subsequent$discussions,$Frege$preferred$to$speak$of$the$horizontal$
stroke$as$a$kind$of$mapping$relation$from$propositions$to$truth$values.$However,$since$
the$unity$proper$to$the$expression$of$truth$was$what$the$concept/object$ligature$was$
supposed$to$exhibit$in$the$first$place,$anything$that$exhibits$such$a$unity$would$seem$to$
be$already$so$mapped,$in$the$sense$that$it$is$formally$oriented$towards$truth,$and$it$
seems$unlikely$any$more$robust$sense$of$mapping$can$be$thought$to$be$established$
formally.$Thus$whether$it$more$directly$confers$the$unity$required$for$the$expression$of$
$
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truth$or$points$an$already$suitably$unified$expression$in$the$appropriate$semantic$
direction$it$would$appear$that$this$part$of$the$assertion$sign,$at$least,$does$what$the$
propositional$notation$already$provides$for.$
$

As$for$the$affirmative$component$of$the$assertion$sign,$it$at$least$seems$to$

express$what$no$other$symbol$of$the$Begriffsschrift,expresses.$Yet$it$is$with$reference$to$
precisely$this$component$that$the$assertion$sign$as$such$is$regularly$dismissed$as$doing$
work$that$is$already$done$without$it,$or$doing$something$that$nothing$at$the$purely$
formal$level$is$capable$of$doing$at$all.$But$if$it$is$true$that$the$work$it$is$designed$to$do$is$
already$being$done$without$it,$then$it$must$be$true$that$there$is$some,extra$bit$of$work$
being$done,$whatever$it$amounts$to,$and$something$that$is$already$doing$it.$At$worst$
then,$such$a$sign$would$then$make$explicit$what$is$already$implicitly$under$way,$which$
would$at$worst$earn$it$the$charge$of$redundancy.$
$

Yet$there$are$difficulties$with$the$sign$under$any,$including$the$most$benign,$

construals$of$its$meaning.$Firstly,$although$it$is$part$of$the$logical$formula$used$to$
express$a$proposition$to$which$it$is$attached,$the$assertion$sign$is$not$considered$part$of$
that$or$any$other$proposition.$It$is$instead$a$formal$constituent$of$an$expression$that$
does$not$enter$into$its$meaning,$or,$in$terms$of$the$distinction$between$sense$(Sinn)$and$
reference$(Bedeutung)$Frege$is$yet$to$develop,$one$that$makes$no$contribution$to$the$
thought$or$truth,value,$respectively,$$of$the$proposition$it$introduces.$Presumably,$
concept$and$object$names,$when$properly$combined,$exhibit$the$contribution$each$
makes$to$the$unit$sense$of$the$proposition$they$together$constitute.$Though$meaning$
$
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(Bedeutung)$receives$no$explicit$discussion$in$the$Begriffsschrift,$Frege$seems$to$have$
thought$the$sense/reference$distinction$and$the$twoOtiered$semantics$it$defines$already$
latent$there,$as$he$makes$clear$in$a$passage$from$the$Grundgesetze,der,Arithmetik$in$
which$he$offers$a$summary$of$the$expressive$resources$of$his$concept9script:$
Thus$it$is$shown$that$our$eight$primitive$names$have$a$Bedeutung,$and$hence$that$
the$same$holds$too$for$all$names$legitimately$constructed$from$them.$However,$not$
only$a$Bedeutung,$but$also$a$sense$(Sinn)$belongs$to$all$names$legitimately$formed$
from$our$signs.$Every$such$name$of$a$truthOvalue$expresses$a$sense,$a$thought.$That$
is,$by$our$stipulations,$it$is$determined$under$what$conditions$the$name$refers$to$
[Bedeutet]$the$True.$The$sense$of$this$name,$the$thought,$is$the$thought$that$these$
conditions$are$fulfilled.76$
He$defines$"name"$a$little$earlier$in$§26$as$"a$sign$[Zeichen],$whether$simple$or$complex,$
that$is$intended$to$refer$to$[bedeuten]$an$object,$but$not$a$sign$that$merely$indicates$
[andeutet]$an$object;"$the$eight$names$he$has$in$mind$here$are$signs$of$firstO,$secondO$
and$thirdOorder$functions,$with$one$or$two$argument$places.$He$also$defines$a$separate$
class$of$signs,$namely$"Marken"$which$seem$to$be$names$in$which$constituent$object$
and$function$names$have$been$replaced$with$appropriate$variables.$In$this$same$section$
he$remarks$that$the$judgment$stroke$(assertion$sign)$is$neither$a$name$nor$a$Marke,$but$
a$"sign$of$its$own$special$kind."$
$

In$other$words,$the$judgment$stroke/assertion$sign$is$a$significant,$i.e.,$signifying,$

symbol$that$seems$to$say$something$without$meaning$anything,$for$if$it$did$mean$
something$it$would$either$be$a$constituent$of$a$secondOorder$proposition$or$of$a$
complex$of$symbols$that$fell$short$of$amounting$to$such$a$thing,$in$which$case$it$would$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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serve$to$obstruct$rather$than$facilitate$judgment$and$so$cease$to$function$as$an$
assertion$sign.$In$either$case,$it$would$seem$to$work$against$the$unification$of$the$
proposition$Frege's$notation$is$supposed$to$exhibit,$if$not$establish.$
$

The$types$of$functions$Frege$is$specifically$interested$in$are$concepts,$which$he$

defines$as$functions$whose$values$are$truth$values.$Though$Frege$is$not$consistent$in$his$
use$of$the$term$Satz,$which$is$usually$translated$proposition,$but$is$also$the$term$used$
for$sentence,$if$we$understand$by$a$sentence$or$proposition$a$saturated$concept,$i.e.,$a$
concept$whose$argument$place$has$been$filled$by$an$appropriate$object$name,$then$a$
sentence/proposition$is$just$the$name$of$a$truth$value,$either$the$True$or$the$False,$
depending$on$whether$or$not$the$object$referred$to$by$the$argument$or$object$name$
falls,under$the$concept.$Frege$also$occasionally$talks$of$a$proposition$as$what$is$
expressed,$although$more$typically$it$is$a$thought$that$is$expressed$by$a$proposition.$
Then$again,$in$the$Grundgesetze$a$proposition$seems$to$be$the$result$of$adding$an$
assertion$sign$(here$"judgment$stroke")$to$a$possible$content$of$judgment:$"A$sign$that$
consists$of$a$judgment$stroke$and$a$name$of$a$truthOvalue$prefixed$by$a$horizontal$I$call$
a$Begriffsschrift,proposition$(Satz)$or,$where$there$is$no$danger$of$confusion,$a$
proposition."$All$the$same,$in$whatever$way$we$designate$it,$in$addition$to$the$
expression$to$which$the$assertion$sign$is$prefixed,$there$is$also$the$expression$that$
consists$of$this$unasserted$expression$preceded$by$the$assertion$sign,$and$just$what$kind$
of$sign$that$entire$formula,$i.e.,$⊢p,$is$supposed$to$be,$is$not$entirely$clear.$
$

Here,$as$elsewhere,$Frege$is$at$pains$to$save$logic,$and$semantics$in$particular,$
$
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from$the$ills$of$psychologism,$and$so$he$insists$on$the$purely$logical$character$of$the$
assertion$sign,$on$the$fact$that$it$is$indeed$a$symbol$of$his$formal,notation.$As$he$tells$us:$
It$is$rather$the$task$...$to$purify$logic$of$all$that$is$alien$and$hence$of$all$that$is$
psychological...Logic$is$concerned$with$the$laws$of$truth,$not$with$the$laws$of$holding$
something$to$be$true,$nor$with$the$question$of$how$people$think,$but$with$the$
question$of$how$they$must$think$if$they$are$not$to$miss$the$truth.77$
The$obvious$problem,$however,$is$that$it$is$difficult$to$see$how$what$such$a$symbol$is$
designed$to$convey,$precisely$that$the$proposition$that$follows$is$in$fact$held,true,$can$be$
intelligibly$construed$as$logical$in$character$on$Frege's$own$view$of$logic,$let$alone$on$
the$standard$more$formal$conception$from$which$we$might$distinguish$Frege's$view.$We$
can$perhaps$mute$the$appearance$of$flatOout$contradiction$by$pointing$out$that$though$
logic$is$not$concerned$with$the$laws$governing$holding$something$true,$it$is$nonetheless$
essentially$concerned$with$things$that$are$or$might$be$held$true,$namely$propositions,$
and$only$insofar$as$they$are$held$true.$
$

This$does$in$fact$point$to$a$way$out$for$Frege$and$I$will$return$to$it$below.$

Nonetheless,$it$still$seems$that$the$sign$in$question,$which$is$all$the$same$a$sign$that$
belongs$to$the$symbolic$notation$of$the$Begriffsschrift,$does$indeed$stand$for$something$
very$much$like$a$psychological$or$propositional$attitude,$and$is$thus$subject$to$the$
substitutivity$constraints$characteristic$of$other$such$attitudes,$i.e.,$knowing,$believing,$
wishing,$etc.$Just$as$in$the$case$of$knows,that,p$or$believes,that,p,$,from$the$truth$value$
of$p$it$is$impossible$to$determine$the$truth$value$of$⊢p$for$any$p,$and$any$given$
author/scribe,$without$first$establishing$whether$or$not$p$is$in$fact$held,true$by$its$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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author/scribe.$But$surely,$and$herein$lies$the$crux$of$the$issue,$that,is$a$matter$of$
empirical,$psychological$evaluation,$not$logical$calculation:$one$cannot$tell$from$the$
mere$occurrence$of$the$turnstile$sign$that$its$author$means$it,$or$to$put$it$another$way,$
that$it$properly$represents$his/her$semantic$commitment.$
$

In$addition$to$providing$for$what$we$might$think$of$as$the$primary$level$of$

semantic$engagement,$i.e.,$truthOholding,$Frege$thinks$it$is$only$when$preceded$by$the$
assertion$sign$that$propositions$can$enter$into$inferential$relations$with$one$another,$
since$it$is$only$then$that$a$judgment$is$expressed$and$inferential$relations$hold$
exclusively$between$propositions$held,true,$i.e.,$judgments,$not$mere$propositions,$
which$are$after$all$mere$signs,$in$isolation:$
An$inference$simply$does$not$belong$to$the$realm$of$signs;$rather,$it$is$the$
pronouncement$of$a$judgement$made$in$accordance$with$logical$laws$on$the$
basis$of$previously$passed$judgments.$Each$of$the$premises$is$a$determinate$
Thought$recognized$as$true;$and$in$the$conclusion$too,$a$determinate$Thought$
is$recognized$as$true.78$
$
It$would$seem$that$if$the$sign$expressing$such$recognition$is$thereby$psychological$in$
nature,$then$inference$itself$is$derivatively$psychological.$$Yet$it$is$generally$held$to$be$of$
the$essence$of$inference$rules$that$they$apply$to$propositions$regardless$of$whether$or$
not$those$propositions$are$held$true,$or$even$held$under$consideration,$by$anyone.$
Modus,ponens,$for$example,$the$single$inference$rule$Frege$introduces$in$the$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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Inference$not$Consequence,"$Philosophy,Compass,4/4,(2009).$

$

$

249$

Begriffsschrift,$would$seem$to$apply$on$the$basis$of$the$logical,$i.e.,$truthOfunctional,$
properties$of$the$conditional,$and$independently$of$the$content$of$the$propositions$to$
which$it$is$applied,$let$alone$of$the$actual$or$potential$author$of$those$propositions.$In$
this$regard,$it$is$also$instructive$to$note$that$Frege$does$not$think$arguments$with$false$
premises$valid,$that,$in$other$words,$he$seems$to$conflate$validity$with$soundness,$or$to$
put$it$more$charitably,$that$he$regards$soundness$alone$as$the$relevant$evaluative$
measure$of$proofs.$Yet$it$is$likely,$and$not$merely$charitably$granted,$that$Frege$takes$
such$a$position$because$he$does$not$think$it$possible$to$logically,acknowledge$as$true$
what$is$not.$
Given$all$of$this,$one$might$be$inclined$to$conclude$instead$that$⊢p$ought$not$to$
be$subject$to$semantic$evaluation$in$the$first$place,$because$"⊢"$is$not$merely$
semantically$vacuous,$but$not$in$any$important$sense$a$part$of$the$statement$under$
evaluation$at$all.$Indeed,$beginning$with$Wittgenstein,$who$may$be$taken$as$the$
spokesman$for$the$traditional$position$on$the$matter,$it$has$generally$been$maintained$
that$Frege's$symbol,$or$anything$like$it,$has$no$legitimate$role$to$play$in$logic,$nor$in$the$
languages$logic$is$designed$to$replace$in$contexts$requiring$more$rigorous$standards$of$
expression$and$inference.$As$Wittgenstein$brashly$puts$it,$"Frege's$assertion$sign$'⊢'$is$
logically$altogether$meaningless;$in$Frege$(and$Russell)$it$only$shows$that$these$authors$
hold$as$true$the$propositions$(Sätze)$marked$in$this$way."$(Tractatus,Logico9
Philosophicus,$4.442).$This$is$more$emphatically$the$attitude$of$those$who$nonetheless$
acknowledge$the$substantial$advance$beyond$Aristotelian$categorical$logic$the$
$
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quantificational$features$of$Frege's$propositional$Begriffsschrift$amount$to.$From$this$
perspective,$the$assertion$sign$represents$a$lamentable$but$negligible$lapse$in$the$
logician's$otherwise$considerable$logical$acumen.$A$result,$it$might$be$further$
conjectured,$of$his$adherence$to$the$old$Kantian$conception$of$judgment$and$thus$to$a$
vestige$of$epistemological$psychologism$he$is$not$disposed$to$recognize.$
$

However,$that$his$commitment$to$the$assertion$sign$does$not$represent$a$lapse$

of$any$kind$is$made$clear$from$the$frequency$with$which$he$confirms$its$necessity,$and$
from$the$central$role$he$seems$to$assign$assertion,$or$assertoric$force,$in$the$logical$
enterprise.$Frege's$conceptOscript$is$first$described$in$his$paper$of$1879,$but$in$a$paper$
dating$from$1915,$entitled$"My$Basic$Logical$insights,"$in$which$he$reflects$back$on$the$
significance$of$his$script$and$its$use,$Frege$writes,$$
the$word$'true'$has$a$sense$that$contributes$nothing$to$the$sense$of$the$whole$
sentence$in$which$it$occurs$as$a$predicate...$But$it$is$precisely$for$this$reason$that$this$
word$seems$fitted$to$indicate$the$essence$of$logic...So$the$word$'true'$seems$to$
make$the$impossible$possible:$it$allows$what$corresponds$to$the$assertoric$force$to$
assume$the$form$of$a$contribution$to$the$thought.$And$although$this$attempt$
miscarries,$or$rather$through$the$very$fact$that$it$miscarries,$it$indicates$what$is$
characteristic$of$logic...For$there$is$no$doubt$that$the$word$'beautiful'$actually$does$
indicate$the$essence$of$aesthetics,$as$does$'good'$that$of$ethics,$whereas$'true'$only$
makes$an$abortive$attempt$to$indicate$the$essence$of$logic,$since$what$logic$is$really$
concerned$with$is$not$contained$in$the$word$'true'$at$all$but$in$the$assertoric$force$
with$which$a$sentence$is$uttered...but$no$word$or$part$of$a$sentence$corresponds$to$
this.79$
$
This$is$not$to$say$that$truth$is$not$the$proper$object$of$logic;$just$that$the$behavior$of$the$
predicate$"true"$cannot$tell$us$much$about$it.$Whatever$it$can$tell$us,$however,$Frege$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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thinks$the$formal$language$set$out$in$his$Begriffsschrift$provides$a$notation$for$
expressing.$To$be$more$exact,$what$shows$us$in$the$concept9script$that$which$"no$word"$
can$linguistically$express$is$what$I$have$persisted$in$calling$the$assertion$sign,$for$reasons$
I$hope$have$been$made$clear,$but$which$Frege$here$refers$to$as$the$turnstile,sign:$
A$judgment$is$always$to$be$expressed$by$means$of$the$turnstile$sign.$This$stands$to$
the$left$of$the$sign$or$complex$of$signs$in$which$the$content$of$the$judgment$is$given.$
If$we$omit$the$little$vertical$stroke$at$the$left$end$of$the$horizontal$stroke,$the$
judgment$is$to$be$transformed$into$a$mere$complex$of$ideas;$the$author$is$not$
expressing$his$recognition$or$nonOrecognition$of$the$truth$of$this.80$
$
The$recognition$or$acknowledgement$of$the$truth$of$a$proposition$simply$is$what$
judgment$consists$in$for$Frege.$To$the$extent$that$this$is$true,$the$assertion$sign$would$
constitute$the$only$strictly$predicative$element$left$in$his$notation,$the$traditional$
subjectOpredicate$structures$having$been$replaced$by$functions$and$arguments,$or,$more$
specifically,$concepts$and$objects.$Though$again$since$it$does$not$actually$occur$as$a$
predicate$but$merely$stands$in$for$one,$it$persists$only$as$a$formal$remnant$of$
predicative$function.$The$assertion$sign,$then,$is$the$logical$representation$of$a$formally$
inexpressible$predicate,$one$that$were$it$capable$of$doing$so$would$directly$express$the$
speaker's/author's$commitment$to$the$truth$of$the$relevant$proposition.$Indeed,$in$his$
introductory$remarks$to$the$Begriffsschrift,$Frege$explicitly$suggests$a$predicative$
construal$along$these$lines:$
We$can$imagine$a$language$in$which$the$proposition$"Archimedes$perished$at$the$
capture$of$Syracuse"$would$be$expressed$thus:$"The$violent$death$of$Archimedes$at$
the$capture$of$Syracuse$is$a$fact."$To$be$sure$one$can$distinguish$between$subject$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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and$predicate$here,$too,$if$one$wishes$to$do$so$but$the$subject$contains$the$whole$
content,$and$the$predicate$serves$only$to$turn$the$content$into$a$judgment.$$Such$a$
language$would$have$only$a$single$predicate$for$all$judgments,$namely,$'is$a$
fact'...Our$ideography$is$a$language$of$this$sort,$and$in$it,$the$sign$⊢$$is$the$common$
predicate$for$all$judgments.81$

$
$

$
We$see$here$an$attempt$to$grapple$with$the$same$issue$of$inexpressibility$faced$

in$dealing$with$the$predicate$"is$true."$Having$recognized$the$redundancy$of$"is$true"$
Frege$here$suggests$"is$a$fact"$as$an$approximation$of$the$expressive$force$of$the$
assertion$sign.$But$again,$if$the$sign$does$in$fact$function$as$a$kind$of$predicate,$and$a$
predicate$with$this$specific$content,$it$necessarily$fails$to$do$the$work$it$is$designed$to$
do,$i.e.,$to$establish$the$fact$that$the$proposition$is$held$true$by$its$author.$Once$again,$
we$would$need$to$know$that$the$predicate$itself$is$asserted$rather$than$simply$
entertained.$To$see$this$we$need$only$construct$an$opaque$context$for$the$formula$"P$is$
a$fact."$For$example:$It$is$understood$that$P$is$a$fact$(where$"P"$has$been$recast$as$a$
nominal$phrase$designating$the$content$of$the$original$sentential$expression).$
$

What$goes$for$explicit$truth$attributions$would$seem$to$apply$to$any$device$that$

operates$in$their$stead.$As$Frege$himself$recognizes,$saying$"P$is$true",$adds$nothing$to,$
and$has$the$same$truth$conditions$as,$just$saying$"P."$On$the$other$hand,$saying$either$is$
consistent$with$asserting$neither,$which$argues$more$for$the$vacuousness$than$the$
redundancy$of$"is$true,"$and$this$is$precisely$why$Frege$thinks$the$word$"true"$fails$to$
capture$the$"essence"$of$logic.$We$might$make$out$a$difference$by$observing$that$the$
truth$conditions$of$"I$assert$P"$and$"P"$do$indeed$diverge,$since$the$former$would$be$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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true$regardless$of$the$truth$value$of$P,$provided$it$is$asserted$by$the$indexically$relevant$
"I."$But$this$would$be$to$express$a$different$proposition,$say$Q,$which$simply$contains$P$
as$an$object,$which$is$not,how$the$assertion$sign$is$supposed$to$operate:$the$assertion$
sign$is$not$part$of$any$propositional$content$at$all;$it$is$just$a$formal$indication$of$the$
assertoric$force$with$which$that$content$is$uttered$or$written.$
$

But$then$what$about$"is$a$fact"?$Once$again,$if$I$can$write$"P"$without$asserting$

it,$then$I$can$write$"R"$without$asserting$it,$where$"R"$stands$for$"P$is$a$fact."$$The$
trouble$with$the$assertion$sign$is$that$prima,facie,it$does$no$better$at$establishing$
semantic$commitment$unless$it$is$already$itself$established$as$semantically$engaged.$So$
again,$if$I$can$utter$P$without$asserting$it,$if$I$can$refrain$from$meaning$what$I$say$(to$put$
things$in$Cavellian$terms,$though$of$course$to$a$venture$a$rather$unOCavellian$thesis),$
then$I$can$do$the$same$with$turnstileOP,$I$can$refrain$from$meaning$what$I$say$even$in$
saying$that$I$mean$what$I$say.$On$the$assumption$that$propositional$inscription$is$
formally$uncoupled$from$assertion,$nothing$at$the$level$of$the$former$can$adequately$
vouchsafe$the$latter.$And$the$symbolization$of$assertoric$commitment$itself$now$
appears$to$be$the$culprit,$since$it$makes$of$assertion$a$secondOorder$or$metasentential$
syntagm,$which$while$intended$to$accomplish$what$no$firstOorder$(truth)$predicate$can,$
entrusts$assertoric$success$to$another$mute$notational$signature,$about$which$the$same$
question$of$assertion$can$be$asked.$Paradoxically$then,$the$assertion$sign,$to$the$extent$
that$it$is$predicatively$parsed,$would$seem$to$be$as$much$an$obstacle$to$as$an$
instrument$of$semantic$engagement.$
$
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The$introduction$of$the$assertion$sign$is$supposed$to$be$motivated$by$an$

observation$concerning$truth$and$true,$namely$that$the$latter$is$not$a$predicate,$the$
former$not$a$property.$What$Frege$does$not$quite$say,$though$he$comes$close$to$doing$
so,$but$what$his$and$the$analytic$tradition's$grappling$with$its$appropriate$designation$
and$status$also$demonstrates,$is$that$this$sign,$the$turnstile,$cannot$be$a$logical$symbol$
in$the$formal$sense$because$only$semantically$engaged$entities,$not$engagement$itself,$
are$so$formalizable.$More$specifically$it$cannot$be$formalized$as$a$predicate,$since$it$
does$not$say$anything$at$all$in$the$discursive$language$it$is$supposed$to$be$part$of.$In$fact$
the$point$may$be$put$more$strongly:$It$does$not$say$anything$at$all$in$any$language,$but$
rather$expresses$the$saying$of$anything$that$is$said.$To$this$extent,$and$more$visibly$and$
obviously$than$Hegel's$infinite$judgment,$it$is$written$both$inside$and$outside$the$
network$of$signs$and$symbols$it$allegedly$belongs$to$(i.e.,$in$this$case,$the$conceptO
script).$Moreover,$it$is$necessarily$so$written.$$
$

This$need$not$amount$to$admitting,$however,$that$the$assertion$sign$has$no$role$

to$play,$nor$in$particular$the$role$Frege$intended$it$to$play,$for$it$is$the$visible$inscription$
of$what$the$attribution$of$truth$cannot$express,$namely$the$semantic$engagement$of$the$
inscription$that$follows.$Its$designation$and$pictographic$form$O$a$horizontal$content$line$
bisecting$a$vertical$line$O$transparently$identify$it$as$a$gateway$to$inscription$and$
utterance.$Yet,$while$it$is$what$distinguishes$judgments$and$propositions$from$mere$
arrays$of$marks$or$signs,$it$is$more$pictogram$than$grapheme,$and$so$an$incongruous$
hieroglyph$in$the$otherwise$orderly$array$of$logical$insigniae.$
$

$
$
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But$to$say$it$is$a$hieroglyph$is$still$to$identify$it$as$an$expressive$mark$of$some$

sort,$though$it$is$indeed$very$difficult$to$say$precisely$what$kind$of$mark$it$is,$and$
therefore$what$kind$of$symbol$it$makes$of$any$expression$it$is$attached$to.$I$mean$by$
this$to$capture,$in$part,$the$sense$in$which$it$can$now$be$said$that$the$assertion$sign$is$
indeed$nonOsymbolic$or$extraOsymbolic,$that$it$shows$how$and$where$truth$enters$into$
the$deployment$of$signs,$without$itself$being$deployed$as$one.$The$further$argument$to$
be$made$is$that$such$a$sign$can$never$be$so$deployed,$cannot$be$understood$as$
operating$at$the$same$symbolic$level$as$the$formulae$it$mobilizes.$The$reason$for$this,$as$
mentioned$above,$is$that$it$says$something$that$cannot$be$meant,$and$to$this$extent$
exhibits$something$about$the$very$character$of$formal$inscription,$namely,$that$it$cannot$
on$its$own$ever$tell$us$that$it$is$to$be$treated,$understood,$responded$to,$etc.,$in$any$
particular$way.82$More$generally$and$to$the$point,$that$any$given$form,$logical$or$
otherwise,$is$semantically$engaged,$rather$than$depleted$or$dead,$cannot$be$established$
by$the$form$itself,$even$by$a$symbol$formally$introduced$to$establish$just$that.$To$return$
to$our$original$focus$on$the$proposition,$nothing$at$the$propositional$level$makes$it$
possible$to$distinguish$propositions$from$judgments.$
$

But$perhaps$there$is$still$a$way$of$avoiding$the$charge$of$redundancy$or$

emptiness.$Consider$the$word$"Exit"$on$an$exit$sign$on$the$wall$of$a$theater,$for$
example.$We$might$ask$what$it$is$about$how$it$occurs$that$tells$us$it$is$pointing$beyond$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
82

$This$is$a$point$that$Wittgenstein$makes$repeatedly$in$the$Philosophical,Investigations,$and$it$is$also$a$
point$that$Hegel$makes$in$distinguishing$between$propositions$and$judgments:$a$judgment,$in$essence,$is$
simply$a$meant$proposition.$
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itself,$indicating$a$direction$of$egress,$rather$than$functioning$imperatively,$or$merely$
decoratively.$Presumably$we$rule$out$an$imperatival$construal$because$its$so$operating$
would$seem$inconsistent$with$the$expectation$of$remaining$in$place$for$a$while$that$is$
an$intrinsic$part$of$the$enterprise$of$attending$a$theater$in$the$first$place,$or$because$no$
one$attending$theaters$tends,$of$his/her$own$accord$or$prompted$by$others,$to$
immediately$exit$upon$seeing$the$word$"Exit."$But$though$the$sign$itself$is$of$course$
incapable$of$telling$us$anything$of$the$sort$about$the$word$that$appears$on$it,$we$would$
still$be$inclined$to$say$that$that$word's$having$the$significance$it$has$is$at$least$in$part$a$
function$of$the$fact$that$it$occurs,$as$a$matter$of$convention,$in$illuminated$letters$on$a$
sign,$in$a$theater,$etc.$
$

The$sign$itself,$and$the$architectural$and$cultural$environments$in$which$it$

appears,$are$not$themselves$without$significance.$Indeed$though$there$is$not$one,$
particular$expression$for$the$relevant$context,$one$might$argue$that$several$features$of$
that$context$together$indicate$that$the$word$"Exit,"$in$this$case,$signifies$a$direction$of$
egress.$Similarly,$one$might$then$say$that$the$turnstile$sign$has$this$kind$of$significance:$
it$tells$us$that$the$context$of$inscription$is$that$of$a$deductive$system,$i.e.,$one$governed$
by$the$demands$of$truth$and$validity.$
$

To$treat$the$assertion$sign$in$this$way,$to$take$up$a$point$argued$for$by$Peter$

Geach,83$is$to$admit$that$Frege's$concept9script,$unlike$the$formal$languages$derived$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
83

$See$his$"Saying$and$Showing$in$Frege$and$Wittgenstein,"$in$Essays,on,Wittgenstein,in,Honour,of,G.,H.,
Von,Wright$(Amsterdam:$North$Holland$Publishing,$1976),,54O70.$
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from$it,$incorporates$a$distinction$between$saying$and$showing,$although$it$seems$to$me$
that$the$character$of$the$assertion$sign$as$a$logical$sign$would$suggest$that$saying$and$
showing,$from$Frege’s$perspective,$both$lie$on$the$formal$side$of$things.$The$claim$that$
Frege's$logic$is$not$formal$in$the$sense$that$it$is$purely$syntactically$defined,$
independently$of$semantic$interpretation,$is$not$a$new$one,$and$has$perhaps$been$most$
succinctly$made$by$Von$Heijenoort$in$terms$of$a$distinction$he$is$famous$for$drawing$
between$logic$as$calculus$and$logic$as$language.$But$it$is$not$enough,$or$is$perhaps$too$
much,$I$think,$to$place$Frege$in$the$logicOasOlanguage$camp.$Given$the$rather$restricted$
domain$of$Frege's$concerns,$one$might$argue$that$he$is$not$concerned$with$natural$
language$or$ordinary$communicative$acts,$philosophical$or$otherwise,$and$that$thus$the$
seeming$artificiality$of$his$treatment$of$assertion,$for$example,$is$just$the$result$of$our$
being$unaccustomed$to$attending$to$logical$structure$insofar$as$this$relates$to$so$limited$
a$field$of$expression.84$
$

But$Frege$does$think$his$Begriffsschrift,$as$a$whole,$shows$what$ordinary$

language$cannot,$that$is,$it$shows$how$truth$finds$its$constituent$expression$in$the$parts$
of$the$proposition$that$is$its$proper$domain,$and$he$does$not$think$there$is$more$than$
one$kind$or$domain$of$truth.$He$thought$that$his$concept9script$showed$in$a$graphic$
manner$the$contours$of$inference$and$concepts$which$ordinary$spoken$language,$or$its$
alphabetic$expression,$obscures:$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
84

$Cora$Diamond$has$something$like$this$to$say$in$her$"What$does$a$ConceptOScript$do?"$in$The,Realistic,
Spirit:,Wittengenstein,,Philosophy,,and,the,Mind$(Cambridge,$Mass.:$MIT$Press,$1995),$115O144.$
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Speech$often$only$indicates$by$inessential$marks$or$by$imagery$what$a$conceptOscript$$
should$spell$out$in$full.$At$a$more$external$level,$the$latter$is$distinguished$from$
verbal$language$in$being$laid$out$for$the$eye,$rather$than$for$the$ear.85$

This$is$something$he$believed$continuous$with$the$Leibnizean$project$of$developing$a$
lingua,characterica,$which$Leibniz$apparently$thought$should$"peindre,non,pas,les,
paroles,,mais,les,pensées."$Yet$what$this$script$is$ultimately$designed$to$make$visible$and$
representable,$to$show,$is$how$truth$is$obliquely$expressed$in$truth$claims$in$the$face$of$
its$own$inexpressibility.$Frege's$concept9script$is$thus$conceived$as$the$kind$of$
demonstrative$notation$Wittgenstein$thought$impossible,$i.e.,$one$that$both$says$and$
shows$how$what$is$said$is$to$be$understood.86$
$

Frege$is$thought$to$have$introduced,$along$with$Peano$and$Russell,$a$more$or$

less$purely$formal$treatment$of$logic,$and$in$so$doing$to$have$made$possible,$at$least$in$
principle,$a$universal$deductive$instrument,$i.e.,$a$symbolic$language$into$which$every$
relevant$proposition$and$method$of$inference$for$a$given$science$might$be$readily$
translated.$Yet$it$is$also$known$from$Frege's$essays$and$correspondence$that$he$
vehemently$rejected$the$pure,$or$what$might$more$usefully$be$called$the$arbitrary$or$
arbirtrarian$formalism$of$Hilbert$et,al,(what$in$discussing$Hegel$I$earlier$identified$as$
abstract$formalism).$In$an$article$on$Boole's$logical$calculus$he$says$as$much:$
In$contrast$we$may$now$set$out$the$aim$of$my$conceptOscript.$Right$from$the$start$I$
had$in$mind$the$expression$of$a$content.$What$I$am$striving$after$is$...$not$a$calculus$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
85

$

$Gottlob$Frege,$“Boole's$logical$Calculus$and$the$ConceptOscript,"$Posthumous,Writings,,13.$

86

$In$the$Tractatus,$Wittgenstein$directs$this$line$of$critique$to$the$assertion$sign,$or$“judgment$stroke,”$as$
he$refers$to$is,$claiming$that$it$is$“logically$meaningless”$(4.442).$
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restricted$to$pure$logic.$But$the$content$is$to$be$rendered$more$exactly$than$is$done$
by$verbal$language.87$

More$to$the$point,$it$is$not$merely$the$emphasis$placed$on$the$role$of$assertion,$but$the$
use$of$alternative$sign$sets$for$bound$and$unbound$variables,$a$pictorial$representation$
of$syntactic$and$inferential$relations,$etc.,88$all$suggest$a$conception$of$logic$as$formal$
primarily$in$the$sense$that$it$exhibits$in$its$very$form$those$and$only$those$features$of$a$
statement$or$thought$that$are$relevant$to$its$truth$and$its$inferential$employment$in$
deductive$proof.$Such$a$conception$is,$for$Frege,$not$merely$consistent$with$but$indeed$
directly$motivates$his$denying$the$arbitrariness$of$form.$If$we$give$up$the$conception$of$
Frege's$concept9script$as$a$formal$calculus,$we$can$begin$to$make$sense$of$the$assertion$
sign,$along$with$other$features$of$his$notation.$
$

On$the$face$of$it,$his$inclusion$of$the$assertion$sign$as$a$constituent$of$his$formal$

language$represents$an$insistence$on$the$determinative$role$assertion$or$semantic$
engagement$as$the$foundation$of$logical$form.$We$should$recall$that$Frege$characterizes$
part$of$the$function$of$the$assertion$sign$initially$in$terms$of$its$establishing$the$unity,$
that$is$to$say$the$propositionality,$of$a$following$formula,$and$then$as$directing$such$
unified$formulae$towards$(mapping$them$with)$truth.$Object$and$concept$terms,$
sentences$and$propositions$all$hang$together$in$terms$of$the$extensional$contribution$
they$make$towards$determining$a$truth$value.$For$Frege,$all$such$expressions$are$

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
87

$Tractatus,$12.$

$

88

$On$this$point$see$Danielle$Macbeth's$Frege's,Logic,(Cambridge,$MA.:$Harvard$University$Press,$2005).$
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semantically$of$a$piece,$in$that$they$all$function$as$names,$and$in$particular$sentences$or$
propositions$are$complex$names$of$truth$values,$namely$the$True$or$the$False.$
$

We$can$thus$begin$to$see$the$motivation$for$the$assertion$sign,$especially$as$he$

introduces$it$as$a$way$of$making$sense$of$its$absence$in$quotation,$and$in$opaque$
contexts$more$generally.$The$sign$enables$us$to$tell$by$simply$looking$at$a$formula$of$the$
Begriffsschrift$whether$or$not$it$is$being$used$truth$functionally,$i.e.,$to$express$a$truth,$
which$in$turn$enables$us$to$determine$its$inferential$value.$Or,$from$the$perspective$I$
think$more$properly$Frege's,$and$which$would$certainly$be$Hegel's,$it$is$intended$to$
make$visible$the$fact$that$what$follows$is$directed$towards$truth,$and$thus$instructs$us$to$
evaluate$each$constituent$concept,$object$and$logical$term$as$an$elucidation$of$the$True.$
The$insistence$that$such$a$sign$be$formal$is$just$the$insistence$that$it$be$graphically$
transparent.,
$

As$Frege$more$or$less$tells$us,$the$significance$of$such$a$sign$can$best$be$seen$in$

the$effect$produced$by$its$omission,$just$as$the$keystone$of$an$arch$might$reveal$its$
function$in$the$structural$collapse$that$follows$its$removal.$We$can$presumably$see$by$
looking$at$"⊢$(A$believes$that$P)"$that$whatever$proposition$P$names$it$is$inferentially$
inert,$and$would$consider$"⊢(A$believes$that$⊢P)"$illOformed.$The$unasserted$inscription$
of$a$proposition$is$semantically$opaque$in$the$sense$that$it$makes$no$claim$to$truth$(or$
falsity,$for$that$matter),$though$knowing$what$truth$it$would$lay$claim$to$remains$
essential$to$determining$its$meaning.$The$claim$would$be$that$even$if$P$implies$Q,$this$

$
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does$not$license$us$to$attribute$belief$in$Q$to$A,$even$though,$on$a$Brandomian$view,$Q$
furnishes$us$with$important$information$about$what$A$believes.$
$

It$is$in$principle$impossible$to$determine$from$the$isolated$fact$of$someone's$

uttering$or$writing$out$a$sequence$of$names$(in$the$fully$general$sense$of$referring$
expressions)$whether$he$is$simply$listing$the$objects$or$persons$named,$calling$upon$
them,$practicing$a$particular$language,$inventing$a$new$one,$trying$to$memorize$or$savor$
the$sound$or$shape$of$a$set$of$propositions,$etc.$But$if$what$is$missing$from$the$
environment$of$utterance$is$an$assertion$sign$or$its$equivalent,$then$because$its$
contribution$to$the$truthOvalue$of$an$utterance$is$what$the$ultimate$meaning,$i.e.,$
reference,$of$any$meaningful$expression$amounts$to,$it$is$impossible$in$principle$to$fully$
determine$what,$if$anything,$any$such$linguistic$display$ultimately$means.$
$

In$discussing$this$issue,$in$a$commentary$on$Frege$that$may$be$considered$

canonical,$Michael$Dummett$likens$the$use$of$language,$let$us$say$the$language$of$the$
Begriffsschrift,$to$the$game$of$chess.$He$raises$the$question$how$anyone$might$
understand$what$one$is$doing$in$playing$the$game$if$all$he$has$at$his$disposal$is$a$"formal$
description$of$chess...describing$the$initial$position$of$the$pieces,$and$giving$rules$for$
what$constituted$a$legitimate$move$from$any$given$position."89$He$maintains$that$from$
such$a$description$it$would$be$"impossible$to$tell$what,$in$playing$chess,$a$player$is$trying$
to$do,"$namely$to$win.$An$analogue$of$the$assertion$sign$for$chess,$on$Dummett's$view,$
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89

$Michael$Dummett,$Frege:,Philosophy,of,Language$(New$York:$Harper$&$Row,$1973),$296.$
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would$be$something$that$addressed$such$a$deficit,$something$that$told$us$that$winning,
was,$so$to$speak,$the$name$of$the$game.$
$

Dummett's$analogy$and$the$analysis$that$follows$help$to$make$clear$why$Frege's$

extralogical$sign$simply$extends$the$problem$of$expressiveness$from$the$level$of$logical$
to$that$of$metalogical$or$metalinguistic$form.$While$it$might$be$true$that$no$one$who$did$
not$know$what$the$players$were$trying$to$accomplish$could$know$what$precisely$they$
were$doing$in$playing$chess,$the$addition$of$a$gesture$or$extra$chess$piece$designed$to$
make$clear$that$purpose$could$hardly$succeed$unless$the$use$of$that$gesture$or$extra$
pieces$were$understood$to$have$been$truthfully,$honestly$or$gameOspecifically$
employed.$One$might$easily$imagine$a$form$of$the$game$in$which$expressing$one's$intent$
in$playing$the$rest$of$the$game$was$considered$part$of$the$game,$and$thus$a$game$in$
which$one$might$express$one's$intent$to$play$to$win,$while$in$fact$playing$to$draw$or$
achieve$a$desired$disposition$of$chess$pieces.$For$someone$who$did$not$already$have$the$
appropriate$concept$of$what$the$point$of$game$playing$is,$the$intention$piece,$as$we$
might$call$it,$would$again$offer$no$clarity$of$intent.$But$even$for$someone$who$did$have$
the$notion$of$winning$as$a$starting$point,$it$would$be$impossible$for$him$to$tell$that$that$
is$what$a$particular$player$was$trying$to$do$in$playing$a$particular$game$of$chess.$
$

This$still$need$not$mean,$however,$that$the$assertion$sign$is$either$hopeless$or$

redundant.$Indeed$it$can$still$be$maintained$that$if$nothing$like$the$force$of$an$assertion$
sign$can$be$detected,$then$no$sense$can$be$made$of$any$string$of$symbols$that$follow$or$
are$otherwise$framed$by$such$a$sign.$To$put$it$this$way$is$to$come$close$to$saying$that$
$
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such$a$sign$functions$more$or$less$as$a$kind$of$diacritic$expressing$something$like$a$
principle$of$charity$of$the$sort$Donald$Davidson$argues$for.$Just$as$for$Davidson$we$
cannot$get$off$the$ground$in$determining$the$meaning$of$another's$speech$if$we$do$not$
assume$that$the$commitment$to$uttering$truths$holds$for$the$most$part,$so$without$the$
assumption$that$a$name$of$a$truth$value$is$being$asserted$it$is$impossible$to$tell$what$
one$is$doing$in$writing$or$pronouncing$that$name$or$its$component$parts.$Frege$thus$
thought$it$necessary$to$make$this$presumption$manifest,$though,$as$we$seem$to$be$
compelled$to$admit,$the$task$of$doing$so$appears$beyond$the$notational$device$
introduced$to$accomplish$it.$
$

Frege$had$sought$to$deliver$logic$from$very$the$riddle$of$predication$I$claimed$

Hegel's$infinite$judgment$seems$to$embody,$from$its$vacillation$between$tautology$and$
contradiction,$but$succeeds$only$in$concentrating$that$riddle$in$a$single,$covert$predicate$
that$when$applied$identifies$every$proposition$with$its$truth$value,$and$thus$depletes$
each$of$its$specific$content.$What$is$revealed$by$this,$strangely$enough,$is$that$the$
content,of$any$proposition$is$in$some$sense$unrepresentable$in$any$formal$language,$
even$an$interpreted$one,$since$if$it$were$representable,$it$would$immediately$identify$
itself$as$true$(or$false),$without$having$to$be$directed$to$do$so$by$a$sign$that$by$definition$
can$add$nothing$to$its$meaning$or$sense$(Sinn).90$
$
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90

$This$problem$of$extensional$descent$lies$at$the$heart$of$Russell's$critique$of$Frege's$distinction$between$
sense$and$reference$in$"On$Denoting"$in$Mind$14$(1905):$479O493.$
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Section(Six.(Frege(and(Hegel(on(Logical(Form(

$

The$philosophical$upshot$of$Frege's$Begriffschrift$is$thus$that$semantic,

engagement,$understood$as$affirmation$and$ultimately$the$intended$meaning,$if$not$
quite$the$extension,$of$the$assertion$sign,$is$the$one$intentional$relation$we$can$properly$
bear$towards$truth.$The$Hegelian$amendment$to$this$would$be$that$semantic$
engagement$must$instead$be$understood$in$terms$of$negation,$and$that$though$it$is$in$
and$through$such$engagement$that$the$concepts$we$use$are$determined,$it$is$not$as$
they$are$in,truth,$but$as$they$are$provisionally,$or$mediately,$as$finite,$if$rational,$
impressions$of$an$infinite$truth,$which,$as$Hegel$will$put$it,$are$capable$of$being$correct,$
but$never$true.$Properly$understood,$that$is$from$the$philosophical$standpoint$of$
absolute,knowing,$our$determinations,$in$other$words,$would$at$the$same$time$be$
acknowledgments$that$the$Truth$eludes$our$truths.$It$is$some$such$amendment$that$$
infinite$judgment$allows$us$to$comprehend$even$as$we$submit$to$the$passing$
verisimilitudes$of$the$Phenomenology.(Here$is$one$of$several$ways$in$which$Hegel$puts$
the$matter:$
It$is$one$of$the$most$fundamental$logical$prejudices$that$qualitative$judgments$such$
as:$"The$rose$is$red,"$or:$"is$not$red,"$can$contain$truth.$Correct$they$may$be,$but$
only$in$the$restricted$confines$of$perception,$finite$representation,$and$thinking;$this$
depends$on$the$content$which$is$just$as$finite,$and$untrue$on$its$own$account.$But$
the$truth$rests$only$on$the$form,$i.e.,$on$the$posited$Concept$and$the$reality$that$
corresponds$to$it;$truth$of$this$kind$is$not$present$in$the$qualitative$judgment,$
however.91$
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Hegel$will$later$identify$the$"deeper"$variety$of$truth$that$is$the$proper$concern$of$
philosophy,$namely,$that$exemplified$in$the$coincidence$of$objectivity$and$concept.$
What$Hegel$seems$to$be$getting$at$here$is$the$roughly$Anselmian$conception$of$truth$as$
ontological$rectitude:$something$is$true$just$in$case$it$conforms$to$what$it$is$to$be$the$
sort$of$thing$that$it$is.92$Such$truth$corresponds$to$the$concept$or$essence$of$things$and$
is$thus$removed$from$the$finitude$and$contingency$of$the$objects$of$experience.$This$
represents$one$sense$in$which$truth,$or$rather$Truth,$is$infinite,$that$is$to$say,$beyond$
determination.$
$

Let$me$try$to$make$this$a$little$more$clear$before$concluding.$The$undisclosed$

philosophical$backdrop$of$both$Hegel's$and$Frege's$work$remains,$I$want$to$claim,$the$
medieval$one,$which$is$to$say$the$Augustinian$one,$of$a$more$or$less$impassable$
boundary$between$the$verbum,mentis$and$the$verbum,carnis,$between$the$unicity$of$
the$nondiscursive,$i.e.,$the$pure,$intelligible$word$of$Truth,$and$the$multiplicity$of$the$
discursive,$diffracted$word$of$human$language,$of$what$Augustine$calls$the$mos,
locutionis,humanae.$Within$this$framework,$Frege's$avenue$of$approach$is$also$roughly$
Hegel's$in$the$Phenomenology,$i.e.,$the$systematic$elucidation$and$refinement$of$the$
verbum,carnis,$the$language$of$finitude$and$contingency,$so$as$to$make$it$suitable$for$
the$expression$of$what$is$both$true$and$necessary:$"The$true$shape$in$which$truth$exists$
can$only$be$the$scientific$system$of$such$truth.$To$help$bring$philosophy$closer$to$the$
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$Hegel$puts$things$as$follows:$"It$is$this$deeper$sense$of$truth$which$as$at$issue$when$we$speak,$for$
instance,$of$a$'true'$State,$or$a$'true'$work$of$art.$These$objects$are$'true$when$they$are$what$they$ought$to$
be,$i.e.,$when$their$reality$corresponds$to$their$concept."$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§213$Addition.$
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form$of$science...that$is$what$I$have$set$myself$to$do."93$For$both,$the$traditional$vehicle$
of$discursive$expression,$inference$and$thought,$the$predicate,$is$also$the$principal$locus$
of$logical$and$metaphysical$error,$and$thus$it$is$only$a$language$or$notation$that$
dispenses$with$predicates$in$the$strict$sense$that$can$lay$any$claim$to$the$universality,$
transparency$and$veridicality$of$a$language$like$Leibniz's$lingua,characterica.$
$

Frege,$however,$believed$that$a$language$that$showed$the$proper$inferential$

relationship$between$singular$terms,$logical$connectives$and$propositions$would$enable$
us$to$separate$out$the$truthOfunctional$dimensions$of$a$given$proposition$and$thus$
ultimately$to$forge$an$evaluable$link$between$truths$and$the$Truth.$He$also$believed$that$
his$concept9script$was$just$such$a$language.$We$have$seen,$however,$that$in$the$end$
what$ultimately$forges$that$link$in$Frege's$concept9script$is$a$diacritical$sign$at$odds$with$
this$very$script,$in$part$because$it$captures$something$at$the$heart$of$predication$that$
persists$despite$the$eradication$of$the$predicate$as$a$formal$structure:$an$invisible$agent$
of$reason$and$assertion.$And$thus$the$concept9script$itself,$intended$as$the$inscriptional$
notation$of$the$True,$for$all$its$hieroglyphic$charm$and$expressiveness,$constitutes$a$kind$
of$visible$geometry$not$of$Truth$but$of$inferential$relations,$however$numerous,$that$at$
best$picture$validity.$As$such$it$is$a$system$of$dead,$if$potentially$infinite,$circuitry,$a$
transparent$labyrinth$in$the$classical$sense$of$an$open$prison,$whose$captive$resident,$in$
this$case,$is,$as$it$were,$this$invisible$agent,$or$what$in$the$end$amounts$to$the$same$
thing$for$Hegel,$self9conscious,$or$absolute,Spirit.$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
93

$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§5.$

$

$

267$

$

And$here$lies$the$key$to$understanding$Hegel's$discovery.$Hegel,$in$essence,$

shows$that$anything$that$occurs$as$a$finite$determination,$whether$it$be$a$predicate$in$
the$narrow,$logical$sense,$or$a$shape$in$the$broader$sense$of$philosophical,$aesthetic,$
political$or$religious$formation,$bears$the$discursive$trace$of$disseverance,$not$simply$
because$it$is$accomplished$in$the$idiom$of$negation$proper$to$the$rational$activity$of$
consciousness,$but$because$it$is$removed$from$the$infinite$by$the$finitude$of$every$such$
act$of$determination.$Hegel's$phenomenological$logic$demonstrates$the$irreducible$
negativity,$diversity$and$finitude$of$the$meant$proposition,$of$the$proposition$held$true,$
i.e.,$of$judgment.$The$crucial$implication$here$is$that$no$truth$survives$its$utterance$or$
assertion,$and$it$is$only$cumulatively$that$the$True$is$approximated,$but$not$in$the$
imaginary$totality$of$truths,$inferentially$consolidated,$as$Frege$would$have$it,$that$is,$
through$the$serial,$or$let$us$call$it$the$discursive$infinity$of$inferential$association,$an$
instance$of$what$Hegel$calls$the$bad,$or$"finitized",infinity.94$For$Hegel,$the$resumption$
of$the$historical$and$necessarily$finite$record$of$judgment,$of$holding,true,$simply$makes$
visible$the$infinite$source$of$knowledge$and$its$correlative$Truth$that$nonetheless$
exceeds$the$resources$of$such$judgment.$
$

What$then$of$the$infinite$of$infinite$judgment?$While$the$Phenomenology$

presents$no$clear$discussion$of$the$distinction$between$"spurious"$and$true$infinity,$the$
latter$seems$clearly$identifiable$with$the$absolute,$which$in$turn$is$identifiable$with$selfO
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reflexive$identity,$with,$for$example$the$"'I'='I'"$of$Absolute,Knowing.$A$more$or$less$
clear$statement$of$what$this$amounts$to$is$be$found$in$the$Encyclopedia,Logic:$
In$its$relationship$to$an$other,$something$is$already$an$other$itself$visOaOvis$the$latter;$
and$therefore,$since$what$it$passes$into$is$entirely$the$same$as$what$passes$into$it$–$
neither$having$any$further$determination$than$this$identical$one$of$being$an$other$–$
in$its$passing$into$another,$something$only$comes$together$with$itself;$and$this$
relation$to$itself$in$the$passing$and$in$the$other$is$genuine,Infinity.95$
To$understand$this,$it$is$helpful$to$recall$our$earlier$discussion$of$Boethius'$Latin$oratio,
infinita,$his$translation$of$Aristotle's$aoristos,logos$as$it$is$presented$in$De,
Interpretatione,$and$almost$certainly$the$source$of$the$expression$in$Kant$and$Hegel.$
What$is$infinitus,$in$this$context,$is$in9definite$or$in9determinate,$and$more$specifically$
indeterminate$as$to$truth$or$falsity.$But$since$the$Latin$"in"$expresses$either$privation$or$
negation,$what$is$indeterminate$may$be$thought$of$either$as$what$is$lacking$in$truth$
value$or$what$is$not$determined,$i.e.,$bounded,$by$such$valuation,$which$might$roughly$
be$identified$as$bad$and$good$infinities,$respectively.$While$an$adequate$account$of$the$
two$will$have$to$be$postponed$for$another$occasion,$it$is$sufficient$here$to$point$out$that$
infinite$judgment$would$seem$to$be$infinite$according$to$both$senses$of$indeterminacy,$
though$not$simultaneously,$i.e.,$as$what$is$firstly$the$simple$negation$of$finitude,$and$
thus$neither$true$nor$false,$and$finally$as$what$lies$beyond$determinacy,$or$rather$
beyond$determination,$and$thus$the$True$as$such.$
$

In$Observing,Reason,$it$is$the$infinite$form$of$finite$judgment$that$prevents$it$

from$formally,expressing$any$truth$and$thus$anything$True$in$the$proper$sense,$i.e.,$
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infinitely,$and$precisely$because$as$long$as$it$retains$its$categorical$form,$the$
incommensurability$of$the$predicate$with$its$subject$persists.$And$yet,$when$it$
reappears,$finally,$in$Absolute,Knowing,$still$more$concretely$than$Frege's$hapless$
diacritic,$it$does$indeed$tell$us$that$and$how$the$True$is$aimed$at,$but$only,$I$would$
suggest,$by$somehow$disavowing$the$categorical$or$propositional$form$in$which$it$
nonetheless$continues$to$appear.,
,

Indeed$if$we$look$more$closely$at$the$original$instance$of$the$infinite$judgment,$it$

seems$to$disavow$its$form$from$the$outset.$"The$spirit$is$a$bone"$is$anything$but$formal,$
in$the$abstract$sense,$and,$absent$the$predicative$negation$that$logically$identifies$such$
judgments,$hardly$seems$an$infinite$judgment$at$all.$A$more$characteristic$formulation$
can,$however,$be$extrapolated$from$Hegel's$later$gloss$on$the$original$instance:$"And$we$
saw$Observing$Reason$at$its$peak$express$its$specific$character$in$the$infinite$judgment$
that$the$being,of,the,'I',is,a,Thing...That$judgment,$taken$as$it$stands$is$nonOspiritual$or$
rather$is$the$nonOspiritual$itself"$(§790).$The$judgment$is$nonOspiritual$inasmuch$as$the$
bone,$a$thing$is$a$nonOSpirit,$which$suggests$"The$(being$of)$Spirit$is$a$nonOspirit"$as$a$
canonical$reformulation.,
$

Still,$even$if$translatable$into$canonical$form,$this$is$merely$to$say$that$it$is$an$

instance$of$that$form,$not$the$form$itself.$It$is$hardly$possible$in$the$present$context$to$
detail$the$richness$of$content$Hegel$finds$in$this$first$instance$of$the$infinite$judgment,$
as$well$as$in$its$second$and$third$moments,$glossed$as$"The$thing$is$an$'I'"$and$finally$"'I'$
=$'I',"$respectively,$since$it$is$fairly$clear$that$concentrated$in$this$confounding$
$
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proposition$is$more$or$less$the$full$passage$to$selfOconsciousness$the$Phenomenology,as$
a$whole$undertakes$to$chronicle.$Yet$what$is$perhaps$more$difficult$to$see$is$that$the$
conceptual$plenitude,$the$replete$selfOidentity$of$the$concept,$to$which$the$original$form$
of$the$proposition$eventually$gives$way$(in$absolute,knowing)$is$in$fact$formal,$according$
to$the$only$conception$of$form$that$Hegel$can$countenance,$i.e.,$the$Aristotelian$one$of$
actualization.$For$as$remarked$earlier,$Hegel$thinks$the$notion$of$abstract$form$
unintelligible.$He$writes:$"form$is$so$far$from$being$indifferent$with$respect$to$content,$
however,$that,$on$the$contrary,$it$is$the$content$itself”$(Encyclopedia,Logic,$202O3).$
$

One$might,$on$the$other$hand,$think$that$the$three$distinct$propositions$Hegel's$

infinite$judgment$comes$to$express$(as$the$three$critical$moments$of$the$
Phenomenology)$reveal$a$syntactically$formal$character.$Yet$if$it$admits$of$diverse$
interpretations$this$is$as$much$a$function$of$semantic$indeterminacy$as$the$irresistible$
drive$of$rational$determination$of$which$such$indeterminacy$is$the$paradoxical$
consequence.$The$"The$'I'$is$a$thing"$gives$way$to$"The$thing$is$an$'I',"$(PS$§791)$and$
eventually$to$"'I'$=$'I',"$precisely$through$the$"emptying$out"$(Entäußerung),and$
reconstitution$of$the$subject$(both$as$consciousness$and$as$determinable$concept)$in$its$
infinite$predicate,$and$it$is$the$determinative$activity$of$spirit$or$consciousness$that$
performs$these$operations.$
$

The$language$of$emptying$returns$us$to$Hegel's$description$of$the$speculative$

proposition,$and,$by$contrast,$to$Frege's$talk$of$the$saturated$and$unsaturated$elements$
of$the$logical$proposition,$i.e.,$concept$and$object,$nonOpredicatively$conceived.$As$we$
$
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saw$earlier,$what$is$a$structural$gap$in$the$Fregean$concept$is$a$more$thoroughgoing$
feature$of$the$speculative$proposition,$which$is$marked$by$a$corresponding$lacuna$in$the$
subject$position$as$well,$rather$than$a$space$or$occasion$for$potential$supplement:$"Thus$
no$content$occurs$which$functions$as$an$underlying$subject,$nor$receives$its$meaning$as$
a$predicate;$the$predicate$as$it$stands$is$merely$an$empty$form."96$For$Frege,$as$long$as$
the$concept$remains$unsaturated,$it$can$play$no$semantic$role$in$either$a$proposition$or$
a$judgment,$and$so$can$bear$no$determinate$relation$to$truth.$On$the$other$hand,$once$
that$gap$is$appropriately$filled,$a$proposition$materializes,$as$does$progress$towards$
truth.$For$Hegel,$on$the$other$hand,$such$saturation$is$what$brings$about$the$dead$
proposition.$If$there$is$any,unity$to$be$found$in$the$proposition$it$lies$in$the$achievement$
of$selfOconsciousness$and$will$thus$depend$upon$the$overcoming$of$predicative$
structure.$
$

But$Hegel's$proposal$is$not$a$Parmenidean$philosophy$of$silence,$nor$one$of$

monistic$or$monastic$incantation.$The$rich$historicism$of$the$Phenomenology$represents$
as$well$its$profound$commitment$to$expression$in$the$fullest$sense:$$
It$is$thus$that$consciousness,$as$the$middle$term$between$universal$Spirit$and$its$
individuality$or$senseOconsciousness,$has$for$[its?]$middle$term$the$system$of$
structured$shapes$assumed$by$consciousness$as$a$selfOsystematizing$whole$of$the$life$
of$Spirit$O$the$system$that$we$are$considering$here,$and$which$has$its$objective$
existence$as$worldOhistory.97$
$
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The$"shapes"$(Gestaltungen)$alluded$to$here$are$the$institutions$and$regimens$of$
philosophical,$cultural$and$political$life$which$comprise$the$topics$of$each$successive$
section$of$the$Phenomenology.$Where$a$pronouncement,$philosophical,$ethical,$
aesthetic$or$otherwise,$comes$up$for$consideration,$it$is$always$within$the$context$of$
these$broader$environments$that$they$are$analyzed.$As$I$hope$to$have$made$clear,$the$
relevant$unit$of$analysis,$in$other$words,$is$not$ultimately$the$individual$proposition$or$
judgment,$but$the$patterns$and$habits$of$naming$and$judgment,$along$with$the$practices$
such$judgments$entail,$within$those$framing$environments,$which$Hegel$broadly$
identifies$as$syllogistically$deployed.$
$

Yet$if$what$is$expressed,$the$"content",$is$always$beyond$the$specific$judgment,$

the$act$of$assertion,$or$rather$negation,$of$articulation$itself,$is$always$utterly$specific.$
When$Antigone$speaks$and$acts$on$behalf$of$a$divine$law,$of$Gods$"that$are$not$of$
yesterday$or$today,$but$everlasting"$her$utterance,$though$an$expression$of$something$
else,$a$traditional$ethicoOreligious$configuration,$that$speaks$beyond$her,$is$singularly$
hers.$It$is$precisely$Hegel's$point$that$this$"beyond,"$in$its$temporal$and$semantic$
priority,$in$its$vital$historicity,$nonetheless$becomes$a$lifeless$edifice,$and$one$through$
which,$therefore,$anything$determinately$meant$succumbs$to$evanescence,$and$
ultimately$to$petrification.$This$point$is$made$repeatedly$and$perhaps$most$graphically$
in$the$section$on$Revealed,Religion,$where$Hegel$speaks$of$the$historical$depletion$of$
the$religion$of$art:$
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The$statues$are$now$only$stones$from$which$belief$has$gone.$The$tables$of$the$gods$
provide$no$spiritual$food$and$drink,$and$in$his$games$and$festivals$man$no$longer$
recovers$the$joyful$consciousness$of$his$unity$with$the$divine.98$

$$
One$task$of$the$Phenomenology$is$to$recover$for$Spirit$and$consciousness$the$meaning$
and$truth$discarded$in$their$development.$$
$

I$spoke$earlier$of$a$dead$repose$to$mark$a$contrast$with$the$"pure"$repose$of$the$

True,$of$the$"Bacchanalian$revel"$Hegel$identifies$with$Truth$in$the$Preface$to$the$
Phenomenology.$The$former$is$the$stillness$of$finitude$exhausted$by$the$discursive$
infinitude$of$"restless"$consciousness.$The$latter$is$the$immutable$tranquility$of$the$
"genuine"$infinite,$the$repose$of$eternal$Truth,$the$truth$of$the$verbum,mentis,$if$not$the$
verbum,dei,$to$which$consciousness$aspires.$If$Hegel's$infinite$judgment,$and$the$
phenomenological$logic$it$represents,$miscarries$in$its$attempt$to$coordinate$truths$with$
the$True,$it$does$so$by$foregrounding,$by$making$visible$the$incongruous$demands$of$
thought$and$Truth$that$structure$the$proposition,$and$paves$the$way$for$a$substantive$
logic$of$the$concept$without$predicative$remainder,$of$Truth$without$truths,$though$
perhaps$not$without$incongruity.$For$Frege,$whose$semantic$Platonism$is$as$strong$as$
Hegel's,99$but$who$ultimately$resists$giving$up$the$propositional$structures$his$Platonism$
requires$him$to,$logic$remains$an$instrument$of$formal$representation,$whether$what$is$
so$represented$are$the$finite$lines$of$attribution$or$the$finitized$relations$of$inference.$
$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
98

$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§753.$

$

99

$This$point,$of$course,$has$been$the$subject$of$some$debate,$one$I’ll$have$to$join$on$another$occasion.$
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Section(Seven.(Conclusion:(Syllogistic,(Division(and(the(Economy(of(Determination(
For$Hegel,$logic$is$properly$speaking$an$instrument$of$determination,$not$

representation.$It$is$how$things$are$discursively$thought,$not$the$residue$of$what$has$
been$thought,$and$so$cannot$be$captured$in$the$static$formulae$of$a$logical$notation.$
What’s$more$Hegel$is$quite$explicit$about$this,$acknowledging$the$possibility$of$a$purely$
formal$language,$such$as$that$developed$by$Gottfried$Ploucquet,$and$says$of$it$that$“it$
makes$of$the$syllogistic$inference$a$totally$empty$and$tautological$construal$of$
propositions.”100$It$is$also$irreducibly$conceptual,$although$it$is$via$the$inferential$
movement$mapped$by$the$syllogism$that$the$concept$logically$enters$and$exits$the$
discursive$fray,$so$to$speak.$To$this$extent$the$syllogism,$which$Hegel$somewhat$
cryptically$identifies$here$with$"the$reasonable,"$is$the$abstract$form$of$understanding,$
identified$in$the$Phenomenology,with$"reasonableness"$(Preface,§55).$Inasmuch$as$the$
syllogism$is$the$movement$of$the$concept,$or$determination,$it$is$also$properly$speaking$
an$instrument$of$negation,$as$a$brief$examination$of$Hegel’s$discussion$in$the$last$
section$of$his$Logic$makes$clear.$
$

There$is$much$overlap$between$the$two$logics,$but$I$quote$here$from$the$Greater,

Logic,$which$contains$the$more$expansive$discussion.$It$begins,$with$characteristic$
paradox,$as$follows:$
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$In$an$article$that$is$otherwise$full$of$useful$observations,$“The$Role$of$Logic$“commonly$soOcalled”$in$
Hegel’s$Science,of,Logic,”$British,Journal,for,the,History,of,Philosophy$22$(2014):$281O301,$Paul$Redding$
argues$that$despite$the$evident$horror$with$which$Hegel$regards$the$mechanization$of$logic$as$calculus,$it$
is$important$for$Hegel$that$logic$pass$through$such$a$phase,$which$he$compares$to$the$ossification$of$spirit$
expressed$by$our$aphorism$from$Observing,Reason.$
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The$syllogism,is$the$result$of$the$restoration$(Wiederherstellung),of$the$concept,in,
the,judgment,$and$consequently$the$unity$and$the$truth$of$the$two.$The$concept$as$
such$holds$its$moments$sublated$(aufgehoben)$in$this$unity;$in$judgment,$the$unity$is$
an$internal$or,$what$amounts$to$the$same,$an$external$one,$and$although$the$
moments$are$connected,$they$are$posited$as$self9subsisting,extremes.$In$the$
syllogism,$the$determinations$of$the$concept$are$like$the$extremes$of$the$judgment,$
and$at$the$same$time$their$determinate$unity,is$posited.$Thus$the$syllogism$is$the$
completely$posited$concept;$it$is,$therefore,$the$rational.101$

In$identifying$the$syllogism$as$the$rationalization$of$the$concept,$Hegel$identifies$it$as$a$
conceptual$logic$whose$propositional$formulae$represent$the$constituents$of$inference,$
no$longer$as$its$structural$elements$but$as$transitional$moments$in$the$inferential$
differentiation$and$unification$of$the$concept.$The$syllogism$so$formulated$is$the$formal$
discursus$of$the$concept,$its$actualization,$though$not$quite$yet$its$actuality;$judgment$is$
identified$both$with$its$categorical$structure,$and$with$the$rational$mobility$it$affords$the$
concept,$as$a$conduit$between$its$indeterminate$and$determinate$"extremes,"$the$
terminal$poles$of$its$categorical$representation.$The$seemingly$paradoxical$equivalence$
of$its$internal$and$external$unity$in$judgment$expresses$this$double$status$of$the$
judgment$as$the$expressive$instrument$of$both$identity$and$attribution,$of$concentration$
and$diffraction,$and$of$mobility$and$immobility.$It$expresses$as$well$the$dual$character$of$
the$concept$as$exemplar$and$as$the$embodiment,$or$rather$the$actuality,$of$thought.$
The$syllogism$thus$has$the$paradoxical$role$of$expressing$the$movement$of$the$concept$
by$parsing$it$into$the$signal$moments$of$its$logical$(as$distinct$from$its$historical)$
constitution.$
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$

So$understood,$the$syllogistic$represents$at$once$the$exterior$or$explicit,logic$of$

discursive$rationality$and$the$interior$or$implicit$logic$of$the$concept,$though$not$
simultaneously.$For$it$is$only$in$passing$from$the$qualitative,$immediate,syllogism$to$the$
syllogism,of,necessity$that$exterior$and$interior$rationality$converge,$or,$from$the$
perspective$of$absolute,knowing,$it$is$only$in$overcoming$the$contingency$of$attribution$
that$the$concept$eventually$realizes$its$absolute,$universal$(or$infinite)$extension$via$the$
circuit$of$discursive$engagement.$Hegel$summarizes$the$conclusion$of$this$circuit$as$
follows:$
Thus$it$[i.e.,$the$concept]$is$still$the$internality$of$this$its$externality;$and$so$in$the$
course$of$the$syllogism$this$externality$is$equalized$with$the$internal$unity.$The$
various$determinations$return$into$this$unity$through$the$mediation$which,$while$it$
unites$them,$is$still$a$third$term...But$that$determination$of$the$Concept$which$had$
been$considered$as$reality$is,$conversely,$equally$a$positedness.$For$in$this$result$the$
truth$of$the$Concept$has$turned$out$to$be$the$identity$of$its$internality$and$
externality;$and$not$only$this:$already$the$moments$of$the$Concept,$in$the$Judgment,$
remain,$in$their$indifference$to$each$other,$determinations$which$have$their$
significance$only$in$their$relation.$The$Syllogism$is$mediation$O$the$complete$Concept$
in$its$positedness.$Its$movement$is$the$transcendence$of$this$mediation.102$
In$passing$beyond$mere$qualitative$or$categorical$attribution$to$(potentially)$exhaustive$
disjunction,$the$final$form$of$the$syllogism,of,necessity,$the$concept$that$fuels$the$
syllogism$overcomes$mediation$as$such,$along$with$the$breach$between$rational$form$
and$content,$and$achieves$an$(approximate)$totality$of$determinations$proper$to$a$given$
concept.$But$if$mediation$is$overcome,$if$only$approximately,$so$is$the$propositional$
structure$that$permitted$its$expression.$
$
What$does$this$amount$to?$The$mediation$expressed$through$judgment,$and$in$
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the$form$of$a$proposition,$i.e.,$its$presentation$of$a$subject$through$its$predicate,$is$here$
found$to$have$unfolded$through$the$mechanism$of$the$syllogism.$This$happens$through$
the$mediation$of$the$middle$term$that$forges$and$maintains$the$predicative$relation$
between$the$extremes,$i.e.,$the$major$and$minor$terms,$of$the$conclusion.$The$middle$
term,$however,$is$lost,$technically$sublated,$in$that$conclusion,$even$though$it$“as$the$
totality$of$the$concept$itself$contains$the$two$extremes$in$their$complete$
determinateness.”103$It$is$through$the$syllogism$that,$for$example,$the$singularity$of$the$
subject$term$and$the$universality$of$the$predicate$term$are$connected$through$the$
particularity,of$the$middle,term.$Put$more$generally,$since$in$the$dynamics$of$categorical$
identity$each$term$successively$assumes$each$quantity,$the$quantities$of$the$extremes$
are$each$exchanged$and$mediated$through$the$quantity$of$the$middle$term.$The$
syllogism,$to$this$extent,$as$the$very$embodiment$of$rationality,$is$also$thus$the$formal$
expression$of$Aufhebung,(sublation)$itself,$of$the$process$through$which$the$concept$is$
elevated$through$the$negated$middle$term$through$which$each$of$the$subject/predicate$
terms$acquires$its$determination.$Every$judgment,$it$then$turns$out,$is$a$judgment$
insofar$as$it$concludes$a$syllogism,$just$as$every$concept$is$a$concept$just$insofar$as$it$is$
discursively$extrapolated$and$determined$through$the$divided$unity$of$the$proposition.$
$

However,$upon$deriving$the$apodictic,form$of$judgment$in$which$subject$and$

predicate$terms$are$mutually$and$fully$determined,$according$to$the$limits$of$judgment,$
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i.e.,$through$the$“repletion$of$the$copula,”104$judgment$is$made$analytic,$and$therefore$
tautological,$just$as$happens$inferentially$in$the$case$of$the$apodictic,syllogism,$with$the$
“repletion”$of$the$middle$term.$In$both$instances,$the$formal$instruments$of$predicative$
and$inferential$determination,$respectively,$are$dissolved.$In$the$former$case,$this$is$
because$“subject$and$predicate$are$in$themselves$the$same$content.”105$In$the$latter$
case,$it$is$because$“the$syllogism,$which$consisted$in$the$difference$of$the$middle$term$
as$against$its$extremes,$has$thereby$sublated$itself.”106$
$

Once$arrived$at,$judgment$is$immediately$transformed$into$mere$proposition,$

just$as$the$syllogism$itself$succumbs,$at$each$of$its$stages,$to$its$merely$formal$adequacy.$
Similarly,$just$as$judgment,$in$reaching$the$limits$of$expression,$gives$way$to$the$
syllogism,$so$the$propositional$logic$of$the$syllogism,$in$reaching$its$own$limits$of$
determination,$gives$way$to$the$logic$of$division.$However,$it$is$not$merely$that$division$
emerges$out$of$the$exhausted$formalism$of$the$syllogistic,$but$that$the$syllogistic$has$
indeed$repleted$the$terms$relevant$to$division,$i.e.,$the$relevant$genus,$or$universal,$its$
differentiae,$and$the$genera,$species$and$individuals$subordinate$to$and$defined$by$
these.$The$syllogistic,$in$other$words,$is$what$supplies,$through$its$inferential$sorting$of$
contingent$and$essential$or$necessary$determinations,$the$plenitude$and$structure$of$
the$genus$and$its$lineage,$even$if$it$is$then$through$division$that$this$lineage$must$be$
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thought$through.$It$is$thus$that$the$threatening$arbitrariness$of$diairetic$taxonomy,$
whether$we$think$of$this$in$the$limited$terms$of$a$Porphyrian$tree,$or$a$less$hierarchical$
table$of$categories,$or$ultimate$concepts,$achieves$its$rational,$yet$immanent,$
justification$in$the$context$of$a$specific$historical$moment$of$philosophical$or$historical$
discourse.$
$

The$economy$of$determination,$whether$expressed$in$the$interplay$between$

judgment$and$proposition,$between$syllogism$and$judgment,$or$finally$between$the$
concept$and$the$idea,$is$thus$a$movement$from$the$vital,$plastic$operations$of$
determining$to$the$moribund$artifacts$of$the$instruments$of$determination.$Yet$if$one$is$
inclined$to$attribute$the$moments$of$petrification$to$negation,$e.g.,$the$aphorism$from$
the$discussion$of$observing,reason$in$the$Phenomenology,of,Spirit$with$which$we$began,$
or$the$Calvary$of$absolute$knowing$with$which$the$Phenomenology,ends,$etc.,$it$should$
be$clear$by$now$that$it$is$in$the$belated$affirmation$of$the$work$of$negation$that$thought$
is$brought$to$the$standstill$of$its$formal$expression.$It$should$be$noted,$by$way$of$
conclusion,$that$the$immobilization$of$thought$Hegel$documents$throughout$his$work$is$
only$part,$albeit$half,$of$the$picture.$Hegel’s$Logic,$therefore,$demonstrates$not,$as$Paul$
Redding$has$put$it,$that$one$must$pass$through$“the$‘ossification’$of$thought$as$it$
reduces$the$life$of$thought$to$the$operations$of$a$dead$mechanism,”$i.e.,$formal$logic,$in$
order$to$redeem$the$vitality$of$the$concept.107$Rather,$Hegel’s$Logic$is$an$expression$of$
the$inevitable$oscillation,$within$the$logical$apprehension$of$Being$and$beings,$between$
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the$vitality$of$thought$in$its$ceaseless$renunciation,$i.e.,$negation,$of$form$and$the$
instruments$of$expression$summoned$to$exhibit$it.$

$
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CONCLUSION!
NEGATION,!PHILOSOPHY!AND!THE!LIMITS!OF!EXPERIENCE!
Within!the!tradition!I!have!been!trying!to!trace,!unity,"since!there!is!no!such!
thing!without!multiplicity,!is!accomplished!on!the!basis!of!a!succession!of!divisions,!of!
rational!interruptions,!so!to!speak,!for!the!reason!in!question!is!discursive,!its!primary!
mode!that!of!negation.!What!reason!uncovers!for!both!Plato!and!Hegel,!
paradigmatically,!are!the!contiguous!boundaries!that!hierarchically!articulate!and!
separate!the!kinds!of!things!there!are,!and!the!individuals!that!instantiate!those!kinds.!
The!unity!of!a!given!concept!or!corresponding!object!will!derive!from!the!system!of!
concepts!or!universals!under!which!it!is!subsumed,!and!ultimately!from!the!
philosophical!articulation!of!that!system.!
The!rational!character!of!such!concepts!therefore!depends!on!their!being!
thought!through!the!hierarchy!of!divisions!they!derive!from.!For!Hegel,!for!example,!the!
nonTidentity!of!subject!and!predicate!is!primary,!and!not!merely!as!a!first!moment!of!
differentiation!to!be!overwritten!in!the!succeeding!selfTidentity!of!the!Absolute:!nonT
identity!is!the!fundamental!form!of!predication,!thought!and!ontological!specification,!
which!is!why!infinite"judgment!plays!so!crucial!a!role!in!Hegel’s!Phenomenology"and!
Logic.!Negation!governs!not!just!the!drive!of!predication,!but!its!eventual!completion!
through!the!syllogism,!which!returns!a!given!predicative!series!to!its!originating!concept,!
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and!thus,!consecutively,!to!the!logic!of!division!and!finally!to!the!Idea.!In!this!return!
through!syllogistic!inference!to!the!concept!Hegel!also!reveals!the!false!dichotomy!
between!reason!and!understanding,!between!thinking!through!the!implications!and!
obligations!of!a!given!judgment!and!applying!a!concept!to!a!given!object!or!
phenomenon:!“just!as!little!as!the!concept!is!to!be!regarded!merely!as!a!determination!
of!the!understanding,!so,!too,!the!syllogism!is!to!be!regarded!without!further!ado!as!
rational.”1!
The!intrinsic!connection!between!negation!and!conceptual!determination!finds!
expression!in!a!great!variety!of!philosophical!theories!of!meaning,!knowledge,!mind,!
etc.,!that!lie!outside!the!limited!focus!of!genealogy!undertaken!in!this!dissertation.!The!
discourse!of!negation!continues,!for!example,!in!medieval!accounts!of!individuation,!
from!the!more!obvious!cases!that!directly!invoke!negation,!such!as!Henry!of!Ghent’s!use!
of!double"negation!as!a!principle!of!individuation,!to!those!that!explain!individuation!in!
terms!of!matter!(Aquinas!et"al)!or!accidental!properties!(Avicenna!et"al),!in!the!negative!
epistemologies!and!metaphysics!of,!for!example,!Eriugena,!Bonaventura,!Maimonides!
and!Meister!Eckhart,!in!Saussurian!structuralism,!and!in!the!diverse!postTstructuralist!
philosophies!of!Heidegger,!Sartre,!Adorno,!Levinas!and!Derrida.!It!also!lies!at!the!heart!
of!Robert!Brandom’s!new!Hegelian!synthesis!of!Fregean!and!pragmatist!semantics.!
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On!the!other!hand,!Hegel’s!recognition!of!the!discursive!rationality!of!the!

concept!is!most!obviously!anticipated!by!Leibniz.!Two!of!the!general!theses!that!define!
the!discourse!of!negation,!i.e.,!(9)!and!(10)!in!my!Introduction,!are!easily!recognizable!as!
two!of!Leibniz’!fundamental!axioms,!axioms!that,!amongst!other!things,!provide!the!
grounds!for!his!principium"rationis!(the!principle!of!reason,!or!more!familiarly,!the!
principle!of!sufficient!reason),!a!principle!he!states!in!two!forms:!(1)!nihil"est"sine"ratione!
(there!is!nothing!without!reason)!and!(2)!nullum"effectum"est"absque"causa!(there!is!no!
effect!apart!from!a!cause).!The!two!formulations!converge!because,!for!Leibniz,!the!
rational!character!(ratio)!of!a!thing!is!just!its!having!a!reason!for!existing,!which!reason!is!
its!intelligible!cause!(causa).!Things!exist!and!are!rational!to!the!extent!that!they!express!
truth,!and!they!are!capable!of!expressing!truth!only!to!the!extent!that!they!are!logically!
representable!as!identity!statements!(or!propositions).!
Leibniz!is!relevant!here!because!his!axioms!(as!I!have!designated!them)"capture!
the!internal!relation!between!conceptual!and!propositional!expression,!or!between!the!
rationality!of!concepts!and!their!propositional!or!discursive!deployment.!While!this!
conception!of!the!proposition,!as!Leibniz!acknowledges,!is!already!present!in!Aristotle,!it!
is!a!centerpiece!of!Leibnizean!metaphysics!and!is!more!clearly!elaborated!here!than!in!
any!other!previous!or!subsequent!philosophical!system.!According!to!the!first!axiom,!
“the!predicate!or!consequent!is!always!in!the!subject!or!antecedent,!and!the!nature!of!
truth,!or!the!connection!between!the!terms!of!the!statement!(enuntiationis)!consists!in!
this!very!thing,!as!Aristotle!also!observed.”!The!second!axiom!states!that!the!“inclusion!
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of!the!predicate!in!the!subject”!is!true!not!only!for!formal!identity!statements!but!for!
“every!affirmative!truth,!universal!or!particular,!necessary!or!contingent.”!The!third!
axiom,!perhaps!the!best!known!and!most!notorious!of!them,!states!that!“Every!
individual!substance!contains!(involvit)!in!its!complete!notion!(in"perfecte"notione"sua)!
the!entire!universe.”2!
The!picture!of!individual!substances!(monads)!and!their!concepts!these!axioms!
define!is!admittedly!rather!different!from!what!we!find!in!the!tradition!I!have!been!
looking!at.!Yet!Leibniz’s!axioms!make!transparent!the!consequences!of!an!appetitive!
conception!of!propositions,!namely!that!all!true!propositions!are!analytic,!even!those!
involving!contingent!facts/predicates,!and!because!they!point!to!conceptual!analysis!
(analysis"notionum)!as!a!central!focus!of!logic,!a!focus!we!see!both!in!Plato!and!again!in!
Hegel,!though!it!is!implicit!as!well!in!the!attention!scholastic!philosophers!pay!to!the!
method!of!division,!and!particularly!to!its!role!in!generating!definitions!and,!what!
amounts!to!the!same!thing,!in!parsing!the!essential!features!of!the!substances!to!which!
those!definitions!apply.!Still!more!important!for!our!purposes!are!the!points!of!
divergence!with!the!tradition!upon!which!I!have!been!focusing.!In!particular,!Leibniz’s!
axioms!account!for!the!unity!of!the!proposition!on!the!basis!of!the!plenitude!of!the!
concept!and!its!corresponding!substance!(monad),!and!do!so!in!terms!of!identity,!and!
the!intrinsic!cohesion!and!unity!of!the!predicates!of!a!given!individual!substance!or!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!Primae"Veritates,!in!Opuscules"Fragments"Inédits"de"Leibniz,!ed.!Louis!Couturat"(Paris,!1903),!518T19.!My!
translation!is!based!on!that!by!Roger!Ariew!and!Daniel!Garber:!“Primary!Truths”!in!Leibniz’s!Philosophical"
Essays!(Indianapolis,!IN:!Hackett!Publishing,!1989),!30T34.!
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concept,!provided!for!by!divine!reason.!Yet!Leibniz!pays!little!philosophical!attention!to!
negation,!and!this!primarily!because!there!is!no!real!discursivity!in!the!logic!of!a!
monadology,!just!as!there!are!no!real!relations!in!its!metaphysics,!for!all!determinations!
are!already!globally!and!instantaneously!determined!by!God.!The!unfolding!of!monadic!
life!is!thus!the!metaphysical!equivalent!of!the!purely!computational!logic!Leibniz!
envisioned,!i.e.,!one!in!which!inference!plays!no!vital!logical!role.!
While!for!Leibniz!all!this!is!taken!to!imply!what!is!systematically!captured!in!his!
Monadology,!namely,!that!things!(monads)!are!predicatively!predetermined,!for!Plato!
and!Hegel!the!relationship!between!things,!or!beings,!and!the!propositions!that!
represent!them!is!best!put!conversely:!propositions!and!ontological!relations!are!
categorically!predetermined.!This!way!of!putting!things!stands!at!odds!with!Heidegger’s!
claim!that!Leibniz’s!logic!represents!the!culmination!of!a!philosophical!tendency!
initiated!by!Plato.3!Plato,!according!to!Heidegger,!cedes!the!place!of!truth!to!
propositions!and!representation,!and!thus!loses!sight!of!its!original!ontological!ground,!
of!its!original!sense!as!revelation!or!unconcealment.!Though!this!is!hardly!the!place!to!
argue!the!point!at!length,!I!hope!to!have!provided!the!basis!for!arguing!that!both!the!
ontological!and!revelatory!character!of!truth!are!in!fact!preserved!in!the!model!Plato!
bequeaths!to!the!tradition.!That!both!conceptions!are!indeed!necessary!is!part!of!what!
is!expressed!in!Hegel’s!muchTcited!dictum!that!“everything!hangs!on!apprehending!and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

!Martin!Heidegger,!“On!the!Essence!of!the!Ground”!in!Pathmarks,!ed.!and!trans.!William!McNeil!
(Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press,!1998),!97T135.!

!

!

286!

expressing!the!truth!not!merely!as!substance!but!also!equally!as!subject.”!Amongst!
other!things,!we!should!discern!here!an!expression!of!the!fact!that!the!ontological!or!de"
re"truth!of!the!designatum!of!a!given!term!has!to!be!understood!in!terms!of!its!logical!
deployment!within!the!categorical!propositions!that!are!true!of!it,!that!the!ontological!
truth!of!substance!is!only!discoverable!through!the!propositional,!or!de"dicto,!truths!of!
the!subject!that!is!its!ground/essence,!even!if!those!propositions!and!their!logic!are,!in!
the!end,!to!be!suspended.!
However,!even!if!Heidegger!is!wrong!in!this!regard!about!Plato!and!Leibniz,!his!
own!philosophical!predilections!bring!him!remarkably!close!to!what!is!right,!or!at!least!
important!in!them,!in!my!view.!While!discussing!the!defining!relationship!between!
Dasein,!i.e.,!the!kind!of!being!that!is!specific!to!human!beings,!and!negativity"in!Being"
and"Time,!Heidegger!asks:!“Has!anyone!ever!made!a!problem!of!the!ontological!source!
of!notness,!or!prior!to!that,!even!sought!the!mere!conditions!on!the!basis!of!which!the!
problem!of!the!‘not’!and!its!notness!and!the!possibility!of!that!notness!can!be!raised?”4!
Though!Heidegger!does!not!attempt!to!fill!this!philosophical!lacuna!here,!he!does!tell!us!
something!about!how!such!a!project!ought!to!be!conceived,!namely,!that!it!lies!at!the!
heart!of!metaphysics,!or!rather!of!the!phenomenology!of!Dasein!he!thinks!must!replace!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!Being"and"Time:"A"Translation"of"Sein"und"Zeit,!trans.!Joan!Stambaugh!(New!York:!State!University!of!
New!York!Press,!1996),!332.!
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traditional!ontology.!He!suggests,!in!particular,!that!the!analysis!of!notness!is!
inseparable!from!the!thematic!examination!of!“the!meaning!of!Being!in!general.”5!
Heidegger!will!argue!elsewhere6!that!the!experience!and!the!problem!of!
nothingness!are!prior!to!the!“problem!of!the!‘not’,”!the!problem,!that!is,!of!negation.!
This!is,!in!part,!because!his!critique!of!metaphysics,!which!nonetheless!remains!
profoundly!bound!to!the!questions!of!metaphysics,!is!in!the!first!place!concerned!with!
ontological"difference,!i.e.,!the!difference!between!Being!(Sein)!and!beings"(Seiendes).!
This!difference!consists!in!the!fact!that!Being"is!not"a!being,!although!beings!are!beings!
only!insofar!as!they!bear!some!relation!to!Being.!I!have!tried!to!motivate!a!broader!use!
of!the!expression!ontological"difference"to!indicate!the!difference!between!any!more!
general!kind!and!its!more!determinate!forms,!including!the!difference!between!a!genus!
and!its!species.!Briefly,!the!considerations!for!the!broader!use!are!that!the!expression!
would!seem!most!aptly!to!apply!to!any!difference!in!ontological!grade!or!status,!and,!on!
the!other!hand,!that!the!ground!or!Abgrund"of!such!differences!would!be!better!
portrayed!as!Plato!portrays!the!Good,!as!lying!outside!of!or!beyond!ontology,!rather!
than!a!difference!within!it.!Moreover,!even!if!the!gap!between!Being!and!beings!is!
granted!metaphysical!prominence,!and!is!not!simply!a!difference!amongst!other!
equivalent!differences,!one!way!of!explaining!its!prominence!is!to!think!of!it!as!spanning!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

!Being"and"Time,!9.!

!

6

!Heidegger!directly!addresses!the!problem!of!the!“nothing”!in!a!number!of!texts,!but!most!concertedly!in!
Being"and"TIme,!“What!is!Metaphysics”!in!Pathmarks,!82T96,!“On!the!Essence!of!the!Ground”!in!
Pathmarks,!97T135,!and!Introduction"to"Metaphysics,!revised!and!expanded!translation!by!Gregory!Fried!
and!Richard!Polt!(New!Haven:!Yale!University!Press,!2014).!
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the!entire!ontological!spectrum,!where!other!ontological!differences!apply!merely!to!a!
single!segment!of!that!spectrum.!
But!to!return!to!Heidegger,!while!ontological"difference,!in!his!more!narrow!
sense,!is!the!primary!concern!of!metaphysics,!according!to!Heidegger!it!is!one!specific!
kind!of!being!that!is!of!particular!importance:!Dasein.!For!Dasein,!and!Dasein!alone,!its!
own!Being,!and!the!divide!between!that!Being!and!the!beings!over!which!it!exercises!
care!(Sorge),!i.e.,!the!ontological!difference,!are!abiding!and!defining!concerns.!It!is!the!
exclusive!capacity!of!Dasein!to!uncover!the!ontological"difference!as!an!essential!project!
of!its!specific!Being,!which!it!does!in!terms!of!its!own!possibilities!and!(more!
importantly)!temporal!limitation,!i.e.,!its!nothingness,!or!death.!Heidegger!maintains,!
very!roughly,!that!the!specific!meaning!of!our!being!is!indeed!death,!and!that!it!is!this!
that!grounds!the!meaning!of!negation.!As!he!puts!it,!“Dasein!means:!being!held!out!into!
the!nothing,”7!where!“the!nothing!is!the!‘not’!of!beings,!and!is!thus!being,!experienced!
from!the!perspective!of!beings.”8!The!experience!of!nothing!proper!to!Dasein!is!the!
experience!of!its!being!“towards,”!and!so!bounded!by,!death.!Importantly,!for!
Heidegger,!death!properly!speaking!only!occurs!for!Dasein!insofar!as!it!is!capable!of!
conceiving!of!it!as!such!a!limit,!as!its!own!negation.!For!those!incapable!of!conceiving!
their!own!death!as!a!kind!of!limit,!that!is,!as!a!form!of!negation,!death!is!merely!an!
occurrence!(ein"Vorkommnis),!not!a!possible!experience!(Erfahrung).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7

!“What!is!metaphysics?”!in!Pathmarks,!91.!

!

8

!

!“On!the!essence!of!the!ground,”!in!Pathmarks,!97.!

!

289!
In!his!late!essay!“The!Thing,”!Heidegger!approaches!the!matter!according!to!the!

metaphysical!regulations!of!scholastic!taxonomy,!which!designates!mortality!the!final!
(infima)!differentia!of!man.!Though!it!may!strike!us!as!odd!that!mortality!occur!below,!
i.e.,!as!a!differentia!of,!rational!animal,!since!certainly!irrational!animals!are!finite!as!
well,!that!is,!all!are!subject!to!death!and!are!thus!mortal,!this!is!indeed!how!the!standard!
taxonomy!represents!matters.!Heidegger!gives!us!a!way!of!understanding!why.!Though!
he!makes!no!reference!to!its!provenance,!he!clearly!relies!on!the!scholastic!definition!of!
man.!On!his!view,!mortality!is!part!of!this!definition!because!being"mortal!is!
fundamental!and!exclusive!to!the!meaning!of!man’s!being:!“to!die!means:!to!be!capable!
of!death!as!death.!Only!man!dies!(stirbt).!The!animal!perishes!(verendet).!It!has!death!
neither!ahead!of!itself!nor!behind!it.”!(TT,!p.!176)!The!implication!is!that!the!death!of!
human"beings,!as!opposed!to!that!of!animals,!is!indeed!something!they!have!before!
them,!as!the!anticipated!limit!of!their!possibilities.!Again,!though!Heidegger!makes!no!
reference!to!Epicurus,!his!argument!surely!alludes!to!Epicurus’!equally!brief:!“whenever!
we!are!present,!death!is!not!present;!but!whenever!death!is!present!we!are"not!(hēmeis"
ouk"esmen).”9!
However,!though!the!argument!is!similar,!Heidegger’s!claim!appears!to!be!a!
direct!rebuttal!of!the!proposition!Epicurus!argues!for,!namely!the!metaphysicoT
therapeutic!principle!that!death"is"nothing"to"us!(ho"thanatos"ouden"pros"hēmās).!For!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9

!Epicurus,!Epistula"Menoeceum,!125,!in!Epicurus:"The"Extant"Remains,!with!short!critical!apparatus,!
translation!and!notes!by!Cyril!Bailey!(Oxford:!Clarendon!Press,!1926),!85.!
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Heidegger!the!principle!applies!merely!to!irrational"animals,!who!presumably,!and!
unfortunately,!cannot!make!use!of!it.!Yet!there!is!another!way!of!construing!the!
Epicurean!principle!that!aligns!it!directly!with!Heidegger’s!claim.!On!this!construal,!the!
principle!tells!us!not!that!death!isn’t!anything!to!us,!but!rather!that!it!is!precisely,!for"us,!
ouden,!nothing.!!
However,!I!want!to!suggest!an!alternative!argument,!one!stemming!from!the!
character!of!scholastic!taxonomy!itself,!and!one!that!perhaps!helps!make!sense!of!the!
distinction!between!sterben!and!verenden!Heidegger!relies!on.!The!verb!sterben!in!
German!is!cognate!with!to"starve!in!English,!and!thus!suggests!a!conception!of!death!as!
privation.!But!the!privation!of!what?!Animals!too!are!deprived!of!life!in!death,!and!so!if!
death!is!just!the!privation!of!life,!and!mortality!is!just!the!property!of!being!subject!to!
this!privation,!then!it!would!seem!that!the!differentia!ought!to!occur!higher!up!in!the!
genealogical!tree,!dividing!mortal!animals!from!immortal!ones.!But!this!is!not!how!the!
genealogy!goes,!and!this!is!because!the!relevant!contrariety!is!not!between!death!and!
life,!but!between!mortality!and!immortality.!While!mortals,!like!all!other!animals,!lose!
their!lives!in!death,!what!they!are!deprived!of,"as!a!matter!of!their!essential!
determination,!is!immortality,!not!life,!which!though!on!the!face!of!it!a!counterintuitive!
claim,!holds!precisely!according!to!the!logic!of!privation:!privation!(sterēsis),!in!its!strict!
Aristotelian!sense,!is!attributable!to!that!which!“though!it!would!naturally!have!the!
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[negated]!attribute…!has!it!not.”10!Relative!to!that!which!properly!possesses!the!
attribute!of!immortality,!mortality!is!therefore!a!privation,!and!as!such!it!secures!for!
man!his!essential!relation!to!immortality.!Whether!we!see!this!in!theological!terms!as!a!
relation!to!a!lost!paradisiac!past,!in!more!strictly!Christological!terms!as!the!possibility!of!
resurrection,!or!according!to!the!Platonic!doctrine!of!the!soul’s!immortality!as!against!
the!perishability!of!the!body,!mortality!is!thereby!established!both!as!a!fundamental!
constituent!and!of!the!taxonomy!and!definition!of!man!and!of!his!essential!privation.!
One!implication!of!the!present!dissertation!is!that!Heidegger!has!the!grounding!
relation!reversed,!that!the!experience!of!nothingness!has!its!basis!in!the!expression!of!
negation.!To!this!extent,!I!take!my!cue!from!Freud,!who!did!indeed,!before!Heidegger,!
broach!the!question!of!the!origins!of!negation!directly,!albeit!from!the!standpoint!of!
psychoanalysis!or!neurology!rather!than!philosophy.!While!death!and!finitude!might!
well!be!thought!the!limiting!and!defining!conditions!of!life,!and!the!apprehension!of!
these!a!condition!of!consciousness,!and!thus!of!negation!and!symbolic!life!more!
generally,!the!considerations!brought!forth!in!this!dissertation!suggest!the!converse!
proposition,!an!extrapolation!of!the!epigraph!from!Freud!with!which!the!Introduction!
begins,!that!it!is!negation!that!makes!possible!symbolic!life!and!with!this!the!
apprehension!of!death!and!finitude.!According!to!the!tradition!under!examination,!
negation!grounds!the!experience!of!being!human,!in!the!specific!sense!that!it!is!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!Aristotle!Metaphysics"IV,!1022b27T30.!!
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fundamental!to!the!capacity!for!discursive!thought,!which!has!been!accounted!a!
distinctive!feature!of!human!beings!since!Plato!and!Aristotle.!
On!the!other!hand,!Heidegger’s!correlation!of!the!problem!of!the!“not”!with!that!
of!being!is!a!necessary!starting!point!for!the!philosophical!treatment!of!negation,!as!I!
have!tried!to!show,!and!it!is!this!correlation!and!the!threat!it!poses!that!explain!the!
philosophical!neglect!of!negation!Heidegger!points!to.!If!speech,!and!thus!true!speech,!is!
always!bound!to!the!here!and!now,!it!also!succeeds!as!speech!only!to!the!extent!that!it!
preemptively!revokes!or!negates!its!indexical!anchors.!And!this!is!not!merely!a!matter!of!
language:!the!tode"ti,!i.e.,!the!individual!or!primary!substance!(prōtē"ousia)!of!traditional!
Aristotelian!metaphysics,!cannot!be!identified!with!any!or!all!of!its!spatioTtemporal!
instances.!Rather,!it!is!precisely!not!any!of!these,!individually!or!in!their!totality.!So!much!
is!revealed!in!the!Greek!expression!itself,!which,!in!the!concatenation!of!a!
demonstrative!and!an!indefinite!pronoun,!draws!into!a!single!denomination!a!this"and!a!
something,!an!individual!limit,!that!is,!and!a!kind!to!which!that!individual!belongs.!
In!his!discussion!of!this!expression!in!Language"and"Death,!Giorgio!Agamben!
remarks!that!“primary!substance,!inasmuch!as!it!signifies!a!tode"ti!(that!is,!both!the!‘this’!
and!the!‘that’),!is!the!point!of!enactment!for!the!movement!from!indication!to!
signification,!from!showing!to!saying.”!(LD,!p.!17)!But!translating!the!two!elements!as!
“this”!and!“that”!diverts!us!from!the!true!gap!traversed!within!this!formula.!While!the!
indexical!tode!names!the!this"of!an!immediate!instance,!the!indefinite!ti!specifies!the!
universal!kind!that!makes!it!one.!A!tode"ti!is!thus!both!many!and!one!itself,!both!
!
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particular!and!universal,!indeed!it!is,!in!Agamben’s!useful!formulation,!“the!most!
concrete!and!immediate!thing”!and!simultaneously!“the!most!generic!and!universal.”!
However,!it!thereby!charts!the!movement!not!from!“showing!to!saying”!but!from!
naming"to!saying,!or!from!the!rudiments!of!the!name!to!the!divided!identity!of!the!
proposition,!for!it!gives!us!all!we!need!to!proceed!from!the!mere!this!(tode)!to!the!
proposition,!this"is"something!(tode"esti"ti).!What!resides!within!this!ligature,!then,!as!a!
condition!of!its!coherence,!is!the!ontological"difference!that!divides!and!connects!the!
tode!to!its!ti,"and!it!is!negation!that!marks!this!difference,!as!the!most!basic!form!of!
indication,!even!if!it!is!here!expressed!merely!internally!in!the!structure!of!the!ligature.!
Such!internal"negation!is!ultimately!what!we!I!have!tried!to!give!an!account!of.!
To!extrapolate!from!the!formal!structure!of!primary"substance!(prōtē"ousia)!we!
might!say!that!any!substance,!whether!individual!or!generic,!is!limited!by!the!kind!that!
defines!it,!the!kind!with!which!it!is!necessarily!nonTidentical.!If!this!is!ontological!
difference!in!the!primary!sense,!then!there!is!a!secondary!sense!as!well,!and!similarly!a!
second!level!of!negation!to!be!accounted!for!in!the!notion!of!substance.!This!secondary!
sense!consists!in!the!fact!that!substance!is!precisely!the!negation!of!each!of!its!
contingent!appearances,!since!if!it!were!simply!identifiable!with!any!of!its!instances!it!
would!be!nonTidentical!to!every!other!(or!a!different!substance!in!each!of!its!instances),!
and!so!nonTidentical!to!itself,!whereas!if!it!were!identifiable!with!the!totality!of!its!
contingent!appearances!it!would!be!constituted!according!to!accident!rather!than!
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essence.11!Yet!the!uniqueness!of!every!substance!is!also!given!by!the!series!of!its!
instances,!which!can!only!belong!to!it!–!nothing!else!could!be!nonTidentical!to!these!
instances!in!this!precise!respect.!However,!if!substance!is!defined!by!the!exclusion!or!
negation!of!its!immediate!time!and!place,!it!is!thereby!defined!by!what!is!not,!and,!as!
Plato!regularly!observed,!what!both!is!and!is!not!is!not!being!(to"on)!but!becoming!
(genesis),!the!proper!object!of!opinion!(doxa)!rather!than!scientia!(epistemē).!In!other!
words,!if!negation!and!substance!are!so!bound!to!one!another,!then!there!would!appear!
to!be!no!possibility!of!metaphysics,!that!is,!of!a!science!of!being!qua!being.!
It!is!hardly!surprising!then!that!it!is!with!the!paradox!of!the!indexical!that!Hegel!
begins!the!Phenomenology"of"Spirit,!for!it!is!here!that!the!interrelatedness!of!substance!
and!negation!is!most!immediately!encountered.!What!he!demonstrates!in!the!
Phenomenology"of"Spirit,"an!essential!contiguity!between!ostension!and!negation,!will!
be!presented!in!the!Logics,"to!begin!with,!as!an!identity!between!being"and!nonSbeing.!!
What!emerges!here!is!the!grounding!of!logic!and!metaphysics!in!the!divided!unity!of!
conceptual!form,!a!joining!of!contraries!T!assertion!and!negation,!being!and!nothingness,!
the!former!signaled!by!the!this!of!an!ontology!of!unmediated!particulars,!the!latter!by!
the!not!of!an!elusive!transcendence!(or!transcendent!ontology)!of!universals.!This!is!
also,!I!believe,!what!Hegel!is!getting!at!in!telling!us!that!“If!we!take!the!‘this’!in!the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

!Admittedly!such!a!position!regarding!substance!has!been!defended!in!Buddhism,!for!example,!but!what!
the!doctrine!of!instantaneous!existence!(kshanika"bhava)!defends!is!not!an!account!of!substance!at!all.!
The!doctrine!is!instead!a!denial!that!there!is!anything!like!substance!to!serve!as!the!basis!of!any!positive!
metaphysics!or!epistemology.!!
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doubled!shape!(der"gedoppelten"Gestalt)!of!its!being,!as!‘now’!and!as!‘here,’!the!
dialectic!will!receive!a!form!as!intelligible!as!the!“This”!itself!is.”!This!dialectic,!in!turn,!
shows!us!that!this!‘“this”!is!a!nonTentity…!neither!this!nor!that,!a!notSthis,”"that!is,!a!
“universal!(Allgemeines).”12!The!generality!or!abstractness!of!language,!without!which!it!
makes!little!sense!to!speak!of!language!at!all,!bears!witness!to!the!originating!interplay!
of!negation!and!affirmation,!of!nonTbeing!and!being.!
It!is!this!interplay!that!Freud!will!return!to!precisely!in!relation!to!the!
development!of!the!capacity!for!judgment,!specifically!in!relation!to!biological!drives!
that!establish!the!possibility!of!psychological!life!while!standing!against!the!specific!
demands!of!thought.!Thought!is!possible!only!to!the!extent!that!the!barrage!of!sensory!
and!affective!input!is!moderated!and!thus!only!under!the!condition!of!exclusion.!Yet!
what!is!excluded!is,!for!all!that,!registered!as!an!exclusion,!which!is!precisely!how!to!
understand!the!logic!of!repression!and!its!instrument!or!field!of!expression,!the!
unconscious.!To!Freud’s!riveting!claim!that!the!unconscious!knows!no!negation!one!has!
to!add!the!observation!that!the!unconscious!itself!is!the!domain!of!the!negated!that!
makes!possible!the!logically!richer!language!of!consciousness.!We!might!further!point!
out!that!consciousness!bears!the!fundamental!structural!relationship!of!negation!to!the!
unconscious.!To!this!extent,!the!unconscious!is!the!infinite!apprehension!with!which!
consciousness!is!both!identical!and!nonTidentical.!When!Freud!assures!us!of!the!
analysand’s!confession,!“You!can!be!certain!it!is!not!my!mother,”!that!the!dream!figure!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!Phenomenology"of"Spirit,!§95.!
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in!question!is!indeed!his!mother,!it!is!important!to!understand!both!the!contradiction!
involved!and!its!resolution.!I!want!to!suggest!that!if!we!read!this!not!in!terms!of!
pathogenic!organization!but!in!terms!of!the!structure!of!symbolic!assent/engagement!
what!we!have!here!is!a!local!picture!of!Hegelian!dialectic.!
If!Freud!offers!us!a!more!precise!elaboration!of,!and!a!contrast!with,!the!
Hegelian!picture!of!the!essential!negativity!of!consciousness,!it!is!Frege!who!brings!into!
similarly!precise!focus!the!irreducibly!inferential!setting!of!the!concept,!which!Hegel!so!
richly,!if!diffusely,!explores.!Although!in!some!sense!Hegel’s!Logic"is!a!more!
thoroughgoing!Begriffschrift"than!Frege’s,!he!shares!with!Frege!the!philosophical!
ambition!of!overcoming!the!illusion!of!the!autonomy!of!names,!predicates!and!the!
objects!and!properties!they!designate.!On!the!other!hand,!Hegel’s!is!more!a!logic!of!
Gedanke!than!Schrift,!and!so!aspires!to!a!formalism!of!rational!constitution!rather!than!
orthographic"clarity.13!Paradoxically,!Hegel’s!concept"logic!is!also!ultimately!more!
attuned!to!the!propositional!framework!of!thinking!and!saying!than!Frege’s!logic,!which!
in!the!end!returns!logic!to!its!archaic!ground,!i.e.,!to!the!Adamic!ground!of!naming,!
despite!Frege’s!valiant!effort!to!confer!upon!assertion!the!status!of!logical!form.!This!is!
so!because!sentences,!on!Frege’s!account,!turn!out!to!be!complex!names,!though!what!
they!name,!i.e.,!truth!values,!remains!a!little!obscure.!What!seems!quite!clear!is!that!in!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

!I!contrast!Frege’s!and!Hegel’s!conceptions!of!formalism!in!Chapter!3.!On!Frege’s!interest!in!the!
orthography!of!propositional!and!inferential!structure!see!Cora!Diamond’s!“What!does!a!ConceptTScript!
do?”!and!Daniele!Macbeth’s!Frege’s"Logic.!!

!

!

297!

this!aspect!of!his!semantics!Frege!is!as!much!a!Platonist!as!I!believe!I!have!shown!Hegel!
to!be.!
That!Platonism!and!one!or!another!form!of!nominalism!can!develop!side!by!side!
is!already!shown!by!Plato!himself,!but!it!is!perhaps!Boethius!who!provides!the!most!vivid!
example!of!their!compatibility,!precisely!insofar!as!he!looks!back!to!the!high!
metaphysics!of!Platonism!and!forward!to!the!high!logicism!of!late!medieval!philosophy.!
Logicism!in!this!context!is!to!be!understood!not!as!the!technical!program!of!reducing!
mathematics!to!logic,!but!as!the!programmatic!attempt!to!assimilate!metaphysics!to!
logic.!It!nonetheless!shares!with!Fregean!and!postTFregean!logicism!the!view!that!the!
formal!language!of!logic!grants!us!a!more!unobstructed!view!of!the!shape!and!function!
of!concepts!and!inference,!and!so!also!tells!us!something!about!the!character!of!objects!
over!which!such!concepts!can!range.!
The!possibility!of!logic!telling!us!something!about!particular!individuals!or!
instances!of!a!given!concept,!or!least!telling!us!something!of!philosophical!interest,!is!
hardly!obvious!and!takes!us!to!the!heart!of!the!matter!concerning!negation.!If!logic!tells!
us!nothing!about!the!character!of!particulars,!that!is,!if!it!is!indifferent!to!the!instances!
over!which!concepts!range,!and!thus!truths!about!those!instances,!then!it!is!pretty!
clearly!irrelevant!to!the!assessment!of!ordinary!speech!about!particulars!and!their!
eventualities.!This!raises!far!more!serious!questions!for!nominalists!than!for!realists,!but!
for!both!it!divides!philosophical!from!quotidian!discourse!in!principle.!Yet!it!raises!more!
serious!questions!about!how!we!determine!what!level!of!generality!or!universality!is!
!
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relevant,!as!a!matter!of!principle,!to!philosophical!discourse.!If!individual!men!are!of!no!
philosophical!consequence,!what!is!it!that!makes!the!species!man!of!interest,!given!the!
greater!generality!of!animal,!or!substance?!
If!it!is!claimed!that!only!what!can!be!defined!is!of!relevance!to!philosophy,!and!
only!what!is!essential!sub"species"aeternitatis!can!be!defined,!we!have!to!insist!that!
individuals!don’t!have!the!relevant!sorts!of!essences,!which!seems!to!beg!the!question,!
since!the!relevant!sort!of!essence!is!simply!one!that!is!possessed!universally!by!things!of!
a!given!kind.!Ultimately,!the!implication!is!that!we!cannot!know!anything!of!individuals!
because!nothing!said!of!them!qua!individuals!follows!from!their!identity!as!individuals,!
because!nothing!can!be!read!off!the!expression!designating!that!individual.!Otherwise!
put,!there!are!no!concepts!of!individuals.!But!why!not?!Leibniz!certainly!thought!there!
were,!and!if!concepts!are!the!determinate!results!of!deductions!that!proceed!through!
the!descending!exclusion,!i.e.,!the!determinate!negation,!of!features!of!higher!concepts,!
why!not!consider!the!ideas!of!individuals!derivable!through!an!extension!of!this!same!
procedure!(of!division)!concepts!as!well?!
In!a!much!remarked!upon!footnote!from!the!Philosophy"of"Nature,"Hegel!reports!
having!been!challenged!by!Herr!Krug!to!deduce!his!(Herr!Krug’s)!pen.!His!response!is!not!
that!the!challenge!is!itself!absurd,!but!that!there!are!likely!more!significant!matters!one!
might!attend!to!first.!In!a!wonderful!work!on!metaphysics,!Jose!Benardete!offers!the!
deduction!Hegel!had!deemed!too!inconsequential.!It!runs!roughly!as!follows:!For!all!x,!x!
is!identical!to!x,!therefore!Herr!Krug’s!pen!is!identical!to!Herr!Krug’s!pen!(by!universal!
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instantiation);!therefore,!there!is!something!with!which!Herr!Krug’s!pen!is!identical!(by!
existential!generalization).!The!sleight!of!hand!detectable!here,!a!hallmark!of!the!fallacy!
of!petitio"principii,!derives!from!drawing!out!the!existence!presupposition!of!the!identity!
statement,!but!it!is!for!this!reason!instructive.!!
At!the!level!of!identity!at!which!what!Hegel!calls!“general!diversity”!may!be!
asserted,!there!is!indeed!no!difference!between!identity!and!existence:!“A!is!A”!is!simply!
a!discursive!expansion!of!the!empty!enumerability!of!a!thing,!its!indeterminate!diversity!
that!is!the!correlate!of!its!indeterminate!identity.!So!what!Herr!Benardete!deduces!is!the!
mere!existence!of!Herr!Krug’s!pen,!which,!despite!its!descriptor,!remains,!perhaps,!a!
bare!particular.!What!is!required,!at!the!very!least,!is!the!deduction!of!the!actuality,!and!
beyond!that!the!individuality!of!Herr!Krug’s!pen,!and!that!would!require!the!complete!
resources!of!the!Logic.!Of!course!we!have!in!Hegel’s!Phenomenology"of"Spirit,!a!ready!
example!of!what!such!a!deduction!would!look!like,!in!this!case!the!deduction!of!Spirit!or!
consciousness,!and!with!this!the!constituent!deductions!of!the!individual!contingencies!
of!Greek!Tragedy,!Stoicism,!etc.!If,!in!short,!Herr!Krug’s!pen!is!to!be!properly!deduced,!it!
would!require,!at!the!very!least,!something!like!or!something!that!includes!a!
phenomenology!of!the!technology!of!writing!(Derrida?),!a!genealogy!of!Herr!Krug’s!
profession,!of!his!social!and!familial!circumstances,!etc.;!hence!Hegel’s!reticence.!All!this!
suggests!that!diverse!contingencies!and!individuals!are!indeed!deducible,!and!so!
conceptualizable,!even!if!they!are!also!necessarily!inexhaustible!in!number,!and!it!is!
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through!negation!that!the!otherwise!indeterminate!terrain!of!contingencies!is!
navigated.!
It!comes!as!no!surprise,!then,!that!in!the!recent!resumption!of!interest!in!Hegel,!
Robert!Brandom,!for!example,!explores!a!variety!of!Fregean!inferentialism!that!leads!
him!to!defend!a!version!of!determinate!negation!he!calls!“material!incompatibility,”14!
that!Jacques!Derrida’s!program!of!conceptual!deconstruction!depends!upon!recovering!
a!notion!of!difference,!what!he!calls!différance,!that!is!wedded!to!negation,!
determinatively!understood,!and!that!Deleuze’s!attempt!to!establish!an!alternative!
model!of!difference!freed!from!the!constraints!of!combination!and!any!symbolic!or!
representational!system!devotes!so!much!space!to!a!critique!of!this!same!conception!of!
negation.!Frege’s!context!principle!might!be!thought!a!counterexample!to!the!
connection!between!division!and!determinate!negation,!but!it!should!be!recalled!that!
the!context!of!Frege’s!context"principle!is!not!the!distribution!of!other!concepts!but!the!
propositional!setting!in!which!a!concept!is!deployed.!
Deleuze!in!his!magisterial!Difference"and"Repetition!challenges!the!determinative!
use!of!negation!precisely!on!the!grounds!that,!like!hypothetical!propositions,!it!has!no!
independent!expressive!power.!The!proper!rejoinder!to!this,!the!ultimate!message!of!
this!dissertation,!is!that!while!this!is!superficially!true!because!negation!itself!has!no!
autonomous,!nonTcontextual!content,!it!is!more!profoundly!true!because!negation!is!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14

!Robert!Brandom,!Tales"of"the"Mighty"Dead:"Historical"Essays"in"the"Metaphysics"of"Intentionality!
(Cambridge:!Harvard!University!Press,!2002),!181.!
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party!to!the!determination!of!all"content,!inasmuch!as!it!is!the!very!instrument!of!the!
discursive!extrapolation!involved!in!demarcating!our!concepts.!In!this!sense,!negation!is!
semantically!inexpressible!in!much!the!way!that!Derrida’s!différance!is!phonetically!so,!
or!in!the!way!that!the!unconscious!is!cognitively!so.!In!other!words,!it!is!lexically!
inexpressible!because!its!proper!role!is!expressed!in!everything!that!is!expressible.!
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